








The Social and Theoretical Dimensions of Sainthood  
in Early Islam: Al-Tirmidhī’s Gnoseology and 






A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Near Eastern Studies) 









Professor Alexander Knysh, Chair 
Professor Sara Ahbel-Rappe 
Associate Professor Kathryn Babayan 
Associate Professor Yaron Z. Eliav 
Professor Sherman A. Jackson, University of Southern California 









“Whoever God has beautified with good character God loves and 
whoever God loves he casts love of that person into the hearts of 
his servants. God said to Moses upon whom be peace, “I have cast 
upon you a tender love from me.” So no one would see him 
(Moses) except that they loved him, even the Pharaoh…” 

























© Aiyub Palmer 































In the name of Allāh most Merciful and Compassionate 
Praise be to God and may the blessings and peace of God be upon Muḥammad 
and his family and companions 
 
For my parents ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Palmer and Amīna Palmer 













My deepest gratitude goes to my advisor Professor Alexander Knysh who provided 
invaluable support at all points in the process of my research and writing of the dissertation and 
who welcomed me as a graduate student after my original advisor Professor Sherman Jackson took 
a position at the University of Southern California. I must also thank the various members of my 
committee who were all extremely helpful in guiding this project. Professor Sherman Jackson 
provided much needed guidance at the beginning of my research and directed me toward the study 
of early Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theology, which proved to be pivotal in my work. Professor Erik 
Ohlander provided important direction and feedback at crucial points in the research, which helped 
me to focus the dissertation and give it form. Professor Kathryn Babayan encouraged me to look 
at the broader social and political climate in which al-Tirmidhī was active and this was important 
in giving much needed context to the work. Professor Yaron Eliav encouraged me to understand 
the roots of the wisdom tradition in Rabbinic and Hellenistic thought to better situate al-Tirmidhī’s 
discussion of wisdom. I want to thank Professor Sara Ahbel-Rappe for her willingness to join the 
committee late in the process as a cognate reader. Also, Evyn Kropf from the University of 
Michigan Library was extremely helpful in narrowing the date and origin of Kitāb al-Ḥikma. I 
must also thank the Rackham Graduate School and the Department of Near Eastern Studies for 
their generous support throughout my years as a graduate student. 
I want to thank my parents Dr. Kent and Mrs. Robyn Palmer for their tireless work in 
editing the dissertation as well as always being there to talk about various challenges that inevitably 
surfaced along the way. A special thanks goes to my sister-in-law Neveen Mubarak for her 
extensive efforts to edit and identify difficult phrases in the transcription of Kitāb al-Ḥikma as well 
as my brother Muhammad Palmer for helping me keep on track with his constant love and concern. 
Dr. Yassin Khattab was also very helpful in the transcription process and I am indebted to his 
efforts. I also want to thank my in-laws Dr. and Mrs. Badrudduja for providing me an office in 
which I spent most of my time writing. I want to thank my dearest wife Sulma who has been a 
foundation of support for me through these many years and without whom I am sure I would not 
have had the strength to push through. Her editing skills and help with the transcription of Kitāb 
al-Ḥikma were also extremely helpful in bringing the draft to a final version. Finally, to my two 
daughters Rabia and Noor who are the light of my life and who have brought immense happiness 














List of Appendices vii 
List of Abbreviations viii 





 The Study of Islamic Sainthood 1 
 Sainthood in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth Literature 5 
 The Cult of Saints 9 
 Sainthood and Authority in the Age of Sanctification 12 
 Methodology 15 
 Sources 20 
 Sainthood 24 
 Disciplining the Lower Self 25 
 Esoteric Vocabulary 25 
 Esoteric Interpretation 26 
 Polemical Works 27 
 Knowledge and Men of Learning 27 
 Moral and Ethical Teachings 28 
 Correspondence 28 
 Autobiography 29 
 Secondary Sources 29 
 




 Al-Tirmidhī’s Context 34 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s Clash with the Local ʿUlamāʾ 40 
 The Scholarly Class or the ʿUlamāʾ 42 
 The Shīʿīs and the Ṣūfī Alternative 45 
 Al-Tirmidhī and the Shīʿī Challenge 50 
 Clientage (walāʾ) as a Social Basis for Understanding Sunnī Authority 53 




Chapter 2: Wisdom Meditates the Terrestrial and Celestial: Pythagorean Wisdom and 
the Non-duality of Sainthood 
 
68 
 The Importance of Ḥikma 68 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in the Near East 71 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in Jewish and Christian Thought (7th–10th centuries 
C.E.) 
71 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. Khurāsān and 
Transoxania 
78 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm among the Ṣūfīs 81 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm among the Early Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs 87 
 Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in the Theosophy of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 90 
 Conclusion 100 
 




 Al-Tirmidhī’s Scholarly Background 102 
 Major Texts of the Ḥanafī Theological Tradition 105 
 The Development of Ḥanafī Theology 108 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī Credentials 111 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī Theology 115 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and Ḥanafī Theology in the 3rd/9th-Century 120 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Relationship to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī 128 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and the Later Ḥanafī Tradition 135 
 Mysticism in the Ḥanafī Tradition 136 
 The Effect of Ḥanafism on al-Tirmidhī’s Doctrine of Walāya 138 
 Conclusion 140 
 





 Was al-Tirmidhī a “Ṣūfī”? 144 
 Sufism and Hellenism 147 
 Early Sufism 153 
 Al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī Build upon the Work of al-Muḥāsibī 155 
 Nīshāpūr and the Development of Sufism as a Meta-Identity 160 
 Al-Sarrāj and al-Kalābādhī 165 
 Al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī 169 
 Conclusion 179 
 




 Sainthood in the Homilies of Isaac of Nineveh 182 
 Sainthood in the 9th-Century C.E. 183 
 The Light Basis of al-Tirmidhī’s Doctrine of Walāya 189 
 Restricting Sainthood 191 
vi 
 
 The Optimism of al-Tirmidhī’s Doctrine of Walāya 194 
 The Seal of Saints 197 
 Sainthood Creates a Third Space 209 
 Conclusion 212 
 
Chapter 6: Sainthood and Wisdom in the Later Islamic Mystical Tradition: Ibn 




 Sainthood in Ibn ʿArabī 216 
 Ibn ʿArabī’s Doctrine of Sainthood 228 
 A Continuation of al-Tirmidhī’s Non-Dual Metaphysics 231 
 Ḥikma and Walāya according to the early Shādhiliyya 238 













             Primary Sources 347 
  












List of Appendicies 
 
Appendix A: Correlation in Points of Doctrine between al-Kalābādhī and al-Ḥakīm 
al-Samarqandī in Arabic 
 
257 















List of Abbreviations 
 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī: Sīrat al-Awliyāʾ (1992) 
 
SA 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī: Kitāb al-Ḥikma (ms.) 
 
KH 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī: Nawādir al-Uṣūl (2010) 
 
NU 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī:ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ (1983) 
 
IA 






Bernd Radtke: The Concept of Sainthood in 
Early Islamic Mysticism (1996) 
 
CS 















System of Transliteration for Arabic Letters 
 
ʾ ء z ز q ق 
b ب s س k ك 
t ت sh ش l ل 
th ث ṣ ص m م 
j ج ḍ ض n ن 
ḥ ح ṭ ط h ه 
kh خ ẓ ظ w و 
d د ʿ ع y ي 
dh ذ gh غ in construct 
state: t   ةـ 
r ر f ف   
The article: al- and l- (even in front of sun letters) 
Short vowels Long vowels Dipthongs 
u  ُ- ū و aw ـَوـ  
a  ُ- ā ا ay ـَيـ  
i  ُ- ī ي iyy  ّيـــــــــ 
Nunation   uww ـُ ّوـ  
an ُ -     
in  ُ-     















This study explores al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and gnoseology. This is 
accomplished through a reading al-Tirmidhī’s works in addition to an analysis of his ideas using 
Foucault’s episteme and discourse methodology. This dissertation offers new perspectives on al-
Tirmidhī’s contribution to the Ṣūfī doctrine of sainthood and to the development of early Islamic 
mysticism. Included in this study and for the first time in print is al-Tirmidhī’s unstudied work, 
Kitāb al-Ḥikma. The first chapter introduces al-Tirmidhī’s social and political context and how 
this context played an important factor in shaping al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood. Al-Tirmidhī 
is situated in relation to various claims to authority in Islamicate societies at the end of the 9th-
century C.E. Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood casts the Sunnī ʿulamāʾ as the true 
representatives of Islamic religious authority, as embodied in the saints who are counted as coming 
from their ranks. Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood also incorporates aspects of various 
discourse streams within his learned context. The discourse streams addressed in this study are: 
Hellenism, early Ḥanafī/Murjiʾī theology and Islamic mysticism. Within Hellenism we find that 
al-Tirmidhī focuses on Pythagorean wisdom as one aspect of his gnoseology which serves to frame 
the non-dual quality of saintly knowledge. Al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī theological background leads him 
to expand sainthood to all Muslims while restricting it in practice to the scholarly class of 
theʿulamāʾ. Islamic mysticism is a discourse stream that also informs al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology 
and doctrine of sainthood through al-Muḥāsibī’s “asceticism of the soul”, an approach adopted by 
al-Tirmidhī and applied to his process of mystical development. Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood played a pivotal role in providing a Khurāsānian structure to Islamic mysticism in the 
later form that Sufism would take. The seal of sainthood and the idea that there will always be a 
constant presence of saints in the world are aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood that 
provide an optimistic alternative to the world outlook of Traditionalists. This outlook appears in 
later Sufism with the adoption of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood. Ibn ʿArabī further refines 
and develops al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood in his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, which is structured by al-
Tirmidhī’s ring analogy. Other mystics such as the eponyms of the Shādhilī Ṭarīqa developed al-
Tirmidhī’s concept of wisdom as a practical tool for the education of aspirants upon the Ṣūfī path. 
This dissertation presents al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood in light of new methodological 
approaches and textual research that has important implications for how we understand early 









The Study of Islamic Sainthood 
 In the study of Islamic sainthood (walāya)1 there are multiple possible trajectories to 
embark upon. Much of the current discussion in the field has focused on anthropological, 
sociological or phenomenological approaches to Islamic sainthood.2 These studies look at 
sainthood in its socio-cultural and/or religious context. While these are important contributions 
to the study of sainthood in Islam, they are clearly influenced by the study of saints and 
sainthood in Christianity by authors such as Donald Weinstein and Rudolph M. Bell, Pierre 
Delooz and Stephen Wilson. This is a trend that I am trying to counterbalance by approaching 
Islamic sainthood from a more theoretical and theological perspective. The study of Islamic 
sainthood prior to Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. ʿArabī al-Ḥātimī al-Ṭāʾī 
(d. 638/1240), also known as Ibn ʿArabī, is underdeveloped as a field,3 yet this time period sets 
the stage for later social and political movements within Islam whose effects have been long 
lasting. 
                                                          
1 Hereafter, I will use the term walāya interchangeably with ‘sainthood.’ 
2 See Gellner (1984) Doctor and Saint, Ewing (1997) Arguing Sainthood, Cornell (1998) Realm of the Saint, Singh 
(2003) Sainthood and Revelatory Discourse. For a discussion on the interconnectedness of Sufism, sainthood and 
power in the Deccan and the close relationship between literary production and sainthood see Nile Green (2006) 
Indian Sufism since the 17th Century: Saints, Books and Empire in the Muslim Deccan. Also, Scott Kugle (2006) 
looks at the motif of the juridical saint in the life and works of Aḥmad Zarrūq (d. 898/1493). 
3 Professor Vincent Cornell encouraged me to focus on sainthood in the East during the early period since this was a 
crucial point in the development of Islamic sainthood and remains underdeveloped as a topic of study. 
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 Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (b. circa 205–215/820–830, d. 
circa 295–300/907–912)4 is often credited as the first Muslim to provide a detailed exposition on 
the topic of walāya in Islam.5 Walāya is the Arabic term al-Tirmidhī uses to communicate the 
idea of a special relationship between God and certain of his elect. Both Gerald Elmore (1999) 
and Vincent Cornell (1998) agree that the distribution of meanings around the Arabic word 
walāya has few parallels to the term sainthood in English. Despite the seeming incongruity 
between the two terms most scholars (Michel Chodkiewicz, Carl Ernst, Vincent Cornell, Gerald 
Elmore, Alexander Knysh, Scott Kugle et al.) consider the use of the terms saint (walī)6 and 
walāya to be acceptable and necessary if we are going to talk about a phenomenon that has both 
universal and particular characteristics across a wide swathe of cultures and traditions.7 For the 
purposes of this study, sainthood and walāya, as well as saint and walī, will be used 
interchangeably with the caveat that Islamic sainthood differs qualitatively from other types of 
sainthood such as Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Buddhist and Confucian sainthood. Elmore, 
Cornell and Kugle have considerably advanced the field of Islamic sainthood by contextualizing 
the term walāya through its various meanings within the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth as well as through 
the use of later dictionaries of Ṣūfī terminology. However al-Tirmidhī’s own use of the term 
walāya, even based on a cursory reading of his corpus, shows that a new significance was 
attached to this term by the middle to late 3rd/9th-century. Walāya came to accrue a new universe 
                                                          
4 Hereafter, we will use the shortened versions of his name interchangeably, either al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, or al-
Tirmidhī. 
5 Michel Chodkiewicz. Seal of the saints, prophethood and sainthood in the doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī. Translated by 
Liadain Sherrard. The Islamic Texts Society. Cambridge 1993, p. 27. Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz in his Kitāb al-Ṣidq and 
Sahl al-Tustarī in his Tafsir both discuss the topic of sainthood but do not provide a unified theory of sainthood. 
That is not to say that al-Tirmidhī does provide what we would call a unified theory but that his works provide the 
fullest treatment of the topic in early Islamic mysticism. 
6 Hereinafter I will use the term walī for saint. 
7 Scott Kugle. Rebel between spirit and law: Aḥmad Zarrūq, sainthood and authority in Islam. Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington 2006, pp. 30–32.  
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of meanings within the linguistic, socio-cultural and religious climate of eastern Khurāsān and 
Transoxania8. This is not to mention the new meanings and significance that al-Tirmidhī also 
brought to this term as he sought to reclaim walāya from those whom he saw as having 
appropriated it for their own ends.  
 The terminology we use to discuss and understand sainthood in Islam is still evolving. 
Vincent Cornell (1998), in his valuable work on Moroccan sainthood, has sought to break with 
the Neo-Weberian approach to Muslim sainthood that equates baraka with charisma and 
substitutes marabout for prophet. According to Cornell, Max Weber’s paradigm of charismatic 
sainthood and its institutionalization through the “routinization of charisma,” does not accord 
with Michael Gilsenan’s (1982) anthropological study of Moroccan maraboutism. Cornell claims 
that his study seeks to understand the underlying epistemological foundations of the Moroccan 
holy man’s charisma. While Cornell does not go so far as Bryan Turner (1998) to say that we 
cannot use or apply the term “sainthood” to the study of Muslim saints, he does call for a 
terminological and methodological approach that is wedded more closely to the Islamic literary 
corpus and self-definition.9 In this respect he employs the dual terms wilāya/walāya, through 
which he seeks to separate two important meanings embedded in the Islamic concept of 
sainthood, that of power, authority and protection on the one hand, and closeness, intimacy and 
friendship on the other. Cornell’s justification for using the wilāya/walāya double-term in place 
of sainthood is that this double meaning has been highlighted by Muslim grammarians and Ṣūfīs 
over the ages. Cornell explains the ambiguity of the two terms in Arabic and the differences of 
                                                          
8 In Arabic this geographic area is referred to as mā warāʾ al-nahr (what is beyond the river). This refers to the Amū 
Darya River, which was a common landmark that separated Iran from Central Asia. I will sometimes refer to 
Khurāsān and Transoxania together as “Greater Khurāsān” since these two regions often came under the rule of the 
same governor/sulṭān. These regions also share a great deal of cultural and linguistic elements. 
9 Bryan S. Turner. Weber and Islam. London: Routledge. 1998, p. 61. 
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opinion regarding the actual morphological forms that each word represents. Cornell does not 
claim, however, a historical basis for this approach through an analysis of the way these terms 
are used in the early sources, or even during the particular period of his study in Moroccan 
Sufism. Cornell’s discussion of the Qurʾānic use of the constellation of related forms to the root 
w-l-y is sparse and he does not address the use of these terms in the Ḥadīth literature or other 
early genres of Arabic prose and poetry. What seems clear is that Cornell is not so much 
interested in tracing the historical meanings of these terms as he is in attempting to develop a 
new methodological approach that stands outside of history. His choice is not arbitrary, but it is 
also not exactly historical even if it does attempt to more thoroughly understand Muslim 
sainthood on its own terms. While this approach has benefits, it also serves to unduly narrow our 
understanding of sainthood to these two facets. For Cornell, the walī Allāh is both an 
intermediary and a patron for his clients. Maria Dakake discusses the use of walāya in the 
context of Shīʿism and argues that walāya is more appropriately “charisma” than “sanctity” 
when communicating Shīʿī notions of authority and identity. This is because, for Shīʿīs, only the 
Imams have true walāya and this authority was removed from temporal existence with the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imam in the 9th-century C.E. Hence, walāya, in the Shīʿī context, is 
reflected in the representation of the spiritual authority of the Imams through Shīʿī scholars 
(ʿulamāʾ).10 Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya clearly departs from the Shīʿī approach by 
presenting walāya as ultimately accessible to all Muslims. 
                                                          
10 Maria Massi Dakake. The charismatic community Shīʿite identity in early Islam. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 2007, p. 30. 
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When we look at the historical development of walāya11 during the classical Islamic 
period there are clear signs of the evolution of this concept, even if many of the basic 
components of the later doctrines of sainthood still incorporate aspects of earlier forms of 
walāya. In the section on methodology I will explain how, instead of Cornell’s use of 
wilāya/walāya as a methodological tool, I will use a modified approach to Michel Foucault’s 
notions of episteme and discourse. In my view Foucault’s episteme more appropriately addresses 
the theoretical and epistemological aims of this study, which looks at al-Tirmidhī as one of 
several early ideologues of what would later become Sufism. 
 
 
Sainthood in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth Literature 
 In the Qurʾān, the term walāya appears twice. According to Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī 
(d. 310/923) the term walāya first appears in Qurʾān 18:4412 and refers to God’s authority (mulk) 
and power (sulṭān). The second usage in Qurʾān 8:7213 denotes the meaning of inheritance 
(mīrāth).14 In this verse those who had migrated to Madīna were not allowed to inherit from 
believing Muslims who had remained in Makka until those remaining Muslims had also 
                                                          
11 I will limit myself to just one of the two terms when denoting Islamic sainthood for the sake of simplicity. I 
believe that focusing on wilāya/walāya as the basis for a methodological approach actually obscures our 
understanding of Islamic sainthood during the early Abbasid period in eastern Khurāsān and Transoxania. 
12 Qurʾān 18:44 reads: hunāk al-walāyatu li-llāh al-ḥaqq huwa khayru thawāban wa-khayru ʿuqbā, There, 
protection is completely for Allāh, the Truth, he is best in reward and best in outcome. 
13 Qurʾān 8:72 reads: Inna al-ladhīna āmanū wa-hājarū wa-jāhadū bi-amwālihim wa anfusihim fī sabīl Allāh wa-
alladhīna āwaw wa-naṣarū ulāʾika baʿḍuhum awliyāʾu baʿḍ wa alladhīna āmanū wa lam yuhājirū mā lakum min 
walāyatihim min shayʾ ḥattā yuhājirū wa-in istanṣarūkum fī al-dīn fa-ʿalaykum al-naṣru illā ʿalā qawmin baynakum 
wa-baynahum mīthāq wa-Allāhu bi-mā taʿmalūna baṣīr, Indeed those who have believed and emigrated and fought 
with their wealth and lives in the cause of Allāh and those who gave shelter and aided, they are allies of one another. 
But those who believed and did not emigrate, for you there is no guardianship/inheritance of them until they 
emigrate. And if they seek help of you for the religion, then you must help, except against a people between 
yourselves and whom is a treaty. And Allāh is seeing of what you do. Saḥīḥ International: http://quran.com/8. 
14 The meaning of inheritance (mīrāth) here for walāya is supported by al-Suyūṭī in Tafṣīr al-Jalālayn, one of the 
most widely recognized commentaries on the Qurʾān in the Sunnī world. 
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completed the migration. Subsequently, when we look at the terms wilāya and walāya in the 
Ḥadīth corpus, we also find meanings that are confined to inheritance, political authority and 
patronage. In addition, in Qurʾān 10:62, a verse that is most often interpreted to indicate a 
concept of closeness actually means protection and patronage. This is the passage according to 
Yūsuf ʿAlī: “Behold! Verily on the awliyā of Allāh, there is no fear, nor shall they grieve.”15 The 
meaning of lā khawfun ʿalayhim, “there is no fear,” in the Arabic actually means “others shall 
not fear for them.” But it is significant to note that this particular passage does not connote 
closeness as the later definitions of wilāya/walāya indicate in most classical Arabic 
dictionaries.16 The concept of God’s closeness to the human being is indeed found in the Qurʾān 
as described in verse 50:16, “And we (God) are closer to him than his carotid artery,” yet, this 
description of closeness (qurba) in the Qurʾān is a benefit prescribed to all of mankind. It is not 
something that is conferred upon a special group of select individuals. Nevertheless, the concept 
of a typology of believers who do have a special implicit closeness to God does exist throughout 
the Qurʾān in other contexts. We have siddīqūn (truthful ones), ṣāliḥūn (righteous) and shuhadāʾ 
(martyrs) to name a few. The idea that there can be a special protection from sin also exists in 
Qurʾān and is found in Qurʾān 33:33. This is the verse that is most often used by Shīʿīs to 
support their claim of the special protection from sin for the family of the Prophet Muḥammad. 
So, while the meanings of the words walāya and the awliyāʾ can communicate a meaning of 
closeness, these words are primarily used to indicate protection and patronage in the Qurʾān. 
What we see in these early sources are motifs and themes that are picked up and reworked in the 
later tradition after having undergone transformations in meaning. At certain points in the 
                                                          
15 ʿAbdallāh Yusuf ʿAlī. The meaning of the holy Qurʾān: text, translation and commentary (in modern English). 
Petaling Jaya: Islamic Book Trust. 2009, p. 243. 
16 Closeness (qurba) is only one of a cluster of meanings given in these dictionaries for wilāya/walāya. 
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developmental trajectory of Islamic sainthood, a doctrine emerged that combined and integrated 
some of these various Qurʾānic and Ḥadīth themes. We see this with figures such as Sahl b. ʿAbd 
Allāh al-Tustarī (d. 283/896), a contemporary of al-Tirmidhī who also spoke about Islamic 
sainthood (walāya). Gerhard Böwering characterizes al-Tustarī’s thought as an encounter 
between his mystical matrix of ideas and Qurʾānic keynotes. A similar statement can be made 
about al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and other mystics who produced their mystical thought through a 
constant reflection and reading of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. This is reflected in the numerous 
Qurʾānic quotes scattered throughout their works. 
 The Ḥadīth literature was also significant and essential for al-Tirmidhī as he formulated 
his views on sainthood. In many ways the Ḥadīth literature is where we find a treatment of 
walāya that accords more succinctly with later interpretations of Islamic sainthood. While the 
Qurʾān focuses primarily on meanings of power and protection, the Ḥadīth emphasize closeness 
and friendship. Probably the most important ḥadīth in this respect is the ḥadīth qudsī (reported as 
if God is speaking) that reads: 
man ʿādā lī waliyyan fa-qad ādhantuhu bi-l-ḥarb wa-mā taqarraba 
ilayya ʿabdī bi-shayʾin aḥabba ilayya mimmā iftaraḍtu ʿalayhi wa-
mā yazālu ʿabdī yataqarrabu ilayya bi-l-nawāfil ḥattā uḥibbah fa-
idhā aḥbabtuhu kuntu samʿahu alladhī yasmaʿu bihi wa-baṣarahu 
alladhī yubṣiru bihi wa-yadahu alladhī yabṭishu bihā wa-rijlahu 
allatī yamshī bihā wa-in saʾalanī la-uʿṭiyannahu wa-la-in 
istaʿādhanī la-uʿīdhannah.17 
 
Whoever shows enmity to a saint of mine I declare war upon. My 
slave does not draw nearer to me in anything more beloved to me 
than what I have made obligatory upon him. My servant then 
continues to draw nearer to me with supererogatory works until I 
love him and when I love him I become the hearing with which he 
hears and the eyesight with which he sees and the hand with which 
he grasps and the foot with which he walks. If he asks of me I will 
                                                          
17 Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl b. Ibrāhīm al-Bukhārī. Al-jāmiʿ al-musnad al-saḥīḥ al-mukhtasar min umūr rasūl Allāh 
ṣalla Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam wa sunanihi wa ayyāmihi. Beirut: Dār Ṭūq al-Najāt. 2001, vol. 8, p. 105. 
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surely give to him and if he seeks protection in me I will surely 
protect him. 
 
This ḥadīth is considered axial for almost any Islamic mystic who discusses Islamic sainthood. It 
brings together the important notions of power and protection that we find in the Qurʾān with 
notions of nearness and the replacement of God’s attributes for human attributes in the person of 
the saint. Al-Tirmidhī, along with most of the other early Islamic mystics, quotes this particular 
ḥadīth in reference to walāya.18 Before al-Tirmidhī, the discourse on walāya and the awliyāʾ 
(saints)19 revolved primarily around distinguishing between the miracles of prophets (muʿjizāt) 
and the miracles of saints (karāmāt). This became a point of theological doctrine for most Sunnīs 
because the Muʿtazilīs20 denied the miracles of saints. This position caused theological problems 
because the Qurʾān itself attests to miracles by other than prophets and messengers such as Mary, 
the mother of Jesus, who is generally not considered a prophet but has several miracles ascribed 
to her in the Qurʾān.  
 In the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature walāya is not connected to a special type of 
knowledge (ʿilm). Nor is there any particular connection between walāya (sainthood) and khilāfa 
(succession) to God or the Prophet. We will explore how al-Tirmidhī introduces new elements 
like these to the understanding of walāya in Chapters 2 and 5. Thus, we can summarize by 
saying that the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature give us an important background that will help us to 
                                                          
18 Al-Tirmidhī uses this ḥadīth in NU. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Nawādir al-uṣūl fī maʿrifat aḥādīth 
al-Rasūl: al-nuskha al-musnada al-kāmila. Ed. Tawfīq Muḥammad Taklah. Bayrūt: Dār al-Nawādir. 2010, vol. 6, p. 
160. 
19 Hereafter I will use the term awliyāʾ as the Arabic plural for ‘saints’. 
20 The Muʿtazilīs were a theological movement beginning in the late Umayyad period and early Abbasid period and 
remaining for a good time after. They favored rationalism in their interpretation of Qurʾānic and Ḥadīth precedents. 
They fell out of favor after their participation in the Miḥna (Inquisition) (218-234/833-848/49). This group cannot be 
considered to be a single madhhab (school) in the sense of the later Fiqh (jurisprudence) madhāhib (schools) but 
functioned more like a straw man for later theological schools of al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī who often defined 
themselves in contrast to this early theological movement. “Muʿtazilīs.” EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 




distinguish the important contributions al-Tirmidhī makes to the doctrine of walāya. This is 
because the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth were constant points of reference for early mystics like al-Tustarī 
and al-Tirmidhī, who meditated upon their meanings and used the vocabulary of these sources to 
couch their particular claims. As we will see, the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth were central, but not 
exclusive, sources used by these mystics. 
 
The Cult of Saints 
 No discussion of sainthood is complete without addressing the cult of saints. What is 
conspicuous about al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of sainthood is the absence of the phenomenon of the 
cult of saints in his writings, or at least the absence of any trace that we can identify as indicative 
of saint veneration in a sociological sense. He does not discuss dead saints, nor does he refer to 
visiting the tombs or shrines of dead saints. Nevertheless, there is an indirect connection between 
al-Tirmidhī and the cult of saints in that al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood appears to provide 
an important theoretical basis for the perpetuation of this social phenomenon as it develops later 
in the Islamic world. Up to the present, saint veneration mediates certain forms of religious 
practice among Muslims from the United States to Indonesia and has become one of the main 
points of cleavage between groups that reject saint veneration as opposed to those who subscribe 
to its underlying ideology. This cleavage between Salafī21 groups and Ṣūfī22 groups, for example, 
                                                          
21 This is a term adopted by Muslim reformers beginning in the 19th century who sought to free Muslims from the 
accumulated ‘baggage’ of tradition by returning to the Qurʾān and Sunna (example of the Prophet). It is best 
understood as a reaction to the threat of colonization in the Ottoman Empire and was first articulated by a group of 
Sufis in Damascus who were inspired by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and other Ṣūfīs who called for an abolition of 
the legal and theological madhahib under the pretext that these schools of thought sowed partisanship and 
dissension. For more on the beginnings of Salafism and its relationship to Sufism see: Itzchak Weismann. The 
Naqshbandiyya: orthodoxy and activism in a worldwide Sufi tradition. London: Routledge. 2007. 
22 I will be discussing my interpretation of this term in more detail in Chapter 4, however, in this context I use Ṣūfī 
to refer to a particular Muslim identity that privileges a set of historically and socially defined authority structures. 
When a modern Muslim identifies as a Ṣūfī he is not always identifying as a mystic but is acknowledging a set of 
assumptions about the nature and structure of Islamic authority. 
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has in some places superseded the traditional Sunnī/Shīʿī cleavage that has historically divided 
Muslims.23 The practices that are connected to the cult of saints24 and saint veneration have deep 
popular cultural roots within the Near East and beyond. These practices also seek ideological 
justification and draw inspiration from Ṣūfī theorists such as al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. The 
famous Moroccan Ṣūfī and saint, Muḥammad al-Jazūlī (d. 869/1465), became the eponymous 
founder of the Jazūliyya, a Shādhilī Ṣūfī order that played a significant role in the jihād (holy 
war) against the Portuguese and led to the adoption of Sharīfian rule in Morocco. Al-Jazūlī 
demonstrates the dynamic potential of the doctrine of the al-insān al-kāmil (perfected 
individual), which was an outgrowth of ideas championed by Ibn ʿArabī and al-Tirmidhī. 
Another important Ṣūfī leader in the 18th- and 19th-centuries C.E. was Aḥmad al-Tijānī (d. 
1230/1815) who became the eponymous founder of a now global Ṣūfī brotherhood. He directly 
appealed to al-Tirmidhī’s idea of the seal of sainthood (khatm al-walāya). He claimed the same 
title of the sealer of saints (khātim al-awliyāʾ)25 that al-Tirmidhī describes in his book, Sīrat al-
Awliyāʾ. ʿUmar al-Fūṭī26 (d. 1280/1864) of the Tijānī Ṭarīqa in West Africa records the words of 
Aḥmad al-Tijānī, Anā sayyid al-awliyāʾ kamā kāna rasūl Allāhi ṣalla Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallama 
sayyida al-anbiyāʾ, “I am the master of the saints just as the messenger of God, may God bless 
him and grant him peace was master of the prophets.”27 This mirrors the wording of al-
Tirmidhī’s own writing when he describes the sealer of saints, Fa-huwa fī kulli makān awwalu 
                                                          
23 ʿAbdurraḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq in his book Al-fikr al-Ṣūfī fī ḍawʾ al-kitāb wa al-sunna, describes Sufism as the 
worst calamity to have befallen Islam throughout its entire history. One of the major tenets of Sufism that he seeks 
to discredit is sainthood and its ethos. ʿAbdurraḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq. Al-fikr al-Ṣūfī fī ḍawʾ al-kitāb wa al-sunna. 
Damascus: Dār al-Fayḥāʾ. 1993, p. 2. 
24 This is a contested term and does not apply well to Islamic sainthood, however I use it here simply because of its 
wide usage in the field. 
25 We will discuss the difference between khātam (the last) as opposed to khātim (the sealer) in our discussion of al-
Tirmidhī’s use of this term in his doctrine of walāya in Chapter 5. 
26 ʿUmar al-Fūṭi was a student of Muḥammad al-Ghālī bū Ṭālib who was a student of Aḥmad al-Tijānī. ʿUmar al-
Fūṭi spread the Tijānī Ṭarīqa in West Africa. 
27 ʿUmar b. Saʿīd al-Fūṭī. Rimāḥ ḥarb al-Raḥīm ʿalā naḥwu ḥarb al-rajīm. Egypt, 1901, p. 260. 
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al-awliyāʾ kamā kāna Muḥammad ṣalla Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallama awwalu al-anbiyāʾ, “He is, in 
every way the foremost of the saints just as Muḥammad may God bless him and grant him peace 
was the foremost of the prophets.”28 The clear parallels between the thought of Aḥmad al-Tijānī 
and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī beg us to consider the archeology of sainthood within Islam and its 
ideological force as an instrument of authority. The cosmological significance that al-Tirmidhī 
gives to the living saints carries over in the later tradition to the eponyms of the various ṭarīqas 
(Ṣūfī brotherhoods) like Aḥmad al-Tijānī whose tombs became important sites of visitation and 
veneration.  
Al-Tirmidhī is the first Muslim mystic to describe a mystical geography that connects the 
unseen realm (ghayb) with the seen world that intersects at the heart of the mystic. In this 
mystical geography light from the unseen realm flows into the seen world through the heart of 
the mystic and is a means of maintaining the existence of the world. When a mystic dies, that 
mystical geography overlays the physical geography of the earth at the place where the saint is 
buried. Hence, Ṣūfīs will visit the graves of saints because these places are considered to be 
windows into the unseen realm and places where God’s theophany is strongest. I will discuss 
more about the heart of the mystic as a site of divine theophany in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 The model of sainthood that al-Tirmidhī develops presents important questions for the 
study of sainthood outside of Islam as well. When addressing the Jewish Polish Hasidic 
movement of the 18th-century C.E., Gershom Scholem29 traces the motif of the tsaddik (in Arabic 
ṣiddīq) from the time of Rabbi Abbahu, a 4th-century C.E. amora (rabbinic scholar), up to the 
modern Polish Hasidic movement. Multiple traditions that abound within the biblical and 
                                                          
28 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Thalāthat muṣannafāt li-l-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī: Kitāb Sirāt al-awlīyāʾ, 
Jawāb al-masāʾil allatī saʾalahu ahl Sarakhs ʿanhā, Jawāb Kitāb min al-rayy. Ed. Radtke, B. Arabisch-Deutsche 
Ausg. Bayrūt: Yuṭlabu min Dār al-Nashr Frānts Shtāynar, Shtūtgārt. 1992, p. 45. 
29 Gershom Scholem. Major trends in Jewish mysticism. New York: Schocken Books. 1971. 
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talmudic literature depict pious and just men who supported the existence of the world. However, 
in the late 3rd-century and early 4th-century C.E., the number seems to have become fixed at 
thirty-six and the idea emerged that these hidden just men also have a special relationship to the 
divine countenance. Scholem’s question, however, is whether or not the motif of the thirty-six 
tsaddikim (Lamed-vav in Hebrew) is part of a continuous tradition from Late Antiquity or 
whether the motif entered Islamic sources and then filtered back into Judaism. A similar ḥadīth 
text describes forty ṣiddīqīn from the Syria-Levant region for whom humanity is saved. This and 
other similar traditions in the Ḥadīth literature form a central component of al-Tirmidhī’s 
discourse on sainthood. While the Ḥadīth literature concerning the ṣiddīqīn does not seem to 
make a specific connection between the ṣiddīq and a special mystical state based on knowledge 
of God, al-Tirmidhī does make this connection. Hence, sainthood is a topic that has the potential 
to cross religious and inter-religious factional lines. This is why al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood is important, not simply for its historical significance, but for its potential as a 
religious and social force.  
 
Sainthood and Authority in the Age of Sanctification 
 Some of the impetus for looking anew at al-Tirmidhī’s thought comes from recent 
scholarship on sainthood from the period of approximately the 13th-century C.E. to the beginning 
of the 19th-century C.E. Some have dubbed this the “Age of Sanctification,” in which the Muslim 
saint or holy man (walī) was an important contender for power and authority in Islamicate 
societies. Dina de Gall calls this period the “triumph of sainthood” and the rise of the Ṣūfī 
brotherhoods.30 Tanvir Anjum discusses the important role that Ṣūfīs played in the negotiation of 
                                                          
30 Dina Le Gall. “Recent thinking on Sufis and saints in the lives of Muslim societies, past and 
present.” International Journal of Middle East Studies. 42 (04). 2010, p. 685. 
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power between the Abbasid Caliph and the Seljukid sultans as well as their role in giving 
legitimacy to the Mamluks in Egypt.31 Margaret Malamud shows how the Seljuk sultans in 
Khurāsān actively supported Sufi khānaqās (Ṣūfī lodges) during the 11th-century C.E.32 Erik 
Ohlander documents the close relationship between Ṣūfī shaykhs and the Abbasid Caliphs33 in 
the 12th- and 13th-centuries C.E. in an important era of transition when Ṣūfī brotherhoods were 
gaining global, economic, political and religious power. Blain Auer demonstrates the intriguing 
relationship between the development of two prominent Ṣūfī brotherhoods in Northern India and 
the Sultanate of Delhi.34 While there is still a need for further research in the relationship 
between Ṣūfīs and political power in Islamicate societies, current research in this field has 
demonstrated a complex and interwoven relationship between Ṣūfī shaykhs, court culture and 
political elites. This inevitably leads us to question whether or not there was a prior theoretical 
basis informing this type of relationship or whether it simply grew organically out of the social 
and religious institutions of the 12th- and 13th-centuries C.E. It is unlikely that a figure like 
Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Ḥafs ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234) would have been endowed with 
such authority as was given him by the Caliph al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh unless that authority was 
somehow supported by some type of prior justification. A Ṣūfī identity was not enough to be a 
rationale for power and authority. A rationale was needed to convince non-Ṣūfīs of the right of 
Ṣūfīs to religious authority. Genealogy was certainly part of this construction of authority and al-
Suhrawardī, like other Ṣūfīs of his period, used genealogy to support their claims. However, 
                                                          
31 Tanvir Anjum. “Sufism in History and its Relationship with Power”. Islamic Studies. 45 (2). 2006, pp. 260-262. 
32 Margaret Malamud. “Sufi Organizations and Structures of Authority in Medieval Nīshāpūr”. International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. 26 (03). 1994, p. 436. 
33 Erik S. Ohlander. Sufism in an age of transition ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī and the rise of the Islamic mystical 
brotherhoods. Leiden: Brill. 2008, pp. 89-112. 
34 Auer Blain. “Intersections between Sufism and power, narrating the shaykhs and sultans of Northern India, 1200-
1400” in Sufism and Society Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World, 1200-1800. Hoboken: Taylor & 
Francis. 2011, pp. 17-33. 
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genealogy is, in a sense, the last piece in the puzzle that represents the development of Ṣūfī 
religious authority. While claims to Islamic religious authority are often grounded in religious 
texts like the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, the structure of these claims is also intimately tied to norms and 
social conventions that return to the social and political patterns that existed at the time of the 
early Arab conquests. This is also true for some of the historical and political precedents that 
established Arab and Islamic rule in those regions that came under the suzerainty of the 
Umayyad (41-132/661-750) and Abbasid (132-656/750-1258) dynasties. As I will attempt to 
demonstrate in Chapter 1, al-Tirmidhī establishes the underlying theoretical framework for Ṣūfī 
authority patterned after the social institution of clientage (walāʾ). This was an institution that 
mediated social relationships of dependence between Arab rulers and non-Arab subjects up into 
the early Abbasid period, especially in the province of Greater Khurāsān. While genealogy was 
an important component of Arab claims to superiority over non-Arab subjects, it was not a 
significant element of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of authority. Rather, for al-Tirmidhī, the slave-
freeman dichotomy, as preserved in the social institution of clientage (walāʾ), served as the basis 
for rationalizing implicit assumptions about the right to power and authority. Al-Tirmidhī 
transferred these structural dichotomies over to the ʿāmma/awliyāʾ (common Muslims/saints). It 
was later Ṣūfī advocates within Islam such as Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021) and 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1074) who added the element of genealogy to reinforce other 
notions of mystical authority first introduced by al-Tirmidhī. The articulation of Ṣūfī authority 
took its complete form under al-Qushayrī and I will argue based on the work of Francesco 
Chiabotti that his articulation of Sufism represents a mystical synthesis that inaugurates Sufism 
as we know it today as a meta-identity with Islam. By understanding al-Sulamī’s and al-
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 My methodological approach draws heavily from Foucault’s concepts of episteme and 
discourse. Foucault defines the episteme in Power/Knowledge: 
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic 
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the 
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, 
I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and 
which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the 
‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true 
from the false, but of what may from what may not be 
characterized as scientific.35 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s attempt to establish Islamic mysticism within the discourse of Islamic sciences 
makes Foucault’s episteme useful in explaining how Islamic mysticism became a part of the 
discursive formations that characterized the uses of knowledge and power in the 3rd- Islamic 
century (9th-century C.E.). Despite our reliance on Foucault’s approach to the episteme, we have 
found it necessary to modify his approach in order to adapt it to al-Tirmidhī’s time period and 
context. Foucault provides a useful framework for understanding knowledge systems and the 
development of the sciences in particular. Despite the fact that he is primarily concerned with the 
development of sciences in the European context during the 17th- and 18th-centuries C.E., his 
idea of the episteme can help us to understand the development of the Islamic sciences in the 9th-
century C.E. Franz Rosenthal dubs the 9th-century in the Islamic world as, “…the age of science, 
the age in which systematic knowledge in a wide variety of clearly defined fields became the 
                                                          
35 Michel Foucault. Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. Edited and Translated by 
Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books. 1980, p. 197. 
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dominant form of expression for Muslim intellectual aspirations.”36 Rosenthal argues that the the 
Ṣūfīs tried strenuously to present their knowledge (ʿilm) as a ‘science’ in order to keep up with 
the views of knowledge that were current at that time.37 Al-Tirmidhī was certainly one of those 
advocating that Islamic mysticism38 should be given a position of authority in relation to other 
Islamic disciplines.39 Foucault’s episteme proves helpful when we think about the type of 
intellectual history that we are dealing with in the thought of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, since we are 
dealing with a profound and detailed exposition on knowledge and its place in the Islamic 
tradition. Thus, we are not dealing with the type of questions that have been proposed in prior 
expositions of al-Tirmidhī’s thought, such as: Was al-Tirmidhī a conduit for Greek ideas that 
flowed into Sufism? This type of a question is problematic on many fronts since it essentializes 
both ‘Greek’ knowledge and ‘Sufism’. Such a question further limits our process of inquiry, 
since, were we to find elements of Greek knowledge in the thought of al-Tirmidhī, we might be 
content to have answered our question and stopped there. Foucault’s episteme helps us to move 
beyond the straight-jacket of these essentialisms and to cast a wider net that can open new 
possibilities. The episteme represents a set of assumptions about the categories of knowledge that 
were shared by al-Tirmidhī’s milieu. In order to understand al-Tirmidhī, we need to understand 
how he engaged in the discourse of this milieu. This means we have to understand the social and 
epistemological backgrounds of al-Tirmidhī’s contemporaries in order to compare with his own 
thought. In this way we can better appreciate al-Tirmidhī’s contribution to concepts of walāya 
                                                          
36 Franz Rosenthal,. Knowledge triumphant the concept of knowledge in medieval Islam. Boston: Brill. 2007, p. 176. 
37 Ibid, p. 177. 
38 I don’t use the term Sufism here because Radtke and others have argued that al-Tirmidhī was not a Ṣūfī but 
represented a different form of Islamic mystical doctrine. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 4 where, in 
essence, I agree with this formulation, however, I would add that, in a similar way, we should not consider Abū al-
Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 297/910), the spokesman of Baghdād mysticism in the 9th century C.E. to have been a Ṣūfī 
either if we apply the same criteria and look at his own writings rather than the way he is portrayed in the writings of 
later Ṣūfīs. 
39 Or we could say to supersede those disciplines. 
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and to Islamic modes of knowledge and authority. Previous studies of al-Tirmidhī have not 
adequately taken into account the social and epistemological background that characterizes the 
various discourses in which al-Tirmidhī participated.  
 In Les Mots et le Choses (The Order of Things) Foucault chooses four basic knowledge 
categories in each age to demonstrate how basic assumptions about knowledge can shift when 
society enters a new episteme. Foucault characterizes the Renaissance as the “Age of 
Resemblance” and he divides this era into four principal forms of knowledge categories, they 
are: convenience, emulation, analogy and sympathy.40 These epistemic structural categories 
attempt to give a global picture of the coherence of knowledge in the Renaissance. Historians of 
the Renaissance have given short shrift to Foucault’s conclusions about this period and he 
accepts that critique himself.41 The benefit of Foucault’s discussion in The Order of Things is not 
necessarily centered around the historical conclusions he makes, but rather in the potential 
benefits of adopting an alternative global perspective based on Structuralism that isolates 
knowledge categories as a basis for our understanding of the shifts in discourse that have taken 
place between different historiographical periods. We are not attempting to define global shifts in 
thought during the Islamic period but rather are attempting to use the episteme to highlight and 
situate the relevance of al-Tirmidhī’s thought. Certainly, the four categories identified in the 
Renaissance episteme seem arbitrary to a certain degree, but they alert us to the global 
distinctions between categories of knowledge that are useful for navigating the streams of 
discourse. If we were to ask ourselves whether such a thing as an episteme exists, I think we can 
agree that at some level this is an intuitive reality. This is because all discourse aims at imparting 
                                                          
40 Gary Gutting,. Michel Foucault's archaeology of scientific reason. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University 
Press. 1989, p. 140. 
41 Ian Maclean,. Foucault’s Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian Counterblast. Journal of the history 
of ideas. Vol. 59 (1), January 1998. 
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some knowledge to others within the universe of discourse. That can only be done if some of the 
knowledge categories that are shared are so basic that everyone within the episteme agrees upon 
them without question. We are all constrained to some degree by basic assumptions about the 
nature of knowledge that we inherit from our religious, social and cultural milieus. The benefit of 
Foucault’s method is to help us escape a linear historical framework that does injustice to the 
complex network of ideas and concepts that emerge in the discourse between authors within a 
given scholarly community and period in history. While the form and expression of a particular 
concept can resemble borrowings from other cultures and traditions, when we look closely, those 
same terms often take on different significations when they relate to the author’s usage within his 
discourse based on the similarities and differences with other authors with whom he was in 
dialog at the time. This idea is not new to Foucault. Al-Tirmidhī comments on this phenomenon 
when he explains how the term Fiqh (jurisprudence), for example, meant something very 
different in an earlier Islamic milieu. Al-Tirmidhī tries repeatedly to return back to the original 
significations of Qurʾānic terminology. This is one aspect of how al-Tirmidhī saw himself as a 
reformer, an idea I will expand upon later.  
 In order to establish my methodology on firmer historical grounds than Foucault, I will 
also draw upon established scholarship on knowledge (ʿilm) and its various types in Islamicate 
societies. Fortunately, Franz Rosenthal provides us with a thorough and well documented study 
on knowledge in Islamic disciplines. Rosenthal discusses six types of knowledge that appear in 
the first four centuries of Islamic civilization. These are: knowledge as revelation (waḥy), 
knowledge as Ḥadīth, knowledge as theology (Kalām), knowledge as light (nūr), knowledge as 
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thought (tafakkur) and knowledge as adab (education - paideia).42 All of these approaches to 
knowledge existed in Muslim societies by the middle of the 9th-century C.E. when al-Tirmidhī 
was writing his works. I believe that al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology must be understood in relation to 
these main types of knowledge, since, in effect, they represent the basic contours of his episteme. 
Foucault’s methodological perspective helps us to explain why it is important that al-Tirmidhī 
focuses on ḥikma (wisdom), since this knowledge type was virtually ignored by the early 
tradition and represented a gap that could be filled by al-Tirmidhī. Al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of 
wisdom (ḥikma) and how it factors into his doctrine of walāya will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 The 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. witnessed the development of a plethora of religious 
factions and schools within Islamdom, from the schools of law (madhāhib) to various theological 
schools, to Shīʿī groups of various types.43 These schools and factions represent discourses that 
coalesced into corporate identities as these groups developed bodies of literature to represent 
their particular viewpoints and interests. I prefer to use the term ‘discourse stream’ rather than 
madhhab (school) to capture the more or less fluid network of social relationships and 
connections among Muslim scholars during the period just prior to and consonant with the 
formation of the schools of law. For example, we can call al-Tirmidhī a ‘Ḥanafī’ in the sense that 
he partakes in a discourse stream that involves a culture of law and theology intimately tied to 
                                                          
42 One should note how Rosenthal excludes ḥikma (wisdom) as a primary knowledge type because he effectively 
states that in the Islamic tradition knowledge (ʿilm) and wisdom (ḥikma) were synonymous. Ibid. Knowledge 
triumphant, p. 38. 
43 Christopher Melchert,. The formation of the Sunni schools of law, 9th-10th centuries C.E. Leiden: Brill. 1997, pp. 
xxvi. Melchert argues that the first school of law to develop was the Shafiʿī School in Baghdād at the end of the 9th 
century. The other schools developed later in the 10th century C.E. Melchert’s thesis returns primarily to his 
definition of madhhab, which he views as a corporate entity comprised of a raʾīs or chief scholar in a particular 
location, the existence of commentaries on standard legal epitomes and the regular transmission of legal knowledge 
in which a student is recognized to have studied under a prominent jurist of that school. Devin J. Steward. Review of 
The formation of the Sunni schools of law, 9th-10th centuries by Christopher Melchert. Islamic Law and Society. Vol. 
6 (2). 1999, p. 276. 
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the network of scholars in Khurāsān and Transoxania who identified with Abū Ḥanīfa Nuʿmān b. 
Thābit (d. 150/772) and his legacy. On the other hand we can clearly say that al-Tirmidhī did not 
belong to a corporate entity similar to what would become the Ḥanafī madhhab (school of law). 
He had no problem criticizing some of the basic premises of Ḥanafī doctrine and felt free to offer 
his own alternative legal and theological methodologies. Furthermore, al-Tirmidhī conceives of 
the transmission of knowledge through the analogy of water flowing in a river and a stream. So, 
not only does ‘discourse stream’ capture the fluid network of connections among scholars prior 
to the madhhab (school), but it also captures a sense of how al-Tirmidhī conceived of this 
process. We will explain al-Tirmidhī’s relationship to the Ḥanafī ‘School’ in more detail in 
Chapter 3. We cannot say that there is any direct relationship between what we term a ‘discourse 
stream’ and what we discussed earlier about Rosenthal’s knowledge-types during this period. 
However, we do posit that every discourse stream must have an epistemological basis so, for our 
purposes here, we will use Foucault’s episteme to understand the underlying structure of 
knowledge production in al-Tirmidhī’s milieu through the eyes of Rosenthal’s knowledge types. 
At the same time, however, we will be addressing the social and historical representations that 
manifest particular approaches to knowledge within various discourse streams. This two pronged 
approach will help us better understand how al-Tirmidhī uses his gnoseology to redefine 




 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī is considered one of the most prolific authors to hail from 
Khurāsān up through the early 10th-century C.E. Fuat Sezgin numbers his extant works, both 
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published and in manuscript, at eighty.44 These works range from full length treatises of several 
hundred pages to short topical pieces that number only a few pages. While al-Tirmidhī’s works 
touch upon a wide range of fields from Ḥadīth and Qurʾānic commentary to jurisprudence and 
mysticism, his works also display a high degree of repetition in terms of themes and topical 
layout. This creates several challenges when attempting to categorize these works. The first is 
that al-Tirmidhī’s use of a particular genre does not conform to the typical conventions of the 
genres of his period. Al-Tirmidhī seems to bend the genre to accommodate his own purposes and 
then uses it as a vehicle to expound his ideas. For example, Nawādir al-Uṣūl is al-Tirmidhī’s 
commentary on close to three hundred aḥadīth (prophetic traditions, pl. of ḥadīth) where he 
provides his unique explanation of each ḥadīth from an esoteric perspective, i.e., ab intra. This 
commentary provides a point of departure for al-Tirmidhī to expound upon a variety of topics 
that are important to his schematization of the world from sainthood to theology. Another 
problem we face in this regard is that al-Tirmidhī clearly did not conceive of the conventional 
genres of traditional Islamic disciplines in the same forms that we have received them today. For 
example, jurisprudence (Fiqh) meant something very different to al-Tirmidhī than it came to be 
understood within the classical Islamic tradition. This makes it highly problematic to use modern 
schemas to categorize his works. Al-Tirmidhī lived in a period of intellectual flux in the Muslim 
world, in which many conceptual categories had not yet become reified. One of the few scholars 
to present a schematization of the works of al-Tirmidhī is Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Juyūshī who 
divides al-Tirmidhī’s works into seven general groups: Qurʾānic Exegesis (tafsīr), prophetic 
reports (Ḥadīth), theology (Kalām), jurisprudence (Fiqh), legal philosophy (falsafat al-tashrīʿ), 
                                                          
44 Fuat Sezgin,. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1967, vol. 1, pp. 653–659. 
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Ṣūfī history (tārīkh al-ṣūfiyya) and Ṣūfī ideology (ārāʾ al-ṣūfiyya).45 Both of the titles chosen for 
these categories, as well as their division, seem to obscure rather than shed light on the contours 
of al-Tirmidhī’s corpus. The use of the term “Ṣūfī” itself is somewhat of an anachronism given 
that al-Tirmidhī never used the term. Prominent scholars of al-Tirmidhī such as Bernd Radtke do 
not consider his thought to be characterized as Ṣūfī, but rather as the product of a separate 
ascetic-mystical movement.46 One of the reasons that al-Tirmidhī’s works are so difficult to 
organize around particular genres is that al-Tirmidhī was often attempting to redefine or recast 
received terminology as well as challenge the boundaries of the conceptual landscape developed 
by his predecessors. Al-Tirmidhī’s works cut across received genres and amalgamate topics and 
themes in unique ways. This means that any one particular text will probably fit into multiple 
categories. Further complicating our understanding of al-Tirmidhī’s corpus is the oral nature of 
the composition of certain texts. Some of al-Tirmidhī’s works resemble notes of a student 
copying the questions and answers from a teacher who is speaking extemporaneously. Sīrat al-
Awliyāʾ is a case in point in this regard and is one possible reason for the repetition of themes 
within the text. We should note that the oral composition of early texts of this period under 
discussion often defies modern notions of authorship. This needs to be a factor not only in our 
understanding of material within the texts, but also the way the text itself plays a role in 
communicating to us the social and corporate nature of authorship. I will not be specifically 
addressing the orality of al-Tirmidhī’s works in this dissertation. However, I realize that as a 
student of this early period of Islamic intellectual history, I must be aware that oral modes of 
                                                          
45 Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Juyūshī. al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Tirmidhī: dirāsa li-āthārihi wa-afkārih. 
al-Qāhira: Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya. 1980, p. 68. 
46 Scholars of Islamic mysticism see al-Tirmidhī as belonging to an indigenous ascetic/mystical movement from 
greater Khurāsān that was originally transplanted by ʿIrāqī Sufism. See Alexander Knysh’s discussion of eastern 
Islamic mystical movements in Islamic Mysticism, a Short History, pp. 88-99. 
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knowledge transmission affected conceptions of knowledge that were more human-centric than 
text-centric. This social underpinning to knowledge transmission is the premise upon which I 
base the concept of the discourse stream, since knowledge was socially transmitted and socially 
constructed within networks and discourses that include seekers of knowledge (ṭullāb al-ʿilm) as 
well as bona fide scholars (ʿulamāʾ).47 
Al-Tirmidhī’s more substantial works number about fifty depending on the size one 
chooses as a point of demarcation. These works are in both published and manuscript form. 
About half of his works are published, while the other half remain unpublished as manuscripts 
scattered in libraries throughout the world. I have attempted my own classification of these 
works according to the manner in which they relate to important themes in al-Tirmidhī’s thought. 
The point of this classification is to provide a sense for the breadth and depth of al-Tirmidhī’s 
works. My classification scheme is as follows:  
1. Sainthood (walāya) 
2. Disciplining the Lower Self 
3. Esoteric Vocabulary 
4. Esoteric Interpretation 
5. Polemical Works 
6. Knowledge and Men of Learning 




                                                          




 Al-Tirmidhī is probably best known for his works on sainthood and many consider him 
the first Sunnī Muslim outside of the Shīʿī tradition to address the nature of sainthood and its 
function in Muslim beliefs about God and the world. For al-Tirmidhī, the saint is the nexus of al-
ẓāhir (the outward) and al-bāṭin (the inward). The bāṭin, for al-Tirmidhī includes what is termed 
the unseen world (al-ghayb). Al-Tirmidhī sets the stage for Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 504/1111) 
in his attempt to redefine true knowledge as maʿrifa or the knowledge that comes to the saint 
(walī) from the realm of the bāṭin. The true walī is not dependent upon exoteric knowledge (al-
ʿilm al-ẓāhir), but through direct inspiration becomes the personification of proof, or ḥujja, of 
God on earth. This approach is reminiscent of what has commonly come to be understood as a 
primarily Shīʿī epistemology, or we could say, gnoseology. The difference between al-Tirmidhī’s 
understanding of sainthood (walāya) and Shīʿī walāya will be explicated in more detail in 
Chapter 5. Al-Tirmidhī’s structure of walāya is a tri-partite one with the highest of the awliyāʾ 
(saints) being the kubarāʾ (the great ones) or siddīqūn (the truthful ones). His hierarchy is a 
nested one in which the awliyāʾ sit within the larger category of ḥukamāʾ (sages) and both of 
those within the still larger category ofʿulamāʾ (scholars). Al-Tirmidhī’s works on walāya here 
represent works that deal with this highest level of the awliyāʾ, i.e., the kubarāʾ (the great ones). 
The two most studied works of al-Tirmidhī in this area of walāya (sainthood) are Sīrat al-
Awliyāʾ (also known as Khatm al-Awliyā’) and ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ, however, there are other 
important works such as Nawādir al-Uṣūl and Maʿrifat al-Asrār that also deal with topics related 
to sainthood. These last two texts have not been studied extensively enough to be used as a major 
contribution to our understanding of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and his gnoseology. In 
this dissertation I will be focusing in particular on NU to provide clarification on several aspects 
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of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and gnoseology that are not apparent in his more studied 
works such as SA. 
 
Disciplining the Lower Self 
 Al-Tirmidhī has numerous works that touch upon the subject of disciplining and refining 
the soul/lower self (nafs). These works, such as Riyāḍat al-Nafs and Adab al-Nafs, set out to 
identify the various components of the spiritual body and connect them to corresponding aspects 
of the physical body. By developing a spiritual topography that is mapped onto the physical 
body, al-Tirmidhī provides his reader with a heuristic for personal self-purification. Al-Tirmidhī 
directs the reader to the subtle, almost ineffable spiritual organs that function together to either 
give free rein to carnal desire (shahawāt) or to unfetter the soul so that it can experience freedom 
in beholding God.  
 
Esoteric Vocabulary 
 A favorite topic of al-Tirmidhī is the sources and meanings of words and the way they are 
used in a particular text (such as the Qurʾān). Al-Tirmidhī was also fascinated by mystical 
vocabulary and was committed to being true to the original meanings of words. Al-Tirmidhī is 
very clear about his approach to semantics and posits and adheres faithfully to the idea that every 
word indicates a unique reality. Hence, if the word for soul/lower self (nafs) is used in the 
Qurʾān as a particular term, then according to al-Tirmidhī, it cannot refer to the same thing as the 
spirit (rūḥ). In other words, these must be distinct entities and cannot represent different aspects 
of a single entity. We also see that some of al-Tirmidhī’s works are simply lists of terms that 
focus on the various meanings of these terms. Some examples of this are Taḥṣīl Naẓāʾir al-
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Qurʾān, which seeks to clarify the meanings of some eighty Qurʾānic terms, and Maʿrifat al-
Asrār, which seeks to clarify terminology related to traveling the spiritual path (sulūk). Other 
works are more theoretical in this regard such as Kitāb al-Furūq wa Manʿ al-Tarāduf and Ghawr 
al-Umūr,48 which primarily argue against the existence of synonyms. Still another group of 
works in this category is dedicated to restoring the true meaning of words that have changed in 
usage over time. One such work of this kind is Bayān al-ʿIlm.  
 
Esoteric Interpretation 
 A large number of lesser works attributed to al-Tirmidhī provide esoteric interpretations 
of the meanings behind various acts of worship, specifically focusing on the main pillars of Islam 
(testification of faith, prayer, fasting and pilgrimage) while also including related acts of worship 
that might come under these five. Some of his works that are representative of this group are ʿIlal 
al-Sharīʿa, Sabab al-Takbīr li-l-Ṣalā and Sharḥ al-Ṣalā wa-Maqāṣiduhā. Here, al-Tirmidhī 
demonstrates his notion of ḥikma by providing what he considers to be the esoteric meaning 
behind outward acts of worship. In recognition of this status as a sage (ḥakīm) and as one of the 
saints (awliyāʾ), al-Tirmidhī claimed to have had access to knowledge of the inner realities 
(ḥaqāʾiq) of things that were revealed to him from God himself. However, probably the most 
important work in this category is Kitāb al-Ḥikma, which discusses the knowledge of the second 
level of al-Tirmidhī’s tripartite structure of walāya. This is the level of the sages (ḥukamāʾ). To 
date, no one has published an edition of KH and the one extant witness to this text has gone 
unstudied. KH is crucial, however, to understanding al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and 
                                                          
48 Bernd Radtke does not consider this work to be original to al-Tirmidhī, however, many of the ideas in the work 
bear the stamp of al-Tirmidhī. We should be willing to consider the proposition that this work may have been the 
work of one of al-Tirmidhī’s students even if it was not his own work. 
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gnoseology because it is the fullest explication of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of wisdom (ḥikma) 
among al-Tirmidhī’s many works. In Appendix B we provide a transcription of KH with notes 
demonstrating its connection to other works in al-Tirmidhī’s corpus. 
 
Polemical Works 
As a scholar in the Ḥanafī theological tradition, al-Tirmidhī wrote works against 
movements that he saw as heretical. Two works in this regard are al-Radd ʿalā al-Rāfiḍa and al-
Radd ʿalā al-Muʿaṭṭila, both of which argue against the positions of the proto-Shīʿīs and the 
Muʿtazilīs. Other works relating to theology that demonstrate ideas in accord with early Ḥanafī 
theology are Sharḥ Qawlihi mā al-Īmān wa-mā al-Islām wa mā al-Iḥsān and al-Kalām ʿalā 
Maʿnā Lā Ilāha illā Allāh. Another work that was polemical in al-Tirmidhī’s time was Bayān al-
Kasb, which clarifies the importance and legality of earning a livelihood. This work was most 
probably oriented toward refuting the Karrāmiyya who were active during al-Tirmidhī’s time, 
especially in eastern Khurāsān.  
 
Knowledge and Men of Learning 
 The nature and character of knowledge was of critical importance to al-Tirmidhī’s 
conceptual system.  Al-Tirmidhī was seeking to redefine religious knowledge as well as upset 
the prevailing hierarchy of prestige assigned to different types of religious knowledge in 
Khurāsān and Transoxania in his time. Changing the priority of knowledge-types, of course, had 
important implications for how religious men of learning were valued. In this category of works 
we have Anwāʿ al-ʿIlm, which addresses outward religious knowledge in juxtaposition to gnosis 
(maʿrifa). Al-Tirmidhī also discusses the different types and levels of servanthood in his book 
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Manāzil al-ʿIbād, which details seven stopping places (manāzil) that characterize different stages 
on the spiritual path (ṭarīq).  
 
Moral and Ethical Teachings 
 Al-Tirmidhī was a teacher and orator as well as a writer and mystic. He was concerned 
with the moral and spiritual welfare of his students as well as those who came to hear him 
lecture. One book that indicates this aspect of his life and teaching is al-Munājāt, a series of 
prayers and supplications that express the dire helplessness of the servant who seeks God. Also 
written by al-Tirmidhī is al-Jumal al-Lāzima Maʿrifatuhā, a collection of sermons, or waʿẓ, that 
seek to admonish as well as entice the listener to refrain from acts of disobedience and then, in 
turn, to motivate the listener to strive toward embracing acts of obedience. In this vein we also 
have al-Iḥṭiyāṭāṭ, a compilation of advice for the spiritual traveler. 
 
Correspondence 
 Al-Tirmidhī was not a reclusive mystic, but was involved in both teaching and the active 
scholarly debates of his time concerning matters related to spiritual development and mystical 
theory. For example, he was in letter correspondence with mystics in Rayy as well as Sarakhs49 
and this correspondence is recorded in two collections, Jawāb Kitāb min al-Rayy and Jawāb al-




                                                          





 Autobiography is included as a category even though there is only one work that is purely 
autobiographical in al-Tirmidhī’s corpus. Buduw Shaʾn is a short work that is the earliest 
example of spiritual autobiography in the Islamic literary tradition. Al-Tirmidhī appears to have 
written about his life in order to establish the credentials of his spiritual rank and to support the 
authority with which he speaks. A brief description of his early years and spiritual conversion are 
followed by a series of dreams that are related on behalf of his wife and several male 
companions. These dreams speak for al-Tirmidhī without his having to claim sainthood himself. 
Al-Tirmidhī’s autobiography provides us with a rare glimpse into the spiritual aspirations and 




 The study of sainthood in Khurāsān and Transoxania under the Samānids (204-395/819-
1005) and Ghaznavids (366-582/977-1186) is an area that has received scant attention in the 
secondary literature, especially when we compare the scholarship on this period with the 
groundbreaking work of Vincent Cornell who discusses Moroccan sainthood and its typology 
during the Moroccan Mārinid (642-870/1244-1465) dynasty. Clearly, the pivotal figure for the 
study of sainthood in the East under the Saffārids (247-393/861-1003) and then the Samānids is 
al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Most studies of al-Tirmidhī, however, seek to place him in relation to the 
larger framework of Sufism, focusing on his unconformist approach as somewhat of an outsider. 
However, by approaching al-Tirmidhī from the standpoint of his gnoseology and discourse 
streams we are pushed to look beyond Sufism to better understand why he might be considered 
an ‘outlier.’ Sainthood is a topos that is not restricted to Islamic mysticism or Sufism, per se, but 
cuts across a diverse set of Islamic movements from Ahl al-Ḥadīth, to Khārijīs, to Shīʿīs. While 
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all of these groups exhibit various aspects of walāya, none of them presents an explicit doctrine 
of walāya before al-Tirmidhī’s time. The problem in the field of Islamic mysticism is two-fold. 
Firstly, the discussion of al-Tirmidhī and his thought in the current literature, even his discussion 
on walāya, is often siloed within the field of Islamic mysticism. Secondly, and to our benefit, 
specialists on al-Tirmidhī such as Bernd Radtke, have focused on al-Tirmidhī’s works from a 
highly textual perspective, treating al-Tirmidhī’s writings almost as a system of its own. Yet, this 
does not address the more intricate relationship of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of walāya to its use in 
other discourse streams current in al-Tirmidhī’s time such as the Ḥanafī theological tradition. 
Radtke and John O’Kane (1996) have provided us with the best work to date on al-Tirmidhī and 
his ideas in The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism. This work is a translation of 
SA into English with an introduction and explanatory notes. Radtke’s work appears to focus 
primarily on the two books most associated with al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya: SA and IA. 
Another very important but overlooked resource for details of al-Tirmidhī’s approach to walāya 
is his NU, a commentary by al-Tirmidhī on a selection of aḥadīth of the Prophet. In CS Radtke 
expresses the need for a systematic study of NU,50 a text we already mentioned earlier under 
‘Sources.’ Not only is NU al-Tirmidhī’s longest work but it is also relatively unstructured, which 
leads the author to ‘confess’ aspects of his thought that might otherwise go unarticulated in his 
other works.  
A second scholar who sought to seriously address the work of al-Tirmidhī is Yves 
Marquet whose dissertation, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī et Neplatonisme de son Temps, compares the 
                                                          
50 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. The concept of sainthood in early Islamic mysticism: two works by al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī; an annotated translation with introduction. Edited and translated by Bernd Radtke, John O'Kane 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. 1996, p. 3. 
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cosmology of al-Tirmidhī with that of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā.51 The comparison is useful in 
elucidating the way in which al-Tirmidhī and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā both draw upon a similar 
corpus of material while also differing significantly in approach. For example, Marquet 
compares the hierarchy of spiritual degrees, light cosmogony and select mythology, such as the 
story of Adam and Eve, in both al-Tirmidhī and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā. Marquet’s work 
demonstrates that we are dealing with two very different systems of thought that seem to be 
drawing upon similar sources. While this is an important contribution to the study of al-Tirmidhī, 
it does not address specifically the subject of walāya. Furthermore, much of Marquet’s work is 
based upon the seminal work of ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAbdallāh Baraka, although a re-examination of 
Baraka’s work on al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya can often suffice. However, neither Radtke, 
Marquet, nor Baraka deal with al-Tirmidhī’s KH. As we will demonstrate in Chapters 2 and 5 al-
Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma (wisdom) frames his doctrine of walāya. For this reason, my 
transcription of KH provides an important and unprecedented contribution to understanding al-
Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya. 
Another important work addressing the thought of al-Tirmidhī is that of 
Geneviève Gobillot whose dissertation situates al-Tirmidhī within the ideological milieu of 9th-
century C.E. Khurasān. Her dissertation concludes with Gobillot’s own translation into French of 
a disputed work attributed to al-Tirmidhī, Ghawr al-Umūr. Gobillot’s work goes far in 
attempting to connect al-Tirmidhī to the Hellenistic milieu of Near Eastern thought, which was 
vibrant both before and after the advent of Islam, especially among Near Eastern elites. Other 
closer, and in some ways more significant, elements of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya, such as 
those contributed by Transoxanian Ḥanafī theology, are not addressed by Gobillot. In this way, I 
                                                          
51 The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā are a group of Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs in Iraq during the 10th-century C.E. who integrated Islamic 
mysticism with a number of other esoteric, philosophical and scientific approaches current during their time. 
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intend to build upon the work of Gobillot by identifying factors of influence that seem to have 
escaped her purview as I map out al-Tirmidhī’s episteme.  
Sara Sviri has written several important articles on various aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s 
thought. Her article, “Hakīm al-Tirmidhī and the Malāmatī Movement in Early Sufism,” 
addresses the relationship of al-Tirmidhī to current ascetic-mystical movements in Khurāsān 
during the 9th century C.E. Another article, “Words of Power and the Power of Words: Mystical 
Linguistics in the works of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī,” helps us understand the similar ‘letter-
mysticism’ that is shared by both the Rabbinic sages and al-Tirmidhī.  
Both Chodkiewicz (1993) in Seal of the Saints and Elmore (1999) in Islamic Sainthood in 
the Fullness of Time, have written extensively on the subject of sainthood in the writings of Ibn 
ʿArabī. In doing so, they both look upon al-Tirmidhī as a predecessor to Ibn ʿArabī, paving the 
way for the latter’s ideas on walāya. Still, however, Ibn ʿArabī’s debt to al-Tirmidhī’s thought 
deserves much more attention and scholarship than it has thus far received. Hopefully, this study 
will pave the way for a closer look at the many parallels that exist between the two mystics. 
These parallels should become clearer once al-Tirmidhī’s approach to walāya is better 
understood.  
Thus far, the most important work that I have encountered during my research of al-
Tirmidhī’s writings on the subject of walāya is a book by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAbdallāh Baraka titled, 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī wa Naẓariyyātahu fī l-Wilāyā. It is the most exhaustive review of al-
Tirmidhī’s approach to walāya and contains detailed references made by later Islamic scholars of 
al-Tirmidhī and his thought. One major lacuna in his study, though, is the omission of both NU 
and KH from his presentation of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya. Another important area not 
addressed by Baraka is the non-Islamic material that informs al-Tirmidhī’s views.  
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One of the possible reasons for the dearth of analytical works relating to al-Tirmidhī’s 
thought is that much of the work on al-Tirmidhī has focused on making his corpus available to 
the scholarly community through published volumes and critical editions. Thanks to ʿUthmān 










The Historical and Social Context of  
al-Tirmidhī’s Life and Times 
This chapter places al-Tirmidhī in his geographical and social 
context. Al-Tirmidhī’s Arab descent and background as a member 
of the Sunnī scholarly class and landed patriciate played a role in his 
self-identity at a time of turmoil and change in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania. A particular social institution that was important in 
defining al-Tirmidhī’s status, the social institution of clientage 
(walāʾ), played an important role in structuring al-Tirmidhī’s 
notions of sainthood. While al-Tirmidhī criticizes the scholarly class 
(ʿulamāʾ), his doctrine of sainthood, in fact, preserves the status of 
this class as it functions to preserve the social privilege inherent in 
the institution of clientage by protecting the privilege of the saints 
and therefore ultimately the ʿulamāʾ. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Context 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī was born during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-Maʾmūn (d. 
218/833) in the city of Tirmidh52 in what is today the southern tip of Uzbekistan. For its day, 
                                                          
52 The city of Tirmidh (Termez) is located in the southern tip of present day Uzbekistan just north of Afghanistan. 
Al-Muqaddasī (d. 990 CE) describes the city of Tirmidh less than a century after the death of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. 
It is the largest city situated on the Amū Daryā River, a river considered since ancient times to be the dividing line 
between Greater Iran (Khurāsān) and Tūrān (Transoxania). According to al-Muqaddasī, Tirmidh was a port city on 
the Amū Darya with accessibility to the river from both sides. The city had three gates with a central mosque inside 
the gates of the city. Connected to the city were suburbs with their own set of walls as a well as a commercial port 
(sarādeqāt) that formed a special quarter of the city. Homes would sometimes have outside patios that were paved 
with burnt brick and open air areas were sometimes covered with canopies. Al-Muqaddasī describes Tirmidh as 
‘clean’ (naẓīfa) and ‘healthy’ (ṭayyiba). We might judge from these remarks that Tirmidh, unlike many other cities 
of the Iranian plateau during the 9th and 10th centuries C.E., did not experience a population explosion that led to 
dense numbers of immigrants settling outside its city walls. (For more on urbanization in early Islamic Iran see 
Bulliet, Richard. Islam, the View from the Edge. New York: Columbia University Press. 1993, p. 73.) Tirmidh today 
is one of the hottest cities in Central Asia with temperatures as high as 122 degrees Fahrenheit during the summer 
months. Being a port city, Tirmidh was an important trade link between Khurāsān and Transoxania. Along with 
goods, ideas traveled these routes and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī was no doubt exposed to a wealth of culture and 
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Tirmidh was a medium-sized city that contained a citadel (qahunduz) outside the city walls. Its 
larger buildings were composed of mud brick rather than stone.53 Tirmidh was under the 
administrative jurisdiction of Balkh under the Ṭāhirids (205-78/821-91) where al-Tirmidhī was 
taken for prosecution when the local scholars of Tirmidh accused him of discoursing on the topic 
of love (ḥubb). The Ṭāhirids were the governors of Khurāsān and Transoxania for much of al-
Tirmidhī’s life. They were briefly followed by the Saffārids54 and then the Samānids (204-
395/819-1005) after them. Al-Tirmidhī references the brief interlude of the Saffārids in his 
autobiography (Buduw Shaʾn) when he states that “there arose in our land discord and 
insurrection.”55 Al-Tirmidhī is referring to the event in which Dāwūd b. al-ʿAbbas al-Bānijūrī, 
the Ṭāhirid governor in Balkh, was forced to flee in 870 C.E. when the Saffārid Yaʿqūb b. Layth 
laid siege to that city.  
                                                          
thought. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Muqaddasī. Kitāb aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī maʿrifat al-aqālīm. Leiden: Brill. 1906, p. 
291. 
53 The city of Tirmidh included several smaller cities and rural villages that fell under its jurisdiction and that 
supported its urban life. These were Ṣarmanjī, Hāshim Jard, Nawdaz and al-Qawādhiyān (a city much smaller than 
Tirmidh but still supporting its own farming villages). Tirmidh was still smaller than the main metropolitan center of 
Samarqand whose population may have been as much as 120,000 inhabitants in the 9th-century C.E. This estimate is 
based on the archeological evidence suggesting that the city (shahrestān) of Samarqand reached close to seven and a 
half square miles. G. A. Pugachenkova and E. V. Rtveladze. “Archeology vii. Islamic Central Asia,” Encyclopædia 
Iranica, Vol. II, Fasc. 3, pp. 322–326; available online at: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/archeology-vii. This 
city was a little larger than Nīshāpūr close to the same time period whose city measured approximately six and a half 
square miles. Richard Bulliet estimates that Nīshāpūr’s population was approximately 100,000 inhabitants taking a 
safe estimate. We might guess that the population of Tirmidh might be somewhere close to 30–40,000 inhabitants. 
Richard W. Bulliet. The patricians of Nishapur; a study in medieval Islamic social history. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 9.  
54 While the Saffārid line continued until the beginning of the 11th century C.E. in the region of Sistān, the Saffārids 
lost Khurāsān and Transoxiana to the Samānids when Abū Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl (I) (279–95/892–907) captured the 
Saffārid ʿAmr b. al-Layth in 287/900, after which the Caliph al-Muʿtaḍid appointed him governor of both 
Transoxania and Khurāsān. “Sāmānids.” EI2, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, 
E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 18 November 
2014 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/sa-ma-nids-
COM_0995> 
55 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. The concept of sainthood in early Islamic mysticism: two works by al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī; an annotated translation with introduction. Ed. Bernd Radtke, John O'Kane. Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press. 1996, pp. 20–23. 
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Al-Tirmidhī came from a family whose ancestral roots go back to the original Arabs who 
settled in the region soon after the early Arab/Islamic conquests. His family was composed of 
wealthy landholders who cultivated religious learning and belonged to the local aristocracy56 of 
Tirmidh. Their status was similar in nature to the patrician families of Nīshāpūr, which was a city 
larger than Tirmidh but still in its same cultural orbit. Al-Tirmidhī’s father was a scholar who 
was known to have visited Baghdād and related Ḥadīth there57 and, as we will discuss in Chapter 
3, al-Tirmidhī continued this scholarly tradition as part of the Ḥanafī jurisprudential and 
theological tradition that was widespread in the eastern provinces during his time. Nevertheless, 
we find in al-Tirmidhī a desire to expand beyond the confines of previous modes of thought 
when we witness the manner in which he exhibits an unflinching insistence on following his own 
intuitions rather than bow to the dictates of the various factions and schools in his city.58 As part 
of this process, he actually retreated from the factionalist tendencies of his city to the private 
space of his home where he established what we may call a ‘salon’ (mujālasa). There he 
conducted semi-private meetings of like-minded individuals who met to discuss spiritual matters 
and to engage in the invocation of God (dhikr).59 Not only does al-Tirmidhī turn to close friends 
                                                          
56 We would consider al-Tirmidhī to belong to what Bulliet calls the Patriciate in early Islamic Iranian cities. These 
were a group of families who consistently held much of the power in the cities of Khurāsān and Transoxiana, 
excluding the transient governors and imperial agents who came and went. These families were usually of three 
types, either landholding, trading or religious families. Ibid. Patricians, pp. 20-21. 
57 Bernd Radtke. Al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmid̲ī: ein islamischer Theosoph des 3./9. [i.e. 8./9.] Jahrhunderts. Freiburg: K. 
Schwarz, 1990, p. 12. 
58 In his autobiography al-Tirmidhī explains how he was regaled by the local scholars of his city for his ascetic and 
anti-social behavior as a result of his endeavor to grow closer to God. Al-Tirmidhī explains that he cared nothing for 
what they said and continued with his spiritual exercises until he was called before the governor at Balkh to stand 
trial for heresy. Ibid. Concept, p. 20. 
59 While this may seem benign and rather ordinary to the modern sensibilities it clearly was not so in al-Tirmidhī’s 
9th-century CE, Transoxania. Religious learning was accessible and usually conducted in public places such as the 
local jāmiʿ masjid or congregational mosque. The gatherings of the early mystics in Iraq, Khurāsān and Transoxiana 
were semi-private events that were often conducted in the homes of participants or wealthy patrons. These 
gatherings were characterized by an informal discourse on mystical topics between like-minded individuals, a very 
different scene than is found several centuries later in Nīshāpūr, where Ṣūfī culture and lore are organized by highly 
formal structures that mediate teacher-student roles. The early Islamic mystics followed a pattern already in practice 
in the large urban centers of Islam during the 9th-century C.E., where the mujālasāt of adab or edifying circles of 
humanistic knowledge was in vogue. For more on early salons in the Islamic world see Samer Ali’s work: Ali, 
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who share his interests in mysticism, but he also includes his wife in these discourses and relates 
a number of her dreams, which signifies not only his own spiritual rank, but her exalted status as 
a waliyya (female saint of God)60 as well. It must be noted that Al-Tirmidhī was not merely a 
renegade who wanted to break free of the social and intellectual mores of his time. He was an 
accomplished scholar in all of the major disciplines of Islamic scholarship as his many books and 
short treatises attest. We can describe him as an encyclopedist of sorts who sought to unify 
Islamic thought under one single approach. Like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī after him, al-Tirmidhī 
was scathing in his criticism of a scholarly class whom he considered to have lost the original 
prophetic vision of Islam. In this way he was also a social critic who wished to reform the social 
class that he represented. His goal was an ethical one just as much as it was mystical. For 
example, Al-Tirmidhī expounds on the importance of ethics when he discusses the three stages 
of good character. The first is to have good character with respect to God’s commands and 
prohibitions. This is at the level of law. The second stage is to have good character with all 
created things (khalq, which also can mean all human beings). The third is to have good 
character with God’s pre-ordainment.61 This is an example of al-Tirmidhī’s consistent attempt to 
extend Islamic values beyond the boundaries of Islam as a faith. This sense of ethics led him to 
defend the weaker elements of his society by, for example, calling for the good treatment of 
                                                          
Samer M. Arabic literary salons in the Islamic Middle Ages: poetry, public performance, and the presentation of the 
past. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 2010. Al-Tirmidhī was not alone in his desire to 
converse with like-minded mystics about the love God and mystical states. The Inquisition of Ghulām Khalīl (d. 
275/888) targeted those discoursing on love (ḥubb). The problem was not that these mystics were experiencing love 
of God. This theme had been in circulation for quite some time in Islamic societies at least since the 2nd Islamic 
century (8th-century C.E.) with the early love poetry of the likes of Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya. I would venture to posit 
that the strong reaction on the part of the Abbasid authorities was the fact that these discourses on love were 
happening in new social structures outside of the purview of the recently ascendant ʿulamāʾ (scholarly class). 
60 Ibid. Concept, pp. 24–36. 
61 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, p. 215. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī distinguishes between “natural” good character shared by all 
human beings and the highest forms of good character brought by the Prophet. Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 4, pp. 341–356. 
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slaves.62 Yet, Al-Tirmidhī was not an egalitarian nor could he be considered a social 
revolutionary. While he called for the good treatment of slaves he also recognized the slave-
owner’s right to discipline within measure. His views on women were typical if not slightly more 
advanced than his time. He upheld the notion that women should not be taught to write because 
writing was a type of communication that exceeded speech, which could lead to temptation 
(fitna).63 According to al-Tirmidhī women are inferior to men because they come from a part of 
men (from Adam’s rib).64 He also viewed women as a source of temptation for men who even 
tempted the greatest of the prophets.65 Despite these views it is clear that he had a deep and 
meaningful relationship with his wife that was respectful and collegial in nature. His 
autobiography indicates that they used to share their spiritual dreams with one another and that 
the dreams themselves sometimes expressed intimate moments such as when they were both 
lying in bed and the Prophet entered the bed with them.66 For al-Tirmidhī, these dreams are 
highly significant because they are a means of communication from the divine to the human 
being.67 
Al-Tirmidhī spoke both Arabic and Persian fluently. We often find Persian words 
peppered throughout his many works for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of an Arabic 
                                                          
62 Ibid, p. 21. 
63 Ibid, p. 271.  
64 Ibid, p. 271. 
65 Al-Tirmidhī highlights the stories of three prophets who were tempted by women as to indicate the station of each 
of these in the way he dealt with this temptation. The first was the Prophet Dāwūd (David) who was tempted by 
Bathsheba and sent her husband to death in order to marry her. His kingdom goes to ruin until he repents. The 
second was Yūsuf (Joseph) who was tempted by Potiphar’s wife and according to al-Tirmidhī almost commits the 
act but turns away at the last minute and is imprisoned as a result. This is an example of a higher station. Finally, he 
gives the example of the Prophet Muḥammad who is tempted by Zaynab and his reaction is to go into seclusion. The 
result is that she is married to him by God. Ibid, pp 248–252. 
66 Al-Tirmidhī clearly saw this as an auspicious omen. Dreams are interpreted symbolically in the Arab/Islamic 
tradition of dream interpretation such as with the likes of Ibn Sīrīn whose book of dream interpretation provides 
meanings for stock symbols within dreams. 
67 Al-Tirmidhī quotes a prophetic tradition to the effect that true dreams are a part of prophecy. Dreams that contain 
the Prophet are considered to always be true dreams. Ibid. Concept, p. 9. 
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word.68 It is not clear whether al-Tirmdhī’s wife spoke Arabic or not, but she clearly spoke 
Persian. In many respects we can think of al-Tirmidhī as a gentrified Persian landholder 
(dihqān)69 if it were not for his vehement defense of Arabic as the greatest and most important of 
languages and of the Arabs as the best of peoples.70 Al-Tirmidhī’s remarks remind us of the 
Shuʿūbī and anti-Shuʿūbī movements during the 2nd- and 3rd- Islamic centuries (8th- and 9th-
centuries C.E.) in which non-Arabs (ʿajam) wrote literature that claimed superiority over Arab 
culture. Arab writers (often of non-Arab origin themselves, such as Ibn Qutayba) wrote in 
defense of Arab superiority and lineage.71 According to al-Tirmidhī, the Arabs were superior to 
the Persians (ʿajam) not because of the superiority of Arabic as a language but because the Arabs 
held more noble qualities and higher character traits than the Persians, in particular, generosity.72 
While noble Arab descent, for al-Tirmidhī, was a source of privilege in the larger Islamic 
community (umma), it was only applicable if the Arab actually displayed those high character 
traits.73 While al-Tirmidhī’s views of Arab superiority are tempered by his ethical standards, he 
elevates the Arabic language to cosmological significance in his gnoseology. One of the highest 
forms of knowledge, the highest wisdom (ḥikmat al-ʿulyā) is the knowledge of the letters (Arabic 
letters).74 Al-Tirmidhī upheld and justified the social hierarchy of his society that placed him in a 
                                                          
68 See Radtke’s list of Persian words compiled from al-Tirmidhī’s writings. Ibid. Ein islamischer Theosoph, p. 137. 
69 Francesco Chiabotti problematizes this term as it came to change over time referring in the Sasanid period to a 
village chief and member of the Sasanid landed aristocracy. With the development of the iqṭāʿ land system, this 
important class lost much of its status and the term came to designate later in the Abbasid period a country peasant. 
Francesco Chiabotti. Entre soufisme et savoir islamique: l’oeuvre de ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (376-465/ 986-
1072). Diss, Universite de Provence. 2014, p. 63.  
70 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 309. 
71 Roy P. Mottahedeh. “The Shuʿūbiyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 161–182. 
72 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 310. 
73 Ibid, p. 107. 
74 Ibid. Concept, p. 83. 
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position of power and authority, but he considered this privilege to be predicated on virtue and 
not lineage. This is one of the reasons that he strongly opposed the Shīʿī position on the imamate. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Clash with the Local ʿUlamāʾ 
Al-Tirmidhī chose to begin teaching his mystical ideas from his home rather than from 
the local jāmiʿ masjid (congregational mosque). However, the numbers of those who came to his 
circle (majlis) grew so numerous that his house could no longer accommodate them. Eventually, 
the lane near his house filled up and then his students took him to the local masjid. Finally, he 
began teaching at a larger masjid, probably the central congregational masjid of Tirmidh.75 In his 
autobiography, al-Tirmidhī describes how it was a group of his original detractors who attempted 
to approach him in private about his ideas. When he finally agreed to speak to them, they were 
mesmerized by his speech and became his students. After he had become well known and had 
attracted many students, his other detractors among the scholars of the city could not sustain their 
criticism of him. Al-Tirmidhī’s trials and eventual triumph over his detractors among the 
scholars (ʿulamāʾ) of Tirmidh exemplifies Richard Bulliet’s thesis about the structure of the 
Patriciate in Nīshāpūr during the 4th- and 5th- Islamic centuries (10th- and 11th-centuries C.E.). 
According to Bulliet, the patricians were a set of landowning, merchant and religious families 
often combining all three groups who controlled the city of Nīshāpūr from generation to 
generation for over a hundred and fifty years. It was the delicate balance of power between these 
families and their various factions that preserved harmony in Nīshāpūr. When this balance of 
power was lost, the city descended into intra-urban warfare and the city was eventually 
destroyed.  
                                                          
75 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Al-Tirmidhī was clearly a member of such a class in his city of Tirmidh, coming from a 
landholding scholarly family of Arab descent. When the faction that opposed al-Tirmidhī was 
successful in bringing him before the governor’s court in Balkh on charges of heresy, it was the 
Ḥanafīs who protected him and enabled him to return to his city. This is why the content and 
nature of what al-Tirmidhī was teaching, as well as where he was teaching, is significant. By 
teaching from his home, al-Tirmidhī was easily subject to labels of heresy because his teachings 
were not being overseen by the establishment of religious notables. If he had not been from the 
patrician class himself, he probably would not have been considered such a threat to the 
established order. Bulliet’s (1997), in The View from the Edge, argues that Islam during the 3rd, 
4th- and 5th- Islamic centuries (9th-, 10th- and 11th-centuries C.E.) looks different when viewed 
from the edge rather than the center (i.e., Baghdād). When we turn our attention away from the 
centers of power (specifically in Khurasān and Transoxiana) during this period, we find a pattern 
in which non-Arab converts are seeking answers to their questions about Islam.76 Al-Tirmidhī’s 
book, Sīrat al-Awliyāʾ (The Way of the Saints), is structured in a question and answer format as a 
dialog between al-Tirmidhī and one of his students.77 At one point, al-Tirmidhī became 
exasperated by a question from one of his students and he exclaims, “Yā ʿajam!” This literally 
means, “You Persians!” Bernd Radtke posits that al-Tirmidhī must be using this phrase to mean 
something like, “You fools!” Even if this was the intended meaning it reveals important 
information about al-Tirmidhī’s sense of privilege and his critical view of those who were not 
                                                          
76 Bulliet follows the life of a Persian soldier Abū Ṭayba whose great grandfather converted to Islam and who settles 
in Jurjān seeking and finding religious guidance. The 9th century CE witnessed some of the highest rates of 
urbanization in the history of Persia. This also coincided with the fastest period of conversion to Islam. It is during 
this period that the function of the faqīh develops as someone who is consulted about religious legal matters. 
Richard W. Bulliet. Islam: the view from the edge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 93. 
77 This dialog is not Socratic in nature in that it does not aim at taking the student through a logical argument but is 
more al-Tirmidhī answering the questions about sainthood that were common in his time such as whether or not a 
saint can be greater than a prophet. 
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versed in the Arabic language.78 In other instances al-Tirmidhī shows a caring and concerned 
attitude toward his students.79 In both cases he assumes a position of authority and distinction 
above his questioner. His wisdom and knowledge were also sought by non-Muslims and non-
Arabs who were seeking guidance and answers to life-questions that would help them to make 
sense of their world.80 
 
The Scholarly Class or the ʿUlamāʾ 
 Al-Tirmidhī hailed from a family of ʿulamāʾ (scholars) and belonged to this class 
himself, but was also highly critical of this group. He called them ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir (scholars of 
the outward), or scholars who were well versed in legal and theological doctrines but whose 
inward character traits belied their knowledge. He militated against the idea that Fiqh 
(jurisprudence) and Kalām (theology) were the totality of what God meant when he referred to 
knowledge (ʿilm) in the Qurʾān.81 In order to better situate al-Tirmidhī, we need to understand 
this religious class and how it related to other social groups in the 9th century C.E. During this 
time we first start to see the term faqīh (jurisprudent) being used in biographical dictionaries, but 
it is not until the 10th- and 11th-centuries C.E. in Khurāsān and Transoxania that this term begins 
to gain wide use.82 We have already explained how, if we take a view from the edge, the ʿulamāʾ 
                                                          
78 Ibid. Concept, p. 202. 
79 Ibid, p. 114. Al-Tirmidhī shows concern for the student who asks a question for which he is not ready to hear the 
answer. 
80 This was a similar phenomenon that took place with the development of Rabbinic Judaism. According to Seth 
Schwartz (2001) the Rabbis, not just as a class of legal experts but as leaders of the Jewish community, came into 
their position of authority when Jews from various diaspora communities began turning to them for answers to their 
questions about how to live a Jewish life.  
81 Al-Tirmidhī anticipated Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 504/1111) criticism of the ʿulamāʾ in his Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn 
by almost two hundred years. Al-Tirmidhī describes the true faqīh (not jurisprudent here but “man of 
understanding”) as someone who “…the veil has been lifted from the eye of his heart,” and not someone who 
“…associates himself with the discipline of fiqh.” Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ. Ed. By 
Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf. [Cairo]: Maktabat al-Ḥurrīyah al-Ḥadīthah. 1983, p. 138.  
82 Ibid. The View from the Edge, p. 93. 
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families constitute one of the pillars of urban social life in the early Abbasid period. However, it 
is also important to go back to the center to see how the struggle for power and authority in Islam 
was shaping the development of this important social class as it affected developments on the 
edge. Most historians of early Islam consider the Miḥna83 to have been the decisive struggle for 
religious authority in Islam between the Caliph and the ʿulamāʾ.84 Muḥammad Qāsim Zamān 
shows, with some success, that such a break was not as complete as once thought and the 
Abbasid caliphs continued to exercise a role in juridical and theological debates even after the 
Miḥna. Despite Zaman’s evidence, it is clear that after the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-
Mutawakkil (d. 247/861) and with the ending of the Miḥna, the Abbasid caliphs could not steer 
the religious discourse in the same way as al-Maʾmūn (d. 218/833) and al-Mutawakkil had 
done.85 The Abbasid Empire was fighting for its very life at the end of the 9th century C.E. The 
assumption among many historians is that when the caliphs lost control of the religious discourse 
(and thus religious authority), it was the ʿulamāʾ who automatically assumed this authority. John 
Turner (2001), (building on the work of Josef van Ess), demonstrates that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 
241/855), the archetypal Sunnī hero, was actually quite low in profile and apolitical in his stance 
toward the caliphs. The early evidence points to him as acquiescing to the Caliph’s order to 
affirm the createdness of the Qurʾān rather than refusing to do so. Turner’s thesis is that a 
‘showdown’ between the Caliph and Ibn Ḥanbal was the product of a later rewriting of the 
narrative and was a tool used by the Ḥanabila to assert their authoritative position among the 
                                                          
83 The Miḥna was the inquisition instituted by the Abbasid Caliph al-Maʾmūn in a struggle between the Caliph and 
the ʿulamāʾ (scholarly class) over religious authority in Islam. Al-Maʾmūn sought to impose a Muʿtazilī theological 
viewpoint on scholars appointed as judges within the Abbasid Caliphate. 
84 Muḥammad Qasim Zamān. Religion and politics under the early ʿAbbāsids: the emergence of the proto-Sunnī 
elite. Leiden: Brill. 1997, p. 70. 
85 Hugh Kennedy. The court of the Caliphs: the rise and fall of Islam's greatest dynasty. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 2004, pp. 294-295. 
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madhhabs.86 By the time of the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadir (295–320/908–925), the 
caliph was no longer seen as the source of religious doctrine and the climate at the caliphal court 
had become antagonistic to religious learning.87 The attempt by caliphs such as al-Maʾmūn and 
al-Mutawakkil to engage directly in religious doctrine was bound to fail since the ʿulamāʾ gave 
no place to caliphs, viziers, assemblies of notables, or even the people, to produce laws, 
commandments, prohibitions or statutes of their own accord.88 Rather, without caliphal guidance 
in the religious discourse after al-Mutawakkil, we find a vacuum of religious authority that 
initiates a contest among the various legal madhāhib and various Islamic sects for the supremacy 
of their particular viewpoint. From the late 9th-century through the 11th-century C.E. the default 
method for mediating conflicting religious viewpoints was through mob rioting in the streets.89 
Even if the caliph was not a legislator, the caliph saw his role as a mediator between various 
proto-Sunnī and proto-Shīʿī factions. After al-Mutawakkil, the Abbasid caliphs were no longer 
able to play this role and the intense factionalism that resulted created the background out of 
which Sunnism and Shīʿism developed.90 Back in the city of Tirmidh, al-Tirmidhī voices his 
                                                          
86 John Persons Turner. Inquisition and the definition of identity in early Abbasid history. 2001, Thesis (Ph. D.)--
University of Michigan, 2001. http://books.google.com/books?id=f7QfAQAAMAAJ, pp. 271–273. 
87 Maaike van Berkel. Crisis and continuity at the Abbasid court formal and informal politics in the caliphate of al-
Muqtadir (295–320/908–32). Leiden: Brill. 2013, pp. 210–211. 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/9789004252707. 
88 Jacob Lassner and Michael David Bonner. Islam in the Middle Ages: the origins and shaping of classical Islamic 
civilization. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger. 2010, pp. 238. As early as al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and even before him we 
find that the four sources of Islamic law (Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, ijmāʿ and qiyās) leave no place for caliphal intervention.  
89 Popular violence began to play an important role in the way the Ḥanābila dealt with their adversaries such as al-
Ṭabarī (d. 310/923). Inquisition, p. 270. The same type of popular violence plays a role in the late 11th-century when 
Ibn al-Qushayrī comes to Baghdād to teach at the Niẓāmiyya. These riots between the Ashʿarīs and Ḥanbalīs were 
symptomatic of the decentralized nature of religious authority. Eric J. Hanne. Putting the caliph in his place: power, 
authority, and the late Abbasid Caliphate. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 2007, pp. 120–121. 
Baghdād was not the only place where rioting took place between various legal and theological factions. Bulliet 
documents the sectarian violence between Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs in Nīshāpūr and other cities of Khurasān and 
Transoxiana that led to the eventual demise of some of these cities even before the Mongol invasions. Ibid. 
Patricians, p. 31. 
90 I am looking at Sunnism here as an identity that resulted from a détente between the various madhhāhib (schools 
of law and jurisprudence) that take their inspiration from the major collections of Ḥadīth literature (the six books of 
Hadith). This approach is best summarized by al-Ghazālī in his Fayṣal al-Tafriqa in which he seeks to demonstrate 
that the various schools of jurisprudence and theology differ in their interpretations only as the result of the different 
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frustration at the factionalism of his time, innamā ṣārū hāʾulāʾi firaqan li-annahum fāraqū 
dīnahum fa-bi-mufāraqati al-dīn tashattatat ahwāʾuhum fa-iftaraqū, “These have only become 
various sects because they have separated themselves from their religion and through their 
separation from the true religion, their vain opinions have diverged and so they became 
sectarian.”91  
 
The Shīʿīs and the Ṣūfī Alternative 
 The development of Shīʿism and Sunnism as distinct viewpoints in Islam can be traced to 
the breakdown of Abbasid religious authority that occurred in the second half of the 9th-century 
C.E. It is no doubt that proto-Sunnī and proto-Shīʿī viewpoints had existed since early Islam. 
However, the need for a ‘real’ khalīfa for the Shīʿīs appeared in the form of ʿUbayd Allāh al-
Mahdī Billāh, supported by the Ismāʿīlī missionary (dāʿī) Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Shīʿī, who 
proclaimed ʿUbayd Allāh as Amīr al-Muʾminīn at the Aghlabid capital of Raqqāda in 910 C.E.92 
The Ismāʿīlī daʿwa started spreading his message among the Kutāma Berbers from 280/893 
onwards. At the same time the Twelver Shīʿīs were working out their doctrine of the lesser and 
greater occultation (ghayba). The doctrine of occultation served to preserve the imām/khalīfa at 
first as a hidden and then as a transcendental figure. The Ismāʿīlīs and the Twelver or Imāmī 
                                                          
existential planes upon which they base their thinking. Al-Ghazālī’s underlying message is that these various 
schools should accept each other as equally valid. We should move away from an orthodoxy/heresy dichotomy 
when discussing Sunnism and Shīʾism because we find in Islamic ‘heresiographical’ works such as al-Maqālāt al-
Islāmiyyīn by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936–936) that the approach is more of a ‘distance from an assumed 
norm’ than a clear label of heresy applied to various ‘Islamic’ groups. 
91 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 4, p. 183-184. Al-Tirmidhī uses the word iftaraqū (to become sectarian) in opposition to the 
word ikhtalafū (to differ in opinion). According to him the true scholars (al-ʿulamāʾ) are those whose beliefs do not 
cause them to separate themselves from the majority (al-sawād al-aʿẓam literally “the great multitude”).  
92 Marius Canard. “Fāṭimids.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 





Shīʿīs represent attempts to find alternative modes of religious authority in a period of upheaval 
when the Abbasid Caliph was no longer able to engage in the role of religious arbiter. It was not 
until the end of the 9th-century and first part of the 10th-century C.E. that these groups became 
explicit in the formulation of their respective doctrines.93 Thus, when we examine the various 
Shīʿī responses to this period of instability and loss of religious authority, we must also look at 
what the various Sunnī responses were. By the 9th-century C.E. proto-Sunnī legal scholars such 
as al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) had established the view that the prophetic Sunna overrode other forms 
of sunna and a general consensus developed over the sources of Islamic law.94 However, the 
legal scholar alone did not have enough authority to stem the tide of the factionalism, inter-
madhhab rivalry and conflict, which had gained momentum after al-Mutawakkil until the 
ascendancy of the Seljuks (1037–1194 C.E.) who imposed uniformity and their own form of 
orthodoxy on the fragmented religious landscape that they inherited.95 Clearly there was a 
movement among the proto-Sunnīs who saw the legal scholar as an arbiter of religious authority. 
The Ḥadīth text oft-cited by Sunnī scholars to this effect is the ḥadīth narrated by al-Tirmidhī96 
that states, al-ʿulamāʾ warathat al-anbiyāʾ, “The scholars are the inheritors of the prophets.” In 
                                                          
93 Shīʿī and pro-Alid sentiments were widespread among what we would call proto-Sunnīs as well since early Islam. 
The Abbasid Caliphate, for example, came to power amid a wave of pro-Alid sentiment. The Caliph al-Maʾmūn 
played with the idea of naming the Shīʿī Imam ʿAlī al-Riḍā (d. 202/818) as his successor to the caliphate. The 
polemical term rāfiḍī (denier) was used by many proto-Sunnīs to indicate someone who denied the caliphates of al-
shaykhayn (the two shaykhs), i.e., Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) and ʿUmar (d. 23/644). The term doesn’t refer to the Shīʿīs 
as a particular sect with a set of separate theological beliefs distinctly different than Sunnīs. It is at the end of the 9th 
century CE that we see a separate Shīʿī identity with the appearance of the first Shīʿī “heresiography” by al-Ḥasan b. 
Mūsa al-Nawbakhtī titled Firaq al-Shīʿa. For more on this alternative view of the development of Shīʿīsm see 
Mashall Hodgson’s article, “How did the Early Shīʿa become Sectarian?” Marshall G. S. Hodgson. 1955. “How Did 
the Early Shīʿa become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental Society. 75 (1): 1-13. 
94 Takim, Liyakatali. The heirs of the prophet charisma and religious authority in Shi'ite Islam. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 2006, p. 23. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=169518. 
95 Safi, Omid. The politics of knowledge in premodern Islam negotiating ideology and religious inquiry. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. 2006, p. 9. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10273394. 
96 This is a different al-Tirmidhī than the one we have been studying so far. This is Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī 




some versions of this ḥadīth the term khulafāʾ (caliphs) is used as a term indicating authority.97 
The legal scholar (faqīh) was not in a position that was strong enough, though, to claim religious 
authority among Sunnīs because he was only an ‘interpreter’ of the Sharīʿa and could not claim 
direct knowledge from God as the Shīʿī imām could do. This was because the caliph still 
reserved the right to appoint judges (ḥukkām) and in this capacity controlled who it was that 
would assume the role of arbiter of religious law. The faqīh could answer legal questions and 
provide legal opinions but had no power to impose his particular viewpoint on others. The 
struggle for religious authority between the caliph and the scholars (ʿulamāʾ) left both of these 
groups compromised in terms of their ultimate religious authority. The Ḥadīth scholar 
(muḥaddith) and the theologian (mutakallim) were similarly bound by their particular school and 
could not impose their doctrines for the advancement of their causes, except by appealing to 
others in power, such as the political rulers of the day.  
It is in this climate of competing notions of authority from the late 9th to the beginning of 
the 11th-century C.E. that we find a new type of identity and religious authority developing 
among the proto-Sunnīʿulamāʾ in the form of the Ṣūfī shaykh. The Ṣūfī shaykh obtains his 
authority through his maʿrifa (divine knowledge directly from God) and claims a position of 
authority above that of the outward religious scholar (al-ʿālim al-ẓāhir). We have to remember 
that Ṣūfīs in the eastern Islamic lands evolved out of the establishment of religious scholars 
themselves and so, rather than contesting the authority of the ʿulamāʾ, the Ṣūfīs made religious 
learning an important part of Ṣūfī identity. This structure is clearly proposed in the first Ṣūfī 
manual Kitāb al-Lumaʿ by Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 378/988). Al-Sarrāj claims that the fuqahāʾ 
                                                          
97 The term khalīfa, plural: khulafāʾ, is used to refer to the successor of Muhammad, the final prophet of Islam. 
Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds (1986) demonstrate that both the term khalīfat al-rasūl (successor to the 
Messenger) as well as khalīfat Allāh (successor of God) were both used by various groups to make claims of 
religious authority in early Islam. 
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(legal scholars) are above the Ahl al-Ḥadīth (Traditionalists)98 who only understand the outward 
purport of the Ḥadīth.99 He then places the Ṣūfīs above the fuqahāʾ as long as the Ṣūfīs have 
gained the same outward knowledge as the Ahl al-Ḥadīth and the fuqahāʾ. Otherwise, the Ṣūfī 
must follow these scholars of outward knowledge.100 According to al-Sarrāj, the Ṣūfī is on a 
higher level than the lower two categories because he can ‘choose’ between the various 
madhāhib (schools of law and theology) for what he considers to be most cautious in religious 
matters.101 In this view the ideal Ṣūfī should hail from the ʿulamāʾ in order to represent the 
highest level of attainment, which combines both outward religious knowledge and inward 
spiritual knowledge from God (maʿrifa). It is this inward spiritual knowledge from God that 
bestows religious authority upon the Ṣūfī, and as a result, the Ṣūfīs are able to solve legal and 
theological conundrums through their maʿrifa that would stymie the scholars of outward 
knowledge.102 Al-Sarrāj states that the fuqahāʾ are those who should be followed in religious 
matters. They do constitute a type of religious authority in his estimation, however, he places the 
Ṣūfī faqīh above the non-Ṣūfī faqīh. Thus, within the scholarly class the Ṣūfī shaykh is elevated 
above the scholar of jurisprudence (faqīh).103 We are not claiming that Sufism overrode juridical 
identities, but that Sufism incorporated and reconfigured juridical identities within the larger 
framework of Sufism as a meta-madhhab. Eventually, as Sufism developed into a formal Muslim 
identity there were attempts to submerge the juridical identity into the Sufi identity as reflected 
                                                          
98 ‘Traditionists’ are those who specialize in narrating Ḥadīth whereas ‘Traditionalists’ represent a conservative 
school of thought that eschews theological speculation and practices takyīf (not asking how) with respect to Qurʾānic 
verses and Ḥadīth about God that are not clearly understandable. Some Traditionalists take these verses and 
prophetic traditions literally. 
99 Abū Naṣr ʿAbdallāh bin ʿAlī al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī. The Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī al-Ṭaṣawwuf of Abū Naṣr ʿAbdallāh bin ʿAlī 
al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī. Edited for the first time, with critical notes, abstract of contents, glossary, and indices by Reynold 
Alleyne Nicholson, etc. E.J. Brill: Leyden; Luzac & Co.: London. 1914, p. 8. 
100 Ibid, pp. 10–11. 
101 Ibid, p. 11. 
102 Ibid, p. 15. 
103 Ibid, p. 10. 
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in the work of Ibn ʿArabī and other Ṣūfīs who attempted to unify the juridical madhāhib under 
one framework. Therefore we can see Sufism in its mature form as one of the Sunnī responses to 
the restructuring of religious authority from the end of the 9th century C.E. to the end of the 11th-
century C.E. was to posit the ʿulamāʾ as custodians of this authority in the form of the Ṣūfī 
shaykh.104 This was because a group of these ʿulamāʾ realized that the fuqahāʾ (legal scholars), 
the mutakallimūn (theologians) and the more conservative elements of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth could 
not rise above their factionalism. A movement that started in Baghdād at the end of the 9th 
century C.E. (the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād) provided a solution to the dilemma of inter-madhhab rivalry 
by proffering a Sunnī identity that could successfully rise above the factionalism among the 
various Sunnī madhāhib.105 Sunnī ʿulamāʾ such as al-Sarrāj were inspired by the Baghdād Ṣūfīs 
and sought to promote their vision of Islam, however, the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād themselves did not 
have a strong claim to religious authority despite the attempts of those like al-Sarrāj to place 
them in the highest rung of the ʿulamāʾ.106 It was al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood and 
religious authority that would provide the needed theoretical basis for the claim of Ṣūfī authority 
as the true inheritor of prophetic charisma to supersede the waning authority of the Abbasid 
Caliphs as well as the compromised authority of the ʿulamāʾ. We will demonstrate in Chapter 4 
how al-Sulamī combined these two trends to create a powerful synthesis that became the basic 
                                                          
104 Ibid. Heirs of the Prophet, pp. 181–182. 
105 Ahmed Karamustafa characterizes the early Ṣūfīs of Baghdād as an avant-garde, hip movement that sought to 
challenge the interpretive authority of the more conservative element of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth community. Karamustafa, 
Ahmet T. Sufism the formative period. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2007, p. 7. The Ṣūfī of Baghdād at 
the end of the 9th-century C.E. and beginning of the 10th-century C.E. came from many different legal and 
theological backgrounds. The Ṣūfīs of Baghdād demonstrated that the different strands of the larger Ahl al-Ḥadīth 
community, including the various legal and theological schools could be unified under a common identity. This new 
identity was harnessed by later Sunnī ʿulamāʾ who were looking for a way to unify the various Sunnī madhāhib 
(schools) 
106 The Ṣūfīs of Baghdād claimed special knowledge from God (maʿrifa) but did not seek to contest the political and 
religious authorities of their time. Rather, al-Junayd remained apolitical and low profile on social issues and points 
of religious doctrine as the events of the Miḥna demonstrated. Alexander D. Knysh. Islamic mysticism a short 
history. Leiden: Brill. 2010, pp. 55–56. 
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pattern for normative Sufism. We term this normative Ṣūfī synthesis that occurred in Nīshāpūr 
during the late 10th- and early 11th-centuries C.E., “the great mystical synthesis of the 5th- Islamic 
century.” 
 
Al-Tirmidhī and the Shīʿī Challenge 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, like Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 298/910) and many of the early 
Ṣūfīs of Baghdād during the 9th-century C.E., belonged to the class of proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ.107 
These ʿulamāʾ recognized the Ḥadīth traditions of the ṣaḥāba (companions) of the Prophet as 
authoritative as opposed to the Shīʿīs who were developing their own corpus of Akhbār (oral 
traditions) of both the Prophet and the Shīʿī imams. At the end of the 9th-century C.E. al-
Tirmidhī was writing polemical works against the rāfiḍa108 (the Shīʿīs) and the Shīʿī challenge is 
palpable throughout his works. For proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ like al-Tirmidhī the Shīʿī challenge was 
real and the political events of the following century proved how real it was. By 945 C.E. a 
Zaydī Shīʿī dynasty from Dailam in Northern Iran had captured Bahgdad and had become the de 
facto rulers of the Abbasid Empire maintaining the Abbasid Caliph as a figurehead. In 969 C.E. 
the Fatimids, an Ismāʿīlī Shīʿī movement, set up a counter caliphate based in Cairo, Egypt. 
Momentum had been growing since the latter part of the 9th-century C.E. for a solution to the 
religio-political crisis in authority that was occurring under the Abbasids.109 It was not only the 
                                                          
107 I call these the proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ because while they ascribe to a similar Ḥadith corpus the various “Sunnī” 
factions had not yet come to fully accept one another as valid representations of the Prophet’s sunna. Abū Jaʿfar al-
Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) uses the term Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa (The Party of Sunna and Majority) to indicate the 
beliefs of the school of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), however, the theological school of Abū Ḥanīfa was by no means 
accepted by other “Sunnī” schools. The Ashʿarī School of theology traces its core teachings back to Abū al-Ḥasan 
al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–936). 
108 This is a pejorative term Sunnīs use for Shīʿīs, referring to their refusing to acknowledge the first three Caliphs of 
Islam. 
109 The earliest Ismāʿīlī mission in Iraq is dated to between 875 and 878 C.E. at Salamya. It was from this small 
town on the western edge of the Syrian steppe (bādiya), thirty kilometers southeast of the present day Syrian city of 
Ḥamā. From this city the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa (proselytization) spread to Yemen and North Africa, eventually leading to 
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Shīʿīs who were contesting Abbasid religious authority, but there were also elements among the 
Sunnī ʿulamāʾ who were doing so as well. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī participated in this discourse 
on power and religious authority and spoke directly to the Shīʿī challenge. Al-Tirmidhī is 
credited with a short treatise titled, al-Radd ʿalā al-Rāfiḍa (The Refutation of the Shīʿīs) in which 
he responds to the claim of the Shīʿīs that the khilāfa (caliphate) of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib was 
obligatory upon all Muslims to follow just as prayer and zakāt were obligatory. Interestingly this 
treatise does not address the idea of naṣṣ (designation) of a Shīʿī Imām or the claims of various 
groups of Shīʿīs about the validity or supremacy of their Imām, which indicates the still nascent 
level of Shīʿī doctrine even at the end of the 9th-century C.E.110 Al-Tirmidhī speaks directly to 
Shīʿī claims throughout his works and focuses on the legitimacy and authority of ahl al-bayt, as 
specifically referring to the Alid line. Al-Tirmidhī explains the Qur’anic verse cited by Shīʿīs to 
support their position that the ahl al-bayt are maʿṣūm (divinely protected from sin), by saying 
that the ahl al-bayt cannot be infallible because this infallibility applies only to prophets. His 
position is not antagonistic to the ahl al-bayt because he goes on to clarify that those among 
them who are ʿulamāʾ and fuqahāʾ (legal scholars) are to be followed.111 Al-Tirmidhī’s argument 
                                                          
the establishment of the Fatimid Caliphate based in Egypt. Heinz Halm. The empire of the Mahdi: the rise of the 
Fatimids. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1996, pp. 11–14. It is not clear why this movement began when it did. Over half a 
century separates the death of Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl and the leader of the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa that begins with ʿAbd 
Allāh the Elder in Salamya. ʿAbdallāh the Elder sets himself up as the representative of the Imam in hiding and his 
forebears spread the message of his awaited coming and the true religion (dīn al-ḥaqq) that represents their esoteric 
doctrine. We find a similar pattern here with Twelver (Imāmī) Shīʿism, in which, individuals claim to represent an 
awaited redeemer (al-qāʾim bi al-ḥujja) from the Alid line. We have to remember that the Abbasids also claimed 
their religious authority based on their coming from the prophetic household (ahl al-bayt). There was really only one 
option for those who wanted to espouse an alternative to Abbasid authority and that was to champion the Alid line. 
Alid pretensions to power and authority had existed since the very beginnings of the Abbasid revolution (750 CE), 
however, the Alid imāms had usually kept a low profile and had abstained from challenging the Abbasids. For some 
reason, during the latter part of the 9th-century C.E. several groups in the Abbasid realm began contesting Abbasid 
religious and political authority on behalf of Alid Imāms who either had disappeared or were killed by the Abbasids. 
110 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Tirmidhī. “Al-Radd ʿalā al-Rāfiḍa.” Ed. A.S. Furat, in Sharkiyat Mecmuasi 6, 1996, pp. 
37–46. 
111 Al-Tirmidhī clearly demonstrates here that he sees the ʿulamāʾ as custodians of religious authority. He says in the 
same discussion about the place of ahl al-bayt in NU: wa idhā kāna hādhā al-ʿilm wa-al-fiqh mawjūdan fī ghayri 
ʿunṣurihim lazimanā al-iqtidaʾ bihim, “…and if this knowledge and legal understanding had been present in other 
than them (the ahl al-bayt) it would be incumbent upon us to follow them.” Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 101.  
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appeals to reason. He argues that the Prophet’s order to follow the ahl al-bayt cannot be a 
general pronouncement because some of them have been shown to be of disrepute.112 Al-
Tirmidhī even seeks to redefine the word ‘bayt’ in the phrase ahl al-bayt by using an 
etymological argument. He says that ahl al-bayt really means the ṣiddīqūn (the truthful ones) and 
the abdāl (substitutes).113 He argues that the word ‘bayt’ comes from the maṣdar of the tri-literal 
root b-w-ʾ in Arabic, which is tabwiʾa meaning ‘to settle.’114 The argument is that the Prophet 
came to this earth in order that the dhikr (remembrance of God) should ‘settle’ in the land and 
that any of those who migrated to this dhikr were called ahl al-bayt (the people of this 
settlement).115 Al-Tirmidhī not only criticizes the Alid line but also directs his criticism toward 
the Abbasid claim to the term ahl al-bayt.116 This is further justification that there were those 
among the proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ who felt that the Abbasids had forfeited their religious authority. 
Al-Tirmidhī criticizes the Shīʿīs for fabricating Ḥadīth about the family of the Prophet, 
specifically the cousin of the Prophet, ʿAlī (d. 40/661), the daughter of the Prophet, Fāṭima (d. 
11/632) and their two sons, Ḥasan (d. 50/670) and Ḥusayn (d. 61/680). He claims that they 
                                                          
112 Ibid, p. 69. 
113 These ‘substitutes’ in al-Tirmidhī’s hierarchy of saints are the forty individuals chosen by God who are each 
replaced by another saint if any one of their number dies. These forty individuals protect the earth through their 
special connection to God. This idea of the abdāl or ‘substitutes’ is much more basic than the later more 
sophisticated hierarchy of saints that we find in ʿAlī al-Hujwīrī’s (d. 469/1077) work Kashf al-Maḥjūb in which he 
describes one qutb (pole), three nuqabāʾ (leaders), four awtād (pillars), seven abrār (pious ones), forty abdāl 
(substitutes) and three hundred akhyār (chosen ones). In this later more complex hierarchy there is a clear ordering 
of prominence in the spiritual kingdom with multiple levels, which we find absent in al-Tirimidhī’s schema. 
114 Ibid, p. 263. 
115 This argument is problematic for several reasons. The first is that the root of the word bayt is considered by most 
grammarians to be from the root b-y-t meaning “to spend the night”. Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311) in his Lisān al-
ʿArab, one of the most comprehensive dictionaries of the Arabic language, records the root of bayt as b-y-t. Abū-
Faḍl Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn-Mukarram Ibn-Manẓūr. Lisān al-ʿarab al-mujallad 2. Bairūt: Dār aṣ-Ṣādir. 1994, 
Vol. 2, p. 14. The second problem with this argument is that it assumes that the meaning of ‘settling’ applies to the 
dhikr. This is an arbitrary relationship. Al-Tirmdhī relies here on the assumption that such relationships constitute 
ḥikma, which is a divinely gifted knowledge. Since this knowledge is inaccessible to others it can only be accepted 
based on al-Tirmidhī’s own claims to have access to divine knowledge. 
116 The Abbasids claimed that ahl al-bayt included not only the Prophet’s immediate household but also the larger 
paternal family with anyone from the clan of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (the grandfather of the Prophet) and Banū Hāshim 
(the descendants of the Prophet’s great grandfather) coming under this designation. Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, p. 140. 
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fabricated Ḥadīth in order to elevate their status and he claims that these Ḥadīth are denied by 
those who have correct judgment (al-muḥiqqūn).117 Al-Tirmdhī’s attempts to refute Shīʿī claims 
are numerous throughout his works and he addresses various aspects of their beliefs.118 It makes 
sense that al-Tirmidhī would directly confront Shīʿī claims to authority because the Shīʿīs 
represented the only viable alternative to the Abbasids and the ʿulamāʾ in terms of expressing 
and exercising religious authority (wilāya dīniyya). If al-Tirmidhī was going to advance a Sunnī 
doctrine of wilāya/walāya as he did, he would clearly have had to respond to the Shīʿīs. As we 
will see later, sainthood was a relatively undeveloped concept in Sunnī Islam outside of Shīʿī 
circles. Sainthood (walāya), supported by a gnoseology that was based on the rather 
underdeveloped concept of ḥikma (wisdom) among Muslim religious scholars during the 3rd/9th-
century, resulted in creating a new field of opportunity for expressing claims to religious 
authority that could compete with the Shīʿī challenge. 
 
Clientage (walāʾ) as a Social basis for Understanding Sunnī Authority. 
 We have discussed how the Muslim world experienced a contest between several groups 
for political and religious authority from the latter part of the 9th-century C.E. to the end of the 
10th-century C.E.  The Shīʿīs presented a potent challenge to the Abbasid caliphs as well as the 
proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ who had codified legal methodologies in the form of nascent schools 
(madhāhib) and had come to generally accept a canon of Ḥadīth as representative of the words 
and actions of the Prophet.119 The Abbasid Caliphs were losing their grip on power even though 
                                                          
117 Ibid, pp. 64–65. 
118 ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ A. Baraka. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī wa-nadhariyyatuhu fī al-wilāya. Vol. 1. Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth al-
Islāmiyya. Cairo. 1971, p. 170. 
119 We are still talking about a formative period in the development of Sunnī legal schools. It is not until the middle 
of the 4th/10th-century that Islamic legal schools come to contain all of the elements that give it an identifiable shape. 
However, by the middle of the 9th-century the major collections of Sunnī Ḥadīth were produced and the elements of 
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they still held immense charismatic authority. At the turn of the 4th/10th-century the Ṣūfīs of 
Baghdād began a movement among the ʿulamāʾ that successfully brought together adherents of 
various competing schools of thought into one movement among this proto-Sunnī urban 
scholarly community; however, this movement did not claim religious authority although it did 
claim Ṣūfī superiority over the scholars of outward knowledge (ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir).120 It is on the 
eastern edge of the Islamic world at this same time that al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī was contemplating 
and creating a vision of Sunnī religious authority that went far beyond the claims of other Sunnī 
ʿulamāʾ of his time. His vision grounded religious authority in an elect group of the ʿulamāʾ 
whom he called the awliyāʾ Allāh (saints of God). In Chapter 4 we will be discussing al-
Tirmidhī’s theory of walāya in further detail in terms of its internal consistency. Here we will 
look at how the social and political milieu of Khurāsān and Transoxiana clearly played a role in 
forming al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood and possibly his motivations for using it as a model 
to advance the claims to authority of the proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ. The proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ represent 
a large discourse stream in the 3rd/9th-century.121 This discourse stream is generally understood 
separately from the social institutions of Arab privilege that are assumed to have lost their 
efficacy after the Abbasid Revolution (132/750). While this is generally true, we will see how 
this was not the case in Khurāsān. 
 As mentioned earlier, al-Tirmdhī lived for much of his early life under Ṭāhirid rule in 
Transoxania in the city of Tirmidh. The Ṭāhirids were Abbasid mawālī, that is, they were clients 
                                                          
a Sunnī ‘approach’ was evident even if the various elements had not yet been worked into a full system. Hallaq, 
Wael B. The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2005, pp. 2–3. 
120 Green, Nile. Sufism: a global history. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 2012, p. 42.  
121 Muḥammad Qāsim Zamān’s work supports the thesis that a proto-Sunnī scholarly elite existed in the 2nd and 3rd 
Islamic centuries. Muḥammad Qāsim Zamān. Religion and politics under the early ʿAbbāsids: the emergence of the 
proto-Sunnī elite. Leiden: Brill. 1997. Christopher Melchert counters this thesis, however, my research on al-
Tirmidhī supports Zamān’s claims and I therefore consider his findings to be generally sound. 
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of the Abbasid house.122 Clientage (walāʾ) was a contractual bond of obligation between a free 
Arab Muslim and, often times, a manumitted slave. This social institution has its roots in Arab 
tribal society and was a means of integrating Arabs from one tribe into another. This allowed 
mawālī (pl. of mawlā) to obtain access to tribal privilege and protection. The system of walāʾ 
characterized Arab and non-Arab relationships during much of the Umayyad period (41–
132/661–750). During the Abbasid period the institution no longer served to functionally 
organize relationships of inequality between Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts to Islam; 
however, the institution was still perpetuated by the ruling Abbasid house, especially in its army 
and with the governors of its provinces.123 In particular, the province of greater Khurāsān 
(including Transoxania) was the most important province to the Abbasid Caliphs and represented 
its largest source of revenue. The Abbasid Caliphs preferred their mawālī as governors because 
they felt that the bond of loyalty among these clients was stronger than Arab or free Muslim 
subjects.124 The word for governor in Arabic is wālī and his governing function is called wilāya. 
All of these words, mawlā/ mawālī, wālī and wilāya come from the same Arabic root w-l-y, 
meaning ‘to be close to power, authority’ or ‘to hold power, govern, be in charge of some 
office.’125 Similarly, the word for ‘saint’ (walī) and for ‘sainthood’ (walāya) derive from this 
same root and share in the constellation of meanings found in this root. In Chapter 4 we will 
address in more detail the use of the English word ‘saint’ for walī and its appropriateness within 
the scheme of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of walāya. It is significant that throughout the Umayyad 
                                                          
122 Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. “Ṭāhirids.” EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 08 December 2014 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/t-a-hirids-
COM_1152> 
123 Crone, Patricia. “Mawlā.” EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. 
Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 08 December 2014 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/mawla-COM_0714> 
124 Ibid, EI2. 
125 Ibid, EI2. 
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period and into the Abbasid period, words formed from the Arabic root w-l-y are used to describe 
relations of power and dependence, specifically between Arabs and non-Arabs. These particular 
relations of dependence frame al-Tirmidhī’s position as one of the ʿulamāʾ who is a descendant 
of the early Arab settlers/conquerors of the region. As a free Muslim of Arab descent, al-
Tirmidhī had a higher social status, technically speaking, than the Ṭāhirid rulers of greater 
Khurāsān who were mawālī ruling on behalf of the Abbasids. Al-Tirmidhī must have felt the 
humiliation acutely when he was summoned by the wālī of Balkh at the behest of some of the 
scholars of his city to be publically admonished in front of the governor and ordered to cease his 
discourse on love.126 In NU al-Tirmidhī devotes a section to the characteristics of ‘just 
governors’ (wulāt al-umūr al-ʿādilīn). Al-Tirmidhī only gives these rulers sulṭān (executive 
power) temporal power, which can be revoked by God if they are not just (ʿādilīn) to their 
subjects. For al-Tirmidhī these temporal rulers are not khulafāʾ (successors, caliphs) of the 
Prophet like the awliyāʾ (saints) and thus have no religious authority in his eyes. Al-Tirmidhī 
includes not only the governors of his region in this category, but also the Abbasid ‘caliphs’ in 
Baghdād, as mentioned earlier.127 This was a transformative period for al-Tirmidhī and it is 
evident that he had begun to reassess the relationships of social dependence that had developed 
over time as well as the impact they had on legal and spiritual matters. The choice of al-
                                                          
126 Ibid. Concept, pp. 20–21. Al-Tirmidhī considered this trial at Balkh a means of God purifying his heart and he 
draws a parallel between himself facing persecution at the hands of his detractors and the Prophet David facing 
persecutions because of his mistakes. He describes this parallel in the passage directly following his description of 
the trial at Balkh. In this ordeal, al-Tirmidhī is maligned by the scholars of outward religious knowledge (ʿulamāʾ 
al-ẓāhir) whom he sees as inferior because they don’t have inward knowledge (al-ʿilm al-bāṭin). Furthermore, he is 
ordered not to teach about love of God by the non-Arab governor who is a mawlā. The parallel between himself and 
the Prophet David is important because in NU we find that David was humiliated by his son who sought to take his 
throne from him. Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, pp. 45–92. 
127 This is an early articulation by al-Tirmidhī of the division between political authority (sulṭān) and religious 
authority (khilāfa). Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī about two hundred years later articulates a similar division between 
wilāya (authority of the caliph) and shawka (force). Al-Ghazālī is describing the phenomenon in which the Seljuq 
mawālī came to control the Caliph and according to him wilāya follows shawka. Omid Safi. The politics of 
knowledge in premodern Islam negotiating ideology and religious inquiry. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 2006, p. 114. 
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Tirmidhī’s language is highly significant because his concept of sainthood (walāya) may be 
understood as patterned off of the social institution of clientage (walāʾ) that mediated 
relationships between the khalīfa (successor to the Prophet in the form of the Abbasid Caliph) 
and his mawālī upon whom he bestowed his wilāya (authority) to carry out his orders as his 
governors (wulāt). Al-Tirmidhī restructures the basic elements of clientage (walāʾ) such that the 
awliyāʾ (saints) are now the khulafāʾ (pl. khalīfa, successors of the Prophet) and are the truly 
‘free’ ones (aḥrār).128 The term awliyāʾ was also used as a synonym for mawālī in al-Tirmidhī’s 
time.129 Hence, for al-Tirmidhī, just as the Caliph frees the slave and then enters into a bond of 
allegiance known as walāʾ (clientage), it is God who frees the believing servant from the 
bondage of his lower self to make him his walī. In this scheme it is now God’s awliyāʾ (saints) 
who govern the world in a spiritual sense. As khulafāʾ (Caliphs) they are religious authorities just 
as the mawālī (also termed awliyāʾ) of the Caliph govern his subjects as wulāt (governors). 
 Al-Tirmidhī uses language that relates to the existing social institution of slavery to 
explain the process of becoming one of the awliyāʾ. This is ultimately a language describing the 
relationship of dependence between the owner and the owned. In al-Tirmidhī’s most important 
book on the nature of walāya he answers a question from one of his students about what happens 
in the event that thoughts occur to the heart of the walī that contradict the Qurʾān. In his answer 
al-Tirmidhī draws a parallel to the Prophet himself and explains that God will protect such an 
                                                          
128 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 4, p. 150, vol. 3, p. 120. 
129 When the Abbasid Caliph became alarmed at al-Layth b. ʿAlī b. al-Layth’s (d. 316/928) military activities in Fars 
and his threat to Khūzistān in 910 C.E., he had his vizier send 5,000 slave troops (awliyāʾ and ghilmān) under 
Muʾnis al-Khādim to recapture Fars. The awliyāʾ here represent freed slaves or mawālī and the ghilmān are Turkish 
slave soldiers who are still slaves and have not yet been freed. Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. The history of the 
Saffarids of Sistan and the Maliks of Nimruz: (247/861 to 949/1542–1543). Costa Mesa, Calif: Mazda Publishers in 
association with Bibliotheca Persica. 1994, p. 261. 
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individual from error like the Prophet was protected from the Satanic verses.130 This protection is 
not given to one who has not become completely free of his lower self and who is still a slave to 
his desires. The following quote from al-Tirmidhī’s SA is provided in extenso because of its 
importance in explaining the master-slave dynamic that underlies al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood: 
Qāla lahu al-qāʾil: fa-in warada ʿalā qalbihi shayʾun lā yuwāfiq al-
kitāb? Qāla: inna walāyata Allāhi lahu tughīthuhu kamā aghātha 
Allahu al-rasūla ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam fī risālatihi ḥattā 
yunsakhu ʿan qalbihi waḥyu al-shayṭān, wa-muḥālun an yakūna 
qalbun mawṣufun bi-hādhā bi-an yutrak makhdhūlan, wa law jāza 
hādhā an yadūm idhan la-baṭalat al-walāya, wa-innamā yajūzu 
hādhā al-takhlīṭ wa-dawāmu mithla hādhihi al-ashyāʾ li mithli 
hāʾulāʾ al-murīdīn al-ladhīna hum fī hādhā al-ṭarīq, wa-man 
waṣala ilā al-martaba wa-nafsuhu maʿahu mashḥuna bi-tilk al-
makāmin bi-dahāʾi al-nafs fa-ulzima al-martaba ʿalā sharīṭa al-
luzūm li-uhadhdhab, fa-huwa ka-l-mukātab al-ladhī yuʿṭaq ʿalā al-
māl, fa-huwa ʿabdun mā baqiya ʿalayhi dirham, fa-ammā man 
uʿṭaqa jūdan wa raḥmatan ʿalayhi qad ṣāra ḥurran lā tabiʿatun 
ʿalayhi li-man kāna yamlikuhu. Fa-kadhālika hādhā uʿṭiqa ʿalā 
sharīṭati luzūm al-martaba huwa ka-al-mukātab, fa huwa ʿabdun 
mā baqiya ʿalayhi khuluqun min akhlāq al-nafs, wa al-majdhūb 
aʿṭaqahu Allahu min riqqi al-nafs ḥīna jadhabahu fa-qad ṣāra 
ḥurran, wa alzama al-martaba ḥīna hudhdhiba wa uddiba wa 
ṭuhhira, fa-aʿṭaqahu Allāhu min riqqi al-nafs bi-jūdihi bi-lā tabiʿa, 
lam yabqā li-l-nafs fīhi muṭālaba khuluqun min akhlāqihā, fa huwa 
ayḍan majdhūb min al-martaba, wa qad bayyana Allāhu dhālika fī 
tanzīlihi fa-qāla: Allāhu yajtabī ilayhi man yashāʾ wa-yahdī ilayhi 
man yunīb, fa-l-mujtabā man jabāhu Allahu fa-jadhabahu, fa-
huwa min ahl jibāyatihi min al-mashīʾa, wa al-ākharu min man 
hadāhu Allāhu al-wuṣūla ilayhi bi-l-ināba, fa-l-awwalu min ahl 
mashīʾatihi wa-l-thānī min ahl hidāyatihi, wa-lā takhlū al-dunyā 
min hādihi al-umma min qāʾim bi-ḥujja, kamā qāla ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib raḍiya Allāhu ʿanhu: Allāhumma lā takhlu al-arḍ min qāʾim 
bi-ḥujja kay lā tabṭula ḥujaj Allāh wa-bayyinātih, wa qāla fī 
tanzīlihi: qul hādhihi sabīlī adʿū ilā Allāh ʿalā baṣīratin anā wa-
man ittabaʿanī, wa-lam yajʿalhā illā li-tābiʿīhi, fa-tābaʿahu man 
                                                          
130 Al-Tirmidhī does not claim that the awliyāʾ are infallible (maʿṣūm) as the Shīʿīs do of their Imāms. Rather, he 
explains in NU that only prophets are infallible and that all other human beings are tested (umtuḥinū - in the passive) 
except that the awliyāʾ have been lifted out of these tests (miḥan). 
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tābaʿahu ʿalā jamīʿi mā jāʾa bihi min ʿind Allāh qalban wa qawlan 
wa-fiʿlan.131 
 
The student asked him: “But what if something arrives in his heart 
which doesn’t agree with the Book?” He replied: Indeed he 
possesses Friendship with God which will assist him the way God 
assisted the Messenger with regard to his mission, namely God 
expunged from his heart Satan’s revelations. It is impossible that a 
heart endowed with these qualities be abandoned and forsaken by 
God. If such a state were allowed to continue, then [the person’s] 
Friendship (walāya) with God would be abolished. Indeed, such a 
state of adulteration and the persistence of such things are only 
possible in the case of those who are still striving on this path. The 
person who has reached the rank [of divine closeness] but whose 
carnal soul, in its secret corners, is still filled with the carnal soul’s 
cunning wiles is unconditionally obliged to remain in his rank in 
order to become refined. Thus he is like a self-ransomed slave who 
is freed for money. He is a slave as long as one dirham is still 
owed. On the other hand, the slave who was set free out of 
generosity (jūd) and mercy (raḥma), becomes a free man (ḥurr) 
without the one who formerly possessed him retaining any claim 
on him. And so is the manner of the man striving to reach God is 
set free on the condition that he remain in his rank, like a self-
ransomed slave. Indeed, he is a slave as long as one moral trait 
from among the moral traits of the carnal soul remains with him. 
Only the man drawn unto God is set free immediately by God from 
slavery to the carnal soul when God draws him unto Himself. And 
thus he becomes a free man. The other one adheres to his rank 
while he is being refined, educated and cleansed, and then God, in 
His generosity, sets him free from slavery to the carnal soul 
without responsibility. The carnal soul can no longer demand from 
him any one of its moral traits. Then he also becomes drawn from 
his rank [unto divine closeness]. God has made this clear in His 
revelation where He says [42/13]: “God chooses for it [the faith] 
whom He will, and He guides to it those that repent.” The chosen 
person is the one God appropriates and then draws unto Himself. 
And this person belongs to the people whom God has appropriated 
(ahl jibāyatihi) because He so wills. The other person is one of 
those to whom God gives guidance, and they reach Him through 
repentance. The first is one of the people of God’s act of willing 
(ahl mashīʾatihi), and the second is one of the people of His 
guidance (ahl hidāyatihi). Nor is the world of this religious 
community ever devoid of someone who presents proof [against 
                                                          
131 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Drei Schriften des Theosophen von Tirmid̲: Das Buch vom Leben der 
Gottesfreunde; Ein Antwortschreiben nach Saraḫs; Ein Antwortschreiben nach Rayy. Ed. Bernd Radtke. Beirut: 
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them] (qāʾim bi-l-ḥujja), as accords with what ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib 
said, “Oh Lord God, may the earth not be without someone who 
presents proof [against mankind] so that God’s proofs and clear 
evidence are not nullified.” And God in His revelation has declared 
[to Muhammad] [12/108]: “Say: ‘This is my path. I call [you] unto 
God with discernment (baṣīra), I and all my followers.’” And God 
only bestows this discernment upon those who follow Muḥammad, 
and his followers are those who follow him with regard to 
everything he brought from God – in their hearts, in their words 
and in their actions.132 
 
This selection from al-Tirmidhī’s SA distinguishes between two types of walī (saint). The 
first is the one who aspires to be a walī and is on the path of disciplining his lower self (nafs), but 
has not yet succeeded completely. This person is like the slave who is paying off his debt to his 
master. He has entered into an agreement with his master to pay off a set sum of money through 
his labor. He is called the mukātab and even after he pays off this amount he still retains a debt 
of allegiance and service to his master. Once the mukātab is freed he becomes a mawlā (pl. 
mawālī) and remains connected to his master through ties of loyalty. This type of walī must 
remain in his rank and is not completely free because the fact that he freed himself always 
compromises the nature of his walāya (sainthood). The second type of walī in al-Tirmdhī’s 
schema is the walī who is freed from the slavery to his lower self by God’s pure favor (jūd) and 
mercy (raḥma). This is the walī who becomes completely free (ḥurr, pl. aḥrār) and is the true 
saint. Both of these types of saints (awliyāʾ) are distinguished from the general populace who are 
all slaves (ʿabīd) to their lower desires whether they are aware or not. As we will discuss later in 
Chapter 5, according to al-Tirmdhī, traveling the path of walāya is a condition but not a 
guarantee that one will attain the highest levels of sainthood. The parallels in this concept of 
sainthood to the social bond of walāʾ (clientage) and the social institution of slavery are quite 
                                                          
132 Ibid. Concept, pp. 123–124. 
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striking. The true awliyāʾ can be seen as parallel to the free Arabs who were given a position of 
power and authority by historical circumstance (of course, in al-Tirmidhī’s understanding it was 
a divine gift). They came to rule over large numbers of non-Arabs who were also non-Muslim 
and the only way to rise in the new Arab polity during the Umayyad era was through clientage 
(walāʾ).133 These were free (aḥrār) Arabs who, like the true saints (awliyāʾ), did not earn their 
privilege but received it as a pure gift. The clients (mawālī) in this system could never become 
Arab but could rise socially by entering into a pact of clientage (walāʾ) with an Arab tribe or 
influential family. Theoretically speaking, this pact would extend in perpetuity to their offspring. 
The same is true for the walī who is mukātab. He never becomes a true walī such as the aḥrār, 
but once he is freed from his lower self he must remain in his rank even after having freed 
himself. On the other hand, al-Tirmidhī explains that the one who is freed out of God’s mercy is 
freed “without the one who formerly possessed him retaining any claim on him.” This ‘claim’ 
(tibāʿa) is another term for walāʾ and al-Tirmidhī uses this to mean that there is no bond of 
clientage, lā tabiʿata ʿalayhi, for the truly free walī.134  
The social bond of clientage, which characterized the relationship of Arabs and non-
Arabs since the beginnings of Muslim rule in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, provides a framework 
for articulating al-Tirmidhī’s positioning of the saint (walī) as the rightful heir to the Prophet’s 
religious and charismatic authority. Al-Tirmidhī uses this language of clientage and social 
dependence to describe the true saint, thereby translating the power differential inherent in this 
social institution into a plane of virtual relationships between saints (awliyāʾ) and those who are 
                                                          
133 A non-Arab convert could enter into a client-patron relationship from manumission or through voluntary 
commendation, this latter path being known by the terms tibāʿa, luzūm, inqitāʿ, khidma and more generally 
muwālāt. However, the vast majority of mawālī during Umayyad times came into this relationship through 
manumission as slaves. Crone, Patricia. Slaves on horses: the evolution of the Islamic polity. Cambridge [England]: 
Cambridge University Press. 1980, pp. 49–50. 
134 Ibid, p. 49. 
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not saints or have not attained sainthood. The question here is: Why would al-Tirmidhī do this? 
Who benefits from this realignment of social dependence in the virtual sphere? To answer this 
we have to come back to al-Tirmidhī’s identity as a member of the scholarly class (ʿulamāʾ) and 
as a Muslim of Arab descent in a largely non-Arab, and to some degree non-Muslim, context.  
Al-Tirmidhī conceives of the awliyāʾ as originating from the social class of the ʿulamāʾ. 
At the same time he is very critical of the ʿulamāʾ and so it is not all ʿulamāʾ who are liable to be 
saints but rather selected ones who are able to penetrate beyond the outward form of religious 
knowledge to its hidden esoteric meanings. In NU al-Tirmidhī clearly places the ʿulamāʾ above 
the general populace (ʿāmma) and below the anbiyāʾ (prophets). That point of distinction 
between these groups is knowledge (ʿilm). According to al-Tirmdhī knowledge is like a sea 
(baḥr) that flows into a river valley (wādī) and from a river valley to a river (nahr) and from a 
river to a creek (jadwal) and from a creek to a rivulet (saqiya).135 If the river valley were to flow 
directly into the creek it would overrun it (gharaqahu) and ruin it (afsadahu) and if the sea were 
to tilt (māla) into the river valley it would ruin it (afsadahu).136 The general populace (ʿāmma) 
here refers to free men who, in turn, educate their wives, children and slaves with the knowledge 
they have taken from the ʿulamāʾ. Hence, al-Tirmidhī’s larger spiritual hierarchy places the 
ʿulamāʾ as the authoritative representatives of the prophets above the general populace who are 
ignorant of the revelation. Al-Tirmidhī then provides three levels within the ʿulamāʾ class. These 
three are the ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir (scholars of outward learning, i.e., fuqahāʾ), the ḥukamāʾ (sages) 
and the awliyāʾ (saints).137 The fuqahāʾ are scholars of outward knowledge and al-Tirmidhī 
                                                          
135 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 30-31. 
136 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 30-31. 
137 The ʿulamāʾ (scholars of outward knowledge) are those who answer questions about the ḥalāl (permissible) and 
the ḥarām (forbidden). The ḥukamāʾ (sages) drop words of knowledge about God’s management (tadbīr) of the 
world and by sitting with them one benefits from their wisdom. The kubarāʾ (great ones – synonymous with awliyāʾ 
in al-Tirmidhī’s terminology) speak about the knowledge of God’s blessings (ālāʾ), and simply to behold them is a 
medicine, and their speech (kalām) is a healing. Ibid, p. 128. 
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likens their knowledge to a grammatical sentence. Outward knowledge (ʿilm al-ẓāhir) of Islam is 
the sentence itself and the inward knowledge (ʿilm al-bāṭin) or gnosis (maʿrifa) is the 
comprehension (tamyīz) of that sentence. Outward knowledge, according to al-Tirmidhī, is also 
known as the knowledge of the tongue (ʿilm al-lisān) and is God’s proof against humanity.138 Al-
Tirmidhī sees the Islamic sciences (Fiqh, Kalām, Ḥadīth, Tafsīr, Qawāʿid al-Naḥwu) as the basis 
and fundament for esoteric interpretation ab intra as understood by the ḥukamāʾ (sages). The 
awliyāʾ (saints) go beyond the esoteric interpretation of texts and engage in direct speech with 
God (muḥādatha) and receive direct knowledge from him.139 While al-Tirmidhī is highly critical 
of the ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir, he is critical of them only because they stop at the outward significance 
of their knowledge and do not go beyond it.140 This amounts to ruining (ifsād) the knowledge 
that they are supposed to represent. What al-Tirmidhī is attempting to do is to reform the social 
class to which he belongs. He is not only seeking reform but at the same time affirming the 
importance of this social class as the true religious authorities and successors (khulafāʾ) of the 
Prophet. As mentioned before with regard to the Shīʿī imāms, religious authority that claims 
direct contact with God is more powerful than a claim to mere interpretation of religious texts. 
The fact that al-Tirmidhī does not designate specific markers for identifying the awliyāʾ serves to 
sanctify the entire class of ʿulamāʾ. So, while we know that the awliyāʾ will originate from their 
ranks, we do not have markers to indicate who they are according to al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine.141  
                                                          
138 Al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm.ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ [Cairo]: Maktabat al-Ḥurrīya al-Ḥadīthah. 1983, pp. 
160–161. 
139 The saints (awliyāʾ) are no longer in need of texts for their knowledge. Al-Tirmidhī implies this in NU when he 
says, wa ammā al-ʿāmma fa innahum yaḥtājūn ilā al-nuṣūṣ wa al-āthār ʿalā alsinat ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir, “…and as for 
the general populace, they need texts and traditions upon the tongues of the outward scholars.” Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, 
p. 43. 
140 Ibid, vol. 4, pp. 72–73. 
141 Al-Tirmidhī does claim that there are ways to uncover who the awliyāʾ Allāh are but ultimately these are 
subjective despite the fact that he claims they are ẓāhira (outward). For example, he says that one can know the 
existence of sainthood (walāya) in an individual by looking into the face of such a person and if one sees the light of 
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We have discussed how al-Tirmidhī uses the language of clientage that, in his time, 
served to mediate relationships between free men and slaves, Arabs and non-Arabs, and caliph 
and subject, as a template for projecting the self-imposed (internalized) notions of obligation, 
loyalty, and commitment into a virtual realm. The social institution of walāʾ (clientage) was 
disappearing during al-Tirmidhī’s lifetime. The Abbasid revolution (750 C.E.) uprooted and 
replaced the old system of walāʾ for a more equitable relationship that used Islam as a common 
denominator between both Arab and non-Arab subjects. The old system did not disappear 
overnight though, and walāʾ continued on, especially in the caliph’s army and administration and 
in the all-important province of greater Khurāsān. Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya freezes the 
social relationships of power in his time and incorporates them into a virtual space. We say 
virtual here because real power had already been transferred to the non-Arabs who were ruling 
greater Khurāsān with practical autonomy in the name of the Caliph. The reality of this shift in 
real power became openly clear in the Ṣaffārid rebellion, in which greater Khurāsān was ruled 
for a short period of time in the second half of the 9th-century C.E. by Yaʿqūb al-Ṣaffār (d. 
265/879), a Persian of humble origins who had dismissed the authority of the ‘caliphal fiction.’ 
This fiction operated through a façade of local rulers paying tribute to the Abbasid caliph, while 
in reality they were not actually under the command of Baghdād.142 The occurrence of this 
rebellion is one of the few historical events that al-Tirmidhī records in his writings. So, while the 
social institution of walāʾ was disappearing in his time, al-Tirmidhī was calling for the 
preservation of social dependence as it was represented in that institution through his doctrine of 
                                                          
God’s majesty and feels the awe of God’s greatness one knows that such a person is one of God’s awliyāʾ. Ibid, p. 
140. 
142 Bosworth, C.E. “Yaʿḳūb b. al-Layt̲h̲.” EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, 





walāya. He envisioned the ʿulamāʾ as those who would become the guardians of religious 
authority with certain individuals among them who could become the saints (awliyāʾ) who would 
receive direct knowledge from God (maʿrifa). Even though local Persians had taken effective 
control of their political destinies in greater Khurāsān, according to al-Tirmidhī’s framework of 
walāya, they were still slaves (ʿabīd) and clients (mawālī) in a system that required them to 
follow the ʿulamāʾ for their ultimate salvation. Theʿulamāʾ were not only custodians of Islamic 
traditions and lore, but the elect (khāṣṣa) among them, according to al-Tirmidhī, were in direct 
contact with God.143 In an important passage in al-Tirmidhī’s IA he describes the awliyāʾ as the 
khulafāʾ of the Messenger who must be obeyed by the ʿāmma (general populace): 
Fa-lammā rafaʿhu Allāhu taʿālā ilayhi jaʿala lahu fī ummatihi 
khulafāʾ karāmatan lahu fa-fāraqahum ẓill al-hawā wa aʿtaqa 
nufūsahum min khayāliha fa kamā jaʿala ṭāʿata hāʾulāʾ al-khulafāʾ 
wājibatan ʿalā al-umma fadīlatan lahum ʿalā ghayrihim min al-
awliyāʾ wa hum khawāṣṣ al-awliyāʾ wa rijāl Allāh fī arḍihi 
alladhīna yaghbiṭuhum al-nabiyyūn wa-al-shuhadāʾ yawm al-
qiyāma li-makānihim wa qurbihim min Allāh ʿazza wa jalla wa-
taʿālā.144 
 
So, when Allāh most high took him (the Prophet) up to himself, he 
made successors to him from among his community. He (God) 
removed from them the shadow of vain desire and he (God) freed 
their souls from its fantasies. And so, in the same way he made 
obedience to those successors (khulafāʾ) obligatory upon the 
Muslim community as a special privilege for them over and above 
others of the saints (awliyā’). They are the elite of the saints 
(awliyā’) and God’s men in his earth; those who the prophets and 
the martyrs will envy on the Day of Judgment because of their rank 
and their nearness to Allāh, glorified and majestic and most high. 
 
The conflation of the term khulafāʾ (successors) with awliyāʾ (saints) unambiguously assigns 
religious authority to the awliyāʾ (saints). While the religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) often claimed to 
                                                          
143 Ethnicity was not the most important factor in identity formation in this period as has been discussed around the 
topic of the Shuʿūbiyya controversy. Ibid. Al-Shuʿūbiyya, EI2. 
144 Ibid. ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ, p. 140. 
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be warathat al-anbiyāʾ (heirs of the prophet), they almost never claimed to be khulafāʾ 
(caliphs).145 Similarly, the majority of Shīʿīs adopted the term Imām to indicate their religious 
and spiritual authority figure. The term khalīfa (successor or caliph) was the prerogative of the 
Abbasids and the Umayyads before them. Claiming khilāfa could be seen as a direct challenge to 
Abbasid claims to political and religious authority over the umma (community of Muslims).146 
Al-Tirmidhī’s language is brazen in both its dismissal of the Abbasids as religious authorities 
and in its direct rebuttal of Shīʿī claims. Identifying al-Tirmidhī as belonging to the discourse 
stream of the proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ is important to understanding why al-Tirmidhī proffers a 
doctrine of sainthood when he does. The social and political context of this discourse stream 
should then play an important role in defining the way al-Tirmidhī structures his doctrine of 
walāya. We find this to be true, since it is the social institution of clientage that provides an 




 The latter part of the 9th-century C.E. and much of the 10th-century C.E. saw an intense 
debate within the lands of the Muslim caliphate over the nature of both political and religious 
authority. The Shīʿīs emerged as a major opposition to the Abbasids and were even successful in 
establishing a counter-caliphate. The Shīʿīs were not the only ones who were claiming khilāfa 
                                                          
145 While the term Caliph (khalīfa) has a much broader signification than simply the temporal Caliphs of the 
Umayyads and Abbasids, al-Tirmidhī uses the term specifically to refer to religious authority that requires obedience 
to what he terms the real khulafāʾ (Caliphs) who are the awliyāʾ in his schematization of the term. It is significant 
that those groups who sought to claim religious authority did so by appropriating this specific term.  
146 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds (1986) trace the use of the word khalīfa (successor, Caliph) from the Rāshidūn 
Caliphs up through the Abbasid era and conclude that this term was used by both Umayyad and Abbasid rulers to 
claim not just successorship (khilāfa) to the Prophet but also to mean the successor appointed by God. The 
Umayyads established a counter caliphate in Spain while the Fatimids established a caliphate in North Africa. Both 
of these movements represent direct challenges to Abbasid authority. 
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(successorship, caliphate) from the Abbasids. On the eastern edge of the Abbasid Empire al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī was working out another vision of khilāfa that would place the awliyāʾ 
(saints) in the position of khulafāʾ (successors) to prophetic authority and charisma. These 
khulafāʾ, for al-Tirmidhī, would ultimately came from the ranks of the proto-Sunnī ʿulamāʾ. Al-
Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya would later be incorporated into the great mystical synthesis of the 
10th-century C.E. in Nīshāpūr where the Sufism of Baghdād-inspiration took its mature form. In 
Chapter 4 we will show how al-Tirmidhī’s concept of walāya became a part of this synthesis and 










Wisdom Meditates the Terrestrial and Celestial:  
Pythagorean Wisdom and the Non-duality of Sainthood 
Ḥikma (wisdom) is not one of Franz Rosenthal’s categories of 
knowledge; however, it is a central theme in al-Tirmidhī’s 
gnoseology and doctrine of sainthood. Al-Tirmidhī not only adopted 
established concepts of ḥikma, but reinvented its meaning to fit his 
own paradigm. This chapter will discuss conceptions of ḥikma in 
both Muslim and non-Muslim sources. Using al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb 
al-Ḥikma we will show how al-Tirmidhī takes his concept of ḥikma 
from the Neopythagorean Hellenistic tradition. For al-Tirmidhī, 
ḥikma is different than gnosis (maʿrifa) and ḥikma, as a knowledge 
of the world and its opposites, serves to frame his essentially non-
dual metaphysic. Ḥikma provides a backdrop for al-Tirmidhī’s 
doctrine of sainthood. 
 
The Importance of Ḥikma 
 In this chapter we intend to show how al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s use of ḥikma is critical to 
understanding his doctrine of sainthood (walāya). As was previously discussed in the 
Introduction, al-Tirmidhī’s mysticism can be considered a gnoseology or a mystical doctrine 
based on a special kind of knowledge and a special access to that knowledge. It is for this reason 
that a discussion of al-Tirmidhī’s epistemology is critical to understanding his concept of walāya 
(sainthood). In other words, if the saint (walī) is one who is distinguished by a special kind of 
knowledge, then the definition and character of that knowledge will affect who we understand 
the saint to be. Franz Rosenthal appears to misinterpret al-Tirmidhī’s concept of wisdom and 
incorrectly conflates ḥikma (wisdom) and ʿilm (knowledge), which is something al-Tirmidhī 
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would never have accepted given his rejection of the existence of synonyms. The fullest 
treatment of ḥikma in the Islamic tradition is provided by Dimitri Gutas who has furthered our 
understanding of ḥikma as a literary genre in both Arabic and non-Arabic sources. He does not, 
however, discuss ḥikma as a knowledge-type. Part of the difficulty in establishing a basis for an 
understanding of ḥikma (wisdom) during the 8th- and 9th-centuries C.E. in Iraq and Khurāsān is 
that no current study adequately addresses ḥikma as a knowledge-type. Most discussions 
concerning the topic tend to define ḥikma as it is represented in Greek philosophy in Aristotelian 
and Neoplatonic forms. This projects an Aristotelian and Neoplatonic view of ḥikma, as it was 
conceived in the 10th century C.E., anachronistically onto the 8th- and 9th-centuries C.E. when al-
Tirmidhī was active. There were also many indigenous forms of ḥikma that took on their own 
significances within particular communities in the Near East since the Hellenistic period. Using 
Rosenthal’s categories of knowledge we have a picture of al-Tirmidhī’s basic episteme. Ḥikma is 
not one of Rosenthal’s categories of Islamic knowledge-types. However, ḥikma certainly was an 
important category among eastern Christians and Jewish Rabbanites. Furthermore, ḥikma 
(wisdom) is mentioned in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature despite its secondary importance in 
relation to ʿilm (knowledge) in later Islamic scholarship. All of these factors provided an 
opportunity for al-Tirmidhī to focus on ḥikma (wisdom) as an alternative to ʿilm (knowledge). 
It is in the 10th-century C.E. that we begin to see a shift in categories that eventually 
equates ḥikma (wisdom) with philosophy in its Neoplatonic and Aristotelian forms. It will be 
stressed that a discussion about ḥikma must necessarily include a discussion of the ḥukamāʾ (the 
sages or the purveyors of ḥikma) to the extent that we can identify the ḥukamāʾ as particular 
individuals, as in the case of al-Tirmidhī, or as those who represented an ideal-type who 
possessed a special vouchsafed knowledge from God such as al-Junayd. The extent to which 
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ḥikma (wisdom) is embodied as ḥukamā’ (sages) will help us to understand the manner in which 
this type of knowledge was conceived and valued during this period. The question that concerns 
us here is the extent to which the concept of ḥikma during this period differs from how it was 
understood in the context of Hellenistic philosophy in its more mature form in the mid to latter 
part of the 10th-century C.E. Ḥikma came to signify a particular set of meanings for particular 
segments of the learned class during the 8th- and 9th-centuries C.E. before it subsequently took on 
a more specific technical usage with the full bloom of Falsafa. Hence, our project here is to 
survey the uses of ḥikma amongst these groups beginning with the Christian ascetic Isaac of 
Nineveh (d. 700 C.E.) and ending with al-Tirmidhī himself. What we propose here is that a 
variety of concepts of ḥikma existed side-by-side during this period until, eventually, a 
particularly ‘philosophical’ or Neoplatonic meaning of ḥikma became dominant by the middle of 
the 10th-century C.E. While al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma was definitely Hellenistic, it was not 
the philosophical form that became widespread in the 10th-century C.E.147 Al-Tirmidhī not only 
borrowed a particular form of Hellenistic ḥikma, but he modified it to suit an Islamic context. We 
will demonstrate this new position with respect to al-Tirmidhī by introducing my findings from 
al-Tirmidhī’s KH, which exists only in manuscript form in a single library in Bursa, Turkey. In 
the chapter that follows we will demonstrate how al-Tirmidhī uses this particular type of ḥikma 
to propose something quite novel in his approach to walāya (sainthood). 
 
                                                          
147 In this respect we are countering Bernd Radtke’s thesis that al-Tirmidhī’s thought is only tangentially and 
superficially Hellenistic. That is, it was not learned but unconsciously appropriated. We do not go as far as Yves 
Marquet though in saying that it was purely Neoplatonic. A. M. Goichon concludes that the scientific aspect of 
hikma remains unbroken from the Greeks to the Arabs. We find this to be true with al-Tirmidhi in which a 
mystical/scientific view of hikma is used rather than a philosophical/scientific usage. Goichon, A.M. “Ḥikma” EI2. 
Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. 




Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in the Near East 
 The sage (ḥakīm, pl. ḥukamā’) is a motif that has persisted for millennia throughout the 
Near East whether it is in extra-biblical texts such as The Words of Aḥiqār or from the sages of 
the Biblical tradition (Esther and the Song of Songs) or even the New Testament.148 
the sage motif takes on new and varied forms during Late Antiquity amongst the Rabbis 
(hakhamīm or wise ones) as well as Nestorian Christians who discussed the sage (ḥkemā) and his 
wisdom (ḥkemūtā). Geographically, the sage motif in the pre-Islamic period spans from Egypt to 
Persia149 (Ancient Iran), India and China in the East, as well as from Greece (Sophia, i.e., the 
writings of the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle) to Yemen150 in the South.151 Thus, when we 
find ḥikma and the motif of the ḥakīm prominent in the works of a 9th-century C.E. Muslim 
mystic from Transoxania, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, we should not be surprised. This diffuse use of 
the term over such large temporal and geographical areas makes it difficult to make 
generalizations about the meaning of ḥikma (wisdom) without looking at particular contexts.  
 
Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in Jewish and Christian Thought (7th- and 10th-centuries C.E.) 
We will now look at how various Christian and Jewish writers living in Muslim lands 
used ḥikma and the sage motif to indicate a special type of knowledge as well as the 
knowledgeable individual. A Nestorian mystic and ascetic by the name of Isaac of Nineveh 
wrote a series of ascetical homilies that have become classics in both the Catholic and Eastern 
                                                          
148 J. G. Gammie et al. The Sage in Israel and the ancient Near East. Winona Lake, IN.: Eisenbrauns. 1990,  p. xi 
149 Ibid, pp. 144–146 
150 Dimitri Gutas. “Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature: Nature and Scope.”  Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 101, No. 1, Oriental Wisdom (Jan. - Mar., 1981), p. 78. There is no consensus on the origin of Luqman 
whose name is associated with maxims (ḥikma) in pre-Islamic Arabia. The Islamic tradition and most early Arabic 
sources associate Luqmān with South Arabia and the tribe of ʿĀd in particular. 
151 Ḥikma can be distinguished from Greek paideia. Paideia transfers over in Arabic to the word adab (arts) and 
taʾdīb (education in the arts). Ibid. Knowledge Triumphant, p. 284. 
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Orthodox traditions. Isaac was consecrated bishop of the Nestorian Church by the Patriarch 
George (660–680 C.E.) after having been a monk at the monastery of Bethabe in Kurdistān. 
However, after only five months in the bishopric he abdicated and moved to the monastery of 
Bar Shapur where he died in the mountains of Kuzistan in western Iran.152 Isaac of Nineveh is 
significant to our discussion of al-Tirmidhī because his writings demonstrate how developed the 
motif of the ḥakīm had become in the Syriac Christian literature of the early Islamic period. Isaac 
of Ninevah lived during the Muslim/Arab conquests of the 1st Islamic century (7th-century C.E.). 
During this period Muslims were mostly segregated in garrison towns in Kufa and Basra in Iraq 
so it is almost certain that they had no impact on Isaac’s thought. We can therefore assume that 
Isaac is providing us with an insight into ḥikma as it was understood just prior to the 
Muslim/Arab conquests.  
Isaac of Nineveh refers to the ḥukamāʾ both as those who had attained religious authority 
as well as a motif or prototype of the ideal ascetic. In a fascinating set of passages in the 
Homilies Isaac refers to the pagan philosophers ( ܘܣܠܝܦܦ ) as “external” sages (ܐܡܝܥܚ). He 
provides a story of one philosopher who attempts to control his will at all cost lest his ‘wisdom’ 
be sullied, even if it should mean death at the hands of the ‘Greek king’ Alexander.153 Isaac’s 
argument is that if these pagan philosophers are able to control their lower passions without the 
reward of Paradise, then the Christian ascetic who has God’s help and the incentive of Paradise 
should have an increased sense of incentive and the ability to achieve such control.154 The 
reference here is clearly to some type of Stoic philosophy, however, it should be noted that these 
                                                          
152 J. Arendzen. “Isaac of Nineveh,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 
1910.  Retrieved May 6, 2013 from New Advent:http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08176a.htm 
153 Isaac.. Mystic treatises by Isaac of Nineveh. Edited and Translated by A.J. Wensinck, and Paul Bedjan. 
Amsterdam: Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen. 1923, pp. 272–273. 
154 Ibid, p. 274. 
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‘philosophers’ are presented as indigenous sages who confront Alexander the Great, the 
Macedonian king who is credited with the introduction of Hellenism into the East.155 Isaac also 
uses the term ܐܡܝܥܚ (ḥkemā) to refer to a biblical sage who says, “Haughtiness comes before 
ruin.” Arent Jan Wensinck indicates that Isaac may be paraphrasing Proverbs 16:19 in this quote; 
however, we should note that Isaac’s quote does not convey the same meaning as the biblical 
statement. Another important passage concerning the sage in Isaac’s work juxtaposes the humble 
servant of God to the philosopher and sage. The sages are forced to remain silent before the one 
who is truly humble. They listen to his words with awe and the words of the humble seem like 
words from God himself.156 We can see that Isaac of Nineveh who lived approximately 150–200 
years before al-Tirmidhī in western Khurāsān saw the sages as pagan philosophers and 
indigenous wise men who can be said to have practiced what came to be known as a form of 
Stoicism. These sages seem to have held authority in the eyes of Isaac’s audience since he uses 
the sages as a backdrop to elevate the Christian ascetic who is supposedly greater than the sage, 
not only in his ascetic discipline, but also in his words of wisdom. It is important to note that the 
sages mentioned by Isaac are noted for their asceticism and not for their theoretical knowledge. 
For Isaac, the ḥkemā (sage) is quite distinct from the Christian ascetic. His knowledge is worldly 
in juxtaposition to the Christian ascetic whose knowledge is otherworldly. 
We also have a rich tradition of wisdom literature by the Jewish sages who have been 
credited by Rabbinic tradition as the saviors of Judaism after the destruction of the Second 
Temple. The Rabbinic sages (ḥākāmīm) became a class of learned specialists in the Torah and 
halakhā (Jewish religious law) during the period of Late Antiquity. It was the ḥākamīm from the 
                                                          
155 The beginning of Stoicism follows after the great conquests of Alexander the Great. It is possible that the cultural 
and intellectual exchange brought upon by these conquests facilitated the borrowing of what became Stoicism by 
Zeno of Citium from Persia rather than the other way around. 
156 Ibid, p. 388. 
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Levant and Babylon who eventually became the spokesmen for the majority of Jews. This 
process took almost five centuries beginning after 70 C.E. and culminated in the collection and 
redaction of the Mishnah and Talmud.157 The Rabbinic sage came to be associated with the 
development of a particular brand of Jewish law (generally reffered to as Halakha) and biblical 
exegesis. They were devoted to the study of the Torah, which consists of the Pentateuch, or the 
first five ancient books of the Bible. This intellectual and spiritual ‘study of the Torah,’ in 
addition to prayer, came to replace the centrality of sacrifice as a means of communicating with 
God.158 By the 8th-century C.E. we find that a split developed in the Jewish community between 
the Rabbanites and the Karaites. The latter group arose in conscious opposition to the Rabbinic 
sages. The Kairites accepted only the Tanakh as a source for Jewish law and rejected Rabbinic 
scholarship and exegesis, which the Rabbis and growing circles in Jewish society had gradually 
come to refer to as the Oral Torah.159 Both the Rabbanites and the Karaites used the term sage 
(ḥākām) to refer to legal authorities within their respective communities, however, the 
Rabbanites preferred to use the term as a collective when they referred to their scholarly 
ancestors who were, in their mind, an important link between the Rabbanites of the Amoraic 
period and Moses. Over time the Karaites came to use the term ḥākām as a title to refer to their 
                                                          
157 There are two main approaches in modern Jewish scholarship over the origin of the Rabbinic sages. One view 
holds that a class of Torah specialists arose in the 3rd-century B.C. to oppose the worldly priesthood that came to 
control the Temple. This class of Torah specialists was the precursor to the Pharisees which were considered the 
precursors to the Rabbinic sages. This view does not stand up well against the current literary and archaeological 
record. The second view holds that the Rabbinic sages were independent learned scholars of Torah who gradually 
developed a legal and exegetical tradition over the four to five hundred years from the fall of the Second Temple to 
the completion of the Babylonian Talmud. Steven D. Fraade. “The Early Rabbinic Sage,” in The Sage in Israel and 
the Ancient Near East. Gammie, John D. and Perdue, Leo G. Winona Lake, IN.: Eisenbrauns. 1990. 
158 Ibid, p. 436. 
159 Daniel J. Lasker; Joel Beinin. “Karaism.” Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World. Executive Editor Norman 






scholars. We will look at two important Jewish scholars from the 10th-century C.E., one a 
Rabbanite, Saʿādia Gaon (d. 942 C.E.), and the other a Karaite, Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī (d. second 
half of 10th-century C.E.).  
In his work al-Amānāt wa-l-Iʿtiqādāt (Book of Beliefs and Opinions), Saʿādia Gaon seeks 
to defend the Rabbinate against its Karaite detractors. An important theme that has generally 
been overlooked in the study of Saʿādia’s work is his discussion around the nature of the ḥakīm 
(in Arabic) or ḥākām (in Hebrew). Saʿādia includes a chapter on ḥikma (wisdom) in his book al-
Amānāt and distinguishes between what he considers to be the true ḥakīm modeled after 
Solomon as opposed to the ḥukamā’ of his time whom he accuses of extremism and perversion 
of religion. Saʿādia writes concerning the ḥukamāʾ:  
min talāmidh al-ḥukamāʾ man zaʿama annahu laysa yanbaghī an 
yashtaghil aḥadun fī dār al-dunyā bi-shayʾin siwā ṭalab al-ḥikma 
wa qālū li-anna bihā yūṣalu ilā maʿrifati kulli mā fi al-arḍi min al-
ṭabāʾiʿ wa-l-amzija wa-ilā ʿilmin kathīrin mimmā fī l-samāʾ min 
al-kawākibi wa-l-aflāk.160 
 
Of the followers of the sages are those who claim that it is 
unnecessary for anyone to busy himself in this world with anything 
other than seeking wisdom and they say that this is because 
through it (wisdom) is attained the knowledge of everything in the 
earth of natures and temperaments and immense knowledge of that 
which is in the heavens of both planets and heavenly orbs. 
 
After Saʿādia mentions the claims of those whom he says follow the sages, he explains how their 
approach runs counter to religion: 
wa-law aṭbaqa al-nās ʿalā ma qāla hāʾulāʾi la-baṭalat al-ḥikma bi-
inqiṭāʿ al-nasl bi-tark al-tazwīj wa-law tashāghalu bi-ḥikmat al-
bunyati (al-dunyati) waḥdahā tarakū ḥikmat al-dīn wa-l-sharīʿa 
                                                          
160 Saʿādia b. Joseph. Kitāb al-Amānāt wa al-iʿtiqādāt. Ed. S. Landauer. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1880, p. 309. 
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allatī innamā ḥubbibat ilayhim hādhihi li-tuʿaḍid tilka fa-taḥsan 
jumlatuhuma.161 
 
Had the people applied what those people have said wisdom would 
cease to be operative as a result of the cutting off of progeny 
through the leaving of marriage and had they busied one another 
with the wisdom of this world exclusively they would have 
neglected the wisdom of religion and the law for which this 
(worldly wisdom) was simply made beloved to them in order for 
them to support that (other wisdom) such that the both of them 
could be achieved” 
 
For Saʿādia, the sages who are his interlocutors are not the ideal sages of the Bible. King 
Solomon is rather conspicuously given the title al-ḥakīm as if to lay to rest any doubt about who 
the true ḥakīm really is.162 Saʿādia is not against wisdom, per se, but rather is against the idea that 
temporal wisdom should become an end in itself. His use of the term talāmidha (students) 
indicates that there may have been a real movement in his time to return to the ideals of the 
earlier sages, however, these sages are clearly those who are engaged in Hellenistic wisdom. As 
with Isaac of Nineveh we see a tension in the work of Saʿādia between two types of sages, one 
representing a ‘pagan’ ideal and the other representing a Biblical ideal. For Saʿādia, the sages are 
not only engaged in worldly knowledge, but they are also ascetics. One of his main criticisms of 
these ascetic sages, from a Jewish perspective, is that they are celibate. It is also significant to 
note that for both Saʿādia and Isaac, the sages go unnamed. This is also true for al-Tirmidhī’s use 
of the term. Saʿādia lived the first part of his life in Egypt, which was a traditional center of 
Greek philosophy during the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Both Saʿādia and Isaac use the 
motif of the sage as a platform from which to communicate their ideas giving the impression that 
we are possibly dealing with a Hellenistic movement that was still active well into the Islamic 
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period. The other possibility is that the reactions of these two figures represent something of a 
resurgence of interest in Hellenistic thought in their times. Saʿādia and Isaac both attempt to use 
a pagan sage motif in order to position the ideal Christian and Jewish religious virtuoso. The 
sage is a conduit of divine speech in the case of Isaac, but a scholar of the Torah and religious 
law in the case of Saʿādia. 
 Another Jewish scholar who lived at the same time as Saʿādia was the Karaite Yaʿqūb al-
Qirqisānī. His work Kitāb al-Anwār wa al-Marāqib is a voluminous work on theology and 
heresiography. For al-Qirqisānī, the philosophers are clearly Aristotelian and Neoplatonic. He 
specifically mentions Alexander of Aphrodisias163, John of Caesarea164 and Porphyry165 as 
philosophers who wrote commentaries on Aristotle. Al-Qirqisānī mentions these three 
philosophers in order to argue that the prophets who brought revelation from God are more 
worthy to have their revelations be the subject of commentary than Aristotle.166 The title ḥakīm, 
according to al-Qirqisānī, is a more general term used to refer to these philosophers and indicates 
their pagan origin. Al-Qirqisānī mentions that the ḥakīm is one who would reject circumcision on 
logical grounds.167 For al-Qirqisānī, ḥikma relates to what can be seen and he refers to it as 
mushāhad (that which can be witnessed and thus that which is created). For example, he argues 
that God can be described as having a heart because he is called ḥakīm since, according to al-
                                                          
163 A peripatetic philosopher of the 2st and 3rd-centuries C.E. known for his commentaries on Aristotle. Dorothea 
Frede. “Alexander of Aphrodisias”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/alexander-aphrodisias/>. 
164 John of Caesarea was also known as John the Grammarian. He was a priest and theologian who lived during the 
late 6th-century C.E. before the rise of Islam. He was one of the first Neo-Chalcedonians. Kazhdan, Alexander P. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
165 Porphyry (d. circa 305 C.E.) was a Neoplatonist philosopher from Tyre in Phoenicia and studied with Plotinus in 
Rome. He was a promulgator of Plotinus’ version of Platonism and sought to harmonize Neoplatonic thought with 
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166 A. Yūsuf Ya-qūb al-Qirqisānī. Kitāb al-Anwār wal-Marāqib: code of Karaite law. Ed. Nemoy, L. New York: 
The Alexander Kohut memorial foundation, vol. III. 1939, p. 223. 
167 Ibid, vol. III p. 214. 
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Qirqisānī, ḥikma resides in the heart and is mushāhad, i.e., created.168 In one sense ḥikma is a 
type of knowledge that resides in the heart but, on the other hand, ḥikma is a term that al-
Qirqisānī uses to indicate a meaning that approximates ‘reason’ such as when he describes the 
views of a heretical group of Jews whom he says deny that God can punish individuals because it 
does not accord with ḥikma (wisdom) and ṣalāḥ (reason and benefit). The double meaning of 
ḥikma in al-Qirqisānī’s writings indicates the ambivalence that often accompanies the use of this 
term. On one hand, ḥikma is knowledge bequeathed by God, but on the other, it can also refer to 
the wisdom of pagan philosophers and sages. 
 
Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in 9th and 10th-Century C.E. Khurāsān and Transoxania 
We will turn now to a discussion of the ḥakīm and ḥikma among Muslim authors 
generally contemporaneous with al-Tirmidhī, and we will focus on ḥikma and the ḥukamāʾ 
according to the Ṣūfīs, Shīʿīs and Falāsifa. I will begin with a general survey of the current 
discussion in the literature around the ḥukamāʾ and their origins according to the early Ṣūfīs. 
This discussion is rather limited given that Ṣūfī studies can sometimes suffer from a silo effect in 
which themes and motifs tend to be restricted to those dealing with Ṣūfīs. This is problematic 
when dealing with a widely diffuse motif such as the ḥukamāʾ and their ḥikma.  
Annemarie Schimmel and Suzanne Diwald present a hypothesis that the ḥukamāʾ of 
Balkh (of which al-Tirmidhī was associated) represent a Neoplatonic mystical ‘school’ whose 
origin returns to the ‘master,’ Shaqīq al-Balkhī (d. 194/810) and his student Ḥātim al-Aṣamm 
(d.237/852).169 This hypothesis was rejected by Bernd Radtke who claims that al-Tirmidhī’s 
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education did not include non-Islamic sciences such as Greek natural science and philosophy.170 
In Radtke’s view the possible Hellenistic influence on al-Tirmidhī is due to diffuse elements that 
had permeated Near Eastern culture and society. For Radtke, the hukamāʾ were a group of 
learned Muslim mystics based in Khurāsān and Transoxania. Furthermore, for Radtke, the ḥakīm 
was not a Ṣūfī and he quotes ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī (d. 481/1089) in this regard by relating a 
comment made by a student of al-Tirmidhī, Abū Bakr al-Warrāq (d.280/893), “Er hat die thora, 
die evangelien, die psalmen, und die himmlischen bücher gelesen und einen diwan verfasst… Er 
war ein gotterkennender hākīm (ḥakīmī ʿārif), kein ṣūfī, der ṣūfī ist etwas anderes.”171 Radtke 
considers the title ḥakīm to have been given to al-Tirmidhī by others and not a title that he 
ascribed to himself since the ḥakīm represents a lower rung on the spiritual hierarchy beneath 
that of walī (saint).172 For Jacqueline Chabbi the ḥakīm simply has didactic value during this 
period, representing a teacher who has knowledge of the human soul.173 These various 
viewpoints about the social and didactic role of the ḥakīm in the world of al-Tirmidhī provide an 
outline to better understand why al-Tirmidhī would be given such a title. These definitions tend 
to privilege a ‘mystical’ aspect to the role of the ḥakīm, however, we should note that the title 
ḥakīm in Khurāsān and Transoxania during the 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. may not necessarily 
indicate a mystic per se. We find this title given to the likes of al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī (d. 
342/953), whose early life overlapped that of al-Tirmidhī174 and who was known for his work on 
                                                          
170 Ibid. Concept, p. 15. 
171 Ibid. Al-Ḥakīm Ein Islamischer, p. 95. 
172 Ibid. Theosoph, p. 95. 
173 Ibid. Profondeur, p. 80. 
174 Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī wrote al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam at the behest of the Samānid ruler of Khurāsān, Aḥmad 
Ismāʿīl, in 902. The fact that al-Samarqandī was chosen to pen such an important work in Ḥanafī theology indicates 
that he could have at least been in his late thirties or early forties when given this task. If he died in 953 C.E. then he 
must have lived to a very old age and his life should have overlapped with that of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī by at least 
forty or fifty years. Bosworth et al. assumes that the title ḥakīm must have indicated his mystical propensities. This 
claim is not clearly substantiated.  
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Ḥanafī theology, such as his famous creed al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam. While al-Samarqandī was also 
known to have an interest in mysticism, it is not clear that this was a reason for his being titled 
ḥakīm. A traditionist in Khurāsān from the generation following that of al-Samarqandī, who also 
bore the title of ḥakīm, is al-Ḥakīm al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014). Al-Ḥakīm al-Naysābūrī was 
known as a traditionist with Shīʿī sympathies. However, as James Robson notes, he was given 
the title of ḥakīm after being appointed qāḍī (judge) for a time, presumably in Nīshāpūr. Thus, 
we find that the title seems to possibly indicate a position of legal authority in the context of 
Khurāsān and Transoxania by the 10th-century C.E. Also in the 10th-century we have another 
Ḥanafī scholar, al-Ḥakīm al-Zandāwistī (d. 382/992), who wrote al-Ḥikma al-Ilāhiyya, a work in 
the eastern Ḥanafī ḥikma tradition. He represents a similar time period to that of al-Ḥakīm al-
Naysābūrī and also holds the title of ḥakīm although his works do not seem to have mystical 
propensities.175 Based on the previous discussion, it remains difficult to tie the title of ḥakīm 
during the 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. in Khurāsān and Transoxania to mysticism per se. Rather, 
the ḥakīm seems to be a title referring to a learned individual who has attained a position of legal 
or pedagogical authority. Such an individual was assumed to be well-versed not only in Islamic 
religious texts, but also in biblical and New Testament traditions, with the ability to draw causal 
relationships between various aspects of these traditions. 
The social use of the title ḥakīm in the 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. only gives us partial 
insight into how al-Tirmidhī may have understood this term since al-Tirmidhī’s discussion is 
                                                          
175 Zandawistī’s work, al-Ḥikma al-Ilāhiyya, represents a series of questions and answers concerning the ḥikma of 
various mundane, religious and theological issues. For example, a question is posed as to the ḥikma of Abū Bakr (d. 
13/634) being the first Caliph in Islam. The ḥikma according to Zandāwistī is that Abū Bakr never faltered when 
given the choice to follow the Prophet. ʿAlī, on the other hand, is said to have sought permission from his father, 
however, after having taken four steps he repented and took allegiance with the Prophet. These four steps indicate 
his being four degrees away from the Prophet and thus the fourth Caliph. This type of ḥikma literature cannot in any 
way be understood in a philosophical sense. It represents the ability of the ḥakīm to call upon a vast array of biblical 
and Islamic literature and to make seemingly arbitrary connections between various details in these traditions. 
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more ideological and gnoseological than social and practical. Nevertheless, it seems clear that 
this title was still applied to knowledgeable individuals as a term of respect up through the end of 
the 10th-century. These individuals tend to be Ḥanafī scholars from Khurāsān and Transoxania. It 
may be that the title, while at one time having been applied to a pagan philosopher or learned 
individual, had changed its semantic use with the adoption of Arabic as the language of learning 
and the replacement of local elites by Arabs with the arrival of Islam. It should be noted that 
Aramaic was the language of communication in the Sassanid Empire prior to Arabic and as we 
have seen in Syriac, a dialect of Aramaic, the Arabic root for ḥakīm, ḥ-k-m, transfers quite easily 
across Semitic languages. 
 
Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm among the Ṣūfīs 
 In Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya by al-Sulamī we find that ḥikma is closely coupled with gnosis 
(maʿrifa). The term maʿrifa is often presented as divinely gifted knowledge, while ḥikma may 
represent the words that articulate that knowledge. Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 165/782) is credited to 
have quoted Jesus as saying, “Do not give wisdom (ḥikma) to those who do not deserve it for 
they will squander it, and do not keep it from those who do deserve it for you will oppress 
them.”176 Here, ḥikma is a special kind of knowledge that should only be given to those who it 
belongs to, i.e., ahlahā (its people). The esoteric nature of this ‘special knowledge’ is 
reminiscent of gnostic ideas for whom gnosis is privy only to those initiated as ‘knowers.’ 
Nevertheless, ḥikma is not purely esoteric here since it is also coupled with maʿrifa which, while 
often being translated as gnosis, refers to God-given knowledge and not a lore or mode of 
exegetical interpretation. Manṣur b. ʿAmmār (d. 225/839) states this connection between ḥikma 
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Ed. Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā. Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya. 1998, p. 38. 
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and maʿrifa when he says, “Wisdom (al-ḥikma) is articulated in the hearts of the knowers of God 
(al-ʿārifīn) with the tongue of true belief…”177 Al-Sulamī also indicates a connection between 
maʿrifa and ḥikma when he describes Abū ʿAlī Al-Jūzajānī (d. 4th Islamic century, 10th-century 
C.E.) as someone who, “perhaps also spoke something concerning the disciplines of gnosis 
(maʿārif) and wisdom (ḥikam).”178 These two ‘disciplines’ are, in fact, never explicitly 
distinguished. Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz (d. 286/899) seems to conflate the two terms when he says, 
“God made knowledge (ʿilm) a guide to himself so that he could be known and made wisdom 
(ḥikma) a mercy from him to them so that he could show compassion. So, knowledge is a guide 
to God and maʿrifa (gnosis) is an indication of God…”179 Shāh al-Kirmānī (d. 299/911) also 
reiterates this connection between ḥikma and maʿrifa when he says, “the sign of wisdom (ḥikma) 
is knowledge (maʿrifa) of the relative values of people.”180 In the Ṭabaqāt we find either a 
conflation of wisdom (ḥikma) with gnosis (maʿrifa) or a sense in which ḥikma is the outward 
spoken form of an inward gifted knowledge. We do find several other meanings of ḥikma, 
however, they do not follow this general trend. For example, Ruwaym b. Aḥmad (d. 303/915) 
states, “Of the wisdom (ḥikam) of the sage (ḥakīm) is that he shows latitude for his brothers in 
outward rulings.”181 Here ḥikma demonstrates an approach to the application of legal rulings to 
others. The basic idea here is that the individual should be restrictive with himself or herself but 
show latitude to others. Another approach is represented in the words of Yūsuf b. al-Ḥusayn of 
Rayy (d. 304/916) who links ḥikma to action or the implementation of knowledge. He says, 
“Through proper dealing (adab) you will understand knowledge, and through knowledge actions 
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will become correct, and through action you will arrive at wisdom (ḥikma), and through wisdom 
(ḥikma) you will understand renunciation of the world (al-zuhd)…”182 
Al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) is an important figure in the development of proto-
Sufism. Alexander Knysh along with Josef van Ess asserts that al-Muḥāsibī may not have been a 
Ṣūfī but more of a ‘moralizing theologian’ who took early Islamic theology and developed it into 
a sophisticated psychology and cardiology.183 Unlike later mystics such as al-Junayd and al-
Tirmidhī, al-Muḥāsibī does not develop a gnoseology that would clarify the ambiguous space 
between prophecy and human knowledge based on experience. For example, al-Muḥāsibī does 
not discuss the nature of ḥikma even though he makes frequent mention of the purveyors of that 
ḥikma, i.e., the ḥukamāʾ. Al-Muḥāsibī certainly sees the ḥukamāʾ as a source of authority since 
several of his works begin with quotations from as yet unknown ‘sages.’184 However, al-
Muḥāsibī does not leave us completely in the dark.  In one of the quotes that he ascribes to the 
ḥukamāʾ, we find an accurate and complete, if not slightly modified, rendition of the “Parable of 
the Sower” from the New Testament. Al-Muḥāsibī’s rendition does not closely follow any one 
particular version in either Matthew, Mark or Luke. Nor does al-Muḥāsibī’s rendition follow 
particularly close to the Syriac New Testament nor the Arabic translation of the Diatessaron. 
Nevertheless, all of the main elements of the parable are there. What makes al-Muḥāsibī’s use of 
the parable significant is how he uses it to explain the function of the ḥakīm. For al-Muḥāsibī the 
“sower” is like the “ḥakīm” and the seed is like the words that this ḥakīm speaks, i.e., ḥikma.185 
So, the Parable of the Sower from the New Testament changes from being a parable used by 
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185 Al-Muḥāsibī doesn’t use the term ḥikma here but rather ṣawāb al-kalām or correct speech. 
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Jesus to elucidate the types of individuals who have an ability to hear God’s Word to a focus on 
the ḥakīm as a conduit for this divine knowledge. The degree to which al-Muḥāsibī was aware of 
the source of this parable is not clear. The fact that such a parable was put into the mouths of the 
ḥukamāʾ is significant in that it connects, even if only tenuously, the ḥukamāʾ to scriptural 
knowledge. This does have some parallel to al-Tirmidhī’s use of the term ḥukamāʾ, since he 
claims that the ḥukamāʾ who are mentioned in the Injīl (Gospels) are, actually, the Muslims.186 
This quote is not found in the New Testament and is one of the traditions attributed to Jesus in 
the Ḥadīth literature. 
Al-Junayd is considered one of the most celebrated orthodox exponents of the ‘sober’ 
school of Sufism and is often credited with a reconciliation of mystical experience to the legal 
and theological norms of his time.187 Knysh explains how Junayd’s dichotomy between fanāʾ 
(annihilation) and baqāʾ (subsistence) provided a possible rationale for the superiority of 
legalism over mysticism, a concession to the powers that be. This may have been a direct result 
of the Inquisition of Ghulām Khalīl (d. 275/888–889), which spared al-Junayd, as he was able to 
count himself among the doctors of the law.188 Al-Junayd clearly provides a framework for 
mystics that successfully incorporated the legal and mystical spheres into a comprehensive 
mystical methodology. It is not clear whether this was the result of political and religious 
circumstances or whether he was actually attempting a rapprochement between two diverging 
tendencies within Islam. While al-Junayd’s fanāʾ/baqāʾ dichotomy is intriguing and 
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groundbreaking, it is not the only focus of his mystical pedagogy.189 In his Rasāʾil we 
consistently find a gnoseology more similar to the mysticism of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī whose 
approach we will address later. Al-Junayd places ḥikma in direct contrast to outward knowledge 
(ʿilm) and elevates the ḥakīm above the doctor of law (ʿālim). The Letters of Junayd begin with a 
letter from al-Junayd to ʿAmr ibn ʿUthmān al-Makkī (d. 291/903 or 297/909) whom he praises as 
one who was given, “of knowledge and wisdom (ḥikma) the highest of its levels.” The letter 
proceeds to warn against the deluding nature of outward knowledge and the inability of those 
who are specialists in the normative Islamic disciplines to speak cogently about ‘inner 
realities.’190 What follows is a dialog between a scholar of the outward (ʿālim) and a sage 
(ḥakīm) who brings the ʿālim to tears and facilitates the “dawning of the sun of ḥikma and the 
attainment of the limpidity of its light.”191 The ḥakīm is stylized as a ‘physician of the heart’ who 
can cure the ‘disorders’ of the scholar. The scholar pleads with the ḥakīm, “please give me more 
of this medicine of yours for my wound has become severe.”192 At this point the scholar is 
broken and concedes that the ḥakīm is “more knowledgeable about what is hidden in my 
innermost secret.”193 Al-Junayd invokes an analogy that likens the physician of the outward body 
to the sincere, refined ḥakīm who, like the physician, treats the often subtle and hidden diseases 
within the body. Likewise, the ḥakīm is knowledgeable of the inner maladies of the soul.194 For 
al-Junayd, the ḥakīm is someone sanctioned by God to speak wisdom (ḥikma), which is a type of 
personal revelatory knowledge. He says, “With that, know that the speakers of ḥikma don’t speak 
except after they are permitted to do so, but when they do, great benefit descends upon those 
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who are given to hear it.”195 Ḥikma in al-Junayd’s mystical thought is something that runs or 
streams (jāriya) and is associated closely with light (nūr).196 A consistent motif in his Rasāʾil is 
that of the ordinary believer immersed in heedlessness (ghafla) who comes into contact with 
someone whose words are characteristic of ḥikma, wisdom from God. This wisdom pours over 
the soul of the listener who becomes perplexed and disoriented. This state is the first stage of 
awakening and occurs at the hands of the ḥakīm and not the Ṣūfī as we might have expected. In 
fact, the word Ṣūfī is not used anywhere in al-Junayd’s letters. 
 Another Ṣūfī and one of al-Junayd’s associates in Baghdād was Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz (d. 
286/899) a contemporary of al-Junayd in Baghdād and a student of Sarī al-Saqatī (d. 253/867). 
We also find that the ḥukamāʾ are a significant motif in his Kitāb al-Ṣidq. Kharrāz does not 
contrast between the ḥukamāʾ and the ʿulamāʾ as does al-Junayd. For Kharrāz, the ḥukamāʾ seem 
to be a distinct and well known group since he mentions in Kitāb al-Ṣidq that “the insightful of 
the ḥukamāʾ have agreed that this world is the self and what it desires,” and “the ḥukamāʾ have 
come to consensus that it (love) results from the constant mention of blessings.” For Kharrāz to 
mention that the ḥukamāʾ have “agreed” or “found consensus” on a particular subject suggests 
that the literature of this group was accessible or that their general views were known to his 
audience. A student of Kharrāz asks for him to explain the saying of “the ḥakīm” about the 
nature of contentment as being a state of happiness and joyfulness in the face of calamities.197 
Kharrāz goes on to explain that the presence of God fills the heart of the servant such that it 
becomes greater than the calamities that beset that individual.198 The familiar theme of balance 
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through opposing states is also attributed to the ḥukamāʾ. Kharrāz states, man ūtiya min al-
maḥabbati shayʾan fa lam yuʾtā mithlahu min al khashya fa-huwa makhḍūʿ, “whoever is given 
some love but is not given its equivalent amount in terms of fear then he is deceived.”199 Most of 
the other references to the ḥukamāʾ in Kitāb al-Ṣidq involve general statements about abstinence 
from the world and closeness to God that fit a general ascetic/mystical model.  
None of the Ṣūfīs and proto-Ṣūfīs mentioned above clearly state who the ḥukamāʾ are or 
what ḥikma is in well-defined terms. The closest we get is with al-Junayd who likens the ḥakīm 
to a ṭabīb (physician), which fits a Hellenistic model since medicine (ṭibb) and philosophy 
(ḥikma) are often mentioned together as a genre well into the Islamic period.200 Al-Junayd sees 
the ḥakīm as a recipient of divine knowledge, a kind of knowledge that can cure the soul just as 
the physician is able to cure bodies. We might suggest that the dichotomy between physician and 
philosopher, a dichotomy that was prominent in the Hellenistic culture of Late Antiquity, may 
have been transposed into an Islamic milieu as the doctor of the law (ʿālim) and the sage (ḥakīm) 
such as we find in the writing of al-Junayd.   
 
Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm among the Early Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs 
We find the closest connection to al-Tirmidhī’s concept of the ḥakīm and the nature of 
the ḥakīm’s wisdom (ḥikma) in the writings of early Ismāʿīlīs of the early 10th-century C.E. 
According to Yves Marquet, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā often apply the sobriquet ḥakīm to the Imām of 
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the age, or a great prophet or to a successor of that prophet.201 However, the term ḥakīm can also 
designate the Imām in contradistinction to the Prophet of the time.202 While the term generally 
applies to prophets, Imāms and their successors, such as the forty abdāl (substitutes) it can also 
apply to ancient philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras.203 Even 
astrologers, alchemists and magicians receive the title of ḥukamā’ (sages) in the Siwān al-
Ḥikma.204 Here we can see a general application of the term ḥakīm to the Imam of the time who 
takes his knowledge from a great prophet. This is balanced by the fact that the term is offered 
loosely to include other types of learned individuals who, in the mind of the Ikhwān, also 
received their knowledge originally from a prophet of some sort. Here the Ikhwān follow the 
Ismāʿīlī approach mentioned by Paul Walker,205 which creates a narrative for the origins of 
philosophical and hermetic sciences in the persons of prophets. For the Ikhwān, the ḥukamāʾ 
represent any knowledge or wisdom that has a divine origin of some kind. Marquet shows how 
the ḥukamāʾ, as purveyors of “good philosophy”, are contrasted to what the Ikhwān call the 
“anti-prophets” who are characterized as materialists and atheists.206 They are referred to as 
frères des dèmons who practice illicit magic and lead people astray. Here we find that the 
ḥukamāʾ offer a convenient catch-all to set up the main dichotomy between knowledge that is 
inspired and therefore has a divine source relating to the soul, as opposed to human-knowledge, 
which is materialistic and the purview of the anti-philosophers. 
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 The Ikhwān are very close to other early Ismaʿīlis of the 10th-century C.E. such as Abū 
Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 322/933-34) who is known to have engaged in a famous polemical debate with 
the renowned physician and philosopher Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925 or d. 323/935) as 
summarized in the triumphalist work of al-Rāzī Aʿlām al-Nubuwwa. It is Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī who 
comes closest to identifying ḥikma and the ḥakīm in terms that mimic al-Tirmidhī’s concept of 
these terms. In his Kitāb al-Zīna al-Rāzī describes God as the Ḥakīm because he separates 
between opposites by placing medial properties between them, for example, the separation of hot 
and cold through the mediation of wet and dry. This separation and maintenance of the opposites 
is exemplary of God’s wisdom and the balance he maintains in the world. This is close to a 
Pythagorean concept of opposites, however, the opposites (hot, cold, wet and dry) mentioned by 
Abū Ḥātim are not represented in the ten primary opposites that govern the world according to 
later Pythagoreans.207 It may be that the allusion here is to Greek Galenic medicine that uses hot, 
cold, wet and dry as a heuristic for understanding balance and imbalance in the body.  
It is clear that the ḥukamāʾ represent a motif of learned individuals that dates prior to the 
Islamic conquests and continues up through the 10th-century C.E. In Christian, Jewish, Ṣūfī and 
Shīʿī sources the ḥukamāʾ function as a backdrop to accentuate the various ideals of these 
disparate religious viewpoints. The ḥukamāʾ are useful as a motif during this period particularly 
because they are not well defined as a category of learned specialists, yet they still seem to 
convey a sense of authority. All of the groups surveyed here tend to be outliers with respect to 
the dominant episteme of the Sunnī ʿulamāʾ. So, while ḥikma is not a major knowledge-type in 
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Rosenthal’s schematization of knowledge in Islam, it clearly was important for more marginal 
groups. In a sense, al-Tirmidhī’s development of ḥikma and stylization of the ḥukamāʾ brings 
this marginal discourse stream into the circle of more mainstream Sunnī thought. The consistent 
reference in both Muslim and non-Muslim sources to a Hellenistic precedent for the ḥukamāʾ 
indicates that it is a Greek model that most likely serves for this motif. Also, the important 
connections to biblical and New Testament literature for the ḥukamāʾ indicates that this 
Hellenistic motif filtered down to the Muslims from eastern Christians who were steeped in this 
lore for centuries before the Arab/Muslim conquests of the 7th-century C.E. 
 
Ḥikma and the Ḥakīm in the Theosophy of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s contribution to the development of what became normative 
Sufism sometime in the late 10th- and early 11th-centuries C.E. has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged, nor has his contribution to later Ṣūfī metaphysics been understood in its entirety. 
One factor that has led to this lack of development in the study of al-Tirmidhī and his mystical 
theosophy is that current theories differ widely on the core elements of his doctrine as well as the 
sources of his inspiration. Yves Marquet considers al-Tirmidhī to have been the first mystic to 
introduce Neoplatonic doctrines into Islamic mysticism as a prelude to Ibn ʿArabī.208 Bernd 
Radtke, on the other hand, acknowledges that al-Tirmidhī was influenced by Neoplatonic and 
Hermetic elements, yet counters by proposing that these were merely diffuse and amorphous 
elements within al-Tirmidhī’s educational milieu. According to Radtke, these diffuse elements 
were picked up by al-Tirmidhī and merged by him into a synthesis that combined theology, 
jurisprudence, Ḥadīth speculation and various aspects of Gnosticism.209 Radtke has gone the 
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farthest in situating al-Tirmidhī’s thought by contrasting and differentiating his ḥikma (wisdom) 
from what later was known as illuminationist wisdom (ḥikmat al-ishrāq), propounded by the 
famous Suhrawardī al-Maqṭūl (d. 587/1191) who was executed for heresy.210 Radtke’s argument 
that al-Tirmidhī’s ḥikma (wisdom) is fundamentally different than Suhrawardī’s ḥikmat al-ishrāq 
(wisdom of illumination) is convincing. However, Radtke’s discussion of ḥikma in “Theologie 
und Philosophie” does not facilitate our understanding of al-Tirmdhī’s concept of ḥikma, 
primarily because he does not provide a methodology for interpreting ḥikma within al-Tirmidhī’s 
own context. We depart from Radtke in that we do not support the idea that al-Tirmidhī’s use of 
Hellenistic thought is simply acquired through diffuse elements. Our study of al-Tirmidhī’s 
Kitāb al-Ḥikma indicates that al-Tirmidhī’s use of Hellenistic elements is both intentional and 
selective. 
 In addition to Marquet and Radtke, Franz Rosenthal discusses the place of knowledge 
(ʿilm) and wisdom (ḥikma) as it relates to al-Tirmidhī. Rosenthal’s discussion tends to favor an 
overly philological approach to the word ʿilm and attempts to draw a distinction between Islam, a 
tradition he says focuses on ʿilm, and Christianity, a tradition that he claims favors ḥikma. This 
approach ignores the nuances in meaning that are characteristic of the way knowledge was 
categorized by al-Tirmidhī and others during the period under discussion. As mentioned earlier, 
Rosenthal mistakenly assumes that Al-Tirmidhī considers ʿilm and ḥikma to be synonymous.211 
According to my reading of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, he does not use the term ḥikma haphazardly. 
He clearly delineates ḥikma as a special type of knowledge (ʿilm) and is consistent in his use of 
the term.  
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It is not possible, though, to gain a complete view of al-Tirmidhī’s understanding of 
ḥikma without a wide reading of his works, which are varied and complex. Al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb 
al-Ḥikma provides us with probably the most concise and elaborate explanation of ḥikma and its 
place in his mystical theosophy. Nevertheless, references to ḥikma abound in his other works 
such as Nawādir al-Uṣūl, ʿIlm al-Awliyā’ and Sīrat al-Awliyā’ among others. Al-Tirmidhī’s 
concept of ḥikma has largely been unexplored partly due to the limited accessibility of KH, of 
which only one manuscript is extant and whose script is difficult to decipher due to the absence 
of dotting on the majority of the letters. KH is mentioned by Sezgin in Geschichte des 
arabischen Schriftums among the eighty works he attributes to al-Tirmidhī ranging from large 
books to small essays of only a few pages.212 KH closely follows al-Tirmidhī’s style and use of 
terminology suggesting that it can be authentically attributed to al-Tirmidhī. Furthermore, our 
transcription of KH in Appendix B provides notes that indicate the many parallels between KH 
and other works that belong to al-Tirmidhī. Bernd Radtke, considered the foremost expert on al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, also lists KH amongst al-Tirmidhī’s works but does not discuss the contents 
of the work in detail or its implications for al-Tirmidhī’s thought. Hence, the combination of the 
complexity of al-Tirmidhī’s style coupled with his voluminous literary output and the relative 
inaccessibility of KH have conspired to leave al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma largely unexplored. 
The implications of this for al-Tirmidhī’s rather widely discussed doctrine of sainthood (walāya) 
are highly significant because al-Tirmidhī uses ḥikma to frame his doctrine of walāya.  
 One of the key passages on the relationship between ʿilm and ḥikma by al-Tirmidhī is 
found in NU. In his commentary on a ḥadīth concerning the nature of the awliyāʾ (saints) al-
Tirmidhī proceeds to divide the people of knowledge into three categories. The first category is 
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ʿulamāʾ bi-umūr Allāh taʿālā min al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām (scholars of the commandments of God 
most high concerning the permissible and impermissible). These are the scholars of sacred law 
who specialize in jurisprudence. Al-Tirmidhī describes them as being known by the signs of 
knowledge. The second category is the scholars of God’s management (tadbīr) of the world, and 
they have upon them the sign of ḥikma and are known by their wisdom. Finally, the third 
category of “men of knowledge” discusses those knowledgeable through God (ʿulamāʾ bi-Allāh), 
and they have upon them the sign of God’s light and his awe-inspiring presence (hayba) and are 
known through God himself. This final category, according to al-Tirmidhī, represents the 
awliyāʾ.213 This tri-partite division is reinforced in another place in the NU where al-Tirmidhī 
describes the three groups who bear God’s knowledge as the doctors of the law (ʿulamāʾ), the 
sages (ḥukamāʾ), and the great ones (kubarāʾ) who are synonymous in al-Tirmidhī’s writing with 
the awliyāʾ.214 Here we can see a clear distinction between three groups that all bear a different 
kind of knowledge. The ḥukamāʾ are clearly a level distinct from the awliyāʾ and inferior to 
them. This distinction between ḥukamāʾ and awliyāʾ is further supported in Kitāb al-Ḥikma 
where the functions of the ḥukamāʾ and the awliyāʾ are delineated in juxtaposition to one 
another.215 Prior scholarship has seemed to conflate the ḥukamāʾ and awliyāʾ, assuming that the 
ḥukamāʾ are simply a synonymous term for the awliyāʾ. As we will see, such a hypothesis does 
not stand up to scrutiny through a close reading of al-Tirmidhī’s works. 
 In the opening of Kitāb al-Ḥikma, al-Tirmidhī defines ḥikma as “the judgment of things, 
according to their various harmful properties, in the way they function and proceed from the 
Lord to his servant, and from the servant to his Lord in terms of their causes and effects.”216 This 
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definition falls directly in line with Neopythagorean definitions of wisdom (sophia) as 
knowledge of things both divine and human.217 In his definition of ḥikma al-Tirmidhī joins two 
opposites,218 the inward (bāṭin) and outward (ẓāhir). The ḥikma of the ḥakīm is knowledge that 
encompasses inward (bāṭin) causes and effects, i.e., those that proceed from the Lord to his 
servant and outward (ẓāhir) causes and effects, i.e., those that proceed from the servant to his 
Lord. This passage is critical to our understanding of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma because al-
Tirmidhī is the first to provide a full and coherent definition of ḥikma across all of the figures we 
have discussed so far. This definition is neither purely metaphysical nor wholly cosmological. It 
treats ḥikma as something cosmological in the sense that ḥikma is concerned with causes and 
effects, but then characterizes it as metaphysical when described as a light knowledge that 
proceeds from God. In this way al-Tirmidhī’s definition somewhat resembles al-Fārābī’s 
statement that wisdom is knowledge of remote causes.219  
The knowledge of opposites is the function par excellence of the ḥakīm in al-Tirmidhī’s 
concept of ḥikma. Al-Tirmidhī goes on to state in KH that the ḥakīm is indispensable to the 
knowledge of good and evil. For example, he states, “There is nothing closer to good than evil 
nor anything farther. Ignorance joins them together in one place [i.e., conflates them] and 
wisdom separates between them so that they are farther apart than the heaven and the earth 
because wisdom makes evil the lowest of the low and good the highest of the high.” We can see 
that according to al-Tirmidhī the knowledge of the ḥakīm is that which distinguishes between 
opposites and keeps them separate in an ethical sense. We can see here that al-Tirmidhī is closest 
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to Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī’s discussion on ḥikma, and he provides a similar yet much simpler 
definition of ḥikma in terms of hot, cold, wet and dry. What is significant in al-Tirmdhī’s 
discussion is the types of opposites that he uses. As mentioned previously, Aristotle describes the 
later Pythagoreans as proposing ten opposites that are the bases of the universe. These are 
limited-unlimited, odd-even, one-many, right-left, male-female, immobile-mobile, straight-
curved, light-dark, good-evil and square-rectangle. We don’t find this exact list of opposites in 
Kitāb al-Ḥikma, but we find some of these among the many opposites al-Tirmidhī uses 
throughout the book. The three most prominent are khayr and sharr (good and evil),220 
mutaḥarrik and sākin (mobile and immobile),221 ḍawʾ and ẓulma (light and darkness).222 We find 
possible indirect references to some of the other Pythagorean opposites such as lā maḥdūd 
(unlimited),223 however, its contrary maḥdūd (limited) is not mentioned specifically. Al-Tirmidhī 
mentions male and female pairs such as ikhwānika wa akhawātika (your brothers and sisters)224 
but doesn’t mention male and female as a specific set of opposites. He also mentions right and 
left, but in the Qurʾānic context of the people of the right hand (aṣḥāb al-yamīn) and the people 
of the left hand (aṣḥāb al-shimāl).225 The point here is not to prove that al-Tirmidhī was a 
Pythagorean, but rather to demonstrate that his concept of ḥikma incorporates more elements of 
Pythagoreanism than other figures we have studied so far. Al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology is neither 
Neoplatonic nor gnostic in its structure. Rather than proposing a series of emanations from an 
abstract One such as the Neoplatonists do, al-Tirmidhī sees the world as an interplay of opposites 
that indicate the existence of a hidden metaphysical realm, or ghayb. Thus, we see that the ḥakīm 
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is the one who is knowledgeable of these opposites and functions as a means of maintaining the 
harmony of opposites in nature. 
Like al-Junayd, al-Tirmidhī draws on the analogy of the physician (ṭabīb) to explain who 
the ḥakīm is and how he functions in the world. Just as the ṭabīb is the physician of the physical 
body, the ḥakīm is the physician of the metaphysical body, or the soul. Al-Tirmidhī accurately 
details the four humours and their corresponding qualities and seasons in KH.226 This clearly 
demonstrates that al-Tirmidhī must have studied Greek medicine and possibly some type of 
Hellenistic philosophy such as Pythagoreanism and Stoicism sometime in his career. Just as the 
world is full of harmful animals and insects that can make us ill, so too the person traveling on 
the path (ṭarīq) to God will find pitfalls every step of the way. The ḥakīm can see these pitfalls 
and avoid them through his knowledge of the opposites that God establishes in the world.227 For 
al-Tirmidhī, ḥikma has an ethical value in that it helps one to make decisions about what is right 
and wrong in the particular moment. This has within it a veiled criticism of the ʿulamāʾ (the 
scholarly class) who, according to al-Tirmidhī, do not have the sufficient tools for making ethical 
judgments from their textual knowledge alone. 
Al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma does not only function to explain ethics, but actually 
helps to define his notion of walāya (sainthood). In NU al-Tirmidhī differentiates the walī from 
the ḥakīm by juxtaposing the first Rightly Guided Caliph Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) to ʿUmar (d. 
23/644), the second Rightly Guided Caliph.228 Al-Tirmidhī relates a story about a time when 
Bakr comes from Yemen with three swords. When his son sees him upon his return, his son asks 
for one of the swords and Abū Bakr gives it to him. The sword was decorated with gilding. 
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ʿUmar saw what happened and approached Abū Bakr stating that he, ʿUmar, had a stronger 
claim to the sword. Abū Bakr agreed and ʿUmar proceeded to take the sword from Abū Bakr’s 
son. Then, ʿUmar went home and separated the gilding from the blade. He then gave the blade 
back to Abū Bakr’s son and returned the gilding to Abū Bakr, the Caliph at the time. Al-Tirmidhī 
explains that Abū Bakr represents the walī and is more like the Prophet Muḥammad, while 
ʿUmar represents the ḥakīm. Abū Bakr gives freely without any concern for the value of the 
sword. He sees the need in the moment and addresses it as inspiration from God. ʿUmar, on the 
other hand, wants to do what is right. He is the ḥakīm who differentiates right from wrong. He 
takes the blade and gives it to the son of Abū Bakr who had asked for the sword, so Abū Bakr’s 
son still received the sword in the end. However, ʿUmar proceeds to give the gilding to Abū Bakr 
whom he believes to have a greater need for it as the leader of the fledgling Muslim community. 
Abū Bakr follows ʿUmar’s suggestion when ʿUmar presents this argument for what is ‘right’ but, 
according to al-Tirmidhī, Abū Bakr’s first action was the inspired action, whereas ʿUmar’s was 
filtered through an abstract process or evaluation. One significant aspect of this story related by 
al-Tirmidhī is that both the motifs of walī and ḥakīm are embodied as Muslim historical figures. 
The ideal walī is Abū Bakr and the ideal ḥakīm is ʿUmar. Abū Bakr is higher in rank than ʿUmar, 
but both are ‘correct’ according to al-Tirmidhī within their own levels of ḥikma (wisdom) and 
maʿrifa (gnosis). This and other stories told by al-Tirmidhī explain how the ḥakīm and the walī 
represent separate levels of spiritual attainment and gnosis, although it is significant to note that 
the walī encompasses the ḥakīm, but the ḥakīm does not encompass the walī. The level of the 
ḥakīm frames the level of the walī since it is the walī who transcends the dualism of right and 
wrong. Al-Tirmidhī is clearly recasting an ancient motif in Islamic terms. Furthermore, in KH 
the only authority mentioned in the book with respect to ḥikma is someone he titles, al-ḥakīm or 
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‘The Sage’. This person is the early traditionist Wahb b. Munabbih (d. 110/728 or 114/732), who 
is credited with introducing many Jewish and Christian traditions into the Ḥadīth corpus knows 
as Isrāʾīliyyāt.  
 The ḥakīm and his ḥikma exist at the level of opposites. This is a level of knowledge 
above the rules of permissibility and impermissibility represented by jurisprudence or Fiqh. 
Ḥikma is an ethical, situational type of knowledge that requires judgments of right and wrong. 
Essentially, what al-Tirmidhī is saying is that knowledge of the law is not enough to make 
ethical judgments. If we understand al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī background, the role of the ḥakīm as 
someone who makes ethical judgments is more clearly understood. In the next chapter we will be 
explaining in more detail al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī credentials. The Ḥanafī School of law is unique 
among the schools of Islamic jurisprudence in that it includes a legal procedure called istiḥsān 
(juristic preference). That is, if the judge deems that the rule of law does not serve the aims of the 
law, the judge can use his juristic preference to rule outside of the legal requirements. While 
Ḥanafī uṣūl (legal methodology) was systematized in the 4th- Islamic century (10th-century C.E.), 
it is obvious from al-Tirmidhī’s own works that the main points of Ḥanafī legal methodology 
were under discussion in the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.). Hence, the motif of the 
ḥakīm is a complex one in al-Tirmidhī’s thought and it is not clear whether current ideas in his 
time were informing his concept of the sage more or less than ancient ones were. Both of these 
influences seem to have played an important role and that the product was al-Tirmidhī’s own 
unique concept of wisdom. 
If al-Tirmidhi developed a distinct concept of wisdom for the sage based on Hellenistic 
and Islamic precedents, then the question is how this relates to the knowledge of the saint. The 
walī, in al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology rises even above the ḥikma of the ḥakīm. He or she (since al-
 99 
 
Tirmidhī demonstrates that women can also be awliyāʾ) are not bound by opposites, but just like 
Abū Bakr in his giving of the sword to his son, they take no heed of what is particularly right or 
wrong in a given situation but act according to what God wants in the moment and are thus 
inspired. The walī in al-Tirmidhī’s epistemology characterizes the maqām (station) of fardāniyya 
(singularity, non-duality) precisely because the walī goes beyond the dualities that are 
characteristic of the world of the ḥakīm. The walī, according to al-Tirmidhī, looks at the world in 
terms of one source and becomes a conduit for the effusion of benefit from that source into a 
world of dualities. In a fascinating passage from KH al-Tirmidhī portrays the ḥakīm and the walī 
as if they are upon a path walking through the wilderness. The ḥakīm has knowledge of the 
various beasts of prey that can harm him on this path. The beasts are likened to the desires that 
waylay a traveler to God that may take him unawares. While the ḥakīm has knowledge of these 
capricious desires that can cause harm, he is not completely protected from them. He must use 
his knowledge of them to protect himself from their danger. The walī, on the other hand, walks 
through this scape completely unscathed. The beasts of prey do not touch him just as caprice 
does not affect him. According to al-Tirmidhī, the ḥakīm reaps the benefit of protection through 
his companionship with the walī. In KH the ḥakīm himself has a contrary, which is often the 
safīh (or the imbecile) while the walī has no opposite in al-Tirmidhī’s writing since the walī is 
the inheritor of the prophets and receives divine knowledge directly from God. The walī is also a 
muḥaddath or one ‘spoken to directly by God’ and is thus the conduit for God’s mercy into the 
world. Al-Tirmidhī’s tri-partite division of knowledge into ʿilm, ḥikma and maʿrifa provides a 
strong basis for understanding ḥikma in relation to both ʿilm and maʿrifa. Not only does this help 
in understanding how al-Tirmidhī formed his concept of walāya, but emphasizes its unique 
structure in its own right among early Islamic mystics. We can see from this discussion that 
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knowledge of the episteme helps to highlight how al-Tirmidhī is offering a new and unique 
contribution to Islamic mystical thought. Not only does the motif of the ḥakīm draw upon 
hellenistic and biblical precedents, but it reflects legal and theological norms current in al-
Tirmidhī’s time. This type of synthesis is rare and highly significant. It speaks to why al-
Tirmidhī’s legacy may have been preserved in such entirety. His ideas were seen as valuable by 
his contemporaries among the scholarly establishment. We will see in Chapter 3 how al-
Tirmidhī’s impact was felt beyond the boundaries of Islamic mysticism as his thought played an 
important role in the development of the Ḥanafī/Mātūrīdī theological tradition. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we discussed the contours of ḥikma (wisdom) among a diverse set of 
historical figures before and after al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmdhī. Understanding his episteme has helped 
us to identify his important contribution to the concept of ḥikma and how it serves to frame our 
knowledge of walāya, a topic we will address in Chapter 5. His relatively untapped and 
misunderstood work, KH has provided us with a new basis for evaluating his gnoseology as it is 
colored by Hellenistic antecedents. It is clear that al-Tirmidhī was not merely borrowing vague 
elements of this Hellenistic culture but must have studied Greek medicine and some form of 
Pythagoreanism, possibly through pythagorean literature available in his time. This was not 
simply a blind imitation of Greek heritage, but a means of using that heritage to support his 
doctrine of walāya (sainthood). The implications of this finding pose new questions about the 
possible relationship between al-Tirmidhī’s ideas and later concepts of sainthood and 
sanctification found in the writings of other Muslim mystics such as Ibn ʿArabī, who relied 
heavily on Al-Tirmidhī as an inspiration for his work. Even more thought provoking is the 
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possibility of a non-dual framework for sainthood based on a particular conceptualization of 
ḥikma in terms of opposites and the understanding that the walī is someone who passes beyond 
these dualities in his direct contemplation and intimate conversation with God. Al-Tirmidhī’s 
non-dual framework leads us to see the possibility of a Buddhist influence, which is not 
unrealistic given that al-Tirmidhī’s birthplace and residence was once a center of Buddhism in 
Transoxania on the eve of the Islamic conquests. Indian Buddhism specifically seeks to move 
beyond a dualistic concept of the world and perceives the ultimate non-duality of consciousness 
as distinct from the natural world. Also significant in al-Tirmidhī’s synthesis is the way he 
combined and juxtaposed textual knowledge with both knowledge of the natural world and 
knowledge bequeathed directly from God. Al-Tirmidhī takes an important position in this regard 










The Theological Significance of Walāya 
Previous scholarship on al-Tirmidhī has not appreciated the extent 
of al-Tirmidhī’s debt to the Ḥanafī theological tradition. This 
chapter seeks to establish al-Tirmidhī’s connection to this discourse 
stream and explain how some of its basic assumptions inform his 
doctrine of sainthood. Not only was al-Tirmidhī influenced by 
Ḥanafī theology, but he played an important role in the development 
of the later Ḥanafī School. Al-Tirmidhī’s more egalitarian approach 
to sainthood clearly stems from his Ḥanafī theological background 
with its tradition of inclusiveness and its expansive definition of 
belief. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Scholarly Background 
 The current research on al-Tirmidhī (Bernd Radtke, Yves Marquet, Sara Sviri, Geneviève 
Gobillot, ʿAbdallāh Barakat, et al.) has not adequately dealt with his audience. As was stated in 
the previous chapter, al-Tirmidhī is often portrayed as an outlier, someone whose ideas were 
unique, ahead of his time, and who may have spawned a movement, the Hakīmiyya.229 This 
perception of al-Tirmidhī depicts him primarily as a mystic. Since Islamic mysticism found its 
systematization under scholars such as al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī in the 5th- Islamic century 
(11th-century C.E.), historians have frequently used the biographical dictionary of al-Sulamī as a 
                                                          
229 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Hujwīrī (d. 465–469/1072–1077) mentions the Ḥakīmiyya in his treatise on Sufism Kashf 
al-Maḥjūb along with eleven other Ṣūfī sects. Only the Malāmatiyya (The People of Blame) are found in other 
supporting texts giving the impression that Hujwīrī’s discussion around these ‘sects’ may be more of an attempt to 
classify various trends in Sufism during his time according to what he sees as ideological viewpoints rather than the 
presence of actual ‘schools.’ This may also be an example of a later trend that projects schools (madhāhib) back 
onto the major figures of early Islam who are styled as eponyms. For more on al-Hujwīrī see Hosain’s article 
“Hujwīrī” in EI2.  
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point of departure in order to understand the early figures of many proto-Ṣūfī mystical 
movements such as the Baghdād School, the Basran School and the Khurāsānian School.230 
Mystical movements of the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.) had not yet developed an 
identity that was socially accepted, hence both al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī escape persecution 
primarily because they can claim juristic credentials.231 If such mystical movements were indeed 
too nascent to expect a larger audience of mystics whom their writings were targeting, it may be 
that we need to look elsewhere to situate them historically. The issue of audience is critical for us 
to situate al-Tirmidhī and to interpret his ideas. In Chapter 2 we showed that ḥikma represented a 
broadly accepted approach to knowledge and a discourse that al-Tirmidhī was a part of. We also 
saw how the term ḥikma represented a widely accepted gnoseology from the 8th- to the early 
10th-century C.E., after which time the same term became associated with Greek knowledge in 
its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic forms. While ḥikma was not represented in the basic episteme 
outlined by Rosenthal, theology (Kalām) certainly is one of his categories. It makes sense then to 
look at the discourse stream that supports this knowledge-type in al-Tirmidhī’s context. In 
Khurāsān and Transoxania Ḥanafism had become widespread by the middle of the 3rd- Islamic 
                                                          
230 See Chapter Six of Knysh’s (2010) Islamic Mysticism: A Short History titled, “The Systematization of the Ṣūfī 
Tradition” for further discussion of the period of systematization of Sufism in Khurāsān during the 4th- and 5th-
Islamic centuries. 
231 According to Gramlich and van Ess, al-Junayd escaped the Miḥna of Ghulām Khalīl (d. 275/888) by claiming to 
be a jurisprudent (faqīh). For more on al-Junayd and the effect of the Miḥna on the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād in the 9th-
century C.E. see Knysh’s (2010) Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, p. 62. During the same general time period al-
Tirmidhī faced persecution from certain local scholars in his town of Tirmidh for discoursing on the topic of love, 
nearly the same accusation leveled at the Ṣūfī mystics of Baghdād during the Miḥna of Ghulām Khalīl. Tāj al-Dīn 
al-Subkī (d. 771/1370) relates from al-Sulamī that when al-Tirmidhī was summoned to Balkh on account of these 
accusations of heresy he escaped persecution on account of his conformance to the madhhab of the scholars of that 
city. Al-Subkī’s words are fa-jāʾa ilā Balkh fa-qabilūhu bi-sabab muwāfaqatihi iyyāhum ʿalā al-madhhab, “He went 
to Balkh and they accepted him because of his conformance to them with regards to their school.” We know that al-
Tirmidhī was a Ḥanafī (See Radtke and O’Kane, The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism, p. 15) and it 
is likely that the Hanafīs of Balkh supported him against his detractors. Thus we can see that like al-Junayd, al-
Tirmidhī escapes persecution through his ability to claim a relation to a particular school of law. For al-Junayd it 
was the school of Abū Thawr and for al-Tirmidhī it was the school of Abū Ḥanīfa.  
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century (9th-century C.E.) in both legal and theological discourses among the scholarly elite.232 
Muʿtazilī theology was more widely represented than Traditionalism among Ḥanafīs in Khurāsān 
at this time. Thus, it is important to emphasize that when we refer to Ḥanafī theology we mean 
the discourse stream that was connected to works such as al-Fiqh al-Akbar I and other texts that 
we will address later in this chapter.  
 When reading entries on al-Tirmidhī in EIr and in Brill’s EI2 one may question whether 
we are even dealing with the same individual. Marquet classifies al-Tirmidhī as a traditionalist 
who is against philosophy and Kalām233 while Radtke, on the other hand, classifies him rather 
ambiguously as a theosophist, borrowing ideas from both Shiʿī and gnostic speculation.234 
Neither of these views clearly situates al-Tirmidhī within his scholarly milieu nor addresses the 
audience for whom al-Tirmidhī was writing. In his dissertation on al-Tirmidhī, Radtke provides 
more detail on al-Tirmidhī’s background. He acknowledges that al-Tirmidhī’s early background 
was Ḥanafī, however, he denies that Ḥanafī jurisprudence or theology had any serious effect on 
his thought.235 For Radtke, al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī background is only one of many sources that al-
Tirmidhī used to develop a unique synthesis that became his own. While there is some credence 
to this approach it does not explore the extent to which al-Tirmidhī is indebted to the Ḥanafī 
theological tradition. Radtke’s approach to Ḥanafī theology perceives tradition in rather static 
terms, similar to the way he portrays other theological movements such as the Muʿtazilīs and 
Ashʿarīs.236 Part of the challenge in dealing with Ḥanafī theology is that it has generally been 
                                                          
232 For more on Ḥanafism in eastern Khurāsān see Madelung, Wilferd. “The early Murjiʾa in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania and the spread of Ḥanafism.” Der Islam. 59 (1): 32–39. 1982. 
233 Ibid. “Ḥakīm Termedī,” EIr. 
234 Ibid. “al-Tirmidhī,” EI2. 
235 Ibid. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmiḏī: Ein Islamischer Theosoph, p. 80. 
236 Citing Madelung and Gardet, Radtke makes the relation of works (aʿmāl) to belief (imān) an important point of 
distinction between the Ḥanafīs and the Muʿtazilīs. However, when we look at Ḥanafī theological works of the 
3rd/9th-centuries C.E. we find that this distinction breaks down, with Ḥanafīs adopting the view that belief itself is a 
type of “work”. Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī (d. 318/930), the main spokesman of Hanafī theology prior to al-Māturīdī, 
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overshadowed by Ashʿarism in the study of Islamic theology.237 The study of Ḥanafī theology 
has mostly focused on the early texts of the school such as al-Fiqh al-Akbar I, al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ 
and al-ʿᾹlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim.238 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 332–336/943–947), after whom the 
Ḥanafī school was later named, has only recently been studied closely by Mustafa Ceriç.239 
Nevertheless, a more nuanced discussion of al-Māturīdī and his relationship to the later Ḥanafī 
theological school that bears his name has yet to be elucidated. 
 
Major Texts of the Ḥanafī Theological Tradition 
 Most studies of Ḥanafī theology begin with Arent Jan Wensinck’s Muslim Creed. 
Wensinck evaluated three foundational texts in Ḥanafī theology, Al-Fiqh al-Akbar I, Waṣiyyat 
Abī Ḥanīfa and Al-Fiqh al-Akbar II. The first of these texts is attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa240 while 
the second is narrated as if it is from Abū Ḥanīfa but, according to Wensinck, probably 
                                                          
claims that belief itself is a “work” in his Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-Bidaʿ. See Bernand, Marie. Le Kitāb al-Radd ʿAlā 
al-Bidaʿ d'Abū Muṭīʿ Makḥūl al-Nasafī. 1980, p. 118. It is understandable that Radtke would generalize about the 
general positions of particular schools, however to say that al-Tirmidhī was following the Muʿtazilīs in particular on 
this point of doctrine is not accurate. 
237 Jackson, Sherman A. Islam and Problem of Black Suffering. Oxford University Press, New York. 2009, p. 102. 
238 Wensinck provides an important analysis of the early texts of the Ḥanafī theological school in the The Muslim 
Creed. His discussion revolves around creedal texts that were ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa such as al-Fiqh al-Akbar I, 
Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa and what Wensinck calls al-Fiqh al-Akbar II, a more advanced creedal text that is sometimes 
attributed to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī but which is most probably the work of Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 
373/983). Schacht discusses an early Murjiʿī text al-ʿᾹlim wa l-Mutaʿallim attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa through the 
riwāya of Abū Muqātil al-Samarqandī (d. 208/823) although Schacht argues that Abū Muqātil was the original 
author of the text. According to Schacht this text reflects the theological milieu of the 2nd Islamic century (8th-
century C.E.). Schacht’s discussion of early Murjiʾī and Ḥanafī Kalām does not go beyond al-Māturīdī. In Religious 
Trends in Early Islamic Iran Wilferd Madelung discusses the historical importance of the early Ḥanafī theological 
school up to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī in as it appears in the eastern Islamic lands, however, his discussion is more 
historical and does not touch upon the positions of the later school. Gardet (1956) discusses faith amongst the 
various early sects of Islam distinguishing between early Murjīʿism and the Ḥanafī-Maturidī school, however he 
doesn’t discuss Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) or the later Ḥanafī-Māturīdī scholars after him such as Maḥmūd 
b. Zayd al-Lāmishī (d. 539/1144). Claude Gilliot goes the furthest in outlining some of the positions of the later 
Māturīdī School but is still very general, giving preference to authors of the Ashʿarī School after al-Ghazālī (d. 
505/1111) a contemporary of Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī. 
239 Ceriç, Mustafa. Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 
333/944). Kuala Lumpur. International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization. 1995. 
240 Both Wensinck and Schacht demonstrate that al-Fiqh al-Akbar I represents most closely what we can assume to 
be some of the original creedal teachings of Abū Ḥanīfa. See Wensinck. The Muslim Creed, p. 187. 
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originated sometime between the time of Abū Ḥanīfa and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.241 The third is often 
attributed to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī though Joseph Schacht prefers Abū al-Layth al-
Samarqandī (d. 373/983). According to Wensinck, the first two texts that represent an earlier 
stage within the school are polemical and primarily attempt to refute the positions of other 
movements. Both al-Fiqh al-Akbar I and the Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa are thought to have originated 
around the latter half of the 8th-century C.E. Al-Fiqh al-Akbar II discusses more advanced 
aspects of Kalām and follows a format that resembles an organized creed, with two sections 
devoted to the two parts of the Muslim testification of faith (shahāda). Wensinck is not so 
interested in following the development of the Ḥanafī/Māturīdī School in its fullest extent since 
he does not show how the creed continued to develop in the Ḥanafī school, after the 3rd- Islamic 
century (9th-century C.E.), but moves on to discuss al-Ashʿarī, al-Juwaynī242 and al-Ghazālī in 
their development of Muslim Kalām.243 While there is some overlap between the Ashʿarī and al-
Māturīdī schools of theology, this overlap primarily occurs much later in the 14th-century C.E. 
with Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). The Māturīdī School is often portrayed as a pale 
shadow of the Ashʿarī School. This is unfortunate because the premises and points of doctrine of 
the Māturīdī School represent a middle ground between Muʿtazilī Kalām and Ashʿarī Kalām. 
One of the main authors of the later Māturīdī School, Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) in his 
Tabṣirat al-Adilla, shows a high level of sophistication in his argumentation, but does not follow 
al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarī model in adopting an Aristotelian framework.244 While Wensinck’s 
model for the early development of the creed is accurate for the early Murjiʾī-Ḥanafī School, it is 
                                                          
241 Wensinck, A. The Muslim creed: its genesis and historical development. London: F. Cass. 1965.  
242 (d. 478/1085) 
243 The general trend in studies of early Islamic theology is to focus on eastern theologians after al-Ashʿarī leaving 
the later Ḥanafī-Māturīdī school almost completely neglected. 
244 Claude Gilliot only briefly mentions Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī in his treatment of the Ḥanafī theological tradition. 
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not precise enough to help us situate al-Tirmidhī within this tradition. We propose filling out 
Wensinck’s model by adding an additional stage between the Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa and al-Fiqh 
al-Akbar II.  
 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī is considered the eponym of the Māturīdī School but his thought 
clearly builds upon earlier texts in the eastern Ḥanafī tradition.245 By the early 5th- Islamic 
century (11th-century C.E.) the Māturīdī School had produced texts of depth and sophistication 
far exceeding that of al-Fiqh al-Akbar II. Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s Tabṣirat al-Adilla was a 
monumental work establishing the position of the Ḥanafī School within the larger context of 
philosophy and theology.246 His student Maḥmūd b. Zayd al-Lāmishī (d. 539/1144) wrote a mid-
sized work, al-Tamhīd, which demonstrated the extent of that sophistication. One possible reason 
that al-Tirmidhī’s connection to the Ḥanafī School has not been thoroughly explored is because 
most studies in Hanafī theology deal with either early texts attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa or to later 
texts by al-Māturīdī and post-Māturīdī scholars. Two Ḥanafī theological works that date just 
prior to al-Māturīdī that are coterminous with the life of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī are al-Sawād al-
Aʿẓam247 by al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī248 and Kitab al-Radd ʿalā al-Bidaʿ by Abū Mutīʿ al-Nasafī 
(d. 318/930), both texts dating approximately toward the end of the 9th-century C.E. and possibly 
the very early part of the 10th-century C.E.249 
                                                          
245 Gilliot, Claude. “La théologie musulmane en Asie centrale et au Khorasan.” Arabica, T. 49, Fasc. 2 (Apr., 2002), 
p. 154. 
246 Abū Muʿīn an-Nasafī is also responding to Ashʿarism in his Tabṣirat al-Adilla. Ibid. La théologie musulmane, p. 
161. 
247 Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam is also found under the title Al-Radd ʿalā Aṣḥāb al-Ahwā’ and 
was translated early on into Persian. The copies that have reached us contain a high degree of variation in wording. 
The manuscript of al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam that I obtained from the British Museum Or. 12781 differs significantly in 
wording from the printed 1837 Bulaq edition. 
248 Despite the current death date of al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī (d. 342/953), we have an approximate date for the 
authoring of his work al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam since we know that it was commissioned by the Samānid ruler Ismāʿīl b. 
Aḥmad (279–295/892–907) at the end of the 9th-century C.E. Ibid. The Muslim Creed, p. 30. 
249 Ibid. La théologie musulmane, p. 154. Keith Lewinstein provides the date of 290/902 for the authorship of al-
Sawād al-Aʿẓam. Lewinstein, Keith. “Notes on Eastern Ḥanafite Heresiography.” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 114, No. 4  (Oct. – Dec., 1994), p. 588. Both Sezgin and Schacht assume that al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam was 
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While Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd250 appears about the same time or just after the works 
of al-Samarqandī and al-Nasafī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd represents a new departure for Ḥanafī theology 
as described in the words of Claude Gilliot, “avec lui (al-Māturīdī) commence la théologie 
dialectique en Transoxiane.” The works of both al-Samarqandī and al-Nasafī summarize and 
codify ideas that had developed over the previous century within the school and thus are 
representative of ideas that were formed prior to the 9th-century C.E. Not only was al-Tirmidhī 
heir to these ideas but, as we will show, was an important figure in the transition from the creedal 
stage of Ḥanafī theology to the dialectical stage that has become associated with al-Māturīdī. 
 
The Development of Ḥanafī Theology 
As was stated previously, the first Ḥanafī theological texts such as al-Fiqh al-Akbar I and 
Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa deal mainly with interfaith polemics. Hence, the beginning words of 
Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa are, al-īmān iqrārun bi-l-lisān wa-taṣdīqun bi-l-janān, that is, “Belief is 
confessing with the tongue and attesting with the heart.”251 This creedal statement addresses 
Khārijī notions that equate actions with belief.252 The definition of belief just mentioned 
                                                          
authored after al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd and that it was the first work in that tradition, however al-Sawād al-
Aʿẓam shows no signs of al-Māturīdī’s influence there being no mention of ḥikma as an overarching principle, nor 
does al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam align to the new creedal structure that al-Māturīdī inaugurates that distinguished between 
ilāhiyyāt, points of doctrine on Godhood, and nubuwwāt, doctrines relating to prophecy. If al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam was 
indeed part of al-Māturīdī’s school it would surely have incorporated at least some of these elements. Finally, the 
date of authorship of al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam suggested by Lewinstein makes it more probably that al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam 
was authored either before or at nearly the same time as al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. It seems that the motivation 
to place al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam after Kitāb al-Tawḥīd may derive from the death date of al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī falling 
after that of al-Māturīdī, however death dates are notoriously difficult to prove accurately especially when dealing 
with contemporaries or near contemporaries in this time period. 
250 Despite there being some discussion over the authenticity of the sole surviving manuscript of Kitāb al-Tawḥīd as 
belonging to al-Māturīdī by Michel Allard (1967) and J. Meric Passagno (1984), both Gimaret (1980) and Özervarlı 
(1997) consider Kitāb al-Tawḥīd to be authentic after a comparison of the book with various passages quoted from it 
in Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s Tabṣirat al-Adilla. 
251 Ibid. The Muslim Creed, p. 125 
252 Also see Madelung’s discussion of early Ḥanafī theological polemics and their relation to politics in Religious 
Trends in Early Islamic Iran, p. 15. 
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eventually becomes foundational to the Ḥanafī School, but, as we will see, is not left 
uncontested. Most of the creedal statements in Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa attempt to take a medial 
position with respect to some point of theological controversy in the first part of the 2nd- Islamic 
century (8th-century C.E.). For example, one article in Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa states that belief 
neither increases nor decreases. This again becomes a basic element of the Ḥanafī creed. This 
follows from the Murjiʾī doctrine of faith that sought to close the door on accusations of unbelief 
(takfīr) that were associated with various movements such as the Khārijīs and the extremist 
(ghulāt) Shīʿīs. The various statements of these early creeds do not have any logical ordering, but 
rather stake out positions in relation to Khārijī, Murjiʾī, Qadarī, Jabrī, Jahmī, Shīʿī and Muʿtazilī 
sympathies.253 If we compare the contents of Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa and al-Fiqh al-Akbar I, 
representing the early stage up to the end of the 2nd- Islamic century (8th-century C.E.), to those 
of al-Fiqh al-Akbar II, representing the creed at the end of the 4th-Islamic century (10th-century 
C.E.), we find many of the same creedal elements with some important new additions. Al-Fiqh 
al-Akbar II discusses four new elements above and beyond what we find in al-Fiqh al-Akbar I, 
which are: saints and their relation to prophets, the controversy of love and its relation to 
antinomianism, the division between attributes and essence with respect to the Godhead and 
finally the Aristotelian concept of body, essence and accident.254 When we look at the two texts 
that we claim represent a medial stage in the development of early Ḥanafī theology, al-Sawād al-
Aʿẓam and Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-Bidaʿ, as it was expressed in the 9th-century C.E. in Khurāsān 
and Transoxania, we only find mention of the first three of the four elements that distinguish al-
Fiqh al-Akbar II from the earlier Ḥanafī texts. The Aristotelian body-essence-accident concept 
                                                          
253 Ibid, p. 131. These are examples of early religious and political movements in Islam that were eventually 
considered heretical by the majority Sunnī heresiographical tradition. 
254 Ibid, pp. 188–197. 
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appears to enter Ḥanafī theology with the arrival of al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. When 
looking at al-Tirmidhī’s works we also find discussions on the role of love, the position of saints 
vis-à-vis prophets and the role of attributes in describing the Godhead. We do not, however, find 
the Aristotelian notion of body-essence-accident that appears in al-Māturīdī’s work. Al-
Tirmidhī’s non-dual approach to walāya actually runs directly counter to Aristotle’s fundamental 
notion of the excluded middle. The Greek Hellenic elements found in al-Tirmidhī’s works 
emanate from the remnants of the Hellenistic mystical and philosophical heritage that permeated 
the scholarly culture in Khurāsān and Transoxania at that time.255 Within a scholarly and cultural 
milieu such as this, it is unlikely that al-Tirmidhī was not aware of Aristotle as Radtke assumes. 
It is probable that al-Tirmidhi consciously chose to avoid some aspects of Aristotelianism while 
giving preference for Pythagoreanism and Lettrism.256 Even throughout the translation 
movement in Baghdād during the first part of the 9th-century C.E. Arab Muslims consciously 
chose to translate scientific and philosophical works, but eschewed Greek literature such as the 
plays of Aristophanes and the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer. This may have been because Abbasid 
culture already prided itself in its own literary tradition. Nevertheless, we can assume that al-
Tirmidhī was making a conscious choice with respect to the various elements he wanted to 
                                                          
255 For more on the relationship between Al-Tirmidhī and Greek philosophy see Chapter 2. Radtke posits that al-
Tirmidhī’s thought represents an old Islamic theosophy very different than the new Islamic theosophy of Suhrawardī 
and Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). According to Radtke, it was not until al-Farābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīna (d. 
428/1037) that Aristotelian philosophy and Neoplatonism made its mark on Islamic mystical thought. See Radtke’s 
The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism, p. 7. If we look, however, at contemporaries of al-Tirmidhī 
such as Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 322/933–934) and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/923 or 323/935) we find individuals for 
whom Aristotelian thought and Neoplatonic ideas were not unknown. Kitāb al-Ḥikma also demonstrates that al-
Tirmidhī was closely aware of Galenic humorism. In Chapter 2 we showed how al-Tirmidhī’s thought corresponds 
closely to various aspects of Pythagorean cosmology. We also showed how the juxtaposition of the ḥakīm to the 
ṭabīb (physician) in al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb al-Ḥikma relates to the Pythagorean notion of macrocosm versus 
microcosm. The ḥakīm understands the macrocosm through his understanding of the opposites in the world just as 
the physician understands the human body or the microcosm through the four opposites of hot, cold, wet and dry.  
256 Lettrism is a cosmological movement in Islam and Jewish Kabala that views the world as originally composed of 
letters spoken by God in the creation of the universe. For al-Tirmidhī the Arabic letters represent the key to 
understanding the roots of words and thus the sources of created things as they were uttered by God in the 
primordial language of Arabic. 
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include in his many works. For al-Tirmidhī this was often dictated by inspiration. For example, 
he records in his autobiography that he ceased his study of Zodiac because he received 
inspiration from God that this was beneath his spiritual level. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī Credentials 
Al-Tirmidhī’s episteme leads us to look more closely at the Hanafi theological tradition 
and the study of this discourse stream has uncovered several texts that correspond closely to al-
Tirmidhī’s time period and the topics of his thought.  Now we will more closely examine how al-
Tirmidhī’s theological views correspond to ideas within al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam and Kitāb al-Radd 
ʿalā al-Bidaʿ. Before that, however, we will review al-Tirmidhī’s educational background and 
what others have said about his relationship to the Ḥanafī tradition. 
Al-Ḥujwīrī relates in Kashf al-Maḥjūb that al-Tirmidhī had studied Fiqh with one of the 
close companions of Abū Ḥanīfa.257 While this is improbable given the distance in time between 
the death of Abū Ḥanīfa and the birth of al-Tirmidhī, it is not impossible that he could have 
studied Fiqh (ʿilm al-raʾy) with one of the students of the students of Abū Ḥanīfa. Radtke 
mentions that al-Tirmidhī was born to a “theological” family258 sometime between 220 and 230 
A.H. (835 and 845 C.E.) in the city of Tirmidh. He studied ʿilm al-raʾy and ʿilm al-āthār from a 
young age.259 According to Radtke, the reference to ʿilm al-raʾy in his autobiography clearly 
indicates his relationship to Ḥanafī Fiqh, which was prevalent in the eastern Islamic lands at the 
time.260 In a passage from al-Rasāʾil al-Maknūna, al-Tirmidhī harshly criticizes the students of 
                                                          
257 ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān, al-Hujwīrī. The Kashf al-Mahjúb: the oldest Persian treatise on Sufism. New ed., London. 
Luzac. 1970, p. 141 
258 Ibid. Concept, p. 1. Also, Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 1.  
259 Ibid, p. 1 
260 Ibid, p. 15. 
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Abū Ḥanīfa while remaining respectfully silent about Abū Ḥanīfa himself.261 Despite his 
scathing criticism, the passage belies al-Tirmidhī’s intimate knowledge of early Ḥanafī 
jurisprudence and its major proponents:  
Fanẓur ilā ʿilmihim al-ladhi qayyaduhu fi kutubihim min ʿulūm al-
aḥkām aḥsabuhu yaqaʿ fī akthar min alfi jildin li-Abī Ḥanīfa 
raḥimahullāh wa-amma li-Abī Yūsuf wa-kutub Zufar wa Asad wa-
l-Luʾluʾī wa Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan fa-hal tarā fī shayʾin minhā 
dhakara al-mīʿād wa-ṣifāt al-janna wa-l-nār … fa ahl al-raʾy fi 
khuluwwin min hādha al-ʿilmi kullihi innama istimāʿuhum bi-l-
ādhān wa fikrihim bi-l-qulūb fī khuṣūmāt al-nufūs wa-sharruhum 
wa-makruhum wa khidaʿuhum wa-khiyānatuhum mā yūjib al-
ḥukmu ʿalayhim fi dhālik wa-ma yaḥillu lahum wa-mā yaḥrumu 
ʿalayhim.262 
 
Look at their knowledge, the rulings of which they have written 
down in their books. I would estimate it to be found in over a 
thousand volumes attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, God have mercy on 
him. As for Abū Yūsuf and the books of Zufar, Asad, Lu’lu’ī and 
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan, do you see in any of them, [have they] 
mentioned the Next Life or the description of Paradise and Hell? 
.... So, Ahl al-Raʾy (the Ḥanafīs) are devoid of all of this. Their 
hearing is only with their ears, their thinking with their hearts is 
only the bickering of souls, and their evil, devising, deceit and 
treachery require a judgment against them in all of those things as 
well as what is permissible for them and what is forbidden for 
them.  
 
It is evident that al-Tirmidhī’s early education was Ḥanafī and that later in his career he would 
respond to what he saw as deficiencies in the approach of Ḥanafī jurisprudence. Al-Tirmidhī not 
only criticized scholars of Ḥanafī law but also Hanafī/Murjiʾī theology as well. In the beginning 
                                                          
261 Elsewhere al-Tirmidhī considers Abū Ḥanīfa to be a scholar of the outward (ʿulamā’ al-ẓāhir) and not a scholar 
of the inward (ʿulamā’ al-bāṭin). Ibid. Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī wa-naẓarīyatih, p. 90. 
262 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, M. b. ʿAlī. Al-Masā’il al-Maknūna. Ms. Leipzig. Folio 3B-4A in Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī 
wa-naẓarīyatih Fī Al-wilāyah, p. 95. 
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of al-Tirmidhī’s Sīrat al-Awliyāʾ (Khatm al-Awliyāʾ) he addresses his audience directly. 
Speaking as if to a student asking a question, al-Tirmidhī responds: 
Wa dhakarta anna nāsan yaqūlūna inna al-wilāyata majhulatun 
ʿinda ahlihā wa man ḥasiba nafsahu waliyyan fahuwa baʿīdun 
minhā. Faʿlam anna hāʾulaʾī al-ladhīna yakhuḍūna fī hādha al-
kalām laysū min hādha l-amr fī shayʾ. Innamā hum qawmun 
yaʿtabirūna shaʾn al-wilāyati min ṭarīq al-ʿilm wa-yatakallamūna 
bi-l-maqāyīs wa-l-ẓunūn wa-bi-l-tawahhumi min anfusihim. 
 
You mentioned there are some people who say that sainthood is 
unknown to its people and whoever considers himself to be a saint 
is far from being so. Know that those who delve into this discourse 
are not a party to this affair. They are a people who consider 
sainthood to be from a type of outward knowledge and they 
discuss it through methods and guesswork and through delusion 
from themselves.263 
 
Sainthood was a topic consistently addressed by the Ḥanafī theologians as we will see in more 
detail later. Al-Tirmidhī’s use of the word “Kalām” here and “yatakallamūna” indicates an 
address towards theologians. This is based on al-Tirmidhī’s use of the same wording to warn the 
traveler on the path of maʿrifa about the “mutakallim” in his KH. There, al-Tirmidhī uses an 
analogy to describe the true reality of the human being’s dependence upon God at all times, 
inwardly and outwardly. Al-Tirmidhī likens the reliance of the human being on God to someone 
held dangling in the air by a hand. Were the hand to let go for an instant, the one being held 
would perish.264 In this way, the world, like the air, does not support the person. In truth, only 
God is the real support. He uses this analogy in order to emphasize a disposition he sees lacking 
in the theologian. For al-Tirmidhī, the theologian suffers from arrogance because he thinks he 
                                                          
263 Ibid. Drei Schriften, vol. 1, p. 1. 
264 Ibid. Kitāb al-ḥikma, fol. 7r. 
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can describe God in his own terms. After this parable al-Tirmidhī uses the following words to 
warn his reader about the pitfalls of Kalām: 
Thumma an yakhluṣa min āfāti al-kalām fa inna al-mutakallima 
muqaddirun li-mā yuftī bi-hā al-malik wa-muqtadir li-taqdīr 
umūrihi wa tadbīr aʿmālihi fa-kayfa yajtarī an yuqaddira aw 
yahtadiya aw yudabbira min aʿmālihi ʿalā miqdār ʿazamatihi wa-
mulkihi wa-kayfa yarā nafsahu yuṣliḥ lidhālik.265 
 
Then he must desist from the pitfalls of Kalām, for the mutakallim 
(theologian) estimates what the king himself decrees and estimates 
in order to assess his affairs and consider his actions – so how is it 
that he should presume to estimate or be correct, or think about any 
of his (the king’s) actions to the extent of what is due to him (he 
king) in terms of his (the king’s) greatness and his dominion and 
how should he (the theologian) see himself capable of that? 
 
Despite al-Tirmidhī’s harsh criticism of the theologian (mutakallim), his works demonstrate that 
he is not completely opposed to Kalām. On the following page of his KH he counsels the 
“mutakallim” (theologian) to take his “Kalām” from God and to consider what God manifests on 
his tongue before he begins to speak about matters related to God.266 For al-Tirmidhī, Kalām 
spoils ḥikma because it circumvents the process of ‘knowing God through spirituality’ through 
its emphasis of ‘knowing God through the intellect’. As we shall see later in this chapter, not all 
Kalām is problematic for al-Tirmidhī, but mainly the aspect of it that speculates abstractly about 
the nature of God. Other aspects of Kalām are upheld by al-Tirmidhī such as the idea of God 
having a particular number of attributes, discussion about the nature of belief and its relationship 
to acts, as well as the discipline of heresiography. Also, when we look at al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine 
of walāya, it is deeply colored by his theological background. This can only be the case for 
                                                          
265 Ibid, fol. 7r. 
266 Ibid, fol. 7r. 
 115 
 
someone who at a very young age studied traditional Ḥanafī Fiqh and Kalām by rote 
memorization as al-Tirmidhī has indicated in his autobiography. 
Al-Tirmidhī’s criticism of the practitioners of Fiqh and Kalām in his time points to his 
sense of independence and to the still fluid nature of the discourse stream around legal and 
theological doctrines in his milieu. It would be incorrect, however, to state that al-Tirmidhī was a 
Traditionalist, as Marquet claims, or that he adopted Muʿtazilī views, as does Radtke, since he 
condemns both of these groups in line with the standard Ḥanafī theological position of his 
time.267 Rather, al-Tirmidhī is better cast as a reformer who is reacting to the way knowledge 
was understood and conveyed in the religious context in which he was articulating his views, a 
context that was predominately Ḥanafī. He clearly lived before the formalization of the schools 
(madhāhib) of law and theology that coalesced in the 4th Islamic century (10-century C.E.). 
Hence, identifying him as Ḥanafī is a somewhat retrospective act. If we are going to designate 
him as someone who belonged to the Ḥanafī theological milieu, then his ideas should conform 
generally to the texts of that school both before him and after him and he should be in 
conversation with its basic precepts. Furthermore, the later Ḥanafī tradition should claim him in 
some way. We will now demonstrate how both of these hypotheses can be verified with respect 
to al-Tirmidhī. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī Theology 
Radtke states that al-Tirmidhī follows the Muʿtazilī position with respect to particular 
aspects of belief (īmān) since al-Tirmidhī constantly stresses the point throughout his various 
works that belief (īmān) must include actions (aʿmāl). Radtke states, “Glaube ist daher für 
                                                          
267 Ibid. Naẓarīyatih fī al-wilāyah, pp. 79–80. 
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Tirmidhī nicht nur, wie nach hanafitischer lehre, reiner bekenntnisakt, sondern, als im menshcen 
zure wirkung kommend, immer gleichzeitig auch äusseres tun: īmān ist zugleich auch werk 
(ʿamal). Hierin folgt Tirmidhī den muʿtaziliten.”268 There are three problems with this analysis 
of al-Tirmidhī’s theological views on belief. The first is that it doesn’t take into account al-
Tirmidhī’s views on language, that is, his insistence on the non-existence of true synonyms 
(mutarādifāt). It also does not account for his audience, nor does it reflect the nuanced approach 
of al-Tirmidhī toward mystical discourse and teaching. On first impression, one would wonder 
how al-Tirmidhī could be called a Ḥanafī while contravening one of the primary precepts of the 
school. We have to remember again that al-Tirmidhī preceded the period of formalization of the 
schools of law and theology and that is why we prefer to use the term ‘discourse stream’ to 
identify a less formal and more fluid period. The Ḥanafī School of theology did not become a 
formal school of thought until sometime in the mid to late 4th- Islamic century (10th-century 
C.E.) with the advent of al-Māturīdī’s Kitab al-Tawḥīd. Before al-Māturīdī we have a great deal 
of diversity among Ḥanafīs in terms of their theological viewpoints. One of the reasons that al-
Tirmidhī insists that belief must include works (aʿmāl) is because he seeks to differentiate the 
word belief (īmān) from submission (islām). Since there are no true synonyms according to al-
Tirmidhī, belief (īmān) and submission (islām) cannot be the same thing.269 In a sense, al-
Tirmidhī is trying to elevate the use of the word belief (īmān) to conform to what he sees as the 
true use of this word as it is articulated in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth.  
Furthermore, al-Tirmidhī has a specific audience in mind for certain of his works. In his 
Kitab Sīrat al-Awliyāʾ al-Tirmidhī engages in a conversation with one of his students and the 
                                                          
268 Ibid. Al-H̲akīm at-Tirmiḏī: ein islamischer theosoph, p. 81. 
269 Al-Tirmidhī’s work Al-Furūq wa-Manʿ al-Tarāduf sets out to demonstrate how various terms that are thought to 
be synonymous are actually different in meaning. The idea of the non-existence of true synonyms is an idea that 
later becomes a part of Ḥanafī Uṣūl (Methodology).  
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book is organized in terms of a dialog. For example, an unnamed speaker asks the question, 
“What is the firmest handhold?” Al-Tirmidhī responds, “It is fitter for me to speak about it when 
I find the right situation because it is ḥikmat al-ḥikma!” The student replies, “Give us a chance, 
consider [the matter] out of concern [for us]!” Al-Tirmidhī answers, “Yes, ask out of your 
poverty to your Lord!” The student then asks again, “What is the firmest handhold?” At this 
point, al-Tirmidhī relents and proceeds to answer the question.270 Since al-Tirmidhī’s works 
often have a pedagogical value for those whom he considered his students, he emphasizes a more 
rigorous definition of belief than that accorded by the theologians who are defining belief for a 
wider audience. In other words, to be a really ‘true believer’ (as an aspirant to the path of maʿrifa 
or gnosis) one must demonstrate one’s beliefs through action. Al-Tirmidhī does not give ordinary 
Muslims the title muʾminūn (believers), rather, he uses a term used in Ḥanafī theological texts to 
refer to ordinary believers, which is, muwaḥḥidūn (those who have testified to God’s unity).271 
Hence, al-Tirmidhī does consider such persons to be Muslims and in that respect does not 
contravene the Ḥanafī theological position, which states that a Muslim is anyone who simply 
confesses to the faith on the tongue (iqrārun bi-l-lisān) and testifies in the heart (taṣdīqun bi-l-
qalb). Al-Tirmidhī does, however, depart from the Ḥanafīs of his time when he describes belief 
(īmān) to be a higher stage than islām (submission and entrance into the faith). This Ḥanafī 
tradition still equates belief (īmān) with submission (islām). Al-Tirmidhī demonstrates this point 
in his NU as follows:  
Hāʾulāʾi qawmun muwaḥḥidūn waḥḥadū Allāha bi-alsinatihim wa-
qulūbihim wa-ḍayyaʿū al-ʿubūdata … fa-inna min ḥaqqi Allāh ʿalā 
al-ʿibādi an yaʿbuduh … fa-l-ʿubūdatu al-ẓahiratu taḥqīqun li-mā fī 
al-bāṭin. 
                                                          
270 Ibid. Drei Schriften, p. 72. 
271 This is to be distinguished from the use of muwaḥḥidūn in the central lands of Islamdom during the 3rd- Islamic 




Those are a people who confess the unity of God. They have 
testified to God’s unity with their tongues and with their hearts but 
have lost the essence of worship… for it is the right of God over 
his servants that they worship him…and outward worship is the 
realization of what is found inwardly. 
 
The muwaḥḥidūn are those who profess outwardly with their tongues and believe inwardly in 
their hearts but do not necessarily do anything else that would distinguish them as Muslims.272 
According to al-Tirmidhī, these muwaḥḥidūn are the ones who will enter Hell and then 
eventually leave it to enter Paradise, in contradistinction to the muʾminūn (believers). This 
position necessitates a response by al-Tirmidhī to the prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) that states that 
the shahāda (statement of confession) is itself weighty enough to enter someone into Paradise. 
Al-Tirmidhī interprets this ḥadīth by saying that the statement of confession referred to in this 
ḥadīth is the confession that happens just before death, since at death a person’s heart is not 
connected to worldly matters and is thus able to make a sincere and pure confession.273 It is 
evident here that al-Tirmidhī’s positions with respect to belief (īmān) are in conversation with 
the theological tradition of his time. Although some of his positions on theological and creedal 
matters differ from the main positions of what came to be the Māturīdī school, this can be 
credited to his having preceded al-Māturīdī at a time when the Ḥanafī School of theology was 
still quite diverse and in a state of flux. 
Al-Tirmidhī directly discusses another major creedal point in the Ḥanafī School, which is 
the controversy over whether or not belief increases or decreases. As stated earlier, all of the 
                                                          
272 The term muwaḥḥid, in this sense, is used by the Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theologians of Khurāsān and Transoxania 
during from the 3rd- to 5th- Islamic centuries (9th- to 11th-centuries C.E.). See Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s use of this 
term in Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, p. 102. Also see Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s (d. 508/1114) use of this term in Tabṣirat al-
Adilla, pp. 24. The Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theologians used the term muwaḥḥidūn to denote a believer who merely 
professed the statement of confession but who was generally ignorant of the legal and theological particulars of 
Islam. 
273 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 1, pp. 62–63. 
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early Ḥanafī creeds that can be attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa and his direct students negate the idea 
that belief increases or decreases. This point of doctrine appears to conflict directly with a verse 
in Chapter Eight (Al-Anfāl) of the Qurʾān, which reads, “They only are the believers whose 
hearts feel fear when Allah is mentioned, and when His revelations are recited unto them they 
increase in their faith, and who trust in their Lord,” Qurʾān [8:2].274 Al-Tirmidhī cites this same 
verse in his discussion on this creedal point and then proceeds to explain his own position in 
relation to the increase or the decrease of belief. Al-Tirmidhī’s words are quite precise and 
indicate his knowledge of the Ḥanafī position and his need to reconcile it with the Qurʾānic text. 
He states: 
Wa min hāhuna istajāza man qāla al-īmān yāzīdu wa-kamā yāzīdu 
fa-innahu yanquṣu summiya al-zāʾid min al-nūr fī ṣadrihi īmānan 
wa-mā naqaṣa fa-minhu yanquṣu wa-l-aṣl alladhī minhu badaʾa 
al-tawḥīd qāʾimun fa-bi-aqalli al-nūr yaṣīru muwaḥḥidan fa-
iṭmaʾanna bihi.275 
 
And from this, it is permissible for one to say that belief increases 
and just as it increases it also decreases. The light which increases 
in his chest is called belief, and what decreases, decreases from it 
(that light) but the original bit with which he started his belief in 
the oneness of God remains. Thus, it is with this smallest bit of 
light that he becomes a muwaḥḥid, (one who confesses to God’s 
unity) and his heart finds repose in it. 
 
Here, al-Tirmidhī attempts to reconcile two positions that seem contradictory.276 From what we 
have seen so far the outlines of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of belief are beginning to become clear. 
The muwaḥḥid is the one who confesses belief with his tongue and believes in tawḥīd (God’s 
unity) with his heart. That original ‘belief’ is a light that God casts into the heart of the 
                                                          
274 Pickthall, Marmaduke William. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. New York: Dorset Press, 1988. 
275 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 124. 
276 Ibid. Nadhariyyatuhu, p. 119. 
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muwaḥḥid. As that point of light expands, belief also expands until one becomes, as al-Tirmidhī 
states, al-muʾmin al-bāligh (a mature believer).277 Any actual decrease in belief is a decrease 
from the amount of belief that exceeded that original point of light. However, that point of light 
itself cannot increase or decrease; it is either present or disappears completely, in which case one 
is no longer a Muslim. Al-Tirmidhī’s use of the word “istajāza” (to be permissible) to refer to 
those who consider belief to increase and decrease indicates that he gave preference to the 
Ḥanafī position that belief does not increase or decrease. Hence, we find that al-Tirmidhī’s 
definition of belief upholds the Ḥanafī position but modifies it in a unique and creative way. Al-
Tirmidhī’s attempt to reconcile two contradictory theological positions betrays his own active 
involvement in developing a theological doctrine of belief that rationalizes various points of 
doctrine in Islam. On the one hand, he criticizes speculative theology for what he considers to be 
its excesses, yet he also takes very specific theological positions in relation to the theological 
tradition in which he was schooled. Reconciling seemingly contradictory statements in the 
Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature is, in fact, one of the functions of the ḥukamāʾ according to al-
Tirmidhī’s approach to ḥikma. What disturbs al-Tirmidhī is the discourse that surrounds God’s 
attributes and actions and how they connect or do not connect with God’s essence. For al-
Tirmidhī this is the blameworthy aspect of theology. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī and Ḥanafī Theology in the 3rd- Islamic Century (9th-Century C.E.) 
One of the reasons that it has been difficult to reconcile al-Tirmidhī’s approach to 
theology is because Kalām has come to mean Islamic theology in a more general sense. When al-
Tirmidhī refers to Kalām and the rational theologians (mutakallimūn) he does not have theology 
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(in the general sense) in mind. Rather, he is addressing particular groups that he sees as heretical 
(ahl al-bidʿa) who were associated with Kalām, namely the Muʿtazilīs or their early forebears. In 
Nawādir al-Ūṣūl al-Tirmidhī lists the groups who he considers ahl al-bidʿa (heretical groups)  
and these accord exactly with the main groups anathematized by the Ḥanafī School, namely the 
Mushabbaha, Qadariyya, Jabriyya and Jahmiyya. For al-Tirmidhī, dīn (religion) is something 
that the soul must submit to. Always taking opportunities to make linguistic connections, he 
relates dīn to the verb dāna, which has the meaning of abasement. In this way al-Tirmidhī 
connects the idea that dīn (religion) presumes that the nafs (soul) abases itself. Al-Tirmidhī then 
explains that God sent down a clear revelation that would leave no room for other than 
submission. He uses the word “kalām” for revelation possibly hinting that the true “kalām” is 
God’s speech and not the theological speculations of the particular groups he mentions. He says, 
fa anzala kalāman furqānan yufarriqu bayna al-haqqi wa l-bāṭil, meaning, “So he (God) sent 
down a clarifying speech which divides between truth and falsehood.”278 Al-Tirmidhī does not 
consider the Ḥanafī theologians to come under the rubric of Kalām at all. The Ḥanafī theological 
school is what he considers to be the ‘alternative’ to the Kalām of heretical groups that he 
considers to have delved into matters they do not understand and who accused others of unbelief 
thereby. For al-Tirmidhī, the mutakallimūn refer primarily to the Muʿtazilī theologians.279 In the 
same passage al-Tirmidhī all but identifies the Muʿtazilīs by name. He says:  
“fa-l-zāʾighūna … tarakū al-khuḍūʿ lillāh taʿāla wa-taslīm al-nafs 
ilā Allāh … sudda ʿalayhim bāb al-qadar fashtaddū wa-
taʿammaqū fī ṭalabihi ḥattā halakū wa-addāhum dhalika ilā an 
                                                          
278 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Nawādir al-uṣūl fī maʿrifat aḥādīth al-Rasūl. Ed. Muṣṭafā b. Ismāʿīl 
Dimashqī. Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir, 1972, p. 210. We used the 1972 edition of Nawādir al-Uṣūl here because the reference 
in the 2010 edition could not be located. 
279 From the middle of the 8th-century C.E. to the middle of the 9th-century C.E. the appellation mutakallim was 
applied almost exclusively to Muʿtazilī theologians. Henrik Lagerlund. Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 2010, p. 666. Also see, Adang et. al. A Common Rationality: Muʿtazilism in Islam and 
Judaism. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission. 2007. 
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barraʾū Allāh min qudratihi wa-sharakūhu fī mashīʾatihi ifkan wa- 
iftirāʾan …”280 
 
Hence, those who are astray … have left abasement to God most 
high and submitting the soul to God … the door of ability (qadar) 
was closed to them so they became extreme, and they delved 
deeply in searching for it until they perished. And this lead them to 
divest God of His true ability, and they co-shared with Him in His 
will as a lie and a conceit…” 
 
The word “qadar” here, in the sense of Ahl al-Qadar (the people of qadar) is a term often 
applied to the Muʿtazilīs because it refers to their delving into the topic of the ability of humans 
to freely create their own actions. Al-Tirmidhī is almost being sarcastic here by saying that the 
door of qadar was closed upon them because they sought to be people of qadar. In other words, 
they were left spiritually impotent because they insisted on their own ability to freely create their 
own actions. Al-Tirmidhī is against Muʿtazilī theology because it attempts to understand and 
describe God in ways that, according to al-Tirmidhī, God does not describe himself. Ḥanafī 
theology in this period was creedal in nature and sought above all to find a middle position in 
relation to various early sects within Islam. This is how al-Tirmidhī approached theology in 
contrast to the speculative approach of the Muʿtazilīs of his time, although it should be noted that 
his incorporation of Ḥanafī theology is very subtle and easy to miss. This is because he was not 
primarily concerned with theology or heresiography. He was more concerned with presenting 
what he saw as the viable alternatives to speculative theology, which are ḥikma (wisdom) and 
maʿrifa (gnosis). As we discussed in the previous chapter, ḥikma entails ‘reading’ (or seeing and 
intuiting) the world through its opposites.281 In this respect al-Tirmidhī is actually saying that the 
                                                          
280 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 4, p. 180. 
281 Umberto Eco describes the Hermetic approach to reading the world as ‘text’ in The Limits of Interpretation. Eco 
argues that Renaissance attempts to interpret the world were based on seeing order in the world as a product of 
resemblances between the microcosm and the macrocosm. This approach is similar to al-Tirmidhi’s concept of 
hikma and further points to an underlying source in Greek Hermetic thought that informed both traditions. Eco, 
Umberto. The limits of interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994, pp. 23–26. 
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mystic is one who must strive to understand God through the world as another type of 
‘revelation.’ We should not forget that much of western science and the impetus to understand 
the natural world grew out of a belief among Deists of the 18th-century C.E. that Nature was a 
manifestation of God’s true revelation.  
In another place in the same passage Al-Tirmidhī distinguishes between ikhtilāf and 
iftirāq. He uses the term ikhtilāf to indicate differing in a respectful manner based on ijtihād al-
raʾy (independent reasoning). According to al-Tirmidhī, this type of scholarly differing is a 
mercy.282 True scholars, al-Tirmidhī says are, ahlu mawaddatin wa-ʿaṭf or, “people of love and 
affection.” In contrast to this, he describes the groups who instigate separation (iftirāq) as those 
who cause disharmony, which results in accusations of unbelief (kufr).283 The groups that al-
Tirmidhī accuses of iftirāq are exactly the same groups that Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī accuses of 
heresy in his Ḥanafī heresiographical work mentioned earlier, Al-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Bidaʿ wa l-
Ahwāʾ. In this book, Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī targets six major heresies, each of which he then 
breaks down into twelve sub-heresies, to make a total of seventy-two heresies, a symbolic 
number, which is mentioned in a report attributed to the Prophet about the number of heretical 
sects in Islam. These six major heretical groups are: al-Ḥarūriyya, al-Rawāfiḍa, al-Qadariyya, al-
Jabriyya, al-Jahmiyya and al-Murjiʾa.284 Al-Tirmidhī mentions all of these groups in the same 
                                                          
282 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 4, p. 183. 
283 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 186. 
284 Marie Bernand. “Le Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Bidaʿ wa-l-Ahwāʾ.” Annales Islamologiques (16). 1980, p. 60. 
The Ḥanafīs are often accused themselves of being Murjiʿa. See Joseph Schacht’s New Sources for Muḥammadan 
Theology and Wilferd Madelung’s Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran. It seems that the Hanafīs are trying to 
reclaim the meaning of Murjiʿa here. The Ḥarūriyya were a sect of the Khawārij during the Umayyad period. The 
Rawāfiḍa is a derogatory term for the Shīʿīs. The Qadariyya refer to an early theological trend that favored human 
agency with respect to human actions and were a precursor to the Muʿtazilīs. The Jabriyya opposed the Qadariyya 
and favored divine predestination over human agency for human actions. This group was the precursor to the 
Traditionalists. The Jahmiyya was a sect that followed the teachings of Jahm b. Safwān and negated the existence of 
attributes for God. The Murjiʾa is the name of a sect that was known for denying the punishment in the Hellfire of 
anyone who professed the testification of faith. It was also used as a label for the early Ḥanafiyya who, as Wilferd 
Madelung states, accepted as Muslim anyone who made the testification of faith. This had political and economic 
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passage mentioned above except for the last group, al-Murjiʾa.285 One group, al-Ḥarūriyya, does 
not appear in the passage just mentioned from NU, nevertheless, this group does appear as a 
heretical sect in another passage in NU.286 The groups al-Tirmidhī lists in NU are al-Mushabbiha, 
al-Qadariyya, al-Jabriyya, al-Jahmiyya and al-Rāfiḍa. It is clear that al-Tirmidhī is pulling from 
the same heresiographical tradition as Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī. Al-Tirmidhī even uses the same 
descriptors to identify these heretical groups using phrases such as, those who speak min al-
ahwāʾ, or “from their caprice”, a term used in the title of al-Nasafī’s heresiography. We can see 
from the previous discussion that Kalām for al-Tirmidhī is not what the Ḥanafī theologians were 
engaged in. Al-Tirmidhī describes Kalām as masaʾil al-fitna, or “topics of discord”. The 
following are some of the issues that he claims are the focus of heretical groups: jabr (being 
compelled), qadr (agency), istiṭāʿa qabl al-fiʿl wa-maʿahu (ability before the act and with the 
act), ṭalab kayfiyyat ṣifāt Allāh (seeking to understand the nature of God’s attributes), al-īmān 
hal huwa makhlūqun am lā (whether or not belief is created), al-qurʾān wa-mā huwa (the Qurʾān 
and its nature), al-imāma wa man istaḥaqqahā baʿd al-rasūl (leadership and who deserves it 
after the Prophet).287 These are all topics that are central to the polemics of Ḥanafī creedal and 
heresiographical treatises of the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.). One such work is Kitāb 
al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam by al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī. The Kitāb al-Sawād not only presents creedal 
topics but also provides arguments to support these topics of creed. Hence, the existence of 
theological arguments attached to various topics that do not follow a particular organization 
indicates, again, a medial stage between the early creedal texts of the 2nd- and early 3rd- Islamic 
                                                          
significance because the Umayyad governors in the eastern provinces sought to discourage conversion to Islam on 
account of loss of revenue from the poll tax (jizya) on non-Muslims. 
285 If al-Tirmidhī had wanted to attack the Ḥanafī theologians he could have easily included the Murjiʾa among the 
sects he labeled as heretical since non-Hanafīs often used the term Murjiʾa as a derogatory term for the Ḥanafīs. 
286 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 1, p. 390. The Ḥarūriyya are a type of Khawārij. Al-Tirmidhī mentions another subgrouping 
of the Khawārij, the Azāriqa, which are also mentioned by Abū Muṭīʾ al-Nasafī. 
287 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 187. 
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centuries (8th- and early 9th-centuries C.E.) and the highly structured theological texts 
inaugurated by al-Māturīdī. 
There are many points of similarity between the theological positions in al-Sawād al-
Aʿẓam and the various positions al-Tirmidhī takes in his works. We will focus here, however, on 
one particular topic that demonstrates the connection between al-Tirmidhī and Ḥanafī theology 
of the late 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.). The issue of kasb (acquiring a livelihood) is a 
point discussed by both al-Tirmidhī and al-Samarqandī. Kasb was an especially important topic 
for Ṣūfīs because it dealt with the question of how to balance spiritual pursuits with the need to 
procure a mundane livelihood.288 Al-Samarqandī is very precise about the Ḥanafī position on 
kasb. He states: 
Yanbaghi an yaʿlama anna al-kasba yuftaraḍu fī baʿḍ al-awqāt 
liʾanna Allāh taʿālā [qāla] wa-huzzī ilayki bi-jidhʿi al-nakhla (al-
āya) wa qāla ʿazza wa jalla wa-jaʿala al-nahāra maʿāshā. Wa-
idhā lam yakun al-kasbu wājiban lā yāḥtāju al-insānu ilā al-kasbi 
fa-ḥīnaʾidhin yakūnu al-kasbu sunnatan waʿlam anna tarka l-kasbi 
rukhṣatun wa inkāru al-kasbi bidʿatun wa ruʾyata al-rizqi min al-
kasb kufrun waʿlam anna man lam yarā al-kasba wājiban wa raʾāhu 
bidʿatan fa-huwa karrāmiyyun mubtadiʿun wa-man raʾā al-rizq min 
al-kasb fa-huwa kāfirun wa-yanbaghī an yakūna al-kasbu taḥt al-
yaqīn wa-l-tawakkul ʿalā al-yaqīn fa-matā lam yakun al-kasbu taḥt 
al-yaqīn wa-l-tawakkul fī al-yaqīn kāna dhālika kufran.289 
 
He must know that earning a livelihood (kasb) is mandatory in 
some instances because Allah most high says, “Shake towards you 
the trunk of the tree (the verse) and he, mighty and majestic, says 
“and we made the day a time for livelihood.” However, when 
earning a livelihood is not mandatory then the human being does 
not have to earn a living and in that instance earning a living 
becomes a sunna (supererogatory work). Know that leaving 
                                                          
288 Ibid. Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, pp. 33, 46, 95. Al-Shaqīq al-Balkhī looked down on earning a 
livelihood while al-Muḥāsibī wrote a treatise defending its importance. The Malāmatiyya were proponents of 
earning a living while the Karrāmiyya eschewed ordinary livelihood and practiced begging. 
289 Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī. Kitāb al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam. Ms. British Museum. Or. 12781 fol. 58–59. 
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earning a living is an exception (permitted in certain 
circumstances), and denying earning a living is an innovation 
(bidʿa) and seeing one’s apportioned sustenance from God as 
coming from one’s earning is unbelief. Know that whoever does 
not consider kasb to be mandatory but sees it as an innovation is a 
heretical Karrāmī, and whoever sees one’s apportioned sustenance 
from God as coming from one’s own earning – he is an unbeliever. 
Earning a livelihood must be seen as under [the power of] certainty 
and reliance upon God. So when earning a livelihood is not under 
[the power of] certainty and reliance upon God then that is 
unbelief. 
 
Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī treads a fine line between several positions on kasb. Al-Samarqandī 
addresses the Karrāmiyya in particular who were accused of begging rather than earning a 
livelihood and were prevalent in Khurāsān and Transoxania at the end of the 3rd- Islamic century 
(9th-century C.E.).290 One significant point, though, in al-Samarqandī’s discussion of kasb is that 
he provides the possibility that there are special circumstances in which kasb is not required. 
This is exactly al-Tirmidhī’s position, however, al-Tirmidhī is more specific since he devotes a 
whole treatise to this issue in Kitāb Bayān al-Kasb. For al-Tirmidhī, earning a livelihood is 
required of most individuals because their lower souls are attached to the things of this world. He 
includes the zuhhād (renunciants) in this category because, while they have renounced the world, 
they still harbor within themselves a secret longing for it.291 Renunciation (zuhd) is understood in 
a dialectical relationship to the world and thus, while it claims separation from the world, it is 
secretly wedded to it. Again, al-Tirmidhī could be obliquely referring to the Karrāmiyya who 
were known for their renunciation of the world as well as their negative attitude toward earning a 
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291 Ibid. Nadhariyyatuhu, p. 244. 
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livelihood. For al-Tirmidhī, kasb is not required of the people of maʿrifa and the ṣiddīqūn 
because their lower souls have died (mātat) and they no longer desire the things of this world. 
Rather, they seek livelihood because it was a practice of the prophets, however, if they did not 
seek a livelihood, their sustenance would come to them from God without any hardship.292 Both 
al-Tirmidhī and al-Samarqandī use the example of Mary to illustrate the nature of rizq. Al-
Tirmidhī describes how Mary would be given food in her prayer niche directly from God but 
would also spin wool to clothe herself and her son.293 Al-Samarqandī uses a different story of 
Mary to illustrate the same principle, citing that at certain times taking means is required, but at 
other times it may not be required for certain elect individuals. Al-Samarqandī uses the example 
of Mary when she leans up next to a palm tree in the pangs of her childbirth. In the Qurʾān Mary 
is told to shake the palm trunk so that dates will fall for her to eat. For al-Samarqandī, this story 
explains both the need to take advantage of the means that are available for provision, while also 
realizing that one’s reliance and true sustenance must be with God. The idea here is that it would 
be impossible for Mary to shake the palm trunk, but her being ordered to do so demonstrates the 
sunna (supererogatory nature) of taking means even for someone of her stature. Hence, the dates 
fell from the palm and she ate from them as a miracle. Mary proactively did her part whether or 
not it would have any effect. 
Both al-Tirmidhī and al-Samarqandī place kasb under the larger umbrella of tawakkul. In 
structural terms it is unlikely that this could be accidental. As is mentioned above in the quote 
from al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam, al-Samarqandī explicitly states that kasb must come under (taḥt) both 
yaqīn (certainty) and tawakkul (reliance upon God). Al-Tirmidhī, in al-Furūq wa-Manʿ al-
Tarāduf, explains kasb in terms of the difference between tawakkul and ittikāl. For al-Tirmidhī, 
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tawakkul means seeking the provision that God has already destined for one while knowing that 
it will come according to his planning. On the other hand, ittikāl can also mean to sit idly and 
wait for one’s provision to come to one out of laziness. His response to such a person who 
refuses to expend effort for his sustenance is that such a person does not know whether God had 
ordained that particular sustenance to come through his effort or not. If so, that sustenance would 
be withheld until the requisite effort is spent.294 For al-Tirmidhī only the ʿārifūn (gnostics) can 
have true reliance upon God, which requires knowing when God wants one to seek one’s 
livelihood by taking means (asbāb). Such individuals know when God wants them to desist from 
taking means (asbāb) and to rely completely upon Him. We can see here that al-Tirmidhī’s 
notion of kasb fits neatly into al-Samarqandī’s rubric. 
 
Al-Tirmidhī’s Relationship to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī 
 In the previous discussion we demonstrated that al-Tirmidhī was working within the 
framework of the Ḥanafī theological tradition, both in terms of the earliest creedal texts of the 
tradition, as well as two Ḥanafī texts that date to al-Tirmidhī’s general time period. This means 
that we can safely say that Hanafī theology represents one of al-Tirmidhī’s discourse streams. 
We have every reason to believe that al-Tirmidhī saw himself as a reformer and defender of what 
he considered to be an orthodox understanding of Islam. That is why he wrote two specific 
heresiographical works that reflect positions in the Ḥanafī tradition, namely al-Radd ʿalā al-
Rāfiḍa (Refutation of the Shīʿīs) and al-Radd ʿalā al-Muʿaṭṭila (Refutation of Those who Deny 
Attributes, i.e., the Muʿtazilīs). Both of these texts are considered authentic by Sezgin and 
Radtke. Al-Tirmidhī’s reformist approach was not limited to theology but focused also on Ḥanafī 
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Uṣūl (Legal Methodology). Even before the work of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980), 295 which Marie 
Bernand considers to be the earliest extant attempt to codify Ḥanafī Uṣūl, al-Tirmidhī had 
written several lengthy works that revised basic tenets of Ḥanafī Uṣūl almost a hundred years 
earlier.296 Despite this, most scholars of al-Tirmidhī do not see him as having had much of an 
impact within the Ḥanafī School. This misreading of al-Tirmidhī has been exacerbated by limited 
access to his full corpus of writings both published and in manuscript. It is my contention that al-
Māturīdī, who is credited as the systematizer of Ḥanafī theology, received much of the 
inspiration for his monumental work Kitāb al-Tawḥīd from al-Tirmidhī. Al-Māturīdī lived in the 
same general area as al-Tirmidhī and was in the next generation of Ḥanafī theologians after al-
Tirmidhī. Al-Māturīdī’s ideas, while consistent with Ḥanafī teachings before and after him, 
include some elements that would seem to come out of a vacuum had we not had access to al-
Tirmidhī’s works.297 The idea that al-Māturīdī is a Ḥanafī reaction to al-Ashʿarī does not 
adequately explain the existence of these elements given the context of al-Māturīdī in the larger 
Ḥanafī theological tradition. Furthermore, neither Ulrich Rudolph nor Claude Gilliot support 
such a thesis. Not only is al-Māturīdī’s thought in many ways more advanced than al-Ashʿarī, 
but al-Māturīdī’s contribution to Ḥanafī theology is not in any way in conversation with al-
Ashʿarī’s teachings.  
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296 Al-Tirmidhī attacks the Ḥanafī notion of qiyās that is handed down from Abū Ḥanīfa. In al-Furūq wa-Manʿ al-
Tarāduf al-Tirmidhī calls Ḥanafī qiyās “mushākila” (resemblancing) rather than true qiyās. For al-Tirmidhī true 
qiyās can only be achieved by returning to a legal cause (ʿilla) that is based, not on the particular new item at hand 
and its relationship to something in the Sharīʿa that it resembles, but rather an ʿilla that is based on principles 
derived directly from the Qurʾān and Sunna.  




 In the last chapter we discussed al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma, its Pythagorean roots, 
and the way in which ḥikma functions to maintain the viability of opposites and, in turn, confers 
order onto the universe. We also discussed the way al-Tirmidhī uses ḥikma to set up his 
discussion of walāya and indicate its non-dual nature. This use of ḥikma is signature to al-
Tirmidhī and only appears in detail in his KH. Al-Tirmidhī’s particular use of ḥikma is not found 
anywhere in the pre-Maturidī Ḥanafī texts, yet appears distinctly in al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd. It is highly probable that al-Māturīdī read al-Tirmidhī’s works since they both belonged 
to the same theological tradition and both lived in the same general locale only one generation 
apart. Ulrich Rudolph considers al-Māturīdī’s use of ḥikma to be due to Muʿtazilī influence. The 
assumption throughout al-Māturīdī’s work is that God is always wise (ḥakīm) and just (ʿadl) and 
according to Rudolph this means that al-Māturīdī is applying rational standards to God.298 While 
this is plausible given that al-Māturīdī spends a great deal of effort attempting to refute the 
Muʿtazilīs, this does not actually fit with al-Māturīdī’s use of ḥikma. Al-Māturīdī states:  
Wa-law amʿana hāʾulāʾi al-firaq al-naẓara fī-mā taqaddama min 
dhikri al-adillati la-ʿalimū qusūra ʿuqūlihim ʿan al-wuqūf ʿalā al-
ḥikmati al-bashariyyati faḍlan ʿan an yuḥīṭu bi-ḥikmati al-
rubūbiyya … wa-lazima al-qawlu bi-kulli mā lā tablughuhu 
ʿuqūlunā bi-darki al-ḥikma baʿda an thabata annahu manshaʾuhu 
wa-muḥdithuhu an naʿlam anna fīhi ḥikmatun bālighatun lam 
tablughuhā.299 
 
Had those (heretical) factions looked closely at the arguments 
previously presented they would have known the limited nature of 
their intellects in understanding human ḥikma let alone that they 
could encompass divine ḥikma … and it is necessary to follow 
anything our intellects do not understand of ḥikma after it has been 
confirmed that He (God) initiated it and brought it into existence 
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299 Al-Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr. Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. Dar Ṣādir: Beirut. 2001, pp. 180–181. 
 131 
 
and that we should know there is a prescient ḥikma that has not 
reached (our intellects). 
 
Al-Māturīdī’s concept of ḥikma is clearly not Muʿtazilī since the Muʿtazilīs would never have 
conceived of a believer following a ḥikma that his intellect could not comprehend. The 
Muʿtazilīs considered God’s rationality to be similar to human rationality. However, as we can 
see from Māturidī, he considers ḥikma to be of two types, divine ḥikma and human ḥikma. Al-
Tirmidhī makes a similar distinction in his definition of ḥikma in KH: 
Al-ḥikmatu iḥkāmu al-umūr ʿalā jihatihā min āfatihā fī subulihā 
subul al-umūr min al-rabbi ilā al-ʿabdi wa-min al-ʿabdi ilā al-
rabbi murūruha ʿalā turuqin min wujūhi al-asbābi wa-l-ālāti fa-l-
asbābu al-khārijatu min al-nafsi al-ālātu al-jawāriḥu al-
mukhtalifatu fa-bi-l-ḥikmati yaḥkumuhā al-ʿabd.300 
 
Ḥikma is the judgment of things according to their various harmful 
qualities in the way they function and proceed from the Lord to his 
servant and from the servant to his Lord in terms of their causes 
and means, causes being outside of the soul, means being the 
various limbs, so with ḥikma the servant comes to gain control 
over them.  
  
For al-Tirmidhī, there is human ḥikma, that is, knowledge of what proceeds from the servant to 
God and then there is divine ḥikma, which is knowledge that proceeds from God to the servant. 
Later, in KH, al-Tirmidhī further clarifies this by explaining that the ḥakīm is like someone 
walking through the wilderness who knows the pathways and is aware of the various wild beasts 
that lurk there and so can pass safely through.301 Hence, ḥikma is the ‘worldly’ knowledge of 
things outside of the soul that relates to vices and temptations, likened to wild beasts that can 
attack the soul on its path towards God. At the same time, for al-Tirmidhī, ḥikma can also be a 
                                                          
300 Ibid. Kitāb al-ḥikma, fol. 1v. 
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knowledge from God and an inspiration about the way God interacts with the world. Al-Māturīdī 
uses the same vocabulary as al-Tirmidhī in terms of āfāt (harmful qualities) and ālāt (means) in 
describing how ḥikma functions. Al-Māturīdī argues that human senses are limited in the same 
way that ʿuqūl (intellects) are limited. For al-Māturīdī, intellects understand the world in terms of 
opposites (aḍdād), but due to the created and limited nature of intellects, sometimes they 
consider good things to be bad and bad things to be good. Hence, he says that it is possible that 
something could befall a person that would prevent him from being able to distinguish between 
wisdom (ḥikma) and foolishness (safah).302 The inability to make true distinctions for al-
Māturīdī is a result of custom (ʿāda) and habit (ulf). The only way for a person to truly 
understand things as they are and make correct distinctions is through divine ḥikma (al-ḥikma al-
rubūbiyya) and through this ḥikma such a person is protected from āfāt (harmful qualities) since 
his usual state is that he is overcome by his limbs (jawāriḥ) even though he makes use of means 
(ālāt). Al-Māturīdī explains that a person guided by divine ḥikma realizes that he acts through a 
strength (quwwa) created by God and a more useful knowledge. This is what is called taḥakkum 
(gaining control) over weakness and ignorance through God who is able and knowing.303 It is 
almost as if al-Māturīdī is quoting al-Tirmidhī’s definition of ḥikma. The vocabulary is 
practically identical and the structure of the various parts of the concept of ḥikma for both of 
them is very close.  
It is clear that both al-Māturīdī and al-Tirmidhī are operating under the same definition of 
ḥikma, however, this could be because they happen to have had access to similar sources. The 
next question then, is whether or not they actually ‘use’ ḥikma in similar ways. Al-Tirmidhī uses 
ḥikma to support his concept of walāya and to indicate the nature of the station of fardāniyya 
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(non-duality) that is characteristic of the kubarāʾ and the awliyāʾ. As we demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, ḥikma serves to frame the non-dual nature of al-Tirmidhī’s mystical theosophy. For 
al-Tirmidhī, the awliyāʾ exemplify God’s non-dual nature and in that sense are a site of the 
manifestation (tajallī) of his attributes. Al-Māturīdī is not concerned with walāya, instead, he 
focuses on theological arguments concerning the nature of God and His existence. Nevertheless, 
al-Māturīdī uses ḥikma to indicate a non-dual concept of God. For al-Māturīdī, opposites 
(aḍiḍḍād) lead to foolishness and meaninglessness when they are not kept from collapsing in on 
each other.304 Just like al-Tirmidhī, al-Māturīdī sees ḥikma as the maintenance of order and 
harmony through the sustaining of the distinctness of opposites. While both are operating under 
the same basic definition of ḥikma, one key difference is that al-Tirmidhī indicates that this order 
is preserved through the knowledge of the ḥakīm as an instrument of God, while al-Māturīdī 
simply describes God as being the one who maintains this order directly. Ḥikma is defined in 
multiple places in Kitāb al-Tawḥīd as “putting things in their proper place”. When al-Māturīdī 
refers to “things in their proper place” he means the placing of opposites in their proper places in 
relation to other opposites. For opposites to have a particular place and order it is necessary that 
something must exist to define that order and bring it about, i.e., God. In a section on theodicy in 
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd al-Māturīdī indicates how the ḥikma of opposites and their interaction in the 
world indicates the non-dual nature of God. The argument begins with al-Māturīdī’s premise, 
argued earlier, that ḥikma (wisdom) must connect to all things created by God. He does not 
simply argue that good is known through evil and vice versa, but rather that God creates good 
and evil so that he can be known through the interaction of these opposites. The example he 
gives, interestingly, is the conflict between the enemies of God and his awliyāʾ. Through this 
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conflict, God’s warning (ḥadhar), support (taʾahhub), aid (maʿūna) and victory (naṣr) are 
known.305 Al-Māturīdī then goes on to explain how the opposites in the world indicate God’s 
non-dual oneness. Al-Māturīdī succinctly explains this below: 
Wa ayḍan inna al-khalqa ʿalā ikhtilāf jawharihim fī al-maḍār wa-
al-manāfiʿ jaʿalahum Allāh fī al-dalālati ʿalā mudabbirin lahum 
ḥakīm ʿalīm wa-ʿalā waḥdāniyyatihi ka-jawharin wāḥid fī al-ittifāq 
min jihat al-dalāla wa-l-shahāda. Wa-lā quwwata illā billāh. Fa-
yakūnu fī dhālik bayān ʿajīb ḥikmatihi an jamaʿa bayn al-ḍārr wa-
al-nāfiʿ wa al-khayr wa-l-sharr ʿalā tanāqudihimā fī al-dalālati 
ʿalā waḥdāniyyatihi wa-l-shahādati bi-rububiyyatihi wāḥīdan.306  
 
And furthermore, all created things depending on their various 
essences are either in harm or benefit. God made them to indicate 
his being one who plans for them, one wise and knowledgeable 
and also to indicate his oneness as one single essence as is agreed 
upon from the standpoint of proof and testament. There is no 
strength or power except by God. So, from that the amazing nature 
of his wisdom is demonstrated such that he joins between harm 
and benefit, good and evil despite their being opposed to each 
other as a proof of his oneness and as a witness to his being  one 
through his lordship. 
 
It is clear that al-Māturīdī, like al-Tirmidhī, uses ḥikma to frame tawḥīd (God’s unity) such that it 
is understood in a non-dual sense. Both use ḥikma in similar ways but to make different types of 
arguments. Al-Māturīdī is attempting to explain the non-dual nature of God’s essence in terms of 
the interaction of opposites and he uses the term waḥdāniyya for non-duality. Al-Tirmidhī, on the 
other hand, argues for the non-dual nature of sainthood (fardāniyya) because it is a manifestation 
of God’s non-duality in the world. Both al-Māturīdī and al-Tirmidhī conceive of God in non-dual 
terms but are applying the framework of ḥikma in different contexts. 
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Al-Tirmidhī and the Later Ḥanafī Tradition 
So far we have demonstrated a strong connection between al-Tirmidhī and the early 
Ḥanafī creedal texts, the Ḥanafī theological tradition of al-Tirmidhī’s own era, and finally al-
Māturīdī, who was a major figure in the transition of Ḥanafī theology into the phase of formal 
methods and dialectical reasoning. Up to this point, none of the Ḥanafī theological texts have 
mentioned al-Tirmidhī by name. The connections have been demonstrated through structural 
similarities and the use of terminology. Among the later Ḥanafī theologians, however, al-
Tirmidhī is actually mentioned by name and clearly counted as one of their own. Abū Muʿīn al-
Nasafī in his Tabṣirat al-Adilla, which is by far the most comprehensive work in the Māturīdī 
theological school, quotes al-Tirmidhī by name on the topic of the beholding God with an eye in 
the next life. Al-Nasafī writes: 
Wa-dhakara al-shaykh Abū Abdillah Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-
Tirmidhī al-Ḥakīm fī taṣnīfin lahu sammāhu: Masʾalatun fī Sulūki 
Ahli al-ʿAdli bayna al-Mushabbihati wa-l-Muʿaṭṭila, fa-qāla: 
ittafaqat ʿalā ḥadīth al-ruʾyati ʿiddatun min aṣḥābi rasūl Allāhi 
ʿalayhi al-salām kulluhum aʾimma.307 
 
Shaykh Abū Abdullāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Tirmidhī al-Ḥakīm 
said in a work by him which he called Treatise on the Way of the 
People of Balance between the Anthropomorphists and those who 
Negate Attributes, “A large number of the companions of the 
Messenger, upon whom be peace, agreed upon the ḥadīth of the 
vision of God in the next life; all of them were eminent. 
 
Al-Lāmishī, the student of al-Nasafī, also mentions al-Tirmidhī on the same topic as his teacher, 
but adds the title of zāhid (mystic). He states, wa dhakar al-shaykh al-zāhid Muḥammad b. ʿAlī 
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al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī raḥimahullāh fī taṣnīfin lahu… or, “The Shaykh, the mystic, Muḥammad 
b. ʿAli al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in a work of his…”308 Here, al-Lāmishī includes the title of zāhid 
but does not mean ‘renunciant’. As we will see later, the term zāhid and its plural zuhhād among 
Ḥanafīs in Khurāsān and Transoxania came to indicate a mystic or what we would call a Ṣūfī.  
 
Mysticism in the Ḥanafī Tradition 
If al-Tirmidhī was thoroughly integrated into the Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theological tradition as 
we have sought to demonstrate, then the question remains as to why this should have been 
overlooked by scholarship for such a long time. Annemarie Schimmel considered al-Tirmidhī to 
be a Shafiʿī, Yves Marquet considered him a Traditionalist, while Bernd Radtke correctly 
understood him to be a Ḥanafī, yet considered his Ḥanafī leanings superficial. The evidence we 
have brought to bear demonstrates the contrary. He was, in fact, an important figure to the 
Ḥanafī theological school and played an important role in its development. Part of the reason for 
the inability to place al-Tirmidhī accurately in the historical context arises from the clearly 
mystical nature of his thought. Al-Tirmidhī purposefully attempts to produce works that are 
holistic in nature and that reflect what he sees as the important devotional and inspirational 
function of religious texts. Often times, as ʿAbd Allāh Baraka mentions, these texts have 
underlying Fiqhī (jurisprudential) and Kalāmī (theological) motives.309 Another possibility is that 
Ḥanafī theology has been misunderstood and understudied in relation to Ashaʿarī Kalām and so 
Ḥanafī theology sometimes goes unrecognized for what it is. Even more so, there is a tendency 
in the study of Islamic mysticism in general to disassociate theology from mysticism, possibly as 
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a result of this trend in European concepts of mysticism. What we find in general among Ḥanafī 
theologians in Khurāsān and Transoxania is a strong mystical current in their works. At this point 
we will only demonstrate the mystical tendencies in some of the works that we have already 
discussed to show that al-Tirmidhī’s mysticism is not out of place in his intellectual milieu. 
In al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam, we find a list of individuals appended 
to the end of the treatise who are credited with upholding certain doctrines championed by the 
text, a foundational work in the Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theological tradition. The fact that these lists 
occur at the end of the work and include the very name of the supposed author himself means 
that these sections were in no doubt added by later generations of Ḥanafī/Māturīdī scholars. A 
procedure used in this creedal text, especially in sections in which these lists occur, is to present 
a point of jurisprudence that differentiates Ḥanafīs from Shāfīʿīs or even Shīʿīs and then list to 
the eminent individuals from particular generations who upheld that point of jurisprudence. The 
companions of the Prophet are listed and then the scholars of hadith and jurisprudence after them 
and then the zuhhād (mystics) and ʿubbād (pious ones). Based on the names in these lists it is 
probable that they were added to the text sometime around the early 10th-century C.E., at a time 
when Sufism was taking root, as is attested by the works of al-Kalābādhī, al-Sulamī and al-
Qushayrī. The list of zuhhād (mystics) begins with Ṣāliḥ al-Marrī (d. 172/788 or 176/792) and 
Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 245/859) but conspicuously leaves out the Baghdād mystics such as al-
Junayd. Almost all of the mystics listed were of eastern Hanafī tendencies. This could possibly 
be a result of the fierce competition between Hanafīs, who were using the term zuhhād, and 
Shāfiʿīs who were identifying themselves as Ṣūfīs.310 Another equally valid and more probable 
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interpretation is that these were still separate mystical traditions in their own right that were only 
merged by al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī in the generations following Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī. 
Al-Tirmidhī provides a useful reference point in this respect for understanding the relationship 
between Ḥanafī theology and mysticism. The mystics who al-Tirmidhī mentions in his various 
works are similar to the mystics appended to al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam. Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī, the 
author of al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam, is often referred to as a mystic in later biographical accounts. He is 
also listed as a mystic in the section of al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam that was later added to the text after 
his death. Rudolph mentions that al-Māturīdī had mystical propensities and later Ḥanafī 
theologians such as Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī frequently mention the same local mystics of 
Khurāsān and Transoxania, which represents a distinct layer in al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt. As we will 
show in a forthcoming chapter, the relationship between mysticism and Ḥanafī theology is a very 
close one and existed since the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.). Therefore, Islamic 
theology should not be seen as opposed to Islamic mysticism or in conflict with it since many 
early theologians were also mystics, especially in the eastern Ḥanafī milieu.  
 
The Effect of Ḥanafism on al-Tirmidhī’s Doctrine of Walāya 
 If we can agree that al-Tirmidhī was actively engaged in the discourse stream of Ḥanafī 
jurisprudential and theological thought, then it is clear why he developed his doctrine of 
sainthood in particular ways. In Chapter 5 we will continue to discuss the nature of al-Tirmidhī’s 
doctrine of sainthood, however, here we will discuss an important effect of Ḥanafī theology upon 
al-Tirmidhī, which concerns the way he opened up the possibility of sainthood to all Muslims. 
As we mentioned in the discussion about the Ḥanafī doctrine of belief (īmān), the Ḥanafīs are 
noted for having a very expansive definition of belief. This definition only required believers to 
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state the formula of the testification of faith (shahada) and to believe it in their hearts. Wilferd 
Madelung demonstrates how this ran counter to an early Umayyad political establishment that 
preferred an Arab identity to Islam and sought to discourage conversion.311 We have been using 
al-Samarqandī’s al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam as a Ḥanafī text representative of al-Tirmidhī’s general 
approach to Ḥanafī theology since it corresponds closely to many elements of his thought. In al-
Samarqandī’s treatise the awliyāʾ are described as synonymous with the muʾminūn (believers). 
He writes, yanbaghī an yaʿlam annahu lā yakūnu ʿaql al-awliyāʾ wa-al-muʾminūn wa-ʿaql al-
kuffār mustawiyān, “One must know that the intellect of the saints and the believers is not the 
same as the intellect of the unbelievers.”312 Al-Samarqandī continues to clarify this by presenting 
five types of ʿaql with the awliyāʾ and muʾminūn both sharing the ʿaql ʿaṭāʾī (the bequeathed 
intellect), the third of the five intellects. The first two are shared by the unbelievers and the last 
two are shared by the prophets and messengers. Al-Samarqandī clearly indicates that any Muslim 
believer can possibly be one of the awliyāʾ. We will demonstrate in Chapter 5 how al-Tirmidhī 
states the exact same formula, conceding that all of the muwaḥḥidūn (those who make the 
testification of Islamic faith) are a type of awliyāʾ. This is often not well understood by those 
who read al-Tirmidhī’s works because of his often vaulted mysticism and the unique 
terminology, such as his distinction between the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh (the saints who observe the 
right(s) God)313 and the awliyāʾ Allāh (the bona fide saints). For al-Tirmidhī, walāya has many 
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those who say it on their tongues but whose actions still follow their lower desires (hawāhā). The first group in NU 
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forms and types and at its most basic level it covers all Muslims who make the testification of 
faith. For those believers who are sincerely seeking God on the path of maʿrifa, they are the 
awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh and they are those who have been chosen by God for his special favor, these 
are the bona fide saints (awliyāʾ Allāh). Even among these bona fide saints there are various 
types of saints such as the ḥukamāʾ (sages), the muqarrabūn (those brought near), and the 
munfaridūn (the solitairs) as well as the ṣiddīqūn (the truthful ones). 
 
Conclusion 
 Foucault’s episteme has helped us to better situate al-Tirmidhī within the social, mystical 
and theological currents of his time. By thinking in terms of discourse streams and a ‘knowledge-
type’ of theology, we are guided by Rosenthal and Foucault to identify the systems of meaning 
that connect al-Tirmidhī to the intellectual currents of his day. The Ḥanafī/Murjiʾī/Māturīdī 
theological tradition played a major role in the eastern lands of the Abbasid empire and when we 
begin to read al-Tirmidhī through this lens we begin to see that his thought builds upon ideas 
working within this milieu just as it is in conversation with it. That al-Tirmidhī was an 
independent and unique thinker for his time is no doubt the case, however, he was not someone 
who operated outside of a pre-existing framework as some scholars of Islamic mysticism have 
posited. One can see here how al-Tirmidhī’s identity as a reformer comes to the fore. Like al-
Ghazālī after him, al-Tirmidhī saw real problems with the way religious knowledge was 
becoming formalized and institutionalized. He wanted to reclaim what he saw as the original 
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vigor of the revelatory message after its apparent fossilization through disciplines such as 
jurisprudence and theology. Al-Tirmidhī believed that these should not and cannot be separated 
from the hidden spiritual realities from which they emerge. With such a complex and nuanced 
figure such as al-Tirmidhī, we have to look at his ideas holistically in relation to his larger body 
of works and within his social and learned context. By identifying Ḥanafī theology as one of the 
several discourse streams within which al-Tirmidhī operated we can begin to see that, while 
scholars of Islamic mysticism often see him as a mystic, this was only one of his multiple 
identities. For al-Tirmidhī, theology functions best when it maintains the parameters by which a 
free religious discourse can take place. Thus, in his NU, al-Tirmidhī stresses that points of belief 









A Ṣūfī by any Other Name:  
al-Tirmidhī’s Relationship to Islamic Mysticism 
The question as to whether al-Tirmidhī was a Ṣūfī or not depends 
heavily on how we define Sufism vis-à-vis Islamic mysticism. If we 
look at Islamic mysticism as a discourse stream that came to 
conceptualize knowledge as light, we find that al-Tirmidhī was an 
active participant in this discourse stream. The current field of 
Islamic mysticism sees al-Tirmidhī as an outlier. I would like to 
correct this view by situating him more centrally within the 
discourse stream of Islamic mysticism. I will show that a close 
reading of al-Tirmidhī’s thought will help us to better understand 
Sufism as a particular movement within Islamic mysticism. 
 
 Before addressing al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya in more detail in Chapter 5, 
we will examine the theoretical backdrop that informs al-Tirmidhī’s thought by exploring his 
relationship to other mystical movements in early Islam. In Chapter 1 we discussed how al-
Tirmidhī uses the language of clientage (walāʾ) to propose a new type of religious authority, 
which ultimately would invest the ʿulamāʾ as custodians of that authority. In Chapter 2 we 
showed how al-Tirmidhī uses aspects of Hellenistic thought and Pythagorean notions of wisdom 
(hikma) to frame his discussion of the awliyāʾ. In Chapter 3 we explored al-Tirmidhī’s debt to 
Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theology and how his use of categories helped to situate and justify his concept 
of walāya within his theological discourse. There are multiple discourse streams at work here 
that blend and interact within al-Tirmidhī’s thought and we are interested in how he developed 
and integrated these discursive formations as his concept of walāya emerged and took form. The 
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social institution of clientage (walāʾ) provided a strong social basis for the preservation of Arab 
privilege and lent itself to the transformation of this social privilege into sainthood (walāya), 
thereby sanctifying the scholarly class (ʿulamāʾ). This transformation was possible because the 
category of walāya had already existed in the Ḥanafī theological tradition, although it was not 
linked to social or political power before al-Tirmidhī’s time. Al-Tirmidhī then uses elements of 
Pythagoreanism to posit a gnoseology that elevates wisdom (ḥikma) to the level of a type of 
revelatory knowledge that speaks to the human being through Nature. This is different than the 
gnosis (maʿrifa) of the proto-Ṣūfīs who styled their knowledge as light (nūr). Thus, the Islamic 
mystical tradition had already devised a language and a path (ṭarīq) to a realization of this type 
of theophanic knowledge that was not mediated through either texts or Nature. Light (nūr) is one 
of the knowledge-types Rosenthal uses to frame the Islamic mystical tradition. Al-Tirmidhī is the 
first one to bring all of the three knowledge types we have just discussed together in one system. 
For al-Tirmidhī, it is the saints (awliyāʾ) and not the ḥukamāʾ (sages) who pass beyond both 
textual knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ẓāhir) and the knowledge of Nature (ʿilm al-asbāb). In this way al-
Tirmidhī situates gnosis (maʿrifa) in relation to the two important modes of knowledge in his 
time: textual religious knowledge within the Islamic orbit and philosophical or wisdom-based 
knowledge whose roots were in the Hellenistic tradition. Al-Tirmidhī not only borrows heavily 
from what he calls the ṭarīq al-maʿrifa (the path of gnosis) associated with the proto-Ṣūfīs, but 
his concept of walāya plays an important role in the development of what later becomes Sufism. 
I will discuss later how I view Sufism in its mature form as a product of the great mystical 
synthesis of the 5th/11th-century.314 Thus, while so many have sought to understand the 
                                                          
314 Francesco Chiabotti (2014) discusses how al-Qushayrī represents the climax of the development of Ṣūfī 
aesthetics and practice between the early masters and the later great shaykhs such as ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 
561/1166). He also argues that al-Qushayrī represents the best example of a harmonization of the various different 
social groups and knowledge-types of his time. Chiabotti’s study of al-Qushayrī supports the idea that al-Qushayrī 
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continuities that link al-Tirmidhī to his context, this study is also interested in understanding the 
ruptures and discontinuities that al-Tirmidhī initiated with his new approach to walāya.  
 
Was al-Tirmidhī a ‘Ṣūfī’? 
 Most scholars in the field of Islamic mysticism (Alexander Knysh, Nile Green, Ahmet 
Karamustafa, Laury Silvers et al.) agree upon a narrative that situates early Sufism in Baghdād 
during the latter half of the 9th-century C.E. as a somewhat avant-garde movement of mystics 
who self-identified as Ṣūfīs and who were somehow connected to the circle of al-Junayd.315 The 
term Sufism itself is much older, reaching back to pre-Islamic times and was used to designate 
certain Christian ascetics in the same general geographical region of Iraq.316 This Baghdād 
tradition then moved eastward to Khurāsān where it blended with older Khurāsānian and 
Transoxanian ascetic and mystical traditions until it superseded and replaced them.317 From 
Khurāsān, Sufism spread to all corners of the Islamic world and continues to be a vibrant 
mystical tradition in Islam to this day. This narrative assumes a somewhat continuous trajectory 
from the circle of al-Junayd up to the 5th- and 6th- Islamic centuries (11th- and 12th-centuries 
C.E.) Ṣūfīs of Khurāsān in Nīshāpūr. While some elements of this narrative are undeniable, the 
narrative also leaves unanswered questions concerning the role that other indigenous mystical 
                                                          
(we include al-Sulamī who was the basis for much of al-Qushayrī’s thought) developed a broad synthesis of Islamic 
knowledge and practice that significantly informed Sufism as a mystical movement. For this reason we dub the 
combined contribution of al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī to Islamic mysticism as, ‘The Great Mystical Synthesis of the 
5th/11th-Century’. In this sense, the introduction of Khurāsānian mysticism into Sufism by al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī 
was as important to what would become mature Sufism, if not more, than the contribution of al-Junayd’s circle of 
Baghdād Ṣūfīs. Chiabotti, Francesco. Entre soufisme et savoir islamique: l’oeuvre de ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī 
(376-465/ 986-1072). Diss, Universite de Provence. 2014, pp. 632–635. 
315 Ibid. Sufism, the formative period, p. 7. 
316 Ibid. Sufism: a global history, p. 18. Green argues that this does not necessarily point to a Christian ‘origin’ for 
Sufism because early Muslim ascetics can be seen just as much as rivals to Christian ascetics as they were imitators 
of their conventions. Hence, Green sees this process as one of ‘mirroring’ rather than ‘borrowing’. 
317 Ibid. Islamic mysticism, pp. 99–100. 
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trends played in the great mystical synthesis of the 5th- Islamic century (11th-century C.E.). 
Furthermore, the reduction of Sufism to its Baghdād variety presupposes a Baghdād-centric view 
of Islamic mysticism, which is a view of Islamic mysticism that we must concede most Muslim 
mystics share to this day. However, we must stress, based on our reading of Foucault, that the 
discontinuities are just as important as the continuities when we are talking about Islamic 
mysticism or any discourse stream structured by an episteme. What we seek to demonstrate here 
is that Sufism in its mature form represents a new development in Islamic mysticism and is an 
emergent event brought about by the confluence of a number of factors. This understanding of 
Sufism makes better sense of al-Tirmidhī’s place in Islamic mysticism, since he is often 
characterized as an outlier and somewhat of an anomaly.318  
 Bernd Radtke is emphatic that al-Tirmidhī was not a Ṣūfī. He quotes several early Ṣūfīs 
who deny that al-Tirmidhī was a Ṣūfī. Among these was the early Ṣūfī historian Jaʿfar al-Khuldī 
(d. 348/959) and ʿAbdallāh al-Anṣārī (d. 481/1088), a Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī who is understood to have 
been markedly against any type of theological speculation. Despite the positions of these two 
mystics, there were many other early Ṣūfīs who did consider al-Tirmidhī to be part of the Ṣūfī 
tradition.319 In this way we can see that al-Tirmidhī problematizes our notions of what it means 
to be a Ṣūfī since Ṣūfīs themselves were split on whether he should be counted among their 
number. Al-Tirmidhī never used the term ‘ṣūfī’ and in several places in NU he speaks in 
derogatory terms about “those who wear wool”, which we can assume is most likely a statement 
criticizing asceticism rather than any particular mystical group associated with the nascent Ṣūfīs 
of Baghdād.  It is also important to remember that al-Tirmidhī precedes the seeding of Baghdād 
Sufism in Khurāsān and Transoxania by about a hundred years if we do not take into account a 
                                                          
318 Ibid, p. 105. 
319 Al-Sulamī, al-Qushayrī and al-Kalābādhī all considered al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī to be a forerunner of Sufism. 
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few early teachers such as Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī (d. 320/932) who may have fled Baghdād in the 
wake of the inquisition of Ghulām Khalīl (d. 275/888).320 Nevertheless, al-Tirmidhī’s writings 
exhibit many of the characteristics that we would associate with Sufism in the 5th- and 6th- 
Islamic centuries in Khurāsān.321 In some cases al-Tirmidhī’s mysticism is ‘closer’ to what we 
might call the product of the great mystical synthesis of the 5th- and 6th- Islamic centuries (i.e., 
Sufism) with his emphasis on a type of mysticism that is squarely anti-ascetical. Yet, many of the 
Ṣūfīs of Baghdād were ascetics to a large degree and al-Junayd, in his writings, clearly defended 
asceticism and its important role in his mystical training.322 If we contrast al-Junayd’s views on 
asceticism with those of al-Qushayrī and al-Sulamī, we find in the latter two an approach that is 
more in line with al-Tirmidhī’s views.323 Al-Junayd’s unique articulation of Ṣūfī aesthetics was 
seminal in defining a way of mystical practice; however, it was not a way that was accessible to 
other than a small elite who could internalize his often highly complicated terminology. On the 
other hand, if we understand Sufism in a broader sense to be the product of an encompassing 
mystical synthesis of the 5th- Islamic century (11th-century C.E.), we see that this type of Sufism 
                                                          
320 Biographical dictionaries indicate that not until the 11th-century do we find the beginnings of a significant 
number of scholars identified as Ṣūfīs. Before this time those who are identified as Ṣūfīs are few and usually are 
those who at some point passed through Baghdād. Up through the 12th-century indigenous forms of Islamic 
mysticism were dominant in Khurāsān and Transoxania. Ibid. Sufism a global history, p. 45. For some of the reasons 
pertaining to al-Wāsiṭī’s emigration to Khurāsān see Silvers, A Soaring Minaret, p. 33. 
321 Al-Tirmidhī uses the term “qawm” (folk) in the phrase “manāzil al-qawm” to talk about the stations of the path. 
The use of the word qawm (folk) in this way is used in later Sufism as another way of identifying the Ṣūfīs. Ibid. 
Nawādir, vol. 4, p. 153. Al-Tirmidhī uses the term ṭarīq (way) similar to the manner of the later Ṣūfīs as well. In SA 
he writes about those who pretend to know the path (ṭarīq) of the awliyāʾ: wa lā huwa ʿālim bi al-ṭarīq wa lā bi al-
makāmin fī al-ṭarīq wa lā bi muntahā al-qawm wa manāzilihim, “…and he is not knowledgeable of the path nor the 
ambushes of the path nor does he know the goal of this folk (qawm) and their halting stations.” Ibid. Thalāthat 
muṣannafāt, p. 30. More similarities to later Sufism abound in al-Tirmdihī’s writings such as his attendance at 
gatherings of dhikr and his discussion of some aspects of samāʾ (audition). Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 1, p. 243; vol. 2, pp. 
23–24; vol. 5, pp. 6–7. We will discuss further structural similarities between al-Tirmidhī’s mystical terminology 
and the terminology of later Sufism at a later point in this chapter. We intend to show that al-Tirmidhī’s terminology 
includes elements that Baghdād Sufism did not include but that were adopted in what later became mature Sufism. 
322 Ibid. Rasāʾil al-Junayd, pp. 66–67. 
323 Al-Qushayrī mentions several different viewpoints on zuhd (renunciation) and then quotes his teacher al-Sulamī 
to the effect that zuhd does not mean “eating course food or wearing a woolen cloak.” ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-
Qushayrī. Al-Qushayrī’s epistle on Sufism al-risala al-qushayriyya fī ʿilm al-taṣawwuf. Translated by Alexander D. 
Knysh; reviewed by Muḥammad Eissa. Reading, U.K.: 2007, pp. 134–135. 
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was accessible to aspirants of a variety of different backgrounds and adherents who were 
associated with many different schools (madhāhib) of thought in Sunnī Islam. If we contemplate 
the diverse, institutionalized and theoretically grounded mysticism of Khurāsān and Transoxania 
before the arrival of Baghdād Sufism, we find that Baghdād Sufism entered a highly developed 
matrix of mystical thought and activity. To posit that Baghdād Sufism replaced these movements 
completely ignores the composite nature of Sufism as we find it in its mature form. The field of 
Islamic mysticism must not underestimate the heritage Sufism owes to Khurāsānian mysticism. 
 
Sufism and Hellenism 
 In Chapter 2 we discussed the extent to which al-Tirmidhī makes use of Hellenistic 
thought. The Pythagorean elements we find in al-Tirmidhī’s works, especially KH, do not 
represent, by any means, the entirety of al-Tirmidhī’s mystical outlook. Rather, al-Tirmidhī uses 
wisdom (ḥikma) to frame and situate his doctrine of sainthood (walāya). By looking at Christian 
mysticism and its structural foundations during the same general historical period as al-Tirmidhī, 
we see how al-Tirmidhī belongs within a broadly defined tradition of mystical thought 
indigenous to the Near East. We will look briefly at the work of two Christian writers, the first 
being Isaac of Nineveh from the 7th-century C.E. and the second, Yaḥyā b. ʿᾹdī, from the 10th-
century C.E., one preceding al-Tirmidhī by several hundred years and the other following closely 
after him. This will help to demonstrate how Islamic mysticism contrasts more clearly when 
compared to a similar and competing mystical tradition in the same general area and time frame. 
As we mentioned earlier, Isaac of Nineveh is particularly helpful to our understanding of early 
Islamic mysticism because he is credited with writing a number of ascetical homilies during the 
period just after the great Arab conquests of the 7th-century C.E. His writings demonstrate in 
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lucid detail the ascetical and mystical quest of someone who we can easily say was not 
influenced by Islamic thought.324 Yaḥyā b. ʿᾹdī, on the other hand, was a participant in the 
active intellectual milieu of Baghdād during the 10th-century C.E. but had clearly inherited the 
legacy of Christian mystical thought of which Isaac was a part.  
 Patrik Hagman demonstrates that Isaac was in conversation with a Christian theological 
tradition that drew heavily from Neoplatonism. The problematique that Isaac, Theodore of 
Mopsuestia, Evagrios, and John of Apamea were attempting to solve returned back to the 
Neoplatonic notion of the soul (nous) as an uncreated substance. These early Christian ascetics 
and theologians were trying to reconcile the existence of passions with a Hellenistic concept of 
the soul as incorruptible and uncreated.325 This notion of an uncreated soul whose source in the 
Godhead is modeled after the Platonic Good or Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is an emanationist 
cosmology and was readily accepted by many early Christian theologians as part of their basic 
weltanschauung. This cosmological doctrine is also clearly found among Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī326, Ibn Sīna327, al-Rāzī328 and al-Rushd329 
among others.330 The question before us, however, is whether or not the early Islamic mystics 
participated in this discourse stream that was active from the 7th-century C.E. onwards in Iraq 
and greater Khurāsān. Louis Massignon’s work on Ṣūfī terminology indicates that Sufism in its 
mature form derives its terminology as well as its basic premises primarily from the Qurʾān.331 
                                                          
324 For the first hundred or so years after the Arab/Islamic invasions of the 7th-century, the Arab Muslims 
concentrated their efforts on expansion and Arab Muslims lived in garrison towns separate from the people they 
ruled. 
325 Hagman, Patrik. The asceticism of Isaac of Nineveh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010, pp. 75–76. 
326 Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) 
327 Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn b. Sīna (d. 428/1037) 
328 Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Rāzī (d. 313/925 or 323/935) 
329 Abū al-Walīd b. Rushd (d. 595/1198) 
330 Al-Ghazālī seeks to refute the doctrine of the Falāsifa (philosophers) concerning the uncreated soul in his Tahāfut 
al-Falāsifa. Ibn Rushd responds to his refutation with a refutation of his own, al-Radd ʿalā al-Radd. 
331 Ibid. Sufism a global history, pp. 26–27. 
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While this might be true in general, one can see many similarities that also connect Ṣūfī thought 
and practice to pre-Islamic precedents.332 Some scholars of Sufism have referred to these 
similarities as ‘floating motifs’ or a shared koine that is difficult to link to any particular 
‘borrowing.’333 It is no doubt that the early Ṣūfīs participated in this koine as did all of the major 
Islamic movements of the first three Islamic centuries. However, while there are clearly outward 
semblances, the deep structure of Ṣūfī thought appears to be molded by a consistent return to 
Islamic sources in the form of Qurʾān and Ḥadīth for justification of its doctrines. This can be 
apparent by looking closely at those Muslim mystics whose thought closely resembles aspects of 
Hellenism. One case in point are the ideas of a Basran mystic by the name of Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 
283/896) who was contemporaneous with al-Tirmidhī and who also discussed walāya 
(sainthood). Gerhard Böwering in his masterful work on the mystical vision of Sahl al-Tustarī 
interprets al-Tustarī’s treatment of the soul in terms of Neoplatonic emanation.334 Indeed, on the 
surface, al-Tustarī’s cosmogony looks emanationist. God creates Muḥammad from his light after 
which Adam and his progeny, as well as the entire universe, is then created from the 
Muḥammadan light.335 This is a cosmogony that is also shared by al-Tirmidhī. Bernd Radtke 
refers to it as the ‘Old Islamic Cosmology.’ Al-Tustari’s cosmogony seems to mirror 
Neoplatonic emanation in which Intellect (Nous) proceeds from the One and the individual 
human souls subsequently proceed from Intellect. These individual souls are immersed in Matter 
and are a less perfect image of the intellection of Nous.336 They are directly connected to the 
                                                          
332 The term Ṣūfī, for example, has been traced back to early Christian ascetics in Iraq who were labeled “lābis al-
ṣūf” or “wool wearer.” It is highly probable that Muslim ascetics developed similar ascetic practices in competition 
with these Christian ascetics. Ibid, pp. 19–20.  
333 Ibid, p. 21. 
334 Böwering, Gerhard. The mystical vision of existence in classical Islam the Qurʾānic hermeneutics of the ṣūfī Sahl 
al-Tustarī (d. 283/896). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1979, p. 153. 
335 Ibid, p. 153. 
336 The European Graduate School. Online resource: http://www.egs.edu/library/plotinus/biography/ 
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‘One’ through the intermediary of the Intellect.337 The Neoplatonic soul is noetic, that is, it 
emanates directly from the Intellect, which itself is a form that comprises all possible forms.338 
The return of the soul to its source in Nous is often characterized as a mystical ascent and 
became an important element of Gnostic speculation, which borrowed heavily from Neoplatonic 
cosmology.339 For al-Tustarī, the ʿaql of each human being does not emanate from the 
Muḥammadan light but is ‘created’ by God from that light.340 The soul (nafs), on the other hand, 
in al-Tustarī’s framework is actually created from the temporal world.341 For al-Tustarī, the 
sublimation of the lower self and the plunging of the self into the ‘earth’ as if to bury it (note 
here the theme of death) results in the ascension of the rūḥ (spirit) or rūḥ al-nafs (spirit of the 
soul) to the Throne of God. However, as we will see with al-Tirmidhī, this same separation of the 
soul as earthly and the rūh (spirit) as heavenly is what creates a ‘space’ in the heart for the divine 
light to manifest. The point for both al-Tustarī and al-Tirmidhī is not a ‘return’ to union with 
God as we see stylized by Christian ascetics like Isaac of Nineveh, but rather the formation of a 
break in the fabric of the temporal world out of which the divine theophany manifests.342 We 
also see that in al-Tustarī’s view the ʿuqūl (intellects) that are specks of light also do not 
emanate, but they are each created separately by the Creator/God directly from the greater 
                                                          
337 Magic Medicine and Science Course Homepage. Online resource: 
http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/mms/handouts/mmsplotinus.htm 
338 Plotinus uses a light metaphor to explain how the soul is like a window for the Intellect to shine into the physical 
world. Plotinus, Enneads: http://classics.mit.edu/Plotinus/enneads.mb.txt 
339 This should not mislead us into assuming that Gnostics were merely Christian Neoplatonists. This was far from 
the case and Neoplatonic philosophers such as Plotinus and Porphyry took pains to distinguish themselves from the 
Gnostics, particularly because the Gnostics held to a radically dualistic cosmology that was foreign to Neoplatonism. 
340 Al-Tustarī’s cosmogony seeks to answer the central question of qadar (free will) in Islamic theology, a problem 
that became central to Islamic theology based on Qurʾānic claims about the nature of God and his all-powerful and 
all-knowing attributes. 
341 Al-Tustarī, Sahl b. ʿAbd Allāh. Tafsīr al-Tustarī translated by Annabel Keeler and ʿAlī Keeler. Fons Vitae, 
Louisville. 2011, p. 314. Ṣurāh 110:2. The self (nafs) desires this world because it is from this world. The spirit 
(rūh) desires the next world because it is from the next world. 
342 Tustarī, Sahl b. ʿAbd Allāh. Tafsīr al-Tustarī. Ed. and Muḥammad Bāsil ʿUyūn al-Sūd. Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya. 2002, p. 159. 
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Muḥammadan soul. In the Neoplatonic view individual souls are not only immaterial but also 
uncreated, which further separates al-Tustarī’s concept of the soul from a Neoplatonic one. In 
fact, al-Tustarī’s cosmogony is more of an attempt to systematize various disparate statements in 
the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature that talk about the intellect, soul and the Muḥammadan light.343 
The entire thrust of al-Tustarī’s discussion on the soul addresses a problematique that arises out 
of various positions espoused by early Islamic theological doctrines.344 As Douglas Crow has 
aptly shown, the mythic ʿaql narratives of the Ḥadīth literature that focus on the Mīthāq (divine 
covenant) grow out of early Islamic theological debates over freewill (qadar) and predestination 
(jabr).345 Crow demonstrates, contrary to Ignaz Goldziher, that the ʿaql of the Iraqi Qadarīs was 
not a Neoplatonic ‘First Emanation.’ The Ḥadīth corpus represents a measure of both continuity 
and rupture with Hellenistic, Patristic and Biblicist precedents.346 Scholars like al-Tustarī and al-
Tirmidhī in the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-century C.E.), who sought to systematize both Qurʾān 
and Ḥadīth statements into a coherent cosmology, created systems of thought founded on a very 
different episteme than the episteme that governed early Patristic thought. While the terminology 
and structure of some early Islamic mystical motifs resemble pre-Islamic precedents and were no 
doubt influenced by them, the episteme inaugurated by Qurʿān and Ḥadīth culture realigned 
                                                          
343 In the Qurʾān the Prophet Muhammad is understood by most exegetes to be referred to as a light. In Qurʾān 5:15 
we have the words … qad jāʾakum min Allāhi nūrun wa-kitābun mubīn, “…there has come to you from Allāh a light 
and a clear book.” The word nūr (light) is interpreted in al-Jalālayn to be a reference to Muḥammad. In Qurʾān 
7:172 we have a verse that refers to extracting of the progeny of Adam from his loins to testify to Allāh’s lordship. 
There is a linguistic relationship between the Qurʾānic term dhurriyyāt (offspring) and the term al-Tustarī uses 
dharrāt (specks). Both attain from the same Arabic root. Also, the idea that the Muḥammadan light was created 
from God’s light originates in a ḥadīth attributed to Jābir b. ʿAbd Allāh (d. 78/698). This ḥadīth is considered 
fabricated (mawḍūʿ) by Ḥadīth specialists, however, it is clear that al-Tustarī is developing his cosmogony, not from 
a Neoplatonic philosophical approach, but rather from Qurʾān and prophetic traditions that he is piecing together 
into a single narrative. Whether or not these Ḥadīth have their origin in Neoplatonic speculation is another question 
that cannot be answered here. 
344 The context of al-Tustarī’s discussion on the primordial covenant is an explanation of shaqāwa (damnation) and 
saʿāda (felicity). Ibid. Tafsīr al-Tustarī (2), p. 68. 
345 Crow, Douglas S. The role of ʿaql in early Islamic wisdom, with reference to Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq. Diss. McGill 
University, Montreal, P.Q. 1996, p. xxv. 
346 Ibid, p. xvii. 
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these motifs to produce very different significations. This orientation towards intellectual history 
is one of the benefits of Foucault’s episteme. The discourse stream of Islamic mysticism is 
apparent in the many similarities that we find between al-Tustarī and al-Tirmidhī. Al-Tirmidhī 
describes the soul as being tripartite with the ʿaql situated in the head, the hawā (caprice) 
situated in the bowels and the heart situated between both of these, and it is in the heart where 
the light of God’s gnosis is placed.347 This tripartite structure mirrors the tripartite structure of 
the soul in Plato’s Timaeus and was upheld by later Neoplatonists such as Apuleius of Madauros 
(mid-120s-after 170 C.E.).348 In the Timaeus Plato describes the soul as having three parts, the 
rational portion in the head, the spirited portion near the heart and the appetitive in the lower 
bowels.349 While it would seem that al-Tirmidhī is following a Neoplatonic vision of the soul, 
when we look closer at the underlying structure of al-Tirmidhī’s notion of the soul, we find that 
it runs contrary to the very foundations of Neoplatonism. Al-Tirmidhī conceives of the soul as 
created from clay and was placed in the bowels by the Devil.350 Furthermore, the heart is not the 
locus for the spiritual soul but rather a site for the manifestation of God’s light or gnosis. Al-
Tirmidhī’s spiritual anatomy presents a way of setting up his non-dual epistemology and 
ontology so that it is framed by the dualities that constitute this world (dunyā) and make it 
understandable to the intellect. We will revisit al-Tirmidhī’s non-dual gnoseology and 
interpretation of sainthood in chapters 5 and 6. Yves Marquet provides a lengthy comparison of 
al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of light to that of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā and concludes that it is essentially 
                                                          
347 Radtke, Bernd. “A Forerunner of Ibn ʿArabī: Ḥakīm Tirmidhī on Sainthood.” Journal of the Muḥyiddin Ibn 
ʿArabī Society, Vol. VIII, 1989. Online resource: http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articles/hakimtirmidhi.html. 
Accessed: 20 December 2014. 
348 Finamore, John F. “The Tripartite Soul in Middle Platonism” in Conversations Platonic and Neoplatonic. 
Academia Verlag. 2010, p. 105. 
349 Ibid, p.105. 
350 Ibid. A Forerunner. A conception of the soul as originating in a material substance could not be farther from the 
Neoplatonic idea of soul. 
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non-Hellenistic in its complete disregard for any attempt to systematize an original source of 
“light” to other than God himself.351 The conclusion of Radtke that al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology is 
not Neoplatonic is supported by Marquet’s findings as well as my own. The light mysticism that 
al-Tirmidhī uses derives from a discourse stream of Islamic mystical thought that developed 
during the 2nd- Islamic century (8th-century C.E.) and the first half of the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-
century C.E.). We can see this in the way al-Tirmidhī draws upon the same light cosmology as 
al-Tustarī. The fact that they both are working from similar material indicates that this light 
cosmology predates them both. 
 
Early Sufism 
 Our discussion of the various sources of Hellenism and Sufism has helped us to 
understand why it can be difficult to identify the foundational elements that are structuring the 
thought of early Islamic mystics. This does not deny the variety of non-Islamic influences that 
were omnipresent in the context of these mystics, however, it helps to situate them in relation to 
a new center within the discursive topography of Near Eastern movements. When the center of 
the episteme shifts, we have a rupture in the intellectual landscape, a break that reconfigures the 
relationships between the various discourse streams. If we look at asceticism/mysticism in the 
Near East as an element of Near Eastern thought and practice that predates Islam, then the arrival 
of the Islamic revelation and the prophetic Ḥadīth definitely represents a rupture in that episteme 
and a recentering. Early Islamic mystics were almost without exception Traditionist352 in their 
approach, that is, they were Muslims from the scholarly class who saw the Ḥadīth as a primary 
                                                          
351 Ibid. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī et Neoplatonisme, p. 43. 
352 As opposed to Traditionalist, which represents an anti-theological trend in Islam. 
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source for their views.353 The Ṣūfīs of Baghdād as well as other ascetic/mystical movements 
were seeking to legitimize as well as articulate their experiences through the Qurʾānic and Ḥadīth 
corpus. Hence, Muslim mystics in both Baghdād and Khurāsān were writing for the scholarly 
class, both mystic and non-mystic alike. Al-Sarrāj, in his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, uses the central 
Gabriel ḥadīth354 to situate Sufism as the epitome of the Islamic sciences (ʿulūm), characterizing 
Sufism as the science of iḥsān (beauty, excellence), the third and final stage of spiritual 
attainment mentioned in this ḥadīth. While al-Tirmidhī was not defending ‘Sufism’ in the same 
way as al-Sarrāj, he was arguing for the primacy of the path of gnosis (ṭarīq al-maʿrifa) by 
appealing to Qurʾān and Ḥadīth sources almost a hundred years before al-Sarrāj. The ascension 
of the Ḥadīth dominance is unmistakably obvious in both of their approaches.  
 Also during the 9th-century C.E. and simultaneous with the ascension of the Ḥadīth folk, 
al-Muḥāsibī develops a sophisticated psychology of introspection.355 Al-Muḥāsibī’s concept of 
the soul breaks from a more ancient Arabian notion of the soul as synonymous with ʿaql.356 This 
notion of the soul (nafs) combines Neoplatonic and Patristic notions of the soul within an 
Arab/Islamic framework. The episteme shift represented by Ḥadīth dominance reconfigured 
these notions based on a new reference point. While the soul is the vehicle by which to reach 
God, this soul does not seek ‘union’ with God, but rather seeks the manifestation of God’s 
presence and attributes in the world.357 For Aristotle, the soul is primarily a passive element, 
                                                          
353 Silvers, Laury. A Soaring Minaret. State University of New York Press. Albany, NY. 2010, p. 2. Silvers argues 
that Sufism developed in a milieu that can best be characterized as an Ahl al-Ḥadīth (party of Ḥadīth) culture. 
354 Ibid. Kitāb al-Lumaʾ, p. 6. This ḥadīth is considered by Muslim legal scholars to be one of the central aḥadīth to 
Islamic lore and doctrine. 
355 Ibid. Islamic mysticism, pp. 44–45. 
356 Ibn ʿAbbās considers nafs (soul) and ʿaql (intellect) to be synonymous. Picken, Gavin N. Spiritual purification in 
Islam: the life and works of al-Muḥāsibī. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 2011, p. 173. 
357 The discussion on ‘union’ (jamʿ) is an example of what I believe is a misreading of early Ṣūfī mystical 
terminology. The discussion in al-Junayd’s mystical treatises on jamʿ (I prefer gatheredness rather than ‘union’) and 
tafriqa (separation) must be understood within the paradigm of ḥikma as discussed in Chapter 2. This was a 
vocabulary that described the interaction of opposites in the world. Al-Tirmidhī engages in a similar discussion of 
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while for the Neoplatonists the soul has both an active and passive nature.358 Even so, the active 
nature of the soul for the Neoplatonists was active in a subconscious manner, that is, the 
intellection of the soul is always and constantly happening through the soul’s actualization of the 
forms of matter in the ‘mind’ of the soul.359 Early Arab/Islamic notions of the ʿaql (mind/soul), 
on the other hand, were preoccupied with qadar (freewill) and jabr (predestination). While 
Neoplatonism was concerned with epistemology, or how we know what we know, al-Muḥāsibī 
focuses on intentionality (irāda) as a focal point for the development of the soul/self (tazkiyat al-
nafs). Hence, again, the context of al-Muḥāsibī’s thought must be situated within the frame of the 
intentionality of actions that will lead one either to salvation (saʿāda) or damnation (shaqāwa). 
For al-Muḥāsibī the path of tazkiya is a path of purification that leads ultimately to sincerity of 
intention while opposing its opposite, i.e., riyāʾ (showing off or intending one’s worship for 
other than God), which is the primary sin in al-Muḥāsibī’s spiritual regime.360 
 
Al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī Build on the Work of al-Muḥāsibī 
 We will now be looking at how al-Muḥāsibī’s concept of the soul, as configured and 
modified by the discourse stream of Ḥadīth dominance, informed the thought of both al-Junayd 
and al-Tirmidhī. This is important because it highlights the complicated and non-linear 
development of Ṣūfī thought. We can view al-Muḥāsibī’s discussion of the soul as a departure 
from previous modes of thinking about the soul in Islamic mystical discourse. Particular 
individuals who followed after him and internalized his teachings (specifically al-Junayd and al-
                                                          
opposites being gathered and separated. This vocabulary provided the framework for understanding how God’s 
theophany manifests in the world. 
358 Remes, Paulina. Neoplatonism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2008, p. 138. 
359 Ibid, p. 137. 
360 Ibid. Spiritual purification, p. 205. 
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Tirmidhī here) became the theoretical progenitors of what was to become Sufism in its mature 
form.361 Al-Junayd lived in Baghdād and was the only one of the early Baghdād Ṣūfīs to admit a 
debt to al-Muḥāsibī.362 While al-Tirmidhī did not meet al-Muḥāsibī, he records in his 
autobiography that it was one of the books of al-Anṭākī, the rāwī (narrator) of al-Muḥāsibī, that 
opened his spiritual insight.363 We can see clearly from al-Junayd’s writings that he borrowed 
from al-Muḥāsibī, whose influence extended his thought in important ways. Al-Junayd shared al-
Muḥāsibī’s basic methodology for refining the self, although he made it a lesser stage in the 
process of spiritual realization. Al-Junayd compares two terms in his Rasāʾil (Letters of al-
Junayd); they are: ṣidq (truthfulness) and ikhlāṣ (sincerity). For al-Junayd, ikhlāṣ is higher than 
ṣidq, and ṣidq entails, al-qiyām ʿalā al-nafs bi-l-ḥarāsati wa-l-riʿāyati lahā, “…gaining control 
over the nafs through constant observation and watchfulness of it.” Here, al-Junayd uses the 
exact same terms to refer to the very same methodology presented by al-Muḥāsibī. For al-
Junayd, however, we should note that he refers to ṣidq (truthfulness) as a lower station and then 
continues to explain how ikhlāṣ is yet a higher station of spiritual attainment. Al-Junayd 
described ikhlās (sincerity) as a characteristic of walāya (sainthood) that is granted unto the 
believer by God. In al-Junayd’s mystical system, the one characterized by sincerity goes beyond 
ʿaql (intellect), a movement that is not particularly clear in the works of al-Muḥāsibī. Al-Junayd 
says, fa ʿinda wuṣūl al-ʿabdi ilā hādhā kharaja ʿan ṣifati wujūdi mā yūṣafu bi-l-ʿaql fa-ṣārat 
ʿawāriḍ al-ʿaql ʿinda wujūd haqīqati al-tawḥīd wasāwis taḥtāju ilā an yaruddahā…, “When the 
servant reaches this [point], he leaves the attribute of the existence of that which can be 
                                                          
361 Alexander Knysh (2011) discusses al-Muḥāsibī’s Ṣūfī credentials and notes that some have interpreted him as a 
‘moralizing theologian’ rather than as a Ṣūfī. Nevertheless, the importance of his approach to spiritual purification 
on later Sufism is undisputed. Ibid. Islamic mysticism, p. 47.  
362 Ibid, p. 53. 
363 Ibid. Concept, p. 17. 
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described by the intellect and [for him] the effulgences of the intellect [standing] before the 
existence of the reality of oneness are but disturbances that need to be repelled.”364 Here we can 
see a more developed presentation of the ʿaql, not simply as that which represents a capacity to 
understand God, but rather a faculty that reflects the world and gives rise to ‘thoughts’. For al-
Junayd it is not enough for the servant (ʿabd) to orient himself toward God with his intellect, but 
rather, true realization is to go beyond the ʿaql itself and thus beyond form (rasm). This does not 
happen as a result of the ability of the servant, but through the servant’s khuṣūṣiyya (being 
chosen) by God. The servant is taken beyond his intellect by the overpowering nature of God’s 
presence. Not only does al-Junayd build upon the methodological foundation established by al-
Muḥāsibī, but he introduces some important transformations. While al-Muḥāsibī calls for the 
servant to turn away from and thus ignore the nafs, al-Junayd calls for its fanā’ (annihilation). 
Al-Junayd says, fa-lammā faqadat al-arwāḥ al-naʿīm al-ghaybī alladhī lā tuḥāssuhu an-nufūs 
wa-lā tuqāribuhu al-ḥusūs alifat fanāhā ʿanhā wa wujidat baqāhā yamnaʿuhu fanāhā, “and 
when the spirits lose the hidden pleasure which souls do not sense nor do feelings come near, 
their annihilation from them (their nufūs) becomes habitual and their state of subsistence, which 
annihilation had blocked, arises.”365 For al-Junayd, the concept of sobriety (saḥw), a 
characteristic coterminous with baqāʾ (subsistence), is built on the idea that spiritual practice is 
primarily an inward discipline that results from the annihilation (fanāʾ) of the soul as it is 
directed towards the contemplation of God. In other words, it is al-Muḥāsibī’s radical 
interiorization of the ascetic path that al-Junayd is refining.366 We call al-Muḥāsibī’s mystical 
                                                          
364 Ibid. Rasāʾil, p. 53. 
365 Ibid, p. 34. 
366 I agree with Nile Green who states that Islamic mysticism was as much a reaction against asceticism as it was 
influenced by early Christian and Muslim asceticism. Islamic mysticism grows out of a dialog among the Ḥadīth 
folk about the place of asceticism in Islam. Al-Muḥāsibī’s approach can be characterized as an inward asceticism or 
an asceticism of the soul (nafs) from its attachments to the world and its desires and a turning (tawba) towards God. 
Al-Junayd adopts al-Muḥāsibī’s ‘asceticism of the soul’ but does not completely disown asceticism of the body. 
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approach ‘radical interorization’ because he appears to call for an ‘asceticism of the soul’ as 
opposed to an ‘asceticism of the body’. For al-Muḥāsibī, strictures of the body don’t cure the evil 
inclinations of the soul and in this we can see an important departure from early Christian 
asceticism. For example, this differs markedly from the approach of Isaac of Nineveh, whose 
asceticism directly links the mortification of the body with the spiritual ascent of the soul.367 Al-
Muḥāsibī’s logic goes as follows: When the ʿaql continuously watches over (muḥāsaba) the soul 
for occurrences of ostentation (riyāʾ), the soul gradually leaves ostentation and begins beholding 
God himself. Al-Muḥāsibī’s spiritual regimen leads the mystic to the point of witnessing God. 
For al-Muḥāsibī, the highest level of spiritual attainment is tawakkul (complete reliance upon 
God).368  At this level of spiritual attainment the seeker of God does not see anything but God, 
and is even oblivious to his own self. At the end of Ādāb al-Nufūs Al-Muḥāsibī states, wa-l-
mutawakkil ʿalā Allāh lā yaltafitu ilā al-dunyā li-annahu lā yarāhā li-nafsihi khaṭaran, wa-lā 
yarāha wa-nafsahu wa-jamīʿa mā fīhā illā Allāh…,369 “The reliant one does not turn his attention 
to this world, because he does not see his very soul even as a single thought, and he does not see 
it nor his soul, nor all that is in it, save God...” We can see from this quote from Ādāb al-Nufūs 
that full realization requires the mystic to lose sight of his self (nafs) in the vision of God. This 
‘forgetting’ of the self/soul is clearly a precursor to al-Junayd’s annihilation (fanāʾ) of the 
self/soul. Al-Junayd takes this process of refinement even further to the point where all 
oppositions and points of reference are lost and the mystic is annihilated in the divine presence 
(fanāʾ). According to al-Junayd, the path (ṭarīq) does not stop there, but the mystic then recovers 
from this spiritual death to subsist (baqāʾ) in God, which he considers a higher station than 
                                                          
367 Ibid. Mystic treatises, p. 5. 
368 Ibid. Ādāb al-Nufūs, p. 180. 
369 Ibid, p. 179. 
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annihilation. For al-Junayd, the mystic journey is not simply a process of refinement and 
accounting for one’s actions (muḥāsaba) and witnessing (mushāhada), but it is a process of the 
mystic himself becoming the site of God’s manifesting presence. While the approaches of al-
Muḥāsibī and al-Junayd express a new way of discoursing about the path (ṭarīq) to God by 
focusing on the vehicle of the soul, neither of these two theoreticians of Islamic mysticism invest 
the mystic with religious authority as a result of his sainthood (walāya). For both of them the 
saint (walī) is someone who is a source of guidance (hidāya) for others and is protected by God, 
but is not a khalīfa (successor to the Prophet or to God).370 
Al-Muḥāsibī’s inward spiritual psychology gave him the theoretical basis to criticize 
bodily asceticism as a viable path to reach God. Al-Junayd was not the only mystic who 
inherited and built upon the ideas of al-Muḥāsibī. Al-Muḥāsibī’s views on the soul were also 
inherited by al-Tirmidhī who voices a very similar condemnation of ascetical practice and 
motives along the same lines. Al-Tirmidhī’s process of tazkiya as he expounds it in SA follows 
al-Muḥāsibī’s lead. Al-Tirmidhī’s inward asceticism of the soul ends in walāya. We can see that 
al-Muḥāsibī begs the question “To what end?” in his intricate moral psychology and we find that 
both al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī proffer two very different answers to this question. The two 
divergent approaches of both al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī were then eventually incorporated into 
the great mystical synthesis of the 5th/11th-century by al-Sulamī and his student al-Qushayrī. We 
would like to put forward the proposition that Sufism in its mature form is a product greater than 
the sum of its parts and constitutes a synthesis of various mystical approaches, such as elements 
                                                          
370 Ibid. Rasāʾil, p. 20. The saints (awliyāʾ) do not figure prominently in al-Muḥāsibī’s spiritual hierarchy. Rather, it 
is the ḥukamāʾ (sages) who play an important role as knowers of God (ʿārifīn). Al-Junayd mentions the awliyāʾ 
more frequently but even for him the term awliyāʾ is one of many descriptors of the knowers of God. 
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of al-Muḥāsibī’s spiritual psychology, filtered through the thought of mystics like al-Junayd and 
al-Tirmidhī, who built upon his radical interiorization of the spiritual path. 
 
Nīshāpūr and the Development of Sufism as a Meta-Identity 
In order to understand Sufism in the 5th/11th-century we need to move from Baghdād, 
where al-Muḥāsibī and al-Junayd were operative, to Khurāsān and, in particular, the city of 
Nīshāpūr. Khurāsān was a crucible for the continued sustainability of what different factions 
within Islam were calling Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa (the people of sunna and community). As 
we will see with the case study of Nīshāpūr during this period, Sunnīsm as an orthodoxy was not 
a forgone conclusion at the beginning of the 11th-century C.E. A crumbling Abbasid state, a 
schism between East and West, invasions of Turkic tribes from Central Asia and social and 
economic divisions that threatened to tear apart the fabric of urban life all militated against a 
collective spirit that would bind Muslims together.  
Nīshāpūr was the cultural and intellectual capital of Khurāsān in the 10th- and 11th-
centuries C.E. As we have seen with the Ṣūfī authors already discussed, the majority of these 
authors hailed from Nīshāpūr, either travelled through it, or at some point studied there. Richard 
Bulliet’s study of the patrician class of this important city helps us to better understand the 
internal workings of this medieval Muslim city in Khurāsān.371 More importantly for us, the 
political and social dynamics of Nīshāpūr during this period will also help us to better understand 
what was taking place in the development of Sufism at the same time. Rather than looking at 
                                                          
371 Bulliet correctly warns us from extrapolating our understanding of Nīshāpūr to other urban centers in Khurāsān. 
Ḥanafīs in Nīshāpūr meant something quite different than Ḥanafīs in Samarqand. Despite the rivalries and factional 
conflicts between Ḥanafīs and Shāfīʿīs we see that the educational system remained unified and did not break up 
into two separate schooling systems. 
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Sufism as a factor in the factional strife in Nīshāpūr372 during the 5th/11th-century, we can view 
the development of Sufism in Nīshāpūr during this historical period as a possible reaction to this 
factionalism and strife and as a vote of no-confidence in a system that was broken and eventually 
led to the destruction of the city.  
The origins of the struggle between Ḥanafīs and Shāfīʿīs in Nīshāpūr predate our period 
of inquiry, starting as early as the 3rd/9th-century. It is at the end the 4th- Islamic century (10th-
century C.E.) that factional violence begins with the adoption of Ashʿarī theology, adopted solely 
by Shāfīʿīs. We can think of Ḥanafīs and Shāfīʿīs as much as political parties as they are legal 
schools during this period.373 Shāfīʿī ideology was more ‘progressive’ in the sense that it 
supported new trends in society such as mysticism and semi-determinism. Ḥanafī ideology, at 
least in Nīshāpūr, was more aristocratic and conservative and was connected with Muʿtazilī 
theology.374 In Transoxania, where al-Tirmidhī lived, the situation was much different with 
Ḥanafīs primarily adhering to a Murjiʾī/Ḥanafī theology. The divide between Ḥanafīs and 
Shāfīʿīs in Nīshāpūr appears to have been the outward manifestation of deeper social divisions 
amongst the leading aristocratic families.375 A series of factors led to an upset in the balance of 
                                                          
372 Margaret Malamud casts the Ṣūfīs of Nīshāpūr as primarily Shāfiʿīs. The Shāfiʿīs were considered to be less 
aristocratic and more open to new trends leading them to try out Sufism. There are several problems, however, with 
Malamud’s interpretation of the usage of the term al-ṣūfī in al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī’s Tārīkh Naysābūr. The first 
consideration is the assumption that the term ṣūfī is used to specifically mean someone who associates with Baghdād 
Sufism. Rather, al-Naysābūrī seems to use the term to refer to mystics in general such as when he refers to al-Ḥākim 
al-Samarqandī, mentioned in Chapter 3 as a Ṣūfī. Al-Samarqandī had no known affiliation with the Baghdād Ṣūfīs 
and was a Ḥanafī theologian and mystic. Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ṣarīfīnī. Al-Muntakhab Min Al-siyāq Li-tārīkh 
Naysābūr. Ed. ʿAbd al-Ghāfir b. Ismāʿīl Fārisī al-Ṭabʿa. Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya. 1989, p. 73. 
373 This speaks to the importance of conceiving of these categories as constructed identities. One finds in the ṭabaqāt 
literature, for example, a Ḥanafī Shāfīʿī. This would seem to be an oxymoron of sorts but what we find is that Shāfīʿī 
becomes identified with Ṣūfī and what is really meant here is a Ḥanafī Ṣūfī and not someone who is following two 
different legal schools at the same time. Ibid. Patricians, p. 41. 
374 Ibid, p. 36. 
375 We find that before Ḥanafī and Shāfīʿī identifications come into play by the middle of the 10th century a similar 
split along the lines of Kūfan and Madīnan madhāhib exists. In this period local dialect, history and customs 
constituted the core of an individual’s identity which was overlain by a veneer of cosmopolitan religious practices 
and imperial administrative procedures. Ibid, p. 31. 
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power between patrician families who controlled the city. When the Ghaznavids replaced the 
Samānids as rulers of Nīshāpūr in 999 C.E. they sought to increase their control in the city by 
supporting various factions of the city against others. At the beginning of his reign, Maḥmūd of 
Ghazna officially endorsed Muʿtazilī theology as propounded by the Ḥanafī leadership of the 
city. Later he appointed a Karrāmī, Abū Bakr, as the raʾīs (mayor) of Nīshāpūr despite the fact 
that Karrāmīs were fanatically anti-Muʿtazilī. The result was a reign of terror in Nīshāpūr in 
which Ashʿarīs, Muʿtazilīs and Ismāʿīlīs were denounced from the pulpits of the mosques and 
attacked with impunity.376 The Karrāmiyya derived the base of their support from the despised 
lower classes such as weavers and the urban and rural poor. They were highly organized and 
stressed moral and social reform. Needless to say, the appointment of a Karrāmī to a position of 
such importance in the city upended the balance of power that had existed amongst the patriciate. 
When the Seljuqs replaced the Ghaznavids in 1037 C.E. they continued the same policy of divide 
and conquer.377 The Seljuq vizier ʿAmīd al-Mulk Kundūrī (d. 455/1063) instituted an inquisition 
of Shāfīʿī Ashʿarīs in which the Ashʿarī Ṣūfī al-Qushayrī was forced to flee Nīshāpūr.378 The 
factional strife in Nīshāpūr kept spiraling downwards during the 11th-century C.E., climaxing in 
the devastation of the city by the Ghuzz and its eventual abandonment. A recurring question in 
Bulliet’s work on Nīshāpūr is why the patriciate allowed such factional strife to escalate to the 
                                                          
376 Margaret Malamud. “The Politics of Heresy in Medieval Khurāsān: The Karrāmiyya in Nīshāpūr”. Iranian 
Studies. 27 (1/4): 1994, p. 46. 
377 In Medieval Muslim cities in greater Khurāsān during the 4th/10th- and 5th/11th-centuries the rulers needed the city 
more than the city needed the ruler. The traditional balance of power in the city between the various patrician 
families unwound as new rulers sought to increase their influence and power in the city. The social unrest that was 
the result of this policy had to do with a struggle for power and authority between a foreign ruler and a landed 
aristocratic class. 
378 It is not clear why al-Kundūrī instituted this inquisition of Ashʿarīs, whether it was for personal reasons or 
whether it was a Machiavellian attempt to reassert the balance of power between Shāfīʿīs and Ḥanafīs after Shāfīʿīs 




point of self-destruction. The opposition between legal or even theological schools does not fully 
explain why Nīshāpūr could not solve its internal factionalism.  
While Bulliet’s work shows that Ḥanafī and Shāfīʿī were identifications that could mean 
more than simple affiliation to a legal school, Jacqueline Chabbi’s work on the historical 
development of mystical movements in Khurāsān demonstrates the possibility that the 
identification ‘Ṣūfī’ used by al-Hakīm al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014) in his Tārīkh Nīshāpūr, in 
effect, referred to Malāmatīs who had consolidated under the banner of Sufism in a coalition 
against the Karrāmiyya.379 The problem we face in trying to understand who the Ṣūfīs really 
were in Nīshāpūr during the 10th- and early 11th-centuries C.E. is that Ṣūfī histories and 
biographical dictionaries do not clearly coincide with the accounts of travelers and geographers. 
The geographer Shams al-Dīn al-Muqaddasī (d. 380/990), who visited Nīshāpūr in 374/984 near 
the end of his life, does not mention Ṣūfīs or Malāmatīs in his works but rather refers to pietists 
(ʿubbād) and renunciants (zuhhād).380 The Karrāmiyya, on the other hand, do figure prominently 
in his descriptions of the various factional groups in the city. Similarly, the historian Abū Manṣūr 
al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) is more concerned with anathematizing the Karrāmiyya than he is 
aware of Sufism.381 The first ‘Ṣūfī’ to be mentioned in the biographical dictionaries of the 
scholars of Khurāsān is Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī (d. 320/932)382 who was one of the only students of 
al-Junayd that we know of to have ventured eastward in the early part of the 10th-century C.E.383 
From his time onward we increasingly see the use of the term Ṣūfī to describe local shaykhs but 
                                                          
379 Jacqueline Chabbi. “Remarques sur le développement historique des mouvements ascétiques et mystiques au 
Khurasan: IIIe/IXe siècle - IVe/Xe siècle”. Studia Islamica. (46): 1977, p. 67. 
380 Sara Sviri. “Ḥakīm Tirmidhī and the Malāmatī Movement in Early Sufism.” L.\ Lewisohn (ed.), Classical 
Persian Sufism. 1993, p. 590. 
381 Ibid. “The Politics of heresy,” p. 50. 
382 Ibid. A Soaring Minaret, p. 35. 
383 Ibid. “Ḥakīm Tirmidhī and the malāmatī movement,” p. 589.  
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never the term Malāmatī.384 If Chabbi’s assertion holds true, it means that the term Ṣūfī, like the 
legal affiliations mentioned previously, was a flexible identity that could be manipulated for 
various purposes even in Nīshāpūr during the 5th/11th-century. Before al-Qushayrī, we can see 
that Sufism may have served the purpose of uniting a local mystical movement relying for its 
support on the tradesmen fraternities of the bazaar. According to Chabbi, this may have occurred 
in the face of the rising threat of an ascetical/mystical movement (the Karrāmiyya) basing its 
strength on the urban poor and connections with the rural areas surrounding the city. In this 
process the value of futuwwa (often translated as ‘chivalry’) and the culture of the fityān 
(chivalrous youth) combine with a prestige and authority that was associated with Iraqi, and 
more specifically Baghdādī, credentials. We can think of Sufism in its Khurāsānian-inspired 
form as possibly Malāmatism with a Baghdādī veneer. While I do agree with the general thrust 
of Chabbi’s hypothesis, I disagree that Sufism was a response to the Ḥanafī Karrāmiyya, 
primarily because the Shāfīʿī connection to Sufism is weak. Furthermore, Sufism in Nīshāpūr 
functioned as an identity that was inclusive of legal and theological allegiances within Sunnism. 
The spokesmen for this new form of mysticism were al-Sulamī and his student al-Qushayrī, both 
of whom stood at a crossroads in the history of Islamic mysticism. Before discussing the 
contributions of al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī, we will address two earlier defenders of Sufism, al-
Sarrāj and al-Kalābādhī. Both of these individuals positioned Sufism as a meta-madhhab, or an 
approach that would encompass the various factionalisms that had developed among proto-
Sunnīs. This idea of Sufism as a meta-madhhab carried over into the work of al-Sulamī and al-
Qushayrī who offered Sufism as a solution to the rampant factionalism that gripped their city of 
Nīshāpūr. Unfortunately, Sufism was not able to save Nīshāpūr, but it quickly spread to all 
                                                          
384 Ibid, p. 589. 
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corners of the Muslim world within only a few centuries of its formulation by al-Sulamī and, in 
particular, al-Qushayrī. 
 
Al-Sarrāj and al-Kalābādhī 
 Both Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 378/988) and Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī (d. 390/990) , wrote 
manuals on Sufism in the latter part of the 4th-Islamic century (10th-century C.E.) that are often 
viewed as apologetic, that is, they sought to attenuate Sufism to the palate of the ʿulamāʾ 
(scholarly class).385 Green provides a different view arguing that since Ṣūfīs were from the 
scholarly class (both scholars of Ḥadīth and Fiqh), they did not really need an apologia, rather, 
their manuals were “manifestos” seeking to advertise a newcomer to the mystical scene of 
Khurāsān.386 Both of these views see Sufism through a diffusion model in which Sufism was 
developed in Baghdād as a new kind of mystical piety that spread from this point outward. Yet, a 
diffusion model may not be the best model to explain such a complex and multi-dimensional 
phenomenon as Sufism. We prefer here to use Foucault’s concept of episteme and discourse, 
which we feel is more appropriate when discussing social and intellectual history. The question 
we would like to answer is: At what time did Sufism actually become a discourse stream? Or 
rather: When was it that Ṣūfīs were writing about themselves as a distinct identity as opposed to 
other identities within Islam? When we analyze al-Junayd’s Rasāʾil we find no mention of the 
‘ṣufiyya’ or taṣawwuf (Sufism). Rather, what we find are descriptions of awliyāʾ (saints), 
ḥukamāʾ (wise men) and ʿārifīn (gnostics). These are all categories that are familiar to us in the 
works of al-Tirmidhī and other mystics of his generation such as al-Tustarī. We only find 
mention of Sufism by al-Junayd in statements attributed to him through individual reports and in 
                                                          
385 Ibid. Islamic mysticism, pp. 120–123. 
386 Ibid. Sufism a global history, p. 52. 
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sections of later books that seek to bolster Sufism itself.387 Nor do we see the term Sufism used 
by other authors of the eclectic group who were called Ṣūfīs in Baghdād except through the lens 
of later Ṣūfīs of the latter part of the 10th-century C.E.388 It seems that Sufism was possibly a 
term others may have used to refer to the mystics of Baghdād during the 3rd- Islamic century (9th-
century C.E.), first as a slightly pejorative term and then reclaimed as a catch-all term for Islamic 
mysticism in general. Furthermore, neither al-Sarrāj nor al-Kalābādhī saw Sufism as a purely 
Baghdād phenomenon.389 Al-Sarrāj and al-Kalābādhī were not necessarily defending a particular 
‘school’ of mysticism, but rather, were negotiating the place of Islamic mysticism within the 
larger Traditionist discourse stream of the Ḥadīth folk.390 If we look at three individual mystics: 
al-Junayd, al-Tustarī and al-Tirmidhī, all of them were writing about topics related to Islamic 
mysticism somewhat independently around the same time, at the end of the 3rd/9th-century. Each 
of them was using his own unique terminology, however, we find that they were all concerned 
with the nature of knowledge and positioning the possessor of inward (bāṭin) knowledge above 
the one who possesses only outward (ẓāhir) knowledge. All of these individuals came from the 
scholarly religious class (ʿulamāʾ) and their reference to Qurʾān and Ḥadīth texts indicates that 
they were in discussion with the larger Traditionist discourse stream. Al-Sarrāj and al-Kalābādhī 
from the 4th- Islamic century (10th-century C.E.) were heir to this larger mystical discourse and it 
                                                          
387 Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī in his short treatise Masʾala fī Qawāʿid al-Taṣwwuf wa-Mabānīhā attributes a 
number of traditions about the nature of taṣawwuf to al-Junayd but without any chain of transmitters (asānīd). Abū 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Ismāʿīl b. Nujayd al-Naysābūrī al-Sulamī. Masāʾil wa-taʾwīlāt al-ṣūfīya li-Abī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Sulamī: wa-yalīhī juzʾ min aḥādīṯ Ismāʿīl b. Nujayd al-Naysābūrī. Ed. Ǧirhar̄d Böwering and Bilāl al-Orfālī. Bairūt: 
Dār al-Mašriq. 2010, pp. 1–2. 
388 Ibid. Islamic mysticism, p. 117. 
389 Ibid. Kitāb al-lumaʿ, p. 42. Al-Kalābādhī sees al-Tirmidhī as also an important figure in Sufism as well as other 
Khurāsānian ascetics and mystics. 
390 Lory, P. “al-Sarrāj.” EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 





is in this spirit that we can make better sense of their works, which pull from a number of 
disparate mystical trends. Al-Kalābādhī’s al-Taʿarruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf is a case in 
point and we would like to show how his work weaves together Baghdād style mysticism with 
important mystical elements from greater Khurāsān, thereby developing a synthesis that laid the 
foundation for later Ṣūfīs to build upon.  
 Paul Nwiya divides al-Kalābādhī’s main work on Sufism into three sections: a historical 
overview, apologetics seeking to promote Ḥanafī points of creed as being one and the same with 
the creed of the Ṣūfīs, and finally a description of the Ṣūfī mystical path.391 Nwiya’s discussion 
on the Taʿrruf is cursory at best and partly inaccurate. When reading the Taʿrruf carefully we can 
see that his creedal section does not simply echo tenets of al-Fiqh al Akbar II as Nwiya claims, 
but seeks to demonstrate the accord between the doctrine of the Ṣūfīs and both Māturīdī theology 
and some aspects of Ashʿarī theology.392 Al-Kalābādhī’s work most likely borrows its inspiration 
not from al-Fiqh al-Akbar II,393 but from al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī’s creedal work al-Sawād al-
Aʿẓam. Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī is mentioned by name in the Taʿarruf, and the creedal points 
mentioned by al-Kalābādhī match with al-Samarqandī’s creed very closely.394 Al-Kalābādhī 
asserts that all of the major Ṣūfīs he mentions in the beginning of the Taʿarruf adhere to sixty-
five points of Ḥanafī creed, a difficult argument to make given the diversity of figures 
                                                          
391 P. Nwiya. “al-Kalābād̲h̲ī.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 20 
August 2014 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-kala-
ba-d-h-i-SIM_3803> First appeared online: 2012. 
392 Al-Fiqh al-Akbar II is a Ḥanafī/Māturīdī text and has no relation to Ashʿarism.  
393 Al-Fiqh al-Akbar II was most likely written some time at the end of the 4th- Islamic century (10th-century C.E.) 
around the time of al-Kalābādhī’s death. 
394 Out of approximately fifty points of doctrine mentioned in al-Kalābādhī’s Taʿarruf forty of those match directly 
to points of doctrine in al-Samarqandī’s al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam. Of the ten that differ, the majority of these are points of 
doctrine that represent a more advanced stage in Ḥanafī/Māturīdī theology since al-Kalābādhī most probably wrote 
his Taʿarruf as much as half a century after al-Samarqandī wrote al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam. See Appendix A for a 
comparison chart in Arabic. 
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mentioned, many of whom were non-Ḥanafīs. If we understand the milieu that al-Kalābādhī was 
writing in, we can assume that he was probably seeking to distinguish the ‘ṣūfiyya’ from the 
ascetic ‘wearers of wool’ among the Karrāmiyya who were despised by the more learned 
scholarly class of Ḥanafīs. This context is significant because it also connects al-Kalābādhī in 
important ways to al-Tirmidhī who, as we demonstrated in Chapter 3, was an important figure in 
Ḥanafī theology. Al-Kalābādhī also includes two sections in his Taʿarruf that indicate a debt to 
al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmdhī’s works. The first of the three sections of al-Kalābādhī’s work discusses the 
nature of sainthood (walāya) and here al-Kalābādhī reproduces al-Tirmidhī’s distinction between 
the “saints of God by right” (awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh) and the higher “saints of God” (awliyāʾ Allāh), 
a distinction unique to al-Tirmidhī. Al-Kalābādhī uses almost the exact same terminology as al-
Tirmdhī.395 Furthermore, al-Kalābādhī takes al-Tirmidhī’s tripartite structure of knowledge and 
reproduces it in the Taʿarruf.396 In addition to this, al-Tirmidhī is mentioned by al-Kalābādhī as 
one of those who wrote on Ṣūfī practice (muʿāmalāt).397 If we are correct in understanding that 
                                                          
395 Al-Kalābādhī writes, al-wilāya wilāyatān wilāya takhruju min al-ʿadāwa wa-hiya li-ʿāmmati al-muʾminīn fa-
hādhihi lā tūjibu maʿrifatihā wa-l-taḥaqquq bi-hā li-l-aʿyān lākin min jihat al-ʿumūm fa-yuqāl al-muʾmin walī Allāh 
wilāya ikhtiṣāṣ wa-iṣṭifāʾ wa-iṣṭināʿ wa-hādhihi tūjibu maʿrifatahā wa-l-taḥaqquqa bihā wa-yakūnu ṣāḥibuhā 
maḥfūẓun ʿan al-naẓar ilā nafsihi, “Sainthood is of two types, a sainthood that arises out of enmity (al-ʿadāwa) and 
it is for the generality of believers, this kind does not necessitate knowledge of it (sainthood) and realization of it 
(sainthood) for those chosen, however for the most part it is said that the believer is a saint (walī) of Allāh with a 
specialized, chosen and prepared sainthood. [Then there is] this [other] type which requires knowledge of it 
(sainthood) and realization of it (sainthood) and the one who has it is protected from beholding his self.” 
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Kalābādhī. Al-Taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf: lawlā al-taʿarruf lamā ʿurifa al-
taṣawwuf. Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya. 1980, pp. 82–83. This is precisely the distinction that al-
Tirmidhī makes between walī ḥaqq Allāh and walī Allāh. Ibid. Concept, p. 43. Compare this to al-Tirmidhī’s 
terminology in which he says, al-wilāyatu ʿalā wajhayn, wilāyatun yakhruju bihā al-ʿabdu min al-ʿadāwa wa-huwa 
wilāyat al-tawḥīd wa-wilāyatun yakhruju bihā min al-khiyāna fa-yakūna amīnan min umanāʾ Allāh ʿazza wa-jall, 
qad jāhada nafsuhu fī dhāt Allāh ḥattā kaffa nafsahu wa-jawāriḥuhu al-sabʿa ʿan maḥārim Allāh taʿālā wa addā 
farāʾidahu fa-lazima ismu al-waraʿ. “Sainthood is of two types, a sainthood by which the servant escapes from 
enmity (al-ʿadāwa) and it is the sainthood of affirming unity (tawḥīd) and [then there is] a sainthood by which he 
exits from treachery and he thus becomes a trustworthy one from among those who are trustworthy by God may he 
be exalted and glorified, he is one who has fought his lower self in the very self of Allah until he has pulled his 
lower self and its seven limbs away from those things prohibited by Allah most high and he has performed its duties 
and thus comes to deserve the name conscientious obedient.” Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 141. 
396 Al-Tirmidhī’s tripartite structure of knowledge: ʿilm al-ẓāhir, ḥikma and maʿrifa is reproduced by al-Kalābādhī in 
the Taʿarruf. Ibid. Al-Taʿarruf, pp. 100–101. 
397 Ibid, p. 30. 
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someone as central to the Ṣūfī canonical tradition as al-Kalābādhī uses al-Tirmidhī’s construct of 
sainthood (walāya), as well as the structure of his gnoseology, it would follow that al-Tirmidhī 
was, indeed, integrated into the mainstream Ṣūfī tradition. What we hope to demonstrate in the 
next section is that it is not only al-Tirmidhī’s notion of sainthood (walāya) that is integrated into 
Sufism in its mature form, but also his vision of religious authority as well. The great mystical 
synthesis of the 5th/11th-century led by al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī fused Baghdād inspired Sufism 
with Malāmatī mysticism along with a gnoseology and saintology developed by al-Tirmidhī. 
This synthesis resulted in a product that imbued the ʿulamāʾ with a special kind of religious 
authority that demanded obedience to them even by the temporal rulers of their time. This was 
the vehicle that helped spread Sufism all over the Muslim world, particularly wherever the Sunnī 
ʿulamāʾ had gone. 
 
Al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī 
 Al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī stood at the crossroads of Islamic civilization. Both of these 
scholars came from the city of Nīshāpūr and lived during the second half of the 10th-century C.E. 
and first part of the 11th-century C.E. Like al-Tirmidhī, they belonged to the patrician class of 
their city, their families were of noble Arab ancestry, and they owned land and engaged in 
scholarly pursuits. Both men traveled in search of knowledge, specifically to study Ḥadīth, and 
both belonged to the Shāfiʿī School of law (madhhab).398 These men were connected by a similar 
culture of Arab identity within a Persian speaking milieu and Arabic textual tradition. They 
could both claim descent to the Arab tribe of Banī Sulaym, thus reinforcing their spiritual 
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fraternity with ties of kinship. After al-Qushayrī’s spiritual master passed away he took al-
Sulamī as his master.399 Both men were well situated to synthesize the various mystical trends 
that had developed in Iraq and greater Khurāsān. The city of Nīshāpūr where they both lived for 
most of their lives was on the Silk Road that passed through northern Iran and Central Asia, 
connecting Iraq to China in the Far East. Al-Sulamī received a khirqa (Ṣūfī cloak) from the 
Shāfiʿī Ṣūfī master, Abū al-Qāsim al-Naṣrābādhī (d. 367/977-8), however, his education was 
entrusted to his maternal grandfather, Abū ʿAmr Ismāʿīl b. Nujayd (d. 366/976-7), who was a 
disciple of Abū ʿUthmān al-Ḥīrī (d. 298/910), one of the important figures in the Malāmatī 
School.400 Al-Sulamī consciously integrates Malāmatī figures into his Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya and he 
even wrote a treatise in which he describes the Malāmatiyya as of a higher spiritual rank than the 
Ṣūfīs.401 In his al-Risāla al-Malāmatiyya al-Sulamī uses the term ‘ṣūfī’ to describe the particular 
movement that originated in al-Junayd’s circle in Baghdād, while in other contexts such as his 
Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, he uses the same term to refer more generally to a mystic of high spiritual 
rank, regardless of school.402 This is significant because it means that al-Sulamī, like al-
Kalābādhi and al-Sarrāj, is using the term ‘ṣūfī’ as a general term for an Islamic mystic and is not 
representing a particular school of mystical thought. Our discussion of Sufism as a meta-
madhhab brings up the question of its relationship to the other indigenous mystical schools 
operative in Nīshāpūr at the time, primarily the Malāmatiyya and the Karrāmiyya. Both Chabbi 
                                                          
399 Ibid. Entre soufisme et savoir islamique, p. 61. 
400 De Jong, F. “Malāmatiyya”. EI2. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. 
Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 27 December 2014 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/mala-matiyya-
COM_0643> 
401 Ibid. Islamic mysticism, pp. 126–127. 
402 In his work Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya al-Sulamī uses the term ‘ṣūfiyya’ to refer to both Baghdādī and Khurāsānī 
mystics, however in his al-Risāla al-Malāmatiyya he refers to the ‘ṣūfiyya’ specifically as the Baghdādiyyūn. See al-
Sulamī’s introduction to his Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya: Muhammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī. Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya. Ed. 
Johannes Pedersen. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1960, p. 5. See also Abū al-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī’s work on the Malāmatiyya: Abū al-
ʿAlā ʿAfīfī. Al-Malāmatīyah wa-al-sūfīyah wa-ahl al-futuwwah. [Cairo]: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī. 1975, p. 112. 
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and Knysh argue that Sufism replaced these indigenous mystical schools. If we view Sufism as 
the result of a mystical synthesis that took place in Nishapur during the 5th-Islamic century (11th-
century C.E.), then we can say that, rather than replacing the Malāmatiyya and the Karrāmiyya, 
Nīshāpūrī Sufism was able to adapt to new contexts while these other schools were not. Rather 
than the Ṣūfīs replacing these groups, we find that the demise of the Karrāmiyya, for example, 
seems to coincide with general holocaust of the Mongol invasions of the 13th- and 14th-centuries 
C.E.403 The Malāmatiyya have been more resilient than the Karramiyya, with offshoots of the 
movement surviving into the Ottoman period, however, traditional Malāmatism in its 
Khurāsānian form is also no longer detectable after the Mongol invasions.404 
 The introduction to al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya uses a style of language and 
terminology that is very close to that used by al-Tirmidhī. Al-Tirmidhī’s ideas are quite unique 
as well as the terms he uses, and given that al-Sulamī was highly acquainted with his writings, it 
is fair to say that he could have taken inspiration for some aspects of his work Ṭabaqāt al-
Ṣūfiyya from al-Tirmidhī. The first biographical dictionary of Muslim ‘mystics’405 is not, in fact, 
al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt, but rather the History of the Shaykhs (Kitāb al-Mashāyikh), no longer 
extant, that is attributed to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and mentioned by al-Hujwīrī in his Kashf al-
                                                          
403 C.E. Bosworth. “Karrāmiyya.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 
15 April 2015 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
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404 Ibid. “Malāmatiyya,” EI2. 
405 It is not clear that mystics are meant by the title mashāyikh, a term that al-Tirmidhī only uses to refer to scholars 
(ʿulamāʾ) and the one reference we find is negative referring to the scholars of outward knowledge who persecuted 
al-Tirmidhī in his city of Tirmidh. It is not clear though that this is the original title that al-Tirmidhī used and among 
Ḥanafīs of al-Hujwīrī’s time period the term mashāyikh referred to ‘authorities’ but not necessarily mystics. 
However, given that almost all of al-Tirmidhī’s works are of a mystical nature and since Hujwīrī mentions that al-
Tirmidhī describes Abū Ḥanīfa as having been one who wore wool in his early days, we might assume that al-
Tirmidhī is using the fact that Abū Ḥanīfa left wearing wool as a sign of his leaving asceticism. Al-Tirmidhī was a 
mystic who consistently attacks asceticism. Also, the context for Hujwīrī’s discussion is a mystical treatise. Even if 




Maḥjūb.406 In al-Sulamī’s introduction we find a statement whose only precedent is in the 
writings of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmdhī. Al-Sulamī writes, wa-atbaʿa al-anbiyāʾ ʿalayhim al-salām bi-l-
awliyāʾ yukhallifūnahum fī sunanihim wa-yaḥmilūna ummatahum ʿalā ṭarīqatihim wa-simatihim, 
“He made the saints follow the prophets, upon whom be peace, and he made them (the saints) 
successors in their ways. They (the saints) guide the community upon their [straight] path and 
their [high] character.”407 In Chapter 1 we discussed how al-Tirmidhī made an important claim 
about religious authority when he said that the saints (awliyāʾ) were the successors (khulafāʾ) of 
the prophets (anbiyāʾ). The awliyāʾ in al-Sulamī’s introduction are those who, yataʾaddab bi-him 
al-murīdūn wa-yaʾtasī bi-him al-muwaḥḥidūn, “…those with whom seekers of God have good 
manners and from whom the ordinary Muslims seek healing.”408 In the same introduction he 
specifically states that the awliyāʾ are the successors (khulafāʾ) of the prophets and messengers, 
fa-hum fī al-umamī khulafāʾ al-anbiyāʾ ʿalayhim al-salām wa-l-rusul ṣalawāt Allāhi ʿalayhim, 
“Among the various nations they are the successors of the prophets and the messenger may the 
blessings of Allāh be upon them.”409 Al-Sulamī goes on to use a specific term that we rarely see 
outside of al-Tirmidhī’s mystical writings. He says, wa-hum arbāb ḥaqāʾiq al-tawḥīd, wa-l-
muḥaddathūn, “They are the masters of the realities of unification and those spoken to by 
God.”410 None of the Ṣūfīs quoted in al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya use the term muḥaddath 
(one spoken to by God). Only one use of the term is found in al-Sulamī’s Qurʾān commentary 
Ḥaqāʾiq al-Tafsīr in a quote by Ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 309/922), one of the Ṣūfīs of Baghdād in the circle 
                                                          
406 ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī. The Kashf al-maḥjūb, the oldest Persian treatise on ṣufism by ʿAlī B. 
ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī. Ed. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson. Leyden [u.a.]: Brill [u.a.]. 1911, p. 46. Al-Sulamī 
uses the term shaykh to describe the Ṣūfī master in the introduction to his Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya. Ibid. Ṭabaqāt al-
Ṣūfiyya, p. 5. 
407 Ibid. Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, p. 4. 
408 Ibid, p. 4. 
409 Ibid, p. 5. 
410 Ibid, p. 5. 
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of al-Junayd. However, in this quote he does not specifically connect the muḥaddath to the saint 
(walī). On the other hand, throughout al-Tirmidhī’s works the awliyāʾ are described as 
muḥaddathūn, just as al-Sulamī describes them in his introduction.411 According to al-Sulamī 
these awliyāʾ are aṣḥāb al-firāsāt al-ṣādiqa, “those who possess true insight”, that is, they have 
special knowledge from God.412 They are an elect group that will be present in the Muslim 
community until the end of time. This is how al-Tirmidhī also describes them in SA, kullamā 
māta minhum rajulun khallafahu ākhirun maqāmahu hattā … atā waqt zawāl al-dunyā, 
“Whenever one of them dies another succeeds him until…the time for the end of the world 
arrives.”413 Al-Sulamī is explicit about the purpose of his Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya. He writes in his 
introduction, fa-aḥbabtu an ajmaʿ fī siyar mutaʾakhkhirī al-awliyāʾ kitāban usammīhī ṭabaqāt al-
ṣūfiyya, “I wanted to make into a book the biographies of the later saints, I call it the generations 
of the Ṣūfīs.”414 Al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt can be seen as an extension of al-Tirmidhī’s basic premise 
that the saints are the true inheritors and successors of the prophets and that they will be present 
in the Muslim community till the end of time. Another assumption in al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt is a 
theological one that al-Tirmidhī clearly makes, which is that the awliyāʾ can, in fact, be known. 
When al-Sulamī lists his generations of Ṣūfīs he is specifying particular individuals as saints. 
Even during al-Sulamī’s time the general agreement among Ḥanafī/Māturīdī and Ashʿarī 
theologians was that a saint (walī) is hidden and that he cannot claim that he is a saint (walī).415  
                                                          
411 For al-Tirmidhī’s description of the types of muḥaddath see NU, p. 118. For al-Tirmidhī’s connecting the awliyāʾ 
with the muḥaddathūn see NU, p. 248. For the same connection also see SA. Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 86. 
412 Ibid. Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, p. 5. 
413 Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 44. 
414 Ibid. Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, p. 5. 
415 According to Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114), one of the foremost Māturīdī theologians, the person who 
claims sainthood (walāya) loses that stature immediately and the saint (walī) who sees a miracle (karāma) proceed 
from himself must assume that it could be a means of God leading him astray and he must try to conceal the miracle. 
Ibid. Tabṣira al-adilla, pp. 536–538. Al-Bāqillānī (d. 403–405/1013) in his book on the miracles of prophets and the 
miracles of saints and their difference from other supernatural phenomena does not bring up the issue of whether a 
walī can openly claim to be a walī or that a walī can know he is a walī. Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī. Kitāb 
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Al-Tirmidhī addresses the question of hiddenness versus visibility of the saint (walī) in 
his SA, fa man saʾala rabbahu al-imāma li-l-muttaqīn hal yakūnu ghāmiḍan,416 “But is that 
person hidden from view who asks his Lord to make him an imām for those who fear God?”417 
Al-Tirmidhī gives the example of the Caliphs Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. He argues that both of these 
Caliphs are considered saints (awliyāʾ) of God and they were clearly not hidden.418 Al-Tirmidhī 
even claims that a saint (walī) can, in fact, know that he is saint (walī).419 Al-Sulamī’s 
introduction to his Ṭabaqāt brings several important ideas together. He appears to use al-
Tirmidhī’s idea that the saints are the real successors (khulafāʾ) to the prophets.420 Then he 
connects the idea of sainthood with the term ṣūfiyya, giving this term wider connotations than 
merely being a reference to a particular mystical school. Finally, he brings under the title of the 
ṣūfiyya a whole range of different mystical movements ranging from the Baghdād Ṣūfīs to the 
Malāmatiyya to the Ḥakīms. Al-Sulamī then uses the literary genre of the biographical dictionary 
as a compelling tool to communicate this synthesis. The content of the biographical sketches that 
al-Sulamī employs are pithy statements that demonstrate the divinely inspired knowledge of 
these exemplars. This also follows al-Tirmidhī’s position that sainthood (walāya) is primarily 
knowledge-based. A saint (walī) is a saint (walī) primarily because he is given special 
knowledge by God. This understanding of sainthood (walāya) differs from previous concepts of 
                                                          
al-bayān ʿan al-farq bayna al-muʿjizāt wa-l-karāmāt wa-l-ḥiyal wa-l-kahāna wa-l-ṣiḥr wa-l-nāranjāt. Ed. Richard 
Joseph McCarthy. Bayrūt: al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya. 1958. Al-Qushayrī mentions in his Risāla that Abū Bakr b. 
Furāk (d. 406/1015), an Ashʿarī theologian in Nīshāpūr was of the opinion that a walī cannot know or claim that he 
is a walī. Ibid. Risāla, p. 270. 
416 Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 60. 
417 Ibid. Concept, p. 129. 
418 Ibid, p. 128. 
419 Ibid, p. 41. 
420 Both al-Tirmidhī and al-Sulamī call the awliyāʾ the khulafāʾ of the anbiyāʾ (prophets), and of the the Prophet 
Muḥammad in particular by al-Tirmidhī. If they had called the awliya khulafāʾ Allāh they would have indicated a 
more general khilāfa (vicegerancy) of the human race as God’s vicegearants on earth. 
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walāya that saw the saints (awliyāʾ) as distinguished primarily by their ability to perform 
miracles (karāmāt).421  
 Al-Qushayrī is the first Ṣūfī writer to include a chapter on walāya in his epistle on 
taṣawwuf (Sufism). Al-Qushayrī builds upon al-Sulamī’s basic framework, incorporating a more 
concise version of al-Sulamīs Ṭabaqāt at the beginning of his handbook on Sufism. Al-Sulamī 
clearly set a pattern that was then adopted by later Ṣūfīs such as ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī in his own 
Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038) in his Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ, Farīd al-Dīn 
al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 627/1230) in his Tadhkirat al-Awliyāʾ and al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492) in his Nafaḥāt al-
Uns. Like al-Tirmidhī and al-Sulamī, al-Qushayrī accedes to the possibility that a saint (walī) can 
know he is a saint (walī) without this detracting from his reverence for God.422 Yet, what 
distinguishes al-Qushayrī’s contribution most is that he formalized the relationship between 
master (shaykh) and disciple (murīd). We can see this formalization as a logical progression of 
the concept of the successorship (khilāfa) of the Prophet initiated by al-Tirmidhī and normalized 
by al-Sulamī. In al-Qushayrī’s advice (waṣiyya) to aspirants to the path (murīdūn) he writes: 
Wa-lam yakun ʿaṣrun min al-aʿṣār fī muddat al-islām illā wa-fīhi 
shaykhun min shuyūkh hādhihi al-ṭāʾifa mimman lahu ʿulūm al-
tawḥīd wa-imāmat al-qawm illā wa-aʾimmatu dhālika al-waqt min 
al-ʿulamāʾ istaslamū lidhālika al-shaykh wa-tawāḍaʿū lahu wa-
tabarrakū bihi wa-lawlā maziyyatun wa-khuṣūṣiyyatun lahum wa-
illā kāna al-amru bi-l-ʿaks.423 
 
There has never been an age in the history of Islam without a 
master of this community who was proficient in the science of the 
oneness [of God]. There has never been a leader of the Ṣūfīs to 
whom the greatest scholars of his epoch would not subordinate 
themselves and pay obeisance and seek blessings of. Had 
                                                          
421 The primary discussion of walāya in books of creed and theological treatises up to al-Tirmidhī, was concerned 
with distinguishing between the miracles (karāmāt) of saints and the miracles (muʿjizāt) of prophets. 
422 Ibid. Risāla, p. 270. 




distinction and special qualities not belonged to them, this would 
not have been so.424 
 
We can see from this quote that the term ‘ṣūfiyya’ here cannot be a reference to the particular 
school of mysticism that originated in Baghdād around the circle of al-Junayd, but rather is used 
as a synonym for awliyāʾ (saints). The conflation of ‘ṣūfiyya’ with ‘awliyāʾ’ is an idea that al-
Qushayrī appears to have taken from al-Sulamī. According to al-Qushayrī, the ‘ṣūfiyya’ had been 
present in the Muslim community since its inception. They came from the scholarly class of 
ʿulamāʾ. Taṣawwuf was considered a ‘science’ (ʿilm) from among the sciences (ʿulūm) of Islamic 
learning and for al-Qushayrī, it represented the highest science. 
 Both al-Qushayrī and al-Sulamī use the same freedom/bondage dichotomy to talk about 
the Ṣūfiyya/awliyāʾ that we have found in al-Tirmidhī’s terminology in Chapter 1. Al-Sulamī 
calls the Malāmatiyya aḥrār (the free ones) and they are equivalent to the highest degree of 
awliyāʾ in his mystical hierarchy.425 Al-Qushayrī devotes a section in his Risāla to the aḥrār (the 
free ones), indicating that freedom (hurriyya) is a quality of the highest of the awliyāʾ.426 This 
structure is consistent with al-Tirmidhī framework, in which we see that slavehood (riqq) applies 
to all Muslims except the slave (mukātab) who has paid off the last dinār that he owes to his 
master.427 Those who have attained their freedom from their master, i.e., God, become the true 
rulers of the world and the temporal rulers (salāṭīn) have no power over them. Al-Qushayrī 
writes, al-ḥurriyya an lā yakūn al-ʿabd taḥt riqq al-makhlūqāt wa lā yajrī ʿalayhi sulṭān al-
mukawwanāt,428 “Freedom means that the servant of God does not allow himself to become 
enslaved by [other] creatures, nor is he subject to the power (sulṭān) of originated things 
                                                          
424 Ibid. Risāla, p. 404. 
425 Ibid. Al-Malāmatiyya, p. 115. 
426 Ibid. Risāla, p. 229. 
427 Ibid, p. 231. 
428 Ibid. Al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya, p. 253. 
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(mukawwanāt).”429 While it was al-Tirmidhī who first used the structure of walāʾ (clientage) to 
describe the awliyāʾ, he did not include the concept of lineage (sanad) that was also a central 
aspect to Arab claims of superiority over non-Arab Persians. With al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī, 
not only do we find the motif of clientage but we also find the ideal of lineage (sanad) as a 
further buttress to the claims of authority by the Ṣūfīs who, in their eyes, represented the saints 
(awliyāʾ). 
 Al-Qushayrī extends this paradigm first inaugurated by al-Tirmidhī and later developed 
by al-Sulamī.430 His Risāla functions to generate a transformation of authority in which the 
awliyāʾ are the true rulers of the world. This authority then transfers to a new social milieu in 
which the shaykh and his disciples (murīdūn) represent a microcosm of the Islamic community 
ruled by the awliyāʾ. The shaykh is the walī and his disciples are the mukātabūn (freed slaves 
who owe allegiance to their free master). With al-Qushayrī, the Ṣūfī shaykh is to be treated as the 
successor to the Prophet (khalīfa) and one of the free ones (aḥrār) who are among the highest of 
the awliyāʾ. A central aspect of this microcosm is the pact (bayʿa) between the disciple (murīd) 
and his master (shaykh).431 This pact (bayʿa) resembles the pact that Muslims traditionally made 
with the Caliph of the Prophet establishing his authority over them. The pact between master 
(shaykh) and disciple (murīd) demands complete obedience to the will of the master (shaykh). To 
contravene this pact is akin to apostasy (ridda) in a virtual sense.432 Al-Qushayrī defends the Ṣūfī 
                                                          
429 Ibid. Risāla, p. 230. 
430 Al-Sulamī wrote a treatise on the manners (adab) of a disciple (murīd) with his master (shaykh) and he links this 
adab with the adab an ordinary Muslim should have with the saints (awliyāʾ). Chiabotti claims that al-Sulamī 
introduces the idea that the disciple (murīd) should not question his master and al-Qushayrī builds upon this thesis.  
Ibid. Entre soufisme et savoir islamique, pp. 621–622.  
431 Ibid. Risāla, p. 407. Also see a discussion of the importance of the pact (bayʿa) in al-Qushayrī’s vision of Sufism 
in Chiabotti’s dissertation. Chiabotti also claims that respect for the shaykh is at the center of al-Qushayrī’s 
narrative. Ibid. Entre soufisme et savoir islamique, p. 622. 
432 Ibid. Risāla, p. 415. 
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practice of samāʿ (audition) and the use of musical instruments.433 The Ṣūfī gathering (majlis) in 
al-Qushayrī’s Risāla is akin to a caliphal court with the Caliph presiding over the entertainment 
of his guests. This differed markedly from the gathering (majlis) of the Baghdād Ṣūfīs, which 
resembled the salon more than a kingly court. The virtual power of the awliyāʾ that al-Tirmidhī 
assigns to an ambiguous and amorphous group of elite (khawāṣṣ) exemplars is narrowed by al-
Sulamī to a select group of representative individuals in his Ṭabaqāt and then narrowed further 
by al-Qushayrī to idealize the position of the spiritual master (shaykh). The basic structure in this 
progression from al-Tirmidhī to al-Sulamī to al-Qushayrī remains the same, in which the 
master/slave and Caliph/subject dichotomy is transferred to a new social space that mediates and 
negotiates ties of allegiance between master (shaykh) and disciple (murīd). Francesco Chiabotti 
claims that al-Qushayrī is speaking to masters (shuyūkh) just as much as he is speaking to 
disciples (murīdūn) and some of his texts can be construed as a template by which these masters 
can consecrate their authority. Since knowledge and application of the sacred law (Sharīʿa) was 
the first rung in this spiritual hierarchy for all of these figures, it meant that the Sunnī ʿulamāʾ, 
wherever they were in the Muslim world, could potentially aspire to this new status of Ṣūfī and 
saint (walī). This can go far in explaining why Sufism spread so far and so quickly from a 
limited geographical space to the far reaches of the Muslim world in only a couple of hundred 
years. It is significant to note that Sufism did not spread to the entire Muslim world from 
Baghdād, but from Nīshāpūr, because it was in Nīshāpūr that Sufism reached its maturity. Al-
Sulamī and al-Qushayrī used al-Tirmidhī’s basic framework to present the ʿulamāʾ as the new 
Caliphs of the umma through the new institution of Sufism. Muslim scholars from around the 
Muslim world adopted this new framework almost en masse. 
                                                          




Al-Tirmidhī was not a Ṣūfī in the restricted sense of the word since he was not acquainted 
with the Baghdād Ṣūfīs of whom al-Junayd was their leader. However, if we look at Sufism in 
the broader sense and as a product of the great mystical synthesis of the 5th/11th-century in 
Nīshāpūr, we can quite easily consider him to be one of the leading theorists of that synthesis. 
When we look at al-Tirmidhī’s contemporaries and Muslim mystics prior to al-Sulamī and al-
Qushayrī we find that sainthood (walāya) was a concept that was used, but did not occupy the 
place of central importance that it played in al-Tirmidhī’s writings or in the writings of al-Sulamī 
and al-Qushayrī. When al-Tirmidhī connected sainthood (walāya) to religious authority he 
created an alternative paradigm of authority that rivaled not only the Shīʿī imams and the 
temporal Abbasid Caliph and his sultans, but also the Sunnī scholarly class (ʿulamāʾ) of his time. 
However, since the awliyāʾ ultimately came from the ranks of the ʿulamāʾ, his concept of walāya 
had the effect of sanctifying the entire class of Sunnī scholars. The Ṣūfīs of Baghdād tended to be 
more collegial in their relationships with one another. Their gatherings were more akin to salons 
in which a small group of elite mystics would gather to discourse on mystical topics. It is al-
Sulamī who combines the prestige of Baghdād Sufism with the authority structures of eastern 
mysticism, particularly the Malāmatīs. Al-Tirmidhī’s concept of walāya was instrumental in 
allowing a new form of mysticism to emerge, a form of mysticism that we call Sufism today. 
This was the great mystical synthesis of the 5th/11th-century in Khurāsān. The elite and inward 
looking phenomenon of Baghdād Sufism came to represent the outward face of a mystical 
system that was wholly Khurāsānian. Al-Qushayrī took the basic template provided by al-Sulamī 
and formalized it in his master/student paradigm. If al-Hujwīrī of Ghazna was correct in stating 
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Al-Tirmidhī’s Gnoseology of Sainthood 
This chapter focuses on how various aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s 
doctrine of sainthood address problematic elements within Islamic 
social and religious spheres. After providing some historical and 
theoretical context we will discuss the light-basis of al-Tirmidhī’s 
gnoseology and how it sets the basis for a more egalitarian approach 
to sainthood. The social consequences of an unrestricted access to 
sainthood must have been apparent to al-Tirmidhī who then restricts 
sainthood by providing the requirement of outward religious 
knowledge. Another very important aspect of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine 
is the sealer of saints. After addressing some ambiguities concerning 
this concept, I will show how the sealer of saints has important 
implications for creating a more optimistic outlook toward the 
trajectory of human destiny. This is an optimism preserved in 
Sufism as a counterweight to more Traditionalist views. Finally, we 
will discuss how al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine works to create a ‘third 
space’ that fragments religious authority in Islam to create a 
religious ‘civic space’. 
 
 Thus far we have shown how al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood did not appear out of a 
vacuum, nor was it on the fringe of the Islamic mystical tradition. Important social and political 
factors were at play in motivating al-Tirmidhī to propose a new approach to Islamic sainthood. 
The category of sainthood had already existed in al-Tirmidhī’s Ḥanafī theological milieu and al-
Tirmidhī readily appropriated Hellenistic mystical/philosophical speculation to create a 
theoretical frame for his focus on sainthood (walāya), which was inspired by Qurʾān and Ḥadīth 
literature. The complex synthesis of these disparate elements is what immediately comes to the 
fore. Al-Tirmidhī’s milieu in Transoxania was clearly one of vibrant intellectual exchange. 
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While we have looked at the various discourses that informed al-Tirmidhī’s thought, we have not 
yet looked deeply into the internal structure of his thought. This will be important in tracing al-
Tirmidhī’s legacy as he was internalized and interpreted by the later Islamic mystical tradition. 
We will be focusing on the legacy of al-Tirmidhī’s thought in Chapter 6 by addressing the deep 
debt Ibn ʿArabī owes to al-Tirmidhī as well as the ḥikma tradition adopted by the masters of the 
Shādhilī Ṣūfī Ṭarīqa that has survived through today.  
 
Sainthood in the Homilies of Isaac of Nineveh 
 In Chapter 2 we discussed the use of wisdom (ḥikma) in the work of Isaac of Nineveh. As 
we stated earlier, Isaac of Nineveh provides a useful point of reference for our study of early 
Islamic mysticism. Even more so than wisdom, the saints play a major role in Isaac’s teaching. 
We have talked about how the use of the term saint (walī) indicates a particular set of 
associations and meanings as a result of its derivation from the Arabic root w-l-y. Isaac wrote in 
Syriac and the word he used for ‘saint’ ܫܝܕܩ (qadīsh) is derived from the Semitic root q-d-s. This 
word in Syriac does not leverage the connotations of protection and power that we find with the 
root w-l-y in Arabic. The word ܫܝܕܩ (qadīsh) means “holy one” and connotes that which is sacred 
and pure, also indicating virginity and celibacy.434 This is consistent with the way Isaac used this 
term in his Homilies. For Isaac, the saint is idealized as the celibate monk who becomes pure 
through his ascetic piety.435 The saint is someone who suffers in this life but overcomes his 
suffering through contemplation and prayer.436 He is someone close to God who wanders in the 
wilderness and the desert by treading the path of asceticism to make the way easier for those who 
                                                          
434 Payne Smith, R., and Jessie Payne Smith Margoliouth. A compendious Syriac dictionary, founded upon the 
thesaurus syriacus of R. Payne Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1957, pp. 489–490. 
435 Ibid. Mystic Treatises, p. 369. 
436 Ibid, pp. 279, 284. 
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come after.437 Saints, according to Isaac, gaze upon God without a veil and have miracles.438 
People in positions of authority seek them out for their blessing.439 For Isaac, the saint is holy 
and reaches his sainthood through his ascetic practice and not primarily through knowledge. The 
saint is juxtaposed with the theologian and the judge.440 Isaac of Nineveh’s description of the 
saints closely follows Peter Brown’s formulation of the saint as a ‘friend of God’ and as an 
intercessor.441 However, the saint of late antique Christianity is primarily a saint who is 
immortalized in death and whose body and grave become loci where heaven and earth meet.442 
The veneration of the saints shifted the center of devotion from the pagan temple at the center of 
the late-antique city to the cemeteries that lay on the edge of the city where great mausoleums 
and monuments marked the redefined landscape.443 The Desert Fathers inspired a new vision of 
sainthood tied closely to asceticism and this ideal gave rise to important monastic institutions 
that sought to capture this vision. The ideal Christian saint in the Near East just before the rise of 
Islam was someone who lived the life of an ascetic and hermit, but in death was celebrated as a 
powerful connection between Heaven and Earth.  
 
Sainthood in the 9th-Century C.E. 
 Goldziher was the first orientalist to provide a critical evaluation of sainthood in Islam. 
His essay, “Veneration of Saints in Islam,” attempts to show how the ‘pure’ theology of Islam 
was forced to negotiate and therefore accede space to the cult of saints that was socially and 
                                                          
437 Ibid, pp. 220, 281, 372. 
438 Ibid, pp. 282, 286. 
439 Ibid, p. 206. 
440 Ibid, p. 206. 
441 Peter Brown. The cult of the saints: its rise and function in Latin Christianity. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1981, p. 6. 
442 Ibid, pp. 4–7. 
443 Ibid, p. 8. 
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culturally embedded in the regions that the Arabs had conquered. Goldziher sees the early 
Qurʾānic message as portraying a God that is so different and distant from humanity that 
Muslims needed mediators to bridge the “insurmountable barrier that divides an infinite and 
unapproachable Godhead from weak and finite humanity.” For Goldziher, grave visitation, 
relics, the healing powers of places visited by a saint and saintly miracles are all examples of pre-
Islamic cultural practices that Muslim theologians found impossible to reject. What we have 
demonstrated thus far, however, is that early Islamic sainthood (walāya) was almost exclusively 
concerned with living saints and not dead saints. The cult of Muslim saints is a later development 
and is not directly associated with the writings of the early Ṣūfīs.444 As we showed in Chapter 1, 
some early Islamic notions of walāya reflect the structure of social institutions that grew out of 
the Arab/Islamic conquests and the negotiation of power and authority between Arabs and non-
Arabs. Goldziher’s observations are important but do not relate directly to this study, which is 
concerned primarily with the theoretical and cosmological aspects of sainthood, that is, walāya 
as a concept and doctrine. 
 Yet, still important to our discussion of walāya is the level to which the walī Allāh is 
indebted to the ‘holy man’ of Late Antiquity. This will give us a point of departure to then 
discuss the different types of saint (walī) in 9th-century C.E. Iraq and Khurāsān. Despite the 
many continuities between Islam and its Christian and Jewish context in Late Antiquity, those 
who study prophetology in Islam and Judaism view Islam as a movement that was to some extent 
sui generis with respect to Jewish prophetic antecedents.445 Islam set the stage for a new 
                                                          
444 Christopher Taylor identifies the first reference to a Muslim grave visitation (ziyāra) guide as referencing the 
visitation guide of al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Faḍḍal al-Taymī al-Kūfī who died in 838/839 C.E. However, the first guides 
that we possess more than a passing reference to, date to somewhere around the end of the 10th-century C.E. 
Christopher Schurman Taylor. In the vicinity of the righteous: ziyāra and the veneration of Muslim saints in late 
medieval Egypt. Leiden: Brill. 1998, p. 5. 
445 Chase Robinson. “Prophecy and Holy Men in Early Islam,” in The cult of saints in late antiquity and the Middle 
Ages: essays on the contribution of Peter Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999, p. 242. 
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paradigm of activist piety in which the holy man was not only the one who healed the sick, 
exorcized demons and made barren women fertile, but one who came with an army to conquer 
cities.446 The source material for this early period aside from the Qurʾānic text does not provide 
more than a glimpse into the dynamic of prophecy and, by extension, sainthood. According to 
Jaakko Hämeen-Antila there were two types of prophecy in early 7th-century C.E. Arabia. There 
were Arabian prophets modeled after their Biblical counterparts and kuhhān or soothsayers who 
played an intermediary role between human beings and the divine through fortune-telling, 
clairvoyance and haruspicy. The continuum between prophet and kāhin seems to have been fluid 
in the pre-Islamic period in Arabia.447 Nevertheless, by the 9th-century C.E., both prophecy and 
soothsaying were no longer viable options within mainstream Muslim society. The idea of 
continuous prophetic revelation after the death of the Prophet was no longer accepted by either 
Sunnīs or Twelver Shīʿīs by the end of the 9th-century C.E.448 If Islam represents a break with the 
past with respect to prophetic types and if a distinctly Arabian prophecy was no longer operative 
by the 9th-century C.E., we can assume that Muslim sainthood was the product of 
transformations that occurred within Islam as well as through negotiated interactions with other 
religious traditions living under Muslim rule. 
 Early concepts of walāya were wedded to political meanings.449 It was the Shīʿīs who 
first developed this term and made it the cornerstone of their doctrine of the Imamate. Early Shīʿī 
                                                          
446 Ibid, p. 243. 
447 Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila Nissinen. “Arabian Prophecy,” in Prophecy in its ancient Near Eastern context: 
Mesopotamian, biblical, and Arabian perspectives. Martti Nissinen, editor. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. 
2000.  
448 Among proto-Sunnī theologians the Prophet Muhammad was seen as the last prophet and among Imāmī Twelver 
Shīʿīs the minor occultation had taken place later to be replaced by the greater occultation sealing prophecy until the 
return of the awaited Mahdī. The idea of continual prophecy did not completely die out though, but continued with 
the Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs and other groups such as the Aḥmadiyya. For more on the Aḥmadiyya and the continuation of 
prophecy in Islam see Prophecy Continuous by Yohanan Friedmann. 
449 Abū ʿAlā ʿAfīfī. Al-Taṣawwuf, al-thawra al-rūhīyya fī al-Islām. Al-Iskandarīyah: Dār al-Maʿārif. 1963, p. 291. 
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ascetics450 were some of the first to discuss the relative importance of saints (awliyāʾ) and 
prophets (anbiyāʾ), giving preference to the awliyāʾ over the anbiyāʾ.451 Following them in this 
were two ascetics from Syria, Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī (d. 215/830) and Aḥmad b. Abī al-
Ḥawārī (d. 230/845 or 246/860), who also both considered the awliyāʾ to rank above the anbiyāʾ. 
The Muʿtazilīs of this same period formed an opposing position denying the existence of walāya 
altogether.452 The political nature of the divide is clearly apparent with those disenfranchised 
groups such as the Shīʿīs and early ascetics developing a competing regime of authority in 
opposition to the dominant power structure. Muʿtazilī theology was the first orthodoxy in Islam 
to extend beyond a single locale and came to be associated with an entrenched religious 
aristocratic class.453 While Shīʿīs were opposing the political structure of the Caliphate, early 
ascetics opposed the ‘corruption’ of true religious practice among Traditionists.454 It is apparent 
that the concept of walāya in both of these early groups became a doctrine that voiced opposition 
to a reification of authority both politically and religiously.  
 The veneration of holy individuals was common amongst several other major movements 
during this period. Traditionists, for example, were known for demonstrations of their dedication 
to the Prophet through relics, as when Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal is said to have requested that he be 
buried with three hairs of the Prophet, one upon each eye and one on his mouth. Demonstrations 
                                                          
450 For example, Kulayb and Riyā from Kūfa were among the early Shīʿī ascetics.  
451 Ibid, p. 304. 
452 Ibid, p. 305. 
453 The Miḥna was a process by which the Abbasid state sought to create uniformity in its judicial system. The 
miḥna (the test scholars were given before allowing them to become judges or provide testimony in court) was a 
method for examining scholars who sought appointments to judgeships. By making Muʿtazilī doctrine a key to 
acquiring a position in the judicial system, the Abbasid Caliphate was creating an entrenched group of religious 
notables (aʿyān) which was only supplanted with the arrival of the Seljuqs in the 11th century. Ibid. “Miḥna,” EI2.  
454 Fudayl b. ʿIyāḍ (d. 188/803) represents a trend of would-be ḥadīth scholars who became disillusioned with the 
profession of Ḥadīth science and withdraw from the ranks of the professional men of religion. Here we can see the 
early development of an identity that contrasts to the identity of the ʿulamāʾ as an identity that is nonconformist and 
anti-establishment. Ibid. Islamic mysticism a short history, p. 24. 
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of devotion at his grave were described as so ardent that the cemetery had to be protected by civil 
authorities. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s grave was one of the most visited gravesites in Baghdād after his 
death.455 A similar type of devotion is recorded among certain Khārijīs who would not go to war 
against the Umayyad troops until they had cut their hair at the tomb of Ṣāliḥ b. Musarriḥ (d. 
78/697) who was a Khārijī who had rebelled in Northern Mesopotamia around 695 C.E.456 These 
examples of veneration at the tombs of holy men are but one facet of the social and cultural 
practices that were later integrated into Islamic forms of saint veneration. Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 
281/894), a Traditionist and zāhid (renunciant), provides us with a useful point of reference on 
the topic of sainthood (walāya) at the end of the 3rd/9th-century. Ibn Abī al-Dunyā was a 
contemporary of al-Junayd and al-Tirmidhī and was a tutor to several Abbasid Caliphs.457 His 
book al-Awliyāʾ or The Saints is a collection of Ḥadīth, quotes from important ascetics/mystics 
and stories about the saints (awliyāʾ). In Ibn Abī al-Dunyā’s book the ideal saint (walī) is the 
ascetic worshiper (zāhid ʿābid). They are worshippers (ʿubbād) who are clothed in awe 
(khushūʿ), lowliness (dhull), fear (khawf) and God-consciousness (taqwā).458 Ibn Abī al-Dunyā’s 
work seems to consciously disassociate the awliyāʾ from having any worldly or temporal power. 
In a quote ascribed anonymously to a “man from Banī Hāshim” he writes: 
Lā yanbaghī li-awliyāʾ Allāh min ahli dār al-khulūd al-ladhīna 
lahā saʿyuhum wa-fīhā raghbatuhum an yakūna awliyāʾ al-sulṭān 
min ahli dār al-ghurūr al-ladhīna lahā saʿyuhum wa-fīhā 
raghbatuhum hum ashaddu tabāruzan wa ashaddu taʿāṭufan li-
                                                          
455 Henri Laoust. “Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. University Of Michigan-
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458 ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad Ibn Abī al-Dunyā. Al-Awliyāʾ. Ed. Abū Hājir Muḥammad al-Saʿīd b. Basyūnī Zaghlūl. 
Bayrūt: Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfīyya. 1993, p. 48.  
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ansābihim wa-akhlāqihim wa-umūrihim min awliyāʾ Allāh fī 
rabbihim wa-fī dīnihim.459 
 
The saints (awliyāʾ) of Allāh from the people of the Everlasting 
Abode, whose striving is for that and whose desire is wholly for 
that, should not let the supporters (awliyāʾ) of the Caliph from the 
people of the Deceitful Abode, whose striving is for that and 
whose desire is for that, be more competitive and more covetous 
for their ancestry and their manners and their affairs than the saints 
(awliyāʾ) of God are for their Lord and their religion. 
 
This quote clearly restricts the saints to an otherworldly status and juxtaposes them to the 
supporters (awliyāʾ) of the Caliph who are engaged in worldly endeavors. In other words, there 
are only two options for the awliyāʾ, either to be God’s saints, in which case they should be 
otherworldly, or to be outward supporters (awliyāʾ) of the Caliph. We can contrast this to al-
Tirmidhī’s strident claims that the awliyāʾ were, in fact, the true Caliphs themselves and that the 
Abbasids had lost any right they may have had to the title. It is clear that by the end of the 3rd/9th-
century the awliyāʾ were a topic of discussion and it was not only the Ṣūfīs who were talking 
about the awliyāʾ. Ascetics and people of the court like Ibn Abī al-Dunyā were intent on defining 
who the awliyāʾ were. The fact that the Ṭāhirids and Samānids were relatively autonomous from 
the control and supervision of Baghdād may have given al-Tirmidhī the space to write freely on 
this topic without fear of retribution from the Abbasid authorities. Al-Tirmidhī’s major 
contribution to the concept of walāya was to combine the awliyāʾ and all of this word’s 
associations with power and authority to a gnoseology that imbued these saints (awliyāʾ) with 
knowledge directly from God. We know from Foucault that power and knowledge are 
inextricably linked, and when al-Tirmidhī weds these two concepts, he unleashes new 
possibilities to envision and recreate Islamic authority. We will now look at the structure of al-
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Tirmidhī’s concept of walāya and what its implications are for the trajectory of Islamic thought 
and religious culture.  
 
The Light-basis of al-Tirmidhī’s Doctrine of Walāya 
 As we have seen up to this point in the work of Isaac of Nineveh, as well as saintly and 
holy figures in various early Islamic communities from the Traditionists (Ahl al-Ḥadīth) to the 
Khārijīs, it is clear that sainthood was an element of a shared koine (or we can say ‘floating 
motif’) in the Near East during the first three centuries of Islam. The topic of saints was 
discussed in early Ḥanafī theological texts primarily to differentiate between prophets and saints 
with respect to miracles and their relative superiority. The episteme that characterizes this period 
is one that includes not only the knowledge categories of theology (Kalām) and tradition 
(Ḥadīth), but beginning in the 8th-century C.E. we also find the knowledge category of light (nūr) 
come into formal use among Muslim intellectuals. The idea of knowledge as light was developed 
by the early Shīʿīs in their formulation of the doctrine of the Imamate but became widespread 
among both Sunnī and Shīʿī circles in the 9th- and 10th-centuries C.E. and was developed in detail 
by al-Tirmidhī.460 Knowledge as Kalām was formalized by the Muʿtazilī theologians. This 
knowledge type was rejected by al-Tirmidhī as we mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. The idea of 
belief (īmān) construed as light (nūr) was something already developed within Ḥanafī 
theological circles before al-Tirmidhī. Al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī in his al-Sawād al-Aʿẓam 
describes belief (īmān) as light (nūr) contrasting it to disbelief (kufr), which he calls darkness 
(ẓulm).461  According to al-Samarqandī and general Ḥanafī creed, belief (īmān) is also a 
                                                          
460 Ibid. Knowledge triumphant, p. 151. Early ‘proto-Sunnī’ scholars like Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795) are also quoted 
as considering knowledge to be light. We can view the ‘knowledge as light’ motif as a possible reaction to the 
‘knowledge as tradition’ motif of the Ḥadīth scholars.  
461 Ibid. al-Sawād al-aʿẓam, fol. 77. 
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knowledge (maʿrifa) in the heart and affirmation (iqrār) by the tongue.462 In al-Samarqandī’s 
definition the Ḥanafī creed, belief is explained as the combination of four created ‘actions’ 
(afʿāl) from the believer and four uncreated ‘attributes’ (ṣifāt) from God. When these eight 
elements combine in the heart, the result is true belief.463 Belief is seen as a confluence of 
uncreated attributes (ṣifāt) from God and created actions (afʿāl) from the believer (muʾmin) that 
meet but never exactly touch in a motif reminiscent of the Qurʾānic analogy of the meeting of the 
two seas between which there is an interstice (barzakh).464 We can compare this to al-Tirmidhī’s 
approach to belief as a knowledge and created light that mingles and meets God’s attribute of 
light as it appears in the heart of the believer (muʾmin).465 This formulation for the mechanism of 
belief in the Ḥanafī theological tradition made it very easy for al-Tirmidhī to introduce an 
alternative definition of ‘light-knowledge’ and to make it central to his discussion on sainthood 
(walāya). For al-Tirmidhī, the saint (walī) is the mature believer (al-muʾmin al-bāligh).466 The 
saint (walī) knows God and has certainty (yaqīn) of him through the shining of God’s light in the 
saint’s heart. This light is able to shine upon the nafs (lower self) where it is tamed and settles in 
                                                          
462 Ibid, fol. 22. 
463 Ibid, fol. 20. The four uncreated ‘attributes’ (ṣifāt) from God are guidance (hidāya), giving the guidance (iʿṭāʾ), 
holding firm (al-tamassuk) to the guidance, and acceptance (qabūl) of the guidance. The four elements from the 
believer are seeing (ruʾyā) the guidance, accepting (qabūl) the gift of guidance, ignoring or forgetting the hold upon 
guidance (jahl al-tamassuk ʿalā al-hudā), and beseeching God (al-taḍarruʿ) to accept the guidance. 
464 The Qurʾānic verses indicating this motif are found in Chapter 55 (al-Raḥmān), verses 19–20: maraj al-baḥrayni 
yaltaqiyān baynahumā barzakhun lā yabghiyān, He released the two seas meeting; between which is an interstice 
that is not crossed.  
465 Al-Tirmidhī describes this effect using the function of sight and its ability to distinguish color. He describes sight 
as a merging or confluence of light (ḍawʾ) from outside (khārij) the human being as meeting the light (nūr) of vision 
within the eye, however these two lights meet but do not mix (lā yajtamiʿān). Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, p. 240. Al-
Tirmidhī also writes that aid (ʿawn) from Allāh is a light (nūr) that is cast up on the heart and gives light to belief 
(īmān). Ibid, vol. 5, p. 174. Also, al-Tirmidhī describes tawḥīd as belief, which is nūr Allāh fī qalbihi, the light of 
God in his heart. Ibid. vol. 5, p. 119. Al-Tirmidhī talks about two levels of light in the heart. He says that when God 
chooses belief for a person God puts a light (nūr) in his heart and through this light guides the servant to God’s light. 
The true light of God (al-nūr al-aʿẓam) is the light of the inward (bāṭin) and the light of the outward (ẓāhir) is the 
light of protection (wiqāya) that covers this light. When someone sins a major sin then the protective outward light 
leaves the inward light unprotected, but this outward light returns when one returns to obedience. Ibid, vol. 4, pp. 
90–91. 
466 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 159. 
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the ‘earth’ of the bowels; then the spirit (rūh) ascends to the “heavens” of the brain. When the 
nafs (lower self) and the rūḥ (spirit) return to their origins, God’s light is able to shine forth in an 
unaltered and unobscured fashion467 and when this happens the believer is perfected and 
becomes a walī. According to al-Tirmidhī, this can only happen by God’s grace, although God’s 
grace usually reaches only those who strive vigorously to master their lower selves. The 
important point here, however, is that this light (nūr) cannot be quantified or objectively 
measured against an external criterion. If true knowledge/belief is, in fact, light (nūr) then 
theoretically anybody could claim to possess sainthood (walāya). The social consequences of 
such a proposition must have been obvious to al-Tirmidhī who, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, 
was a landed patrician. Al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology had to be limited in some way to protect 
against its anarchic possibilities. 
 
Restricting Sainthood 
Al-Tirmidhī was not a revolutionary and he built into his concept of sainthood (walāya) 
several mechanisms to balance the claims he was making about the light-knowledge of the saints 
(awliyāʾ). One mechanism al-Tirmidhī used to limit the chaotic potential of light-knowledge was 
to set a standard by which this knowledge could be gauged. Al-Tirmidhī accomplishes this to 
some degree in his SA by posing a series of questions that a would-be saint should answer were 
he to claim sainthood (walāya). These questions were meant to be extremely challenging and 
even their number, one hundred and fifty, was daunting. There are questions such as, “What are 
the decrees of divine predestination?” and “What has every messenger received as his allotment 
from his Lord?”468 These questions come under the rubric of what al-Tirmidhī calls ḥikmat al-
                                                          
467 It is not obscured by the smoke generated from the fire of the desires of the lower self (nafs). 
468 Ibid. Concept, pp. 72–86. 
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ḥikma or al-ḥikmat al-ʿulyā (the wisdom of wisdom, or the highest wisdom). This type of 
wisdom includes knowledge of the letters (ḥurūf), of the primordial covenant (mīthāq), of God’s 
divine gifts (ālāʾ) and of God’s preordainments (maqādīr).469 The second constraint al-Tirmidhī 
places on access to sainthood (walāya) is to restrict them to the scholarly class. It would seem 
counter-intuitive that al-Tirmidhī would make such a restriction given his fierce criticism of the 
scholars (ʿulamāʾ) of his time. However, we have to remember that al-Tirmidhī himself came 
from this class of religious scholars and saw himself as a reformer of that class. He was not 
trying to replace the scholarly class (ʿulamāʾ), but was seeking to reform it. In al-Tirmidhī’s 
Kitāb Bayān al-ʿIlm he expounds upon his tripartite division of scholars who are the ʿulamāʾ, 
ḥukamāʾ and kubarāʾ. As mentioned previously the term kubarāʾ is another term al-Tirmidhī 
uses for awliyāʾ.470 For al-Tirmidhī, however, these are not separate categories, but are nested 
one within the other. The largest category is al-ʿulamāʾ bi-aḥkām Allāh (the scholars of God’s 
rulings) and these are the scholars of outward (ẓāhir) knowledge. Within this category there is a 
smaller group of scholars of outward knowledge that al-Tirmidhī calls the ḥukamāʾ (sages). 
These he terms al-ʿulamāʾ bi-amr Allāh (the scholars of God’s command) and they are 
knowledgeable about God’s orchestration of affairs in the world or his tadbīr (planning) of 
affairs. Note that these are also called ʿulamāʾ (scholars). The final group, which is a smaller 
group among the ḥukamāʾ (sages) are the kubarāʾ (great ones) and these are called al-ʿulamāʾ bi-
Allāh (the scholars through/by God) and this group contains the knowledge of the previous two 
groups but are also purified inwardly and are God’s true saints. Al-Tirmidhī writes in Kitāb 
Bayān al-ʿIlm:  
                                                          
469 Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 48. 
470 Al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. Kitāb bayān al-ʿilm. in the Ankara Ms. Ismail Saib, I, 1571, fol. 20b. Al-
Tirmidhī writes, fa-ulāʾika (al-kubarāʾ) khulafāʾ Allāh ʿalā ʿibādihi wa-awliyāʾihi fī arḍihi, And those (the kubarāʾ) 
are the Caliphs of God over his servants and his saints in his earth. 
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…al-kubarāʾ hum al-ladhīna jamaʿū hādhihi al-ʿulūm kullahā fa-
ʿalimū al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām wa-fahimū tadbīrahu ʿanhu fī taḥlīlihi 
al-ḥalāl wa-taḥrīmihi al-ḥarām wa-iṭṭalaʿū fī ʿilm al-malakūt wa-
istashʿarat qulūbuhum min ʿaẓamat Allāh fa-hābūhu wa-ajallūhu 
wa-lahat qulūbuhum ilayhi wa-ḥannat ilā liqāʾihi fa-bi-ʿilm al-
yaqīn ʿabadūhu.471 
 
The great ones (al-kubarāʾ) are the ones who have encompassed 
all of these knowledges, hence they know the licit and the illicit, 
and they have understood his (God’s) planning concerning his 
making licit what is licit and his making illicit what is illicit, and 
they have experienced the knowledge of the angelic world and 
their hearts have felt the immensity of God; and so they are in awe 
of him and exalt him, and their hearts desire him and yearn to meet 
him. Through the knowledge of certainty they worship him. 
 
This nesting of scholar-types results in outward knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ẓāhir) being the first door 
one must enter in order to reach the walāya of the kubarāʾ. As we mentioned before this has the 
effect of sanctifying the entire scholarly class since all of the signs of walāya are subjective 
rather than objective criteria in al-Tirmidhī’s schema. If outward knowledge is a gatekeeper for 
walāya, it set up formidable obstacles to attaining this rank since the outward knowledge al-
Tirmidhī was talking about, the ḥalāl (licit) and the ḥarām (illicit), was taught and understood in 
Arabic and the means for formal study were not available to the majority of Muslims.472 Hence, 
we can view al-Tirmidhī’s approach to walāya as an attempt to reform the scholarly class rather 
than replace it and empower lower strata in society. Al-Tirmidhī tries to reorient the scholars of 
outward knowledge toward a higher type of light-knowledge that he sees as the true and real 
knowledge. For al-Tirmidhī, the reform of the ʿulamāʾ eventually reforms other elements of 
society as their knowledge filters down to the common Muslim. 
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The Optimism of al-Tirmidhī’s Sainthood 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood is not simply an idea about the role of particular elite 
individuals who are privy to a special knowledge they derive directly from their colloquy 
(ḥadīth) with God. Rather, al-Tirmidhī initiates a very different approach and world-outlook that 
runs counter to the prevailing ‘degeneration’ framework that sees the first generation of the 
Islamic community (even the first three generations) as the height of perfection, only to see each 
successive generation as a degeneration from this pristine origin. The idea that the Islamic 
community is hurtling inevitably toward its eventual demise is one that permeates much of the 
culture of Ahl al-Hadith discourse around the corruption of modern times. The oft-cited 
prophetic ḥadīth that is used to demonstrate this viewpoint is, khayru al-nās qarnī thumma al-
ladhīna yalūnahum thumma al-ladhīna yalūnahu…, “the best of people is my generation and 
then those that follow and then those that follow...”473 The conclusion taken from Ḥadīth of this 
kind, that each successive generation is worse than the previous one, is an approach that has 
sometimes justified a certain resignation and attitude of inevitability to the difficulties and 
challenges that have beset Muslim communities throughout history. Al-Tirmidhī challenges this 
notion by disconnecting sainthood from time and stating that “sainthood from God and strict 
truthfulness in no way depend on time.”474 Al-Tirmidhī, through his concept of sainthood 
(walāya), offers an optimistic alternative to this sometimes pessimistic narrative. According to 
al-Tirmidhī there will always be true saints who offer guidance to human beings as successors to 
the Prophet until the end of the world comes about. These are individuals who receive the light 
                                                          
473 Al-Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in the chapter on witnesses (al-shahādāt), ḥadīth 2509. 
474 Diego R. Sarrio. “Spiritual anti-elitism: Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine of sainthood (walāya).” Islam and Christian–
Muslim Relations. 22 (3): 2011, p. 282. 
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of guidance directly from God and are in colloquy with him. Al-Tirmidhī also offers evidence 
from the Ḥadīth corpus to support his view that later generations of the Muslim umma 
(community) may be, in fact, greater than earlier generations. He quotes the ḥadīth, mathalu 
ummatī ka-l-maṭar lā yadrī awwaluhu khayrun am ākhiruhu, “My community is like the rain; one 
doesn’t know if the first is better or the last.”475 It would seem that what al-Tirmidhī means is 
that both the first generation and the last generation will be the best rather than the more 
orthodox view that the first generation is always the best. However, rather than looking at just 
the Muslim umma (community) throughout time, al-Tirmidhī is looking at the entire world 
community and its guidance and blessedness. Both prophets (anbiyāʾ) and saints (awliyāʾ) are 
sent to this world community commensurate to its state in order to establish an equilibrium. The 
darkness of ignorance is balanced with the light of gnosis (maʿrifa) that comes through these 
individuals. Hence, when one of al-Tirmidhī’s students asks him about this point he responds 
with the following argument: 
Qāla inna al-walāya wa-l-ṣiddīqiyya laysatā min al-zamān fī shayʾ 
wa-inna al-walī wa-l-ṣiddīq ḥujjat Allāh ʿalā khalqihi wa-ghiyāth 
al-khalq wa-amānihim li-annahum duʾātun ilā Allāh ʿalā baṣīra fa-
hum fī waqt al-ḥāja aḥrā an yakūnū wa-qad baʿatha Allāh al-rusul 
fī al-fatrati wa-l-ʿamā wa-dawlat al-bāṭil ḥattā naʿasha al-ḥaqq 
wa-zahaq al-bāṭil fa-limādhā yakbur fī al-ṣudūr an yakūna fī ākhir 
al-zamān man yuwāzī awwalahum li-ḥājjat al-khalq ilayhim?476 
 
He replied: Sainthood with God and strict truthfulness in no way 
depend on time. Indeed, the saint of God and the strictly truthful 
person are God’s proof against mankind, and they are assistance 
and protection for mankind because they call [people] to God with 
discernment (baṣīra). Thus, it is more appropriate for them to exist 
during a time of need, and indeed God has sent the messengers 
when there was a period of no prophecy (fatra), blindness and the 
dominion of falsehood so that that which is due would be 
invigorated and falsehood would perish. So why does it seem too 
great in [men’s] hearts that at the end of time someone would exist 
                                                          
475 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 3, p. 298. 
476 Ibid. Concept, pp. 196–197. 
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who corresponds to the persons who existed at the beginning 
because of mankind’s need for them? 
 
This understanding of light (nūr) and darkness (ẓulma) is consonant with al-Tirmidhī’s approach 
to ḥikma, which is a knowledge of God’s use of opposites in the world. This is not a Zoroastrian 
model of a cosmic battle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. Rather, as al-
Tirmidhī states in his Kitāb al-Ḥikma, both light and darkness are needed in order to know God 
since these are opposites created by him and they define each other.477 Thus, it makes sense that 
al-Tirmidhī would see an even greater need for exemplars of truth to appear when the darkness 
of ignorance was greater. While this approach is ‘optimistic’ it is not one that promises 
‘progress’ or the idea that society or humanity is moving towards perfection or that perfection is 
even an ideal. Perfection is possible on a personal level but not on a societal level. The idea is 
not to erase or destroy ignorance because that would be impossible in this model. Rather, the 
point is to ‘separate’ knowledge from ignorance so that there is no turbidity (kadar) or admixture 
(ikhtilāṭ) in the opposites and that truth and falsehood can accurately define each other as 
opposites. That is the function of the ḥakīm (sage).478 Such a cosmography that describes the 
universe in terms of opposites serves to frame God’s traces (āthār) in the world. As we have 
mentioned previously, al-Tirmidhī numbers these traces as four. Since they are representative of 
God on earth, and because God, by definition, has no opposite, those traces also have the quality 
of non-duality. Thus, the dualisms that al-Tirmidhī sets up are a way of pointing to and 
identifying these traces, or these non-duals, which derive their non-duality from God’s 
singularity and uniqueness. In this way al-Tirmidhī’s cosmology indicates an optimism about the 
possibilities of human spiritual achievement. Not only do we know from al-Tirmidhī that there 
                                                          
477 Ibid. Kitāb al-ḥikma, fol. 16v. 
478 Ibid, fol. 3r. 
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are at least forty of God’s saints (awliyāʾ) alive at any time and that they can be a means of 
guidance for humanity, but we are also aware of God’s immanence and that the manifestation of 
his traces in the world are palpable and capable of being experienced. 
 
The Seal of Saints 
 Probably the most controversial element of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood is his 
doctrine of the seal of sainthood (khatm al-walāya). One of the difficulties in approaching al-
Tirmidhī’s doctrine of the seal of sainthood is the challenge of sorting through his contradictory 
statements regarding various aspects of the sealer of saints (khātim walāya) and his relationship 
to the sealer of prophets (khātim al-nabiyyīn), i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad. The doctrine of the 
seal of sainthood (khatm al-awliyāʾ) states that just as the Prophet Muḥammad was the sealer of 
prophets, similarly there exists a sealer of saints who will complete sainthood (walāya), just as 
Muḥammad completed prophecy (nubuwwa). Al-Tirmidhī did not view the sealer (khātim) as 
simply the last saint (al-ākhir mabʿathan), but also as the one who completes prophecy and 
sainthood respectively.479 Critics of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of the seal of sainthood point to his 
passage in Sīrat al-Awliyāʾ in which he rejects the idea put forward by many in his time that the 
meaning of sealer (khātim) is final or last (khātam) with a fatḥa vowel on the letter tāʾ rather than 
a kasra as in khātim. This passage is often singled out to indicate that al-Tirmidhī leaves open the 
possibility of continuous prophecy after Muḥammad, a position unacceptable to Muslim 
orthodoxy. Al-Tirmidhī states, fa-inna al-ladhī ʿamiya ʿan khabar hādhā yadhunnu anna khātim 
al-nabiyyīn innamā taʾwīluhu annahu ākhiruhum mabʿathan fa-ayyatu manqabatun fī hādhā? 
Wa-ayyu ʿalam fī hādhā? Hādhā taʾwīl al-bulah al-jahla,480 “Now whoever is unaware of this 
                                                          
479 Ibid. Drei Schriften, p. 42. 
480 Ibid, p. 42. 
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Tradition and thinks the interpretation of ‘seal[er] of the prophets, only means that he is the last 
of them [the prophets] to be sent – would this be a feat or a mark of distinction? This is an 
interpretation of stupid people and fools.”481 Al-Tirmidhī actually accedes to both interpretations 
based on a correct reading of this passage as well as statements he has made in others of his 
works.482 So, according to al-Tirmidhī, the Prophet is both the last (khātam) as well as sealer 
(khātim) of the prophets while the sealer of saints (khātim al-awliyāʾ), or the qāʾim bi-l-ḥujja (the 
one who stands as a proof),483 is also both the final (khātam) saint as well as sealer (khātim) of 
the saints. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) rejects this particular doctrine of al-Tirmidhī as 
unorthodox citing it as having been unknown to the earlier generations and contradictory to 
revealed scripture, reason and the true saints themselves.484 It is true that the doctrine of the 
khātim/khātam has no precedent in the Qurʾān or Ḥadīth corpus. The question then is how al-
Tirmidhī came up with this doctrine and why he put such emphasis on it. At one level al-
Tirmidhī sees himself as one of the ḥukamāʾ and awliyāʾ and in that capacity sees himself as 
having the authority to introduce new doctrines that are based on knowledge vouchsafed to him 
by God. In this sense al-Tirmidhī believes that the awliyāʾ have a portion (juzʾ) of prophethood 
(nubuwwa) but not complete or unrestricted prophecy as in the case with the Prophet 
Muḥammad.485 
                                                          
481 Ibid. Concept, p. 107. I have modified Radtke’s translation here because he mistranslates the passage due to not 
translating the particle ‘innamā’ which is a restrictive particle translated often as ‘only’. This passage cannot be 
understood correctly without understanding how al-Tirmidhī is using this particle to indicate that in fact al-Tirmidhī 
disagrees with those who say that Muḥammad is ‘only’ the last prophet when interpreting his title khātam/khātim al-
nabiyyīn (the sealer of prophets). 
482 Ibid. Nadhariyyat al-Walāya, vol. 2, pp. 377–378. Al-Tirmidhī considers the interpretation as khātam (final) to be 
a weak but valid interpretation, while the interpretation as khātim (sealer) as in perfecting sainthood is a deeper and 
grander interpretation as well as an older use of the word being closer to the usage of Prophet and his companions. 
483 This is another name al-Tirmidhī uses for the khātim al-awliyāʾ (sealer of the saints) who comes at the end of 
time and is both the last saint as well as the completion of sainthood. 
484 Ibid. Spiritual anti-elitism, p. 282. 
485 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 2, p. 444. 
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 Al-Tirmidhī’s approach to knowledge production is based on a gnoseology of light-
knowledge that is gifted to select individuals (al-khawāṣṣ) by God. The main vehicle for 
transmitting this light-knowledge is the Qurʾānic mathal (analogy).486 Ṣūfīs, such as al-Ghazālī, 
saw the mathal as representing a separate level of existence (al-wujūd al-khayālī) and even 
described the mathal as representing a world separate from the world of the mind (ʿaql) and the 
world of the senses (ḥiss).487 Henry Corbin calls this the mundus imaginalis (the imaginal realm) 
as opposed to the ‘imaginary realm’ that does not have objective reality.488 This is, in the Arabic, 
al-ʿālam al-mithāl (world of analogies), extensively used by Ibn ʿArabī and other Islamic 
mystics. This use of analogy in early Islamic mystical thought should be distinguished from what 
Umberto Eco calls ‘universal analogy’ as a characteristic of Renaissance Hermeticism. 
Renaissance Hermeticism shares many features with early Islamic ḥikma but also differs in 
important ways. According to Eco, universal analogy means that every element of the furniture 
of this world is connected to every other element of this sublunar world as well as to every 
element of the superior world. These elements are all connected to each other through analogies 
and resemblances.489 There is a similar structure taking place in al-Tirmidhī’s cosmology, 
however, the scope of analogy and resemblance are restricted through particular analogical types 
established through Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature. Renaissance Hermeticism is also what Eco 
                                                          
486 I use the term ‘analogy’ here in the sense of a complex interwoven pattern of metaphors that create an image that 
can take on interpretive possibilities. The analogy is somewhere between both idea and archetype. It is not a 
complete abstraction because it is based on ‘real’ images but neither is it ultra-particularized such as the archetype 
can be when it is produced out of and includes all of the particulars of a certain type. The archetype of the father, in 
a Jungian sense, contains all of the particular idiosyncrasies of the category of ‘father.’ But the mathal (analogy), as 
used by al-Tirmidhī, is a set of metaphors that together create a pattern through a network of interrelations that are 
supported by human experience. 
487 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī. Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa-l-zandaqa maʿa al-
risāla al-waʿẓīya wa-kitāb mishkāt al-anwār wa-risālat al-ʿaqāʾid wa-l-waʿẓ ilā Malik Shāh wa-risālat al-tawḥīd. 
Wa-yalīhum kitāb al-tajrīd fī kalimat al-tawḥīd li-Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī. Ed. Muḥammad badr al-Dīn al-
Naʿisānī. Al-Astānah: Jamālī wa-Khānjī. 1907, p. 6. 
488 Henry Corbin. “Mundus imaginalis, the imaginary and the imaginal.” Spring, 1972: 1–19. New York: Analytical 
Psychology Club of New York, Inc. 1972, p. 1. 
489 Eco, Umberto. The limits of interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994, p. 24. 
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calls a ‘strong Neoplatonism’ or an emasculated Neoplatonism, strengthened by Christian ideas 
of divine transcendence.490 This strong Neoplatonic view holds that all elements of the world are 
essentially non-dual because they emanate from the divine one. This, in fact, is different than al-
Tirmidhī’s Pythagorean approach, which views the world in terms of dualities that point to 
God’s non-duality. This approach does not negate dualism as does Hermeticism. Furthermore, 
the analogies (amthāl) that al-Tirmidhī uses combine dualities; however, these dualities exist as 
coincidentia oppositorum in the imaginal space and not in the world of matter. As we mentioned 
in Chapter 4, early Islamic mystics like al-Tustarī and al-Tirmidhī saw duality in the world as a 
means of indicating God’s non-dual attributes as they manifest in the world. 
For al-Tirmidhī, the mathal (analogy) is that which connects the ghayb (unseen) to the 
seen world (al-ʿālam al-mudrak), hence we can see how important it is to his gnoseology. If we 
think of the different knowledge categories in Islamic thought we can see that they each produce 
particular religious and cultural artifacts in Islamic civilization. Knowledge as Ḥadīth, for 
example, produces Ḥadīth literatures of all kinds. Even Ṣūfī literature did not escape the all-
encompassing reach of isnād (genealogy) and Ḥadīth conventions as a basis for establishing 
authoritative knowledge. The mathal (analogy) is a vehicle for the expression of the knowledge 
producing agent of light (nūr) in al-Tirmidhī’s approach. Al-Tirmidhī characterizes the heart as 
the place where the light of certainty resides. This light allows the knower of God (ʿārif) to ‘see’ 
aspects of the unseen (al-ghayb) through firāsa (insight).491 The mathal (analogy) for al-
Tirmdihī captures unseen meanings in a way that enables them to be understood by those who do 
not have access to the unseen realm. Al-Tirmidhī writes, fa-l-amthāl namūdhajāt al-ḥikma li-mā 
ghāba ʿan al-asmāʿ wa-l-abṣār li-tahtadī al-nufūs bi-mā adrakat ʿiyānan, “Analogies are the 
                                                          
490 Ibid, p. 18. 
491 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, p. 241. 
 201 
 
forms of wisdom for that which is unseen to the ears and eyes in order that people may be guided 
by what they perceive directly.”492 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of the seal of sainthood (khatm al-walāya) becomes clearer if we 
understand that the seal (khatm) and the sealer (khātim/khātam) derive from a mathal (analogy) 
that al-Tirmidhī pulls from both Islamic and Persian lore. Al-Tirmidhī uses the mathal (analogy) 
as a philosophical tool to produce the various aspects of his gnoseology. In other words, he is 
seeking topoi and motifs that lend themselves to the mathal (analogy) through his survey of both 
Islamic and non-Islamic lore and then he uses these amthāl (analogies) to structure the landscape 
of his thought. Al-Tirmidhī has a book called al-Amthāl min al-Qurʾān wa-l-Sunna listing over 
two hundred and thirty amthāl (analogies) from Islamic lore. One of the amthāl (analogies) listed 
in this book is the khawātīm (plural for khātam – ring). Later we will explain the connection 
between the doctrine of the khātim/khātam (sealer/final) of the awliyāʾ (the saints) and the 
khātam (seal ring). However, the first point we want to make here is that the khātam (seal ring) is 
conceived by al-Tirmidhī to be a mathal (analogy) that helps configure the light-knowledge of 
the unseen (ghayb). I have included here in extenso al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of the khātam (ring 
– plural, khawātīm) in order to demonstrate the relationship between al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology 
and his notion of the mathal (analogy). A portion of this excerpt is also found in al-Tirmidhī’s IA 
as well as indirect references to it in his NU: 
Wa-hādhā al-kalām innamā yakhruju min hādhihi al-afwāh ḥurūfan 
muʾallafatan wa-l-anwār kiswatuhā maʿahā nazalat li-l-ʿibād min 
al-samāʿ wa-l-ʿibād mutafāwatunā fī al-nuṭqi bi-hādhihi al-kalima 
ka-l-shaʾni fī al-anwār. 
 
Wa-mathalu dhālika mathalu al-khawātīm fa-laysa bayna 
khawātīm al-nās kathīru tafāwutin fa-inna aktharuhā fīmā bayna 
mithqāl wa-mithqālayn fa-ʿāmmatu awzānihā bi-hādhā al-qadri 
                                                          
492 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Al-Amthāl min al-kitāb wa-l-sunna. Ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī. 
Al-Fajāllah al-Qāhirah: Dār Nahḍat Miṣr. 1975, p. 17. 
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min al-fiḍḍa aw min al-dhahab innamā al-shaʾnu fī al-fuṣūṣ allatī 
tabāyanat jawāhiruha fa-rubba jawhari faṣṣin li-khatamin lā 
usāwī dirhaman wa-rubba faṣṣin tablughu qīmatuhu ālāfan min al-
darāhim wa-l-danānīr. Fa-kadhā al-nuṭqu bi-hādhihi al-kalimati 
mutafāwatun fī ibrāzihā lafẓan wa-qirāʾatan wa duʿāʾan wa-lākin 
al-tafāwutu fī al-maʿādin allatī fīhā hādhihi al-anwār wa-ʿilmu 
hādhā al-kalām. 
 
Wa-tafāwutu hādhā akthar min tafāwutu al-fuṣūṣ aḍʿāfan fa-
kalimatun takhruju min qalbin maʿdinu dhālika al-qalb al-dunyā fa-
dhāka yubghī bihi al-thawāb wa-kalimatun takhruju min qalbin 
maʿdinu dhālika al-qalb al-ʿuqbā wa-kalimatun takhruju min qalbin 
maʿdinu dhālika al-qalb al-malakūt wa-kalimatun takhruju min 
qalbin maʿdinu dhālika al-qalb mālik al-mulk bayna yadayhi. Fa-
innamā istanāra qalbuhu bi-dhālik al-nūr wa-kullu kalāmin 
yakhruju minhu min dhālika al-nūr.493 
 
These words [there is no god but God, glory be to God, God is 
great, there is no power or ability save through God] only exits 
from these mouths as conjoined letters while lights clothe them and 
were sent down with those words from Heaven for [God’s] 
servants. [His] servants differ in the pronunciation of these words 
just as they differ in the lights [that clothe them]. 
 
The analogy (mathal) of this is the analogy of rings (khawātīm). 
There is not much difference between the rings of people. Most of 
them are between one and two ounces [in weight]. Most of the 
weight of these rings is the amount of silver or gold in them. The 
only real consideration though is with the bezels whose gems 
differ. It could be that the gem of a particular bezel for a ring does 
not equal even a silver piece in value. However, it could also be 
that the value of the bezel could reach thousands of gold and silver 
pieces. Likewise, the pronunciation of these words differs in the 
way they are pronounced aloud in reading and supplication. 
However, the true difference is in the mines in which these lights 
are found and the cognizance of these words. 
 
This difference is many times greater than the actual differences 
between bezels. A word may exit the heart of someone while the 
mine of that heart is in fact this world; such a one desires reward 
by it. Another word may exit the heart of someone while the mine 
of that heart is recompense. Another word exits the heart of 
another person while the mine of that heart is the angelic realm. 
Another word exits the heart of yet another person while the mine 
of that heart stands before the Possessor of all creation. The heart 
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of that person is enlightened by that light and all speech that exits 
from him is from that light. 
 
The khātam (ring) is an ancient motif found throughout the Near East and is important in biblical 
literature. It is not strange then that we would find the ring motif in early stories of the Prophet. 
According to the Sīra (early biographical) literature, the Prophet Muḥammad had a seal ring 
made for him out of silver with the words “Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh” engraved on the ring with 
the name of God, Allāh, on top. This ring was passed on to each successive Caliph from Abū 
Bakr to ʿUmar and then to ʿUthmān. Then, according to tradition, the Caliph ʿUthmān lost the 
ring when it fell into a well. In addition to the ring motif in the early Sīra literature, al-Tirmidhī 
also references a ḥadīth in which God creates Adam from dust and kneads this dust with the 
water of Paradise, then crowns Adam and then places on his finger the ring of a king.494 
 For al-Tirmidhī, the ring is a mathal (analogy) that gathers together a multitude of 
metaphors that communicate a particular ‘truth’ he is trying to express. The ring (khātam) by 
itself is not the mathal (analogy). The actual ring mathal (analogy) in its entirety includes a ring 
that contains a bezel with a seal engraving that can be used for particular purposes within a 
network of social and semantic relationships. In this sense the ring has a significant interpretive 
potential. It can signify the king as well as khilāfa (successorship) to the Prophet. Al-Tirmidhī 
presents the ring mathal as communicating a hidden truth through a prophetic analogy that 
transmits knowledge as light. In this sense, the meaning of this mathal and its subsequent 
interpretation becomes less subjective, since the analogy makes use of a material object that has 
real functions in the social and semantic domains, and with regard to the realm of religious 
function, it can even be connected to customs attributed to the Prophet. In the imaginal realm the 
mathal of the ring takes on its own reality; it is the image of a real material object with all of its 
                                                          
494 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 6, p. 219. 
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real world relationships bound up within it so that it becomes a means for creating an analogy. 
Thus, the ring connects ‘truths’ about God to ‘truths’ in the world in a way that is accessible to 
human perception. Not all material objects carry this kind of significance and for al-Tirmidhī it is 
the amthāl (pl. mathal) of the Qurʾān and the Prophetic Sunna that provide a template for him to 
create his own amthāl. For example, the mathal of the ring is not mentioned as a specific mathal 
in the Qurʾān or the Ḥadīth, but it is chosen by al-Tirmidhī to illustrate the way God organizes 
the world, which is what al-Tirmidhī calls al-tadbīr.495 Knowledge of God’s tadbīr 
(organization, planning) of the universe is one of the hallmarks of the ḥukamāʾ (sages) who were 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.496 Hence, the ability to use analogies to interpret the world 
is one of the functions of the ḥukamāʾ in al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology. 
 Al-Tirmidhī draws a connection for us between the ring (khātam) and the sealer/final 
saint (khātim/khātam al-awliyāʾ) in his autobiography Buduw Shaʾn. At first glance the ring 
mathal seems to be separate from al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of the sealer of saints. The ring 
mathal is used by al-Tirmidhī in ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ and al-Amthāl min al-Qurʾān wa-l-Sunna 
primarily to explain the difference between the ʿāmma (the common believers) and the khāṣṣa 
(elite) or, as al-Tirmidhī also calls them, the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh497 and the awliyāʾ Allāh.498 As 
we saw in the above quote from al-Tirmidhī’s al-Amthāl, all believers are similar to the ring in 
that the weight of the silver in each ring is approximately the same. What determines the real 
value is the price of the bezel (ring stone) and it is the rare bezels that are mined deep within the 
                                                          
495 Ibid. Al-Amthāl, p. 17. 
496 Ibid. Kitāb Bayān al-ʿIlm, fol. 16a. 
497 These are the saints who benefit from God’s grace by the mere fact of making the testimony of faith (shahāda) 
and so God gives them his protection and grace because of a right (ḥaqq) that they have with God by virtue of this 
statement. 
498 These are the true saints who have been given protection and amnesty in this life and the next and receive divine 
inspiration from God. They are the ones who have been given victory over their carnal souls by God and are a 
means of protection and blessing for humanity. 
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earth that are considered the most expensive. Metaphorically speaking, when the awliyāʾ Allāh 
(the true saints) say the adhkār (formulas for remembering God), these words, while seeming to 
be similar on the surface actually originate from different “mines” (maʿādin), which represent 
the hearts of different believers and the relative attachment of these hearts to God. While this 
discussion of the ring mathal seeks to elaborate the distinction between different types of 
believers, al-Tirmidhī also uses the ring as a symbol to indicate the sealer of saints. At the end of 
his autobiography al-Tirmidhī relates a dream in which his wife hears a voice telling her in 
Persian, nigīnē man torā dādham, “I have given you a seal ring.”499 When taken in the context of 
the other dreams of al-Tirmidhī’s wife, we can interpret this to mean that al-Tirmidhī is either the 
sealer of saints, or one of the forty saints of his time, completing their number, as symbolized by 
the seal ring that was given to his wife. The ring mathal not only speaks about the difference 
between the types of believers, but also functions as a symbol for the sealer of saints. The seals 
on rings in eastern Iran would often be cut directly into the bezel as can be seen in some 
examples from 11th- and 12th-century C.E. Khurāsān. (See figure 1 below) These seal rings have 
words carved into them as opposed to human or animal figures that we find in Byzantine and 
Sassanid seal rings, possibly due to Islamic mores. Here we can see many of the aspects of al-
Tirmidhī’s notion of sainthood and the sealer of saints represented in a single material object. 
The silver ring, the bezel, the seal carving on the bezel and the lexical nature of these seal 
carvings all touch upon important aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s structure of sainthood and the sealer 
of saints.  
                                                          







We can possibly say that the ring mathal itself is structuring the various relationships between 
these different aspects of sainthood in al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and was partly his 
inspiration for his book SA, which discusses in detail his doctrine of the sealer of saints 
(khātim/khātam al-awliyāʾ). Evidence in this regard is that al-Tirmidhī mentions a date in his 
autobiography with respect to the dream of his wife in which she is gifted a seal-ring (nigīnē) 
representing al-Tirmidhī himself. This was in June of 883 C.E. or Dhū al-Qāʿda of 269 A.H.500 It 
is not clear exactly when al-Tirmidhī wrote his SA, but we know that he did so sometime after 
the death of the Khurāsānian mystic and his contemporary Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh al-Rāzī (d. 
258/872). Also in his autobiography, al-Tirmidhī indicates that he did not start teaching formally 
until after the period of insurrection that occurred around 256/870 during the Ṣaffārid 
rebellion.501 In his autobiography Al-Tirmidhī mentions that after this event he moved from 
                                                          
500 Ibid. Concept, pp. 34–35. 
501 Ibid, p. 20. 
Figure 1: 1. One bezel set with a banded agate, engraved kufic inscription 
Musa Ibn Ahmad. 2cm high. 2. The other similar ring is bezel set with 
engraved carnelian, also 2cm high. 3. One cast gold ring 2.5cm high. 4. 








teaching sessions in his house to the masjid where he began teaching openly to many students. 
The confident approach of al-Tirmidhī in SA as well as its polished form, polemical tone, and 
back and forth question and answer format between himself and a student indicate that SA was 
likely the result of many years of teaching. This suggests that al-Tirmidhī’s SA probably came to 
its finished form sometime around the writing of his autobiography and the narrating of his 
wife’s dream some ten years after he began teaching formally. The important point here is not to 
establish that the dream of the ring mathal came first, but that both ideas were functioning at 
approximately the same time in al-Tirmidhī’s career. The ring mathal still has a function even in 
al-Tirmidhī’s SA where al-Tirmidhī describes the sealing of prophethood as being like a royal 
decree that is written and then stamped with a seal.502 The ring mathal is found throughout al-
Tirmidhī’s works and is used to explain the nature of the sealer (khātim/khātam) and the seal 
(khatm). Not only is the ring mathal used to discuss sainthood, but al-Tirmidhī uses it as a 
framework to discuss other topics such as the word āmīn (Amen), which al-Tirmidhī says is a 
khatm (seal) for supplication (duʿāʾ). The word āmīn (Amen), when used at the end of a 
supplication to God, seals it and protects the supplication from being intercepted or modified in 
any way by the devil.503 Here, we can see that the ring mathal structures multiple topics in al-
Tirmidhī’s works. 
The ring mathal is an appropriate analogy for the paradigm of ‘knowledge as light’ found 
throughout al-Tirmidhī’s works. The ring mathal makes use of the light metaphor since the bezel 
of a ring refracts light in special ways depending on the type and quality of the stone. Thus, with 
this analogy we can think of the heart of the saint as refracting spiritual light-knowledge 
depending on the mine/source (maʿdin) of his heart. Hence, the mathal (analogy) is a way of 
                                                          
502 Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, pp. 109–110. 
503 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, pp. 483–484. 
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thinking about God and the world and is a way of capturing and presenting knowledge as light. 
Plato employs analogical reasoning in the analogy of the cave in his dialog The Republic. The 
cave, the prisoners, as well as the play of light and darkness are all elements of Plato’s analogy 
and serve to explain a ‘reality’ that would otherwise be imperceptible to the senses. The ‘light’ of 
the sun in Plato’s analogy can be interpreted as the “true knowledge of the forms” that is too 
bright for normal human beings to see.504 Plato provides us with two other analogies in The 
Republic, which are the Divided Line and the Analogy of the Sun. For Plato, though, analogy is 
not the main vehicle for dispensing knowledge, rather, dialectic is at the center of Plato’s 
epistemology.505 Plato’s three analogies pale in comparison to al-Tirmidhī’s over two hundred 
analogies in his book al-Amthāl min al-Qurʾān wa-l-Sunna. For al-Tirmidhī, the mathal 
(analogy) is the means par excellence for communicating knowledge bequeathed by God and 
thinking about the world. We will see in the next chapter how the mathal can be interpreted and 
reinterpreted as well as extended to ‘explore’ its field of possibilities. As we will see in Chapter 6 
Ibn ʿArabī takes al-Tirmidhī’s ring mathal and reinvents it to develop an even more elaborate 
doctrine of sainthood building on al-Tirmidhī’s approach. 
 For al-Tirmidhī, the sealer of the saints (khātim/khātam al-awliya) completes sainthood 
(walāya) by encompassing all of the names of God just as the Prophet completes (khatama) 
prophethood (nubuwwa) by encompassing all of the names of God. In this way the sealer of the 
saints mirrors the Prophet’s states and stations at the level of sainthood (walāya) just below 
prophethood.506 This type of mirroring between sainthood and prophethood was no doubt 
troubling to many Muslim scholars, particularly Ibn Taymiyya. If this mirroring is, in fact, true, 
                                                          
504 Robert J. Fogelin. “Three Platonic Dialogs,” The Philosophical Review. Vol. 80, (No. 3, Jul.) 1971, p. 372. 
505 N. Notomi. “Socratic Dialogue and Platonic Dialectic. How the soul knows in the Republic.” Plato-The Internet 
Journal of the International Plato Society. (Plato 4). 2004. 
506 Ibid. Nadhariyyat al-Walāya, pp. 374–375. 
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then what is the real difference between the sealer of the saints and the sealer of the prophets? 
The ring mathal is essential to explaining this difference in al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology and 
epistemology. The seal/sealer (khatam/khātim) belongs ultimately to God and is a function of his 
tadbīr (organization and planning) of the world. Prophethood is likened to a document that 
contains certain kinds of knowledge that, when completed, is folded and stamped with a seal. 
Similarly, sainthood and the particular knowledge it contains is like another document that, when 
completed, is folded and sealed with its own seal. Each seal has the same mark of God’s 
kingship but the stone in each is different because they come from different mines (maʿādin) and 
it is the quality of the stones that causes them to reflect God’s light differently. 
 
Sainthood Creates a Third Space 
 We discussed in Chapter 2 how al-Tirmidhī uses a Pythagorean sense of ḥikma (wisdom) 
to view the world as arranged by opposites (aḍdād) that, in turn, point to an underlying unitary 
principle. For al-Tirmidhī, this principle was Allāh, who created the world as opposites. 
Adopting aspects of a Pythagorean cosmology was not difficult for al-Tirmidhī because this 
basic structure is clearly explicated in the Qurʾān, specifically in verses 49 and 50 of Chapter 51, 
al-Dhāriyāt, and supported by many other verses throughout the Qurʾān,507 wa-min kulli shayʾin 
khalaqnā zawjayni laʿallakum tadhakkarūn fa-firrū ilā Allāh innī lakum minhu nadhīrun mubīn, 
“And of everything we have created pairs so that perhaps you will remember, so flee to God, I 
am only a clear warner for you.” The Qurʾān clearly views the world as a place of dualities, not 
in a strictly antagonistic sense as in Zoroastrian cosmology, but as a means to understand God. 
The Qurʾānic discussion of marriage is a case in point in which the zawj (spouse-pair-opposite) 
                                                          
507 For other verses in the Qurʾān that discuss creation in pairs see 13:3, 20:53, 20:131, 26:7, 30:21, 35:11, 36:36, 
42:11 and 43:12. 
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is created in order for God’s attributes to manifest, for example, mawadda (love) and raḥma 
(mercy) occur between (bayn) the two spouses (al-zawjayn) and is a sign (āya) of God. These 
attributes are characterized in a non-dual sense because they are traces of God who is described 
in the Qurʾān as al-wadūd (the loving) and al-raḥmān (the all-merciful).508 Al-Tirmidhī’s 
cosmology can be considered Pythagorean in the sense that Pythagorean notions fit well into his 
Qurʾānic worldview.  
For al-Tirmidhī, God and his attributes are not the only non-dual’. God’s “traces” in the 
world also take on an aspect of God’s non-duality and are thus representative of God on earth.509 
These four traces (āthār) of God are: the Qurʾan, the sulṭān (temporal ruler in an abstract sense 
of representing God’s power), the Kaʿba (God’s house) and the saints (awliyāʾ). In NU al-
Tirmidhī writes about these four traces:  
fa-bi-hāʾulāʾ al-arbaʿ taqūm al-arḍ fa-idhā danā qiyām al-sāʿa 
rafaʿa al-qurʾān wa-hudimat al-kaʿba wa-dhahaba al-sulṭān wa-
qubiḍa al-awliyāʾ ʿan ākhirihim fa-lam yabqa fī al-arḍ dhū ḥurma 
fa-l-mutanabbihūna innamā maʾkhudhuhum min al-qurʾān 
laṭāʾifuhu wa-ṭalāwatuhu wa-labaquhu wa-min al-sulṭān haybat 
ẓillihi wa-lā yalḥaẓūna ilā afʿālihim wa-sīratihim wa-min al-bayti 
ilā waqārihi lā ilā tilk al-aḥjāri wa-l-bunyāni wa-min al-walī ilā 
nūri jalālihi al-ladhī qad ashraqa fī ṣadrihi.510 
 
Thus, through these four the earth persists. So if the Hour comes 
close, the Qurʾān will be lifted and the Kaʿba will be destroyed and 
the temporal ruler will disappear, and the souls of the saints, up to 
the last of them, will be taken and there will not remain on Earth 
any sacred person. Those who are aware simply take from the 
Qurʾān its subtleties and its beauty and its refinement; and from the 
temporal ruler the awesomeness of his shadow but not [his] actions 
or [his] example; and from the House of God they perceive God’s 
dignity but not the stones and structure; and from the saint they 
                                                          
508 Qurʾān 30:21 
509 Al-Tirmidhī specifically says that God has no opposite, lā ḍidda lahu, “He has no opposite.” Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 
1, p. 21. The four traces of God each have a non-dual character. There is only one Kaʿba, the Qurʾān represents the 
attribute of God’s speech (kalām) which borrows from God’s non-duality, the sulṭān (temporal ruler of all the 
Muslims) is God’s shadow on earth (ẓillihi) and the saints (awliyāʾ) attain the station (manzil) of fardāniyya which 
has the character of non-duality. 
510 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 424. 
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perceive the light of God’s majesty which dawns in the saint’s 
heart. 
 
These four traces are sources of protection for humanity because, for al-Tirmidhī, it is through 
them that the world is protected by God from destruction. The Kaʿba in Makka is described as a 
ḥaram (sacred precinct) in which fighting or killing is not allowed.511 The role of the sulṭān (the 
temporal ruler) is to maintain order and justice such that people’s rights are not transgressed and 
the ideal ruler is someone who is a protection for people.512 The Qurʾān, or God’s speech 
(kalām), has a sanctity (ḥurma) that makes it inviolable to touch unless one is ritually purified 
through ablution.513 The saint (walī) is a protection for the land he lives in and because of him 
the crops are watered and the animals fed.514 Al-Tirmidhī mentions that when a believer beholds 
any of these four things, his heart finds ease and calmness (istarwaḥa).515 The saints, as 
representatives of God’s trace on earth, become not only a means of witnessing God’s light, but 
are also loci for God’s mercy and protection. It appears that al-Tirmidhī is saying that if a person 
can find one of these saints, then he can find protection and security can be found through the 
saint’s blessing since the heart of the saint occupies a station at which God’s light enters the 
world.  
 For al-Tirmidhī, the dualisms in the world provide a framework to identify the non-dual 
traces of God in the world. At the end of Chapter 2 we discussed the non-dual station of the saint 
(walī), which is called fardāniyya (non-duality, solitariness). This station is unique and is 
reserved for the highest saints. In KH al-Tirmidhī provides us with a mathal to explain the non-
dual position of the saint (walī) and how this creates a safe space for those who are connected to 
                                                          
511 Ibid, pp. 132–133. 
512 Ibid, p. 401. 
513 Ibid, pp. 332–334. 
514 Ibid, pp. 263–264. 
515 Ibid, p. 172. 
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the saint (walī). Al-Tirmidhī compares the saint (walī) to a shepherd who has a flock of sheep. 
When predators attack the sheep the shepherd’s dogs fight these predators and kill them. The 
shepherd and his flock remain safe while the dogs and predators fight each other.516 Al-Tirmidhī 
mentions how the sheep dog was, at one time, a predator itself, but that through the influence of 
the shepherd becomes the opposite of its original nature and fights off the other predators. Here, 
the non-dual position of the shepherd actually gives rise to the duality that, in turn, defines the 
non-duality. Here, the saint (walī), as a conduit for God’s light and a trace of God in the world, is 
a means for establishing safe spaces that are impervious to the interaction of opposites that can 
sometimes, but not always, be antagonistic. 
 
Conclusion 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s vision of sainthood clearly demonstrates a great deal of versatility. By 
combining and amalgamating various trends in early Islamic thought and mysticism, al-Tirmidhī 
was able to put forward ideas that were socially and politically relevant to his time. And not only 
were they relevant, but they had powerful transformative potential. Al-Tirmidhī takes the light 
motif and places it at the center of his gnoseology similar to the way the proto-Shīʿīs had 
construed the ʿilm (knowledge) of their imams and the proto-Sunnīs of Madīna construed the 
charisma of the prophetic legacy. Al-Tirmidhī clearly belonged to the discourse stream of proto-
Sunnism, however, it wasn’t until the arrival of al-Tirmidhī that the light-motif takes center stage 
amongst the Sunnī ʿulamāʾ. When al-Tirmidhī combines this light motif with sainthood, which 
was a category that was already established in Ḥanafī theological discourse, the result is a new 
spiritual geography. Knowledge, as light, resides in the hearts of living saints who are 
                                                          
516 Ibid. Kitāb al-ḥikma, fol. 6v. 
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undesignated except by spiritual markers within the Muslim community. They exist as the 
conduits through whom God continues to provide guidance to humanity as successors to the 
Prophet. Hence, God’s light flows into the world through the hearts of these men and women if 
they can only be found. This doctrine provides a counterweight to the sometimes fatalistic and 
pessimistic orthodox view that the Muslim community is in a continual state of decline moving 
headlong toward the final destruction of both mankind and the world at the end of time. Al-
Tirmidhī’s eschatology also admits to an end of the world, but explains that before that time 
God’s guidance for humanity is always commensurate with the level of ignorance and darkness 
that is simultaneously occurring in the world. Hence, sainthood here can address very important 
theological views about God’s involvement in the world and the continuation of prophecy and 
sainthood.  
 One of the most important aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology of sainthood deals with 
the figure of the sealer of saints (khātim/khātam al-awliyāʾ). With this doctrine we may gain an 
insight into how al-Tirmidhī’s thought develops through the use of amthāl (analogies). By 
understanding al-Tirmidhī’s use of the mathal we can better understand how he conceived the 
function of the sealer of saints and either reconciled this doctrine with more orthodox theological 
views about the nature of revelation and prophethood. The doctrine of the sealer of saints is 
derived from al-Tirmidhī’s episteme of light-knowledge and al-Tirmidhī articulates it in terms of 
its embodiment in the form of the mathal (analogy). By understanding this ‘thought process’ of 
analogizing we can better understand how Ibn ʿArabī extends the mathal of the ring to explicate 
an even more elaborate doctrine of sainthood.  
 Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood also has implications for the social and political 
sphere. By separating temporal authority from religious authority, al-Tirmidhī opens up religious 
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authority to new claimants. However, at the same time, he attempts to restrict this authority by 
making outward religious knowledge a prerequisite for it. The saints, however, as traces of God 
on earth, create safe spaces that are a protection for humanity. This idea inspired early Ṣūfīs like 
al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī to integrate this structure into Sufism. In time, the Ṣūfī shaykh would 
come to function as a buffer between ordinary Muslims and the unmitigated power of the state, 









Sainthood and Wisdom in the Later Islamic Mystical Tradition: 
Ibn ʿArabī and the Shādhiliyya 
 
Despite the plethora of research on Ibn ʿArabī, few Ibn ʿArabī 
scholars have read al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī closely. Ibn ʿArabī not 
only cites al-Tirmidhī by name, but his works are tightly connected 
to motifs and approaches inaugurated by al-Tirmidhī. Based on our 
preceding discussion of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya, we will 
examine in this chapter how this doctrine provides important 
interpretative potential for understanding Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of 
walāya. The ring mathal, in particular, is used by Ibn ʿArabī to 
structure his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (The Ring Stones of Wisdom). Another 
less well known continuation of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya is 
in the ḥikma tradition of the early Shādhilī masters of the Shādhilī 
Ṭarīqa. 
 
 In Chapters 3 and 4 we discussed how al-Tirmidhī’s influence on the Islamic mystical 
tradition was not limited to his influence on Ibn ʿArabī. Al-Tirmidhī played an important role in 
the development of Sufism in the great mystical synthesis of the 5th/11th-century in Nīshāpūr and 
this had a decisive impact on the form Sufism would take thereafter. Al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood (walāya) played a crucial role in establishing the religious authority of the Ṣūfī shaykh. 
Even Ibn ʿArabī’s debt to al-Tirmidhī is not completely appreciated despite important 
contributions to this study by Chodkiewicz. This has partly been due to an incomplete 
appreciation of some of al-Tirmidhī’s foundational concepts. As a result of our further 
examination of al-Tirmidhī’s ring mathal, we can see that Ibn ʿArabī takes the main structure of 
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his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam from al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood, although he has clearly made 
important additions and changes. Similarly, the founders of the Shādhilī Ṭarīqa (Ṣūfī 
brotherhood) in North Africa relied heavily on al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya and expanded 
his approach to ḥikma. 
 
The Ring Mathal in Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam 
 The influence of al-Tirmidhī on the thought of Ibn ʿArabī has been discussed widely in 
the field of Islamic mysticism.517 Ibn ʿArabī engages al-Tirmidhī directly and quotes him in a 
number of his works, primarily his al-Futuḥāt al-Makkiyya (The Meccan Revelations) and Fuṣūṣ 
al-Ḥikam (The Ring Stones of Wisdom). Probably most fascinating is the series of one hundred 
and fifty-seven questions that al-Tirmidhī poses to anyone who would claim sainthood. These 
questions are quite elusive and arcane and no one seems to have attempted to answer them until 
Ibn ʿArabī devoted a treatise to this task under the title al-Jawāb al-Mustaqīm ʿammā saʾala 
ʿanhu al-Tirmidhī al-Ḥakīm (The Direct Reply to the Questions of al-Tirmidhī the Ḥakīm). These 
answers were then included in chapter seventy-three of al-Futuḥāt including more detail than the 
original work.518 According to Radtke, Ibn ʿArabī merely uses al-Tirmidhī’s questions as a 
platform to express his own ideas.519 This view oversimplifies a fascinating example of 
intertextuality between authors who lived some three hundred years apart. Ibn ʿArabī’s answers 
are often quite specific about details that cannot be corroborated in any way, such as the number 
of stations (manāzil) of the saints (awliyāʾ). For example, Ibn ʿArabī says there are two hundred 
                                                          
517 Osman Yahya, Michel Chodkiewicz, Bernd Ratke, Richard McGregor, Alexander Knysh, Binyamin Abrahamov 
et al. 
518 Michel Chodkiewicz. Seal of the saints: prophethood and sainthood in the doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī. Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society. 1993, p. 32. 
519 Bernd Radtke. “The Concepts of Walāya in Early Sufism,” in L. Lewinsohn (ed.), The Heritage of Sufism. vol. I. 
1999, p. 487. 
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and forty-eight thousand spiritual (maʿnawiyya) stations.520 In effect, Ibn ʿArabī is displaying his 
qualifications to speak about sainthood by answering al-Tirmidhī’s challenge and the answers are 
both confident and often exact in nature. As Chodkiewicz remarks, it is a spiritual tournament 
between two solitaires and Ibn ʿArabī takes up the challenge triumphantly.521 Ibn ʿArabī, 
himself, identified al-Tirmidhī’s questions as a test (imtiḥān).  
 Like al-Tirmidhī, sainthood (walāya) for Ibn ʿArabī forms one of the most central and 
important aspects of his thought.522 The FH is a summary of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of walāya and 
a central theme in this work is the ring (khātam). We will attempt to demonstrate how the ring 
mathal, which Ibn ʿArabī clearly adopts from al-Tirmidhī, can only be completely understood in 
light of al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of the ring (khātam) and the ring stone (faṣṣ). In his introduction 
to Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ, Abū ʿAlā ʿAfīfī laments Ibn ʿArabī’s indirect figurative approach and 
vague allusions, which seem to complicate the efforts of the reader to understand exactly what 
Ibn ʿArabī is often talking about.523 For ʿAfīfī, Ibn ʿArabī makes “the power of thought a great 
deal subservient to the power of his imagination.”524 Part of the challenge in understanding Ibn 
ʿArabī is understanding the amthāl (analogies) that form the connection between the unseen 
world and the seen world just as we have shown with al-Tirmidhī.525 As Corbin tells us, these 
                                                          
520 Ibid. Seal of the saints, p. 53. 
521 Ibid, p. 32. 
522 Ibid, p. 47. 
523 Ibn ʿArabī, Muhyī al-Dīn. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, li-Muḥyī al-Dīn b. ʿArabī wa-l-taʿlīqāt ʿalayh bi-qalam Abū al-ʿIlā 
ʿAfīfī. Ed. A. E. ʿAfīfī. Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʻArabī. 1966, p. 19. 
524 Ibid, p. 19. 
525 Sleep is the realm of imagination for Ibn ʿArabī and sleep is the intermediate realm between life and death, it is a 
type of living death and in that sense is an intermediate realm between the opposites of life and death. It is in this 
realm that we find the imaginal and amthāl (analogies) are the substance of dreams. In this realm the dreamer can 
access disembodied intelligible entities in the form of corporeal sensory objects. According to Ibn ʿArabī, dreams 
must always be interpreted and their interpretation requires special knowledge from God. Felek, Özgen, and 




amthāl (analogies) are as real for Ibn ʿArabī as the physical world.526  Given the strong 
connection between Ibn ʿArabī and al-Tirmidhī it is strange that, as of yet, no one has drawn a 
comparison between the structure of Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam and the ring mathal of al-
Tirmidhī. This comparison is highly significant because it indicates the extent of al-Tirmidhī’s 
influence on the Islamic doctrine of sainthood in its later form and helps to clarify important 
aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine that are often difficult to interpret. 
 Michel Chodkiewicz is probably the foremost expert on Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of 
sainthood. Nevertheless, it is unclear why he does not give more importance to the ring mathal. 
One possible reason for this is that I believe he misinterprets some aspects of the ring mathal 
itself. Chodkiewicz writes:  
The setting (faṣṣ, plural fuṣūṣ) of a ring is the part which encloses 
the precious stone. The word recurs in the title of each chapter 
where it is followed by two determinants: a ‘wisdom’ (ḥikma), 
which is itself qualified by an adjective; and a ‘word’ (kalima) 
connected with one of the twenty-seven prophets. Thus, for 
example, we have ‘the setting of divine wisdom in the Word of 
Adam’, ‘the setting of the wisdom of the heart in the Word of 
Shuʿayb’, and so on. In this way a series of spiritual types is built 
up, of whom each is in some sense defined as the intersection of an 
aspect of divine Wisdom with the human vessel that encloses it 
and thereby imposes its own limits on it. As we shall see, this 
structure is in no way a mere rhetorical device, but corresponds 
symbolically with the actual structure of walāya.527 
 
While Chodkiewicz indicates the importance of the ring to Ibn ʿArabī’s structure of walāya and 
mentions that this will be demonstrated later in the book, we do not find the topic addressed in 
much detail later in his work. In fact, Chodkiewicz mistakenly interprets the word faṣṣ (pl. fuṣūṣ) 
to mean the “part which encloses the precious stone”, rather than the stone itself. This may be 
                                                          
526 Ibid. Mundus Imaginalis, p. 5. We can distinguish these analogies from the Platonic Forms in that they are not 
the abstract sources of physical objects in the world, but rather a vehicle for apprehending divine knowledge. 
527 Ibid. Seal of the saints, pp. 48–49. 
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one reason that he does not fully explicate the implications of the ring mathal for interpreting Ibn 
ʿArabī’s doctrine of walāya. The word faṣṣ (pl. fuṣūṣ) in Arabic means the stone that is enclosed 
by the ring and not the casing itself that encloses the stone as Chodkiewicz indicates.528 This 
interpretation of the word faṣṣ, as meaning the setting or the precious stone that is set in a ring, is 
how al-Tirmidhī presents the ring mathal. The close correspondence between al-Tirmidhī’s ring 
mathal and Ibn ʿArabī’s ring imagery in the Fuṣūṣ further reinforces this interpretation. 
 In his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam Ibn ʿArabī describes the knowledge-types of twenty-seven 
prophets, each with a different wisdom (ḥikma), word (kalima) and stone (faṣṣ). As Chodkiewicz 
mentions, the first section in the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam is the chapter titled: “The Ring Stone of Divine 
Wisdom in the Adamic Word.”529 The title of each chapter of the Fuṣūṣ follows the same pattern 
but in each case for a different prophet or messenger. For example, the last chapter is titled: “The 
Ring Stone of Singularity (Non-duality) in the Muḥammadan Word.” If we recall from our 
discussion in Chapter 5, al-Tirmidhī uses the ring mathal to explain the difference between the 
saints (awliyāʾ) or elite (khawāṣṣ) and the common (ʿāmma) among the Muslims. While both of 
these groups outwardly say the same words to remember God (dhikr), for al-Tirmidhī, these 
words come from different sources (maʿādin, literally ‘mines’) just as the ring stones of various 
rings differ in quality and come from different mines within the earth. In terms of al-Tirmidhī’s 
metaphorical approach, the elite (khāṣṣa) and the common (ʿāmma) are the same ‘outwardly’ (fī 
al-ẓāhir) and are represented by the silver part of the ring, which is of almost equal weight 
among rings and is almost negligible when accounting for the actual value of the ring. Yet, 
‘inwardly’ (fī al-bāṭin) there is a tremendous difference between the actual value of the rings 
                                                          
528 The meaning of faṣṣ (pl. fuṣūṣ) as precious stone and not the encasing of the stone is supported by Lane’s Lexicon 
(see p. 2458 under faṣṣ), Lisān al-ʿArab, Muʿjam al-Wasīṭ, and Hans Wehr.  
529 Note that my translation here differs from that of Chodkiewicz above in order to better bring out the significance 
of the ring mathal. 
 220 
 
based in the value of their individual stones. Al-Tirmidhī uses this mathal to address a 
theological issue relating to the actual and perceived difference between believers. As we will 
see, Ibn ʿArabī uses the same basic structure in order to address a different but related issue, 
namely, the difference between the prophets/messengers and the Muḥammadan reality (ḥaqīqa 
Muḥammadiyya). In FH, we have ring stones (fuṣūṣ) that are different for each prophet and are 
indicated in each chapter with a specific title, such as “the ring stone of divine wisdom” etc… 
Then there is the word (kalima) that represents the silver ring that encases the stone. In the 
example of the Prophet Adam the ring stone is from the ‘mine’ (maʿdan) of divine wisdom, 
which is set in the “ring of Adam”, with the ring representing “his word”. In this sense, we can 
read the title of the first chapter as: Faṣṣ Ḥikma Ilāhiyya [murakkab] fī Kalimatin Ᾱdamiyya, 
“The Ring Stone of Divine Wisdom [set] in the Adamic Word”. The major commentaries on the 
Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam do not bring out this correspondence between the word (kalima) and the silver 
ring.530 Part of the ambiguity rests in Ibn ʿArabī’s oblique style, but also, one would not 
necessarily understand this point without fully understanding that Ibn ʿArabī is basing his mathal 
on the ring mathal of al-Tirmidhī, and al-Tirmidhī is very explicit about what each part of the 
mathal represents, with the fuṣūṣ (ring stones) representing the qualitative nature of the saint’s 
                                                          
530 Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 998/1492) identifies the faṣṣ (pl. fuṣūṣ) as that which beautifies the ring and 
upon which the name of the owner of the ring is carved, and which he uses to stamp his seal. Jāmī identifies the faṣṣ 
and the ring band as a powerful mathal but does not interpret it in the same way that al-Tirmidhī does. For Jāmī the 
faṣṣ represents the non-dual (aḥadiyyati jamʿihimā) point of singularity that joins the two bands together just as the 
heart of the believer joins the opposites of necessity and possibility in the created world. ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī 
(d. 1143/1730) likens the faṣṣ to the Adamic body, which contains all of the possibilities of perfection. ʿAbd al-
Ghanī sees the faṣṣ as the point of the ring and the naqsh (writing on the stone) to be the point of the faṣṣ. Hence, for 
ʿAbd al-Ghanī the words (kalimāt) are represented by the writing on the stone that is the seal. ʿAbd al-Ghanī b. 
Ismāʿīl al-Nābulsī, Ibn ʿArabī, and Jāmī. Sharḥ jawāhir al-nuṣūṣ fī ḥall kalimāt al-Fuṣūṣ. Miṣr: Maṭbaʿat al-Zamān. 
1887, pp. 13–16. Ibn ʿArabī’s Kitāb Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ, which is a summary of his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam does not shed light 
on his use of the ring mathal. Jāmī’s commentary or the Naqsh states many of the same points he makes in his 
commentary on the Fuṣūṣ. 
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(walī) remembrance (dhikr), while the word (kalima) represents the vehicle that holds this 
remembrance, which corresponds to the silver part of the ring. 
 Understanding the legally valid attributes of the Sharīʿa compliant ring (khātam sharʿī) 
for men and women is important to understanding the significance of this mathal used by al-
Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. According to Islamic law men are permitted to wear a silver ring, 
sometimes of a specified weight while women can wear both silver and gold. Al-Tirmidhī 
indicates the importance of the legal ring in NU where he describes the legal specifications for 
the use of rings by men and women. The significance of the khātam sharʿī is that the stone that is 
set in the ring has no value according to the Sharīʿa because zakāt (alms tax) is only calculated 
for the value of the silver or gold part of the ring and not the value of the stone. To this effect al-
Tirmidhī cites a ḥadīth in which Ḥafṣa, one of the wives of the Prophet, had a necklace made of 
precious stones worth up to thirty-thousand dirhams that she gave to the womenfolk of the 
Caliph ʿUmar, but she did not pay zakāt on it.531 Hence, from the point of view of the Sharīʾa the 
only real value to the ring is the value of the metal and the stone has no particular value. On the 
other hand, from the point of view of the real economic value of the ring, the stone is what 
actually determines the value and the metal band is not the significant factor. Here we can see 
how the ring mathal functions to resolve the apparent contradiction between the equivalence of 
all believers as opposed to the variance in spiritual rank between those same believers. The ring 
thus exhibits the dual aspects of Sharīʿa (Law) and Ḥaqīqa (divine reality) that are so important 
in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. As we discussed in Chapter 3 the topic of belief (imān) and what 
constitutes a believer (muʾmin) was particularly important during the 9th-century C.E. when al-
Tirmidhī was writing. For Ibn ʿArabī the more important topic was the relationship between the 
                                                          
531 Ibid. Nawādir, pp. 129–130. 
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Prophet Muḥammad and the rest of the prophets. This is a topic in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought that 
addresses the universality of Islam as well as the relationship between Islam and other religions. 
The flexibility of the ring mathal allows Ibn ʿArabī to use it as a means of commenting on issues 
that were more cogent in his time.532 
 Commentators on Ibn ʿArabī’s FH have not brought out the connection between the 
silver/gold ring band and the word (kalima). Rather, ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī (d. 1143/1730), 
for example, interprets the word (kalima) as a divine meaning or reality (ḥaqīqa), while Nūr al-
Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 998/1492) interprets the word (kalima) as the actual person of the 
Prophet and his community (umma).533 If we use al-Tirmidhī’s structure of the ring mathal we 
will understand that the metal band of the ring represents the word (kalima). This connotation 
helps us to understand various aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s argument in the FH. For example, in the 
chapter titled, Faṣṣ Ḥikma Aḥadiyya fī Kalima Hūdiyya, (The Ringstone of the Wisdom of Unicity 
[set] in the Word of Hūd), Ibn ʿArabī explains a vision he had at Cordoba in 586/1190 in which 
he saw all of the prophets and messengers at a gathering and was spoken to personally by the 
Prophet Hūd.534 In this meeting the Prophet Hūd recites the words of the Qurʾān (11:56), mā min 
dābba illā huwa ākhidhun bi-nāṣiyatihā inna rabbī ʿalā ṣirāṭin mustaqīm, “There is no creature 
except that he takes it by its forelock, indeed my Lord is upon a straight path.” Here, Ibn ʿArabī 
illustrates the relationship between the Prophet Hūd and the Prophet Muḥammad. The words 
used by Hūd are the same as the words used by the Prophet Muḥammad because these are words 
found in the Qurʾān. Thus, at one level these prophets are of the same station just as the weight 
                                                          
532 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 605/1209) was a contemporary of Ibn ʿArabī and went into great detail expositing the 
virtues of Muḥammad as the greatest of the prophets providing nineteen proofs for his preeminence. Al-Rāzī, Fakhr 
al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿUmar. Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī: al-mushahhar bi-l-Tafsīr al-kabīr wa-Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. 
Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr. 1981, vol. 6, pp. 209–214. 
533 Ibid. Sharḥ jawāhir al-nuṣūṣ, pp. 14–16. 
534 Ibid. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 110. 
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of the silver in the ring is the same for each ring. The meaning implied by Hūd through the 
recitation of this verse, however, is unique to the mine (maʿdan) of his heart, which is 
represented by his ring stone (faṣṣ). While the mine (maʿdan) of Hūd is limited to a particular 
area of the spiritual geography laid out by al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī, the Prophet Muḥammad, 
as a mercy to all of the worlds (raḥmatan li-l-ʿālamīn), represents the entire spiritual earth and, 
hence, the mine of Hūd is just one of the mines of Muḥammad. As Ibn ʿArabī then continues to 
say, it is the Prophet Muḥammad that completes the implication of Hūd’s meaning as he recites 
this verse. The completion of this meaning is the Prophet’s saying in a hadīth qudsī (God’s 
speech revealed in the Prophet’s own words) that God becomes the hearing, seeing, hand, foot 
and tongue of the true chosen servant (ʿabd). What Ibn ʿArabī indicates through this discourse 
between prophets is a picture of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) that is pieced together 
through his references to the continuous line of the prophets only to be completed by 
Muḥammad as the seal of the prophets. Through Hūd we know that the path (ṣirāṭ) is not just the 
path of the Lord, but that his Lord (rabb) is the path (ṣirāṭ) upon which the servant walks.535 It is 
through Muḥammad, though, that we also know that his Lord (rabb) is the true servant, himself, 
who is walking.536 If from one point of the view the Lord (rabb) is the path and from another 
point of view the Lord (rabb) is the one walking upon the path, then, as Ibn ʿArabī might say: 
Where is the servant (ʿabd)? As understood through a close reading of the FH, for Ibn ʿArabī, 
the term Lord (rabb) is a facet of God’s (Allāh’s) person (dhāt) and both rubūbiyya (lordship) 
and ʿubūdiyya (servanthood) are opposites that define each other. Hence, the manifestation of 
lordship occurs when the servant realizes his pure servanthood. This is similar to al-Tirmidhī’s 
                                                          
535 Ibid, p. 109. 
536 Ibid, p. 110. 
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concept of the awliyāʾ as the site of God’s theophany. Ibn ʿArabī’s discourse leads the reader to 
ask: How do you expect to find God if you are not even on the path (ṭarīq)? 
 Like al-Tirmidhī, Ibn ʿArabī uses the ring mathal to discuss both the sealer of saints 
(khātim al-awliyāʾ) and the sealer of prophets (khātim al-nabiyyīn). Ibn ʿArabī introduces 
another mathal (analogy) to support the ring mathal in this regard. He uses the mathal of the wall 
that is mentioned in a prophetic ḥadīth in which the Prophet Muḥammad describes himself as the 
last brick in the wall of prophecy that completes God’s religion. Ibn ʿArabī adds that, in fact, 
there are two bricks missing in that wall. One of them is a golden brick representing the Prophet 
Muḥammad and the second is a silver brick representing the sealer of saints (awliyāʾ). These 
bricks come from the same mine (maʿdan), as represented by the entire earth rather than a 
particular mine as in the case of particular prophets.537 This concept of walāya and its 
relationship to governance in particular areas of the earth was first articulated by al-Tirmidhī in 
his NU. The prophet or saint receives his spiritual knowledge in relation to the mine (maʿdan) 
that relates to the particular area of that prophet or saint’s jurisdiction. This structure is mirrored 
closely in Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of prophethood and sainthood both in the ring and the wall 
analogies (amthāl). Al-Tirmidhī writes: 
Wa-kullu amīrin muʾnatuhu ʿalā qadri raʿiyyatihi fa-l-amīru al-
mabʿūthu ilā kawratin muḥtājun ʿalā qadri wilāyatihi ilā ālati al-
wilāya min al-khadam wa-l-dawābbi wa-l-marākib wa-l-kanz li-
yunfiq fī imāratihi fa-man ummira ʿalā ṭakhāristān fa-huwa aqallu 
haẓẓan min hādhihi al-ashyāʾ allati waṣafnā wa-man ummira ʿalā 
khurāsān kānat iḥtāja ilā kanzin ʿaẓīm wa-man malaka al-mashriq 
wa-l-maghrib wa-l-arḍa kullahā iḥtāja ilā khazāʾin al-amwāl ḥattā 
yaḍbiṭ bihā dhālika al-mulk fa-kadhālika kullu rasūlin buʿitha ilā 
qawmin uʿṭiya min kanzi al-tawḥid wa-jawāhir al-maʿrifa ʿalā 
qadri mā ḥamala min al-risāla fa-l-mursalu ilā qawmihi fī 
nāḥiyatin min al-arḍ innamā yuʿṭā min al-nubuwwa min hādhihi al-
kunūz ʿalā qadri mā yaqūmu bihi fī shaʾni nubuwwatihi wa-
riʿayati qawmihi wa-l-mursalu ilā jamīʿi al-arḍi kāffatan insihā wa-
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jinnihā [ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam] uʿṭiya min al-maʿrifa bi-
qadri mā yaqūmu bihā fī shaʾn al-nubuwwa ilā jamīʿi ahl al-arḍ 
kāffatan fa-haẓẓuhu min qawlihi [ṣallā Allahu ʿalayhi wa-sallam] 
buʿithtu ilā al-aḥmar wa-l-aswad wa-min qawl Allāhi lahu wa-mā 
arsalnāka illā kāffatan li-l-nās ka-ḥaẓẓi min wilāyati malik yamliku 
al-dunyā sharqihā wa-gharbihā wa-mā baynahumā wa-man 
malaka al-arḍ kullahā wa-jawāhir al-arḍ kulliha wa-maʿadinahā 
lahu wa-al-malik alladhi yamliku nāḥiyatan min al-arḍ laysa lahu 
illā maʿdin nāḥiyatihi wa-jawhar dhālika al-maʿdan faqaṭ fa-
lidhālika qāla rasūl Allāh ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam ukhtuṣira 
lī al-ḥadīth wa-ūtītu jawāmiʿa al-kalim.538 
 
Every commander’s supplies are commensurate with his following. 
The commander who is sent to a particular district needs, 
according to the level of his authority, the instruments of that 
authority, be they servants or beasts of burden or ships or treasure 
in order to in order to spend on his government. Whoever is given 
command over Ṭakhāristān, has less of a portion of these things 
that we have described. The one who is given command over 
Khurāsān [on the other hand], his need for what we have 
mentioned is even more. Whoever is the commander of the faithful 
needs a huge treasure trove and whoever is the king of the East and 
the West and the entire world needs the storehouses of all wealth 
so that he can use that dominion appropriately. Likewise every 
messenger who is sent to a particular people is given a portion of 
the treasure of tawḥīd (the unity of God) and the gems of gnosis 
commensurate with the degree of the message he carries. So, the 
messenger who is sent to his people in a particular place on earth is 
only given the degree of prophethood and treasure that is 
commensurate with what he must execute of the affair of his 
prophethood and the responsibility he has for his people. Similarly, 
the messenger sent to all of the people of the earth in totality, both 
its humans and its spirits, may God bless him and grant him peace, 
is given a gnosis commensurate with what he must execute 
concerning the affair of his prophethood as it applies to all the 
people of the earth. So, his portion of his saying, may God bless 
him and grant him peace, ‘I was sent to the red and the black’ and 
God’s saying, most high, ‘We did not send you except to all 
mankind,’ is like his portion of the governance and authority of a 
king who owns the entire world its East and West and what is 
between them. Whoever owns all of the world, its gems and its 
mines (maʿādin) and likewise whoever owns a portion of the 
world, he only has the mine of his portion and the gem of that 
mine. That is why he said, may God bless him and grant him 
                                                          
538 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 5, p. 286. 
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peace, ‘Speech was abbreviated for me and I was given 
comprehensive and all encompassing words.’ 
 
In this excerpt al-Tirmidhī draws a connection between spiritual governance and physical 
geography. This is picked up by Ibn ʿArabī and becomes the foundation for his doctrine of 
sainthood and prophethood. For both al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī the physical world is a heuristic 
tool for understanding the spiritual or celestial realms. This is a type of ‘reading the world’ 
through analogies (amthāl). For al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī, the physical world is not just a map 
of the celestial world, but a site of God’s theophany (tajallī) and a key to accessing that 
theophany. This is not the microcosm/macrocosm dichotomy we mentioned before in Chapter 2, 
although this dichotomy is certainly important in the work of both al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. 
Rather, the point here is that analogies (amthāl) are a bridge, not between the human being and 
the cosmos, but between the inward (bāṭin) and the outward (ẓāhir). For al-Tirmidhī, the ring 
stone of one person’s heart may have its source (mine) at the level of the physical universe, for 
others it is at the level of the malakūt (angelic realm), and for still others it is at the level of the 
sovereign king (malik al-mulk), i.e., God himself, in his very presence (bayna yadayhi).539 
Hence, the heart of different individuals may be connected to different realms of the universe. 
The ring stones from these different mines will refract the divine light of God differently 
depending on their source. 
 Ibn ʿArabī does not simply recapitulate al-Tirmidhī’s use of the ring mathal. Rather, he 
reformulates it and extends it. For al-Tirmidhī, the faṣṣ (ring stone) represents the heart of the 
saint and, as we mentioned before, al-Tirmidhī uses the ring mathal to talk about the difference 
between the ordinary believer and the saint. For Ibn ʿArabī, the ring stones become archetypes 
for specific modes of prophethood. These modes of prophethood are encompassed by and have 
                                                          
539 Ibid. ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ, p. 173. 
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their source in the prophethood of Muḥammad, while at the same time being equally valid 
expressions of the divine theophany. For Ibn ʿArabī, the saints inherit (yarithūna) their sainthood 
from the mine (maʿdan) of a particular prophet. Ibn ʿArabī and his close students considered 
himself to be the sealer of Muḥammadan sainthood (khātim al-walāya al-muḥammadīyya) and in 
that sense he inherits meanings whose mine is the entire created universe, just like the Prophet 
Muḥammad. While the ring stones (fuṣūṣ) represent the archetypes of the various prophets, Ibn 
ʿArabī sees the saints (awliyāʾ) as representing the casings that enclose the stones in the different 
rings. These casings have different forms depending on the number of facets in the stone and its 
particular shape. Ibn ʿArabī explains the place of the saints in the overall scheme of the ring 
mathal in the chapter titled, The Ring Stone of the Heart [set] in the Word of Shuʿaib: 
Fa inna al-qalb min al-ʿārif aw al-insān al-kāmil bi-manzilati 
maḥall faṣṣ al-khātam min al-khātam lā yafḍulu bal yakūnu ʿalā 
qadrihi wa shaklihi min al-istidāra in kāna al-faṣṣ mustadīran aw 
min al-tarbīʿ wa-l-tasdīs wa-l-tathmīn wa-ghayri dhālika min al-
ashkāl in kāna al-faṣṣ murabbaʿan aw musaddasan aw 
muthamanan aw mā kāna min al-ashkāl fa-inna maḥallahu min al-
khātam yakūnu mithlahu lā ghayr.540 
 
Indeed the heart of the gnostic or the perfected human being is 
analogous to the casing of the ring stone of the ring in relation to 
the ring itself. It is not wider, rather it is exactly equal to its size 
and shape, whether it is round if the ring stone is round, or whether 
it is square or hexagonal or octagonal or other than that in shape if 
the ring stone happens to be square-shaped or hexagonal-shaped or 
octagonal-shaped or whatever shape it happens to have. The casing 
of the ring stone in relation to the ring will always fit exactly. 
 
We can see here how the ring mathal structures Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of prophethood and 
sainthood; however, the mathal itself is flexible enough to be interpreted differently by both al-
Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. Nevertheless, we can clearly say that this type of ‘thinking through 
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analogies’ is inspired by al-Tirmidhī and wholeheartedly adopted by Ibn ʿArabī as an alternative 
to speculative theology (Kalām) and philosophy (Falsafa). 
Ibn ʿArabī’s Doctrine of Sainthood  
 Chodkiewicz summarizes Ibn ʿArabī’s hagiology, or doctrine of walāya, as revolving 
around three fundamental notions: wirātha (inheritance),541 niyāba (the substitution of the walī 
in a role that ultimately belongs to the Muḥammadan reality) and qurba (proximity).542 Our 
discussion, thus far, about the relationship between al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī and their use of 
the ring mathal to structure their doctrines of walāya, forces us to look anew at Chodkiewicz’ 
summary of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of walāya. The ring mathal is an analogy that describes how 
God’s theophany (tajallī) appears in the world. The silver or gold band represents the words of 
the divine remembrance (dhikr) and these words hold the ring stone that is set in the ring. The 
ring stone comes from different sources (mines), the stones of which carry different values. The 
ring stone represents the heart of the walī according to al-Tirmidhī and the heart of the 
prophet/messenger, according to Ibn ʿArabī. Thus, when the walī or prophet/messenger speaks, 
the divine meaning, which corresponds to the mine (maʿdan) that his heart is connected to in the 
unseen world (ghayb), then becomes manifest in the seen world (al-ʿālam al-ẓāhir). Thus, it is 
the heart of the walī/prophet/messenger that represents the conduit by which God’s divine light 
(nūr) shines into the world. If we understand that this structure is shared by both al-Tirmidhī and 
Ibn ʿArabī we should venture to say that theophany (tajallī) is probably the most important 
aspect of Ibn ʿArabī’s hagiology. While wirātha (spiritual heritage) and niyāba (substitution) 
definitely play defining roles in that hagiology, we would dispute the extent to which qurba 
(nearness) plays an important role. For Ibn ʿArabī nearness (qurba) and distance (buʿd) are 
                                                          
541 Chodkiewicz translates this term as “the heritage of a spiritual knowledge.” 
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relative qualities with respect to the saint (walī). For example, one of the reasons given by Ibn 
ʿArabī for the gathering of prophets at Cordoba mentioned earlier, was to intercede with the 
Prophet Muḥammad on behalf of al-Ḥusayn b. Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj who had been insolent about 
him.543 For Ibn ʿArabī qurb (nearness) itself can be a veil to the manifestation of God.544 As we 
discussed generally about Islamic sainthood, nearness (qurba) is one aspect of sainthood in the 
Islamic tradition but not its defining point. 
 Instead of qurb (nearness), a more defining element of walāya for Ibn ʿArabī is 
knowledge (ʿilm). For example, Ibn ʿArabī states in his Futūḥāt al-Makiyya (Meccan 
Revelations) that God never takes an ignorant person to be his saint (walī).545 For Ibn ʿArabī, 
though, a walī has knowledge of tawḥīd (God’s oneness). Tawḥīd is different from shahada (the 
witnessing of faith in Islam). Ibn ʿArabī sees tawḥīd as more general than the shahada because 
tawḥīd is understood “from any perspective” (bi-ayyi wajhin kān). Ibn ʿArabī is ambivilant about 
whether or not this is restricted to Islam.546 This is very different than al-Tirmidhī’s 
understanding of the muwaḥḥid, who is strictly someone who testifies to God’s oneness through 
the testification of faith.547 While al-Tirmidhī extends the possibility of walāya to all Muslims, 
Ibn ʿArabī extends the possibility of walāya to all of humanity.548 
                                                          
543 Ibid, p. 132. 
544 Ibid. Khatm al-awliyāʾ, p. 269. 
545 Ibid, p. 166. 
546 Ibid, pp. 166–167. Ibn ʿArabī first says that the muwaḥḥid is one who expresses tawḥīd through any means, 
however, he then begins a discussion about how the testification of faith as mentioned in the Qurʾān is protected by 
God’s testifying to his own oneness before and after the testification lest any damned person (shaqī) have access to 
it. This could be interpreted to mean that no muwaḥḥid will be damned to Hell. On the other hand it could mean that 
tawḥīd is simply the belief in the heart and not the outward testification of faith. This would make sense with Ibn 
ʿArabī’s approach to the status of Pharaoh, who he counts among those who will not ultimately be among the 
damned (ashqiyāʾ) because of his act of faith uttered in extremis. Ibid. Seal of the saints, p. 161. Pharaoh’s 
testification of faith is not considered a willful act because it was made at the point of death as if under duress. 
Furthermore, Pharaoh testifies to belief in the God of the Israelites and does not mention the formal testification 
which mentions God’s name. 
547 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 6, p. 141. 
548 Ibid. Thalāthat muṣannafāt, p. 141. 
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 Al-Tirmidhī made an important claim when he stated that the awliyāʾ were the true 
khulafāʾ (successors of the Prophet). For al-Tirmidhī, this khilāfa (vicegerency) is not the khilāfa 
extended to Adam upon his descent to earth and through which human beings are distinguished 
from other creatures in God’s creation. As we mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4, al-Tirmidhī sees 
the awliyāʾ as the real and rightful religious authorities of the Muslim community (umma). Ibn 
ʿArabī also discusses khilāfa but uses it in the other sense to mean the special status of human 
beings in the world.549 From this point of view Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of walāya seems less 
powerful than al-Tirmidhī’s, because its social and political implications are less. As we 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya served to sanctify the scholarly 
class (ʿulamāʾ) even while it was a strong critique of this class. This was because al-Tirmidhī did 
not establish any clear external criteria for identifying the awliyāʾ. Rather, al-Tirmidhī 
considered knowledge of the Sharīʿa [defined by al-Tirmidhī as the knowledge of the halāl 
(permissible) and the ḥarām (impermissible)] to be the entry point for the higher levels of 
walāya. Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of walāya, on the other hand, appears to undermine the power and 
authority of the scholarly class (ʿulamāʾ) to the benefit of the Ṣūfī shaykh by establishing the 
latter as an independent authority without needing the qualification of Sharīʿa knowledge.550 Al-
Tirmidhī seeks to reform and empower the scholarly class, while Ibn ʿArabī disempowers the 
scholarly class and empowers the Ṣūfī shaykh as an independent actor. However, for both al-
                                                          
549 Ibn ʿArabī sees vicegerency in a more abstract sense of being the reason that God preserves his creation. The 
khalīfa (successor) can only be a perfected human being (al-insān al-kāmil). Sometimes this individual may 
coincide with outward authority or may not, however, the principal of khilāfa (successorship or vicegerency) does 
not necessarily imply outward authority for Ibn ʿArabī. Ibid. Seal of the saints, p. 70. 
550 A testament to this are the awliyā (saints) highlighted in his work Sufis of Andalusia, who clearly are not from the 
ʿulamāʾ class. It seems that sainthood in the western lands of Islamdom more often generate this type of saint and 




Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī the discussion around walāya is a discussion about authority and 
prophecy.  
 
A Continuation of al-Tirmidhī’s Non-dual Metaphysics 
 We discussed in Chapter 2 how al-Tirmidhī posits a cosmos composed of duals as a 
way of framing God’s non-duality. If by God’s oneness we mean that God is the only true 
singularity, then God is not just ‘one’ like other objects but a unique type of oneness that has no 
opposite. The term al-Tirmidhī uses for this is fardāniyya (singularity or non-duality). This term 
denotes the idea of being alone and without opposite.551 For al-Tirmidhī, certain traces of God’s 
theophany (tajallī) must exist in the world in order for the world to continue its existence. The 
highest group of the awliyāʾ are seen as traces (āthār) of God in the world and they attain the 
station (manzil) of fardānīyya, that is, they take on certain qualities that are non-dual in nature. It 
is in this way that al-Tirmidhī considers the awliyāʾ to be a ḥujja (standard) for the people who 
live in their time because the awliyāʾ are the point of reference by which the actions of those 
people will be judged. This is similar to how the Qurʾān presents the Prophet Muḥammad as a 
witness or ḥujja (standard) for all of mankind. This dualistic cosmology and non-dual theology 
forms the backdrop to the thought of al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. We have already provided 
some examples of al-Tirmidhī’s non-dual theology in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. However, in 
order to demonstrate the interconnected nature of the thought of both al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī, 
we will show how Ibn ʿArabī builds upon a foundation provided by al-Tirmidhī. In NU al-
Tirmidhī explains how the highest of the awliyāʾ not only pass beyond the world of opposites but 
                                                          
551 The word fard is implicitly tied to the concept of duality. According to Ibn Manẓūr in his Lisān al-ʿArab the 
word fard indicates one of a pair. However, since God has no pair he is one without a pair while all other created 
things have pairs in the Qurʾānic cosmology. Ibid. Lisān al-ʿArab, vol. 2, p. 292. Al-Tirmidhī takes this word and 
creates a nisba adjective fardānī from which the abstract noun is derived fardānīyya. 
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beyond God’s attributes that are connected to dualities in the world such as his beauty and 
majesty: 
Fa idhā kāna qalbuhu ʿindahu fī mulk al-jamāl fa-l-ghālib ʿalayhi 
al-uns wa-jazāʾ al-uns wa-idhā kāna qalbuhu ʿindahu mulk al-jalāl 
fa-l-ghālib ʿalayhi al-hayba wa-jazāʾ al-hayba minhu al-yawm al-
amn ghadan wa jazāʾ al-uns bihi al-yawm al-aml ghadan. Wa ṣinfun 
min al-awliyāʾ aʿlā min hādhayn al-ṣinfayn wa-hum al-
muḥaddathūna qad qarabū min maḥall al-anbiyāʾ fa-qulūbuhum 
ʿindahu fī mulk mulkihi qad jāwazat mulk al-jalāl wa-l-jamāl ilā 
fardāniyyatihi fa-infardū bihi fī waḥdaniyyatihi .552 
 
So if his heart is with him (God) in the dominion of beauty (jamāl) 
then the preponderance of his state is intimacy with him (God) and 
the recompense for intimacy is hope [for what his fate will be] 
after that. [On the other hand] whoever’s heart is with him (God) 
in the dominion of majesty (jalāl) the preponderance of his state is 
awe and the recompense for awe of him (God) is security after that 
and the recompense for intimacy with him on that Day is hope 
after that. A group of the saints is higher than these two groups and 
they are the ones spoken to by God. They have come nigh to the 
station of the prophets because their hearts are with him in the 
dominion of his dominion. [Their hearts] have surpassed the 
dominion of beauty and the majesty to reach absolute aloneness 
and so they have become solitaries through him in his oneness. 
 
In this passage we can see how many of the elements of al-Tirmidhī’s non-dual theology come 
together. There is the basic idea that human hearts are connected to different realms represented 
by mines (maʿādin) within the earth. Although al-Tirmidhī doesn’t mention mines (maʿādin) in 
this passage, we discussed earlier how, for al-Tirmidhī, mines in the earth connect to realms in 
the ghayb (unseen). The human soul was created from the top layer of the earth’s “dust” (turāb) 
that was tread upon by Satan while the human heart was created from a particular clay (ṭīna) 
deep within the earth and thus, the heart is the faculty by which the human being perceives 
God.553 When God kneaded the primordial clay with his hands he mixed it with water and then 
                                                          
552 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 3, p. 410. 
553 Ibid. Al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmidī et le néoplatonisme de son temps, p. 28. 
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let it rise. From that primordial “dough” he first created Adam and then from Adam generated all 
of the human race.554 Thus, human beings have a portion of that dust (turāb) representing the 
lower soul, but have a heart made from different types of clay (ṭīn) within the earth. Since each 
heart is molded from a different part of the primordial clay, each heart has a different ability to 
perceive God’s light. Some will perceive God’s creation, others, his attributes, while still others 
will go beyond the attributes to be in the presence or dominion of his dominion (mulk mulkihi). 
Since the world, according to al-Tirmidhī, is a place composed of opposites (aḍdād), some of the 
attributes of God will reflect that duality, while other saints will be closer to God’s non-duality 
such as the first Caliph Abū Bakr who is characterized by God’s mercy (raḥma).555 From this we 
can see that the heart that draws nearer to God draws closer to his non-duality and is 
characterized by that non-duality, becoming a trace of God in the world. For al-Tirmidhī, the 
Prophet Muḥammad epitomizes this non-dual station (fardāniyya) and he explains it in a story 
related about the Prophet in the Ḥadīth literature. This ḥadīth was narrated by ʿAbdallāh b. 
Burayda through his father: The Prophet Muḥammad left Madīna to go on a military expedition, 
but instead, returned without going. He was then visited by a black slave girl who told him that 
she had sworn an oath that she would play a drum for him if he returned safely from his 
expedition. The Prophet replied that if she had really sworn an oath she could go ahead and play 
the drum, but if not, that she should not. While she was playing the drum Abū Bakr entered and 
she continued playing, but when ʿUmar came in she stopped and sat on the drum out of fear of 
him. The Prophet turned to ʿUmar and said that the devil himself was afraid of ʿUmar.556 Al-
                                                          
554 Ibid. Nawādir, vol. 6, p. 218. 
555 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 24. Abū Bakr, the first of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and father-in-law of the Prophet Muḥammad 
is considered by al-Tirmidhī to be one of the foremost of the saints and is characterized by raḥma (mercy). God’s 
mercy attaches to every created thing and is thus more indicative of God’s non-duality than his beauty (jamāl) or 
majesty (jalāl). Al-Tirmidhī contrasts this to the second Caliph ʿUmar who he characterizes as being at the level of 
rightness (ḥaqq), which is a level below that of Abū Bakr, who is closer to God’s non-duality. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 24. 
556 Ibid, pp. 58–59. 
 234 
 
Tirmdhī tells us that we should not think that ʿUmar is better than the Prophet or Abū Bakr; 
rather, as we stated in Chapter 2, ʿUmar is an example of one of the ḥukamāʾ (sages) who are 
able to distinguish between truth and falsehood. However, the Prophet and Abū Bakr (who 
among Sunnī believers is most like the Prophet Muḥammad) are at a yet higher level, which is 
the station of fardāniyya. That is, they are at the level of witnessing God’s divine theophany in 
the moment. They are not veiled by the opposites of truth and falsehood. Rather, they are the 
standard by which truth and falsehood are judged. For ʿUmar, a woman playing an instrument in 
front of men is reprehensible because it can lead to immorality. However, this applies an abstract 
moral judgment and assumes that a woman playing an instrument in front of men necessarily 
leads to immorality. The Prophet accedes to the fact that there is a possibility for immorality to 
occur because he mentions that the devil was present, but he does not judge abstractly where the 
limit between morality and immorality occurs. Rather, the Prophet, himself, is the conduit for 
God’s own judgment. Since the Prophet did not receive a revelation from God telling him 
otherwise, he allowed the girl to play the drum. The fact that al-Tirmidhī believes that there are 
saints like Abū Bakr in the station of fardāniyya (non-duality) who will exist after the Prophet 
and who will continue to exist in the world until the Final Judgment, brings up the controversial 
issue of antinomianism. This is the charge that critics of Sufism, like Ibn Taymiyya, have used to 
attack the Ṣūfī doctrine of saints. On the flip side, however, al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine gives Muslim 
saints the authority to adapt and tailor the Sharīʿa to new people, places and situations. 
Historically this has lent Sufism a dynamism that has only slowed in the modern period with the 
advent of Salafism and Wahhabism. For al-Tirmidhī, prophecy does not completely stop with the 
death of the Prophet but continues in a limited sense through the saints. As we will see, this is a 
doctrine that is also supported by Ibn ʿArabī. 
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 Ibn ʿArabī takes al-Tirmidhī’s non-dual theology a step further. For Ibn ʿArabī, the 
world is not composed of opposites because the entire world is the site of God’s theophany 
(tajallī). Rather, it is in the imaginal realm (ʿālam al-khayāl) that opposites actually exist. The 
following quote summarizes Ibn ʿArabī’s approach: 
Fa anta ʿabdun wa-anta rabbun 
 li-man lahu fīhi anta ʿabdun 
Wa anta rabbun wa anta ʿabdun 
 li-man lahu fī al-khiṭāb ʿahdun 
Fa-kullu ʿaqdin ʿalayhi shakhṣun 
 yaḥilluhu man siwāhu ʿaqdun 
 
Fa-radiya Allāhu ʿan ʿabīdihi fa-hum marḍiyyūn wa raḍū ʿanhu 
fa-huwa marḍiyyun fa-taqābalat al-haḍratān taqābul al-amthāl wa-
al-amthāl aḍdād li-anna al-mathalayn lā yajtamiʿān idh lā 
yatamayyizān wa-mā thamma illā mutamayyiz fa-mā thamma 
mathalun fa-mā fī al-wujūdi mathal fa-mā fī al-wujūdi ḍiddun fa-
inna al-wujūd ḥaqīqa wāḥida wa-l-shayʾ lā yuḍād nafsahu. 
 
Fa lam yabqā illā al-ḥaqq lam yabqā kāʾin 
 fa-mā thamma mawṣūlun wa-mā thamma bāʾin 
Bi-dhā jāʾa burhānu al-ʿiyān fa-mā arā 
 bi-ʿaynī illā ʿaynahu idh uʿāyan557 
 
You are servant and you are Lord  
 For One for Whom and in Whom you are servant 
You are Lord and you are servant  
 For One who has knowledge of the divine address 
Every relationship one is upon   
 Any other relationship will unbind 
 
God is pleased with His servants and so they are well pleasing, 
and they are pleased with Him and so He is pleasing. Thus the 
two planes (servant and Lord) are contrasted like analogies 
(amthāl) and analogies are [composed of] opposites, since two 
analogies will never join, otherwise there would be no distinction. 
There is [in fact] only One who is distinct and there is no analogy. 
In [true] existence there is no analogy and there is no opposite, for 
existence is but One Reality, and a thing is not the opposite of 
itself. 
 
Nothing remains other than the Reality, no being 
                                                          
557 Ibid. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, pp. 92–93. 
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 There is no arriving and no being afar 
Spiritual vision confirms this, for I  
 Have not seen aught but Him, when I was shown.558 
 
For Ibn ʿArabī only God has existence (wujūd) and all other things in the world are merely 
reflections of aspects of his reality. When taken as a whole, all of the created world reflects 
God’s dhāt (essence) in his entirety, although it is only accessible to him and not to any created 
thing. In a sense, Ibn ʿArabī flips al-Tirmidhī’s paradigm. God has no opposite just as al-
Tirmidhī says, but instead of the opposites in creation framing God’s non-duality, it is God’s 
non-duality and its reflection in all created things that gives meaning to the dualities (amthāl) in 
the imaginal realm. In other words, analogies (amthāl) are not intrinsic to the world, but are a 
means for human beings to understand and make sense of their original reality since they are 
only reflections of aspects of God’s single reality. This is how the amthāl (analogies) provide a 
way of ‘thinking’ about God and the world. This is why, for Ibn ʿArabī, every outward act of 
religious devotion in any religion, monotheistic or polytheistic can be seen as an object of God’s 
worship and an expression of God’s lordship.559 
 The relationship between the thought of Ibn ʿArabī and the thought of al-Tirmidhī is 
extensive and subtle. We discussed earlier how al-Tirmidhī uses the term mulk mulkihi (the 
dominion of his dominion) to indicate the non-dual station of walāya reserved for the highest of 
the awliyāʾ. In his FH Ibn ʿArabī cites al-Tirmidhī by name as mentioning this station/name 
since the vowel markings on these two words can be switched to read either mulk al-malik (the 
dominion of the king) or malik al-mulk (the king of the dominion).560 However, since the vowel 
                                                          
558 In the translation of these lines we made use of R. W. J. Austin’s translation of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, however, we 
modified this translation because of what we consider to be some inaccuracies based on a misunderstanding of the 
significance of the word mathal (analogy). Muḥyī al-Dīn b. ʿArabī. The bezels of wisdom. Ed. R. W. J. Austin New 
York: Paulist Press. 1980, p. 108. 
559 Ibid. Seal of the saints, p. 40. 
560 Ibid. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 71. ʿAfīfī writes mālik al-mulk in the text, however he indicates in the footnotes that one 
of the manuscripts actually witnesses the correct version which is mulk al-malik. We know that the reading must be 
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markings are not written in the texts that we are dealing with, there is an ambiguity as to which 
of these two readings is meant. The only way to distinguish is through context. Al-Tirmidhī 
clearly meant the first of the two readings, mulk mulkihi (the dominion of the king, which 
corresponds to mulk al-malik in Ibn ʿArabī) since he was contrasting the dominion (mulk) of the 
king himself to the dominion (mulk) of the attributes of the king. For Ibn ʿArabī, this type of 
ambiguity speaks directly to his thesis that only God really has existence (wujūd). In this scheme 
our human consciousness is only a factor of our distance from God, but seen from another 
perspective, that consciousness is also an aspect of God’s self-consciousness, which for Ibn 
ʿArabī, is the only consciousness that truly exists. In the Futūḥāt al-Makiyya Ibn ʿArabī plays 
with the vowel markings of the two phrases mulk al-malik (dominion of the king) and malik al-
mulk (king of the dominion) to demonstrate his point that, depending on the perspective, one can 
say that both the king (malik) and the dominion (mulk) are in one sense the same, while in 
another sense, not the same.561 He then uses a participial form for king/owner (malīk) from the 
root m-l-k also found in the Qurʾān to bolster his argument. The form is the faʿīl pattern that can 
have the meaning of both the doer (fāʿil) of an action as well as the object (mafʿūl) of that action. 
Hence, the word malīk can mean both ‘owner’ or ‘thing owned.’ For Ibn ʿArabī, if God himself 
is non-dual, then the entirety of creation that is a reflection of him as his trace (athar) must also 
be non-dual. Again, we can see here how Ibn ʿArabī takes motifs, concepts and words from al-
Tirmidhī and builds upon them to construct a unique and sophisticated theosophy. In general, the 
problem that we are faced with in studies of Ibn ʿArabī’s works is that Ibn ʿArabī’s debt to al-
Tirmidhī is not sufficiently appreciated. This has led to a misunderstanding of some of Ibn 
                                                          
mulk al-malik (the dominion of the king) or malik al-mulk (the king of the dominion) because Ibn ʿArabī cites al-
Tirmidhī’s use of this term by name and al-Tirmidhī consistently uses the term mulk al-malik. 
561 Ibid. Khatm al-awliyāʾ, p. 164. 
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ʿArabī’s major ideas that can only be fully understood through an analysis of his discourse 
stream involving al-Tirmidhī.  
 
Ḥikma and Walāya according to the Early Shādhiliyya 
 The Shādhiliyya is one of the important and influential ṭuruq (Ṣūfī brotherhoods) still 
in operation today in much of the Muslim world. It takes its inspiration from Abū al-Ḥasan al-
Shādhilī (d. 656/1258), a Moroccan saint of the 13th-century C.E. who traveled throughout North 
Africa but had his greatest success in Egypt.562 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī may not have intended 
to pioneer a successful and far-reaching brotherhood, however, the enthusiasm of his followers 
as well as the emergence of a number of highly gifted successors catapulted the ṭarīqa to 
prominence. The commonly held belief among the followers of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī was 
that he was the quṭb (the spiritual pole) of his time and this gave them a sense of distinction and 
importance, not only for Islam, but for the world. A saying attributed to Abū al-Ḥasan al-
Shādhilī indicates that he was granted a request by God that the quṭb (spiritual pole) would be 
maintained in the spiritual lineage (shajara) of the Shādhilī Ṭarīqa (brotherhood) until the end of 
time. This ṭarīqa, as well as others like it, became a living embodiment of the spiritual hierarchy 
and government Ibn ʿArabī and al-Tirmidhī both espoused in their doctrines of walāya. Above 
and beyond this, it is the Shādhilī ṭarīqa that developed al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma (wisdom) 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
562 P. Lory. “al-S̲h̲ād̲h̲ilī.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 





 The connection between al-Tirmidhī’s thought and the works of the main progenitors 
of the Shādhilī ṭarīqa has already been established by Richard McGregor.563 It is clear that both 
al-Shādhilī and his close students read SA (also known as Khatm al-Awliyāʾ) by al-Tirmidhī. 
However, MacGregor does not highlight the degree to which al-Tirmidhī’s concepts of walāya 
(sainthood) and ḥikma (wisdom) became integral to the thought of the early Shādhiliyya. While 
Ibn ʿArabī was fascinated by al-Tirmidhī’s discussion of non-duality and khatm al-walāya (the 
seal of sainthood), the Shādhilīyya were more concerned with the practical aspects of ḥikma 
(wisdom) and walāya (sainthood).564 It is not until Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh (d. 709/1309)565 that al-
Tirmidhī’s doctrine is clearly synthesized with the main tenets of the ṭarīqa (spiritual path) 
established by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī. However, even with al-Shādhilī himself, we can see 
elements of al-Tirmidhī’s influence. In his Ḥizb al-Kabīr (also known as Ḥizb al-Barr) or The 
Great Litany, al-Shādhilī asks God to give him the ḥikmat al-ḥikma (the wisdom of wisdom).566 
This is most probably a reference to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s ḥikmat al-ḥikma (the wisdom of 
wisdom), which represents the ḥikma (wisdom) of the awliyāʾ and is a wisdom higher than the 
wisdom of the ḥukamāʾ (sages). 
 The foremost spokesman for the teachings of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī was 
undoubtedly Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh.567 In his work Laṭāʾif al-Minan fī Manāqib al-Shaykh Abī al-
                                                          
563 Richard J. A. McGregor. Sanctity and mysticism in medieval Egypt the Wafāʾ Sufi order and the legacy of Ibn 
ʿArabī. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2004, p. 30. 
564 This is not to discount the claims, for example, of Muḥammad Wafāʾ that he was the seal of saints. Ibid. Sanctity 
and mysticism, p. 57. The general trend, however, among Shādhilīs was a more practical ḥikma (wisdom) oriented 
approach to Ṣūfī discourse. 
565 Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh was a student of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī (d. 686/1287) who was a student of Abū al-Ḥasan al-
Shādhilī. 
566 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad Qaṣrī, Muḥammad ʿAṭīya Khamīs, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, Abī al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Shādhilī, and Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAṭāʾ Allāh. Sharḥ ḥizb al-barr. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azhariyya li-l-Turāth. 2002, p. 116. 
567 George Makdisi. “Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh”. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
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ʿAbbās al-Mursī wa-Shaykhihi Abī al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (The Precious Gifts concerning the 
Virtues of Shaykh Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī and his Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī) Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
Allāh begins with a discussion on walāya (sainthood) that draws heavily from al-Tirmidhī’s 
works. His introduction on walāya serves to identify Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī (d. 686/1287) and 
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī as exemplars of walāya (sainthood). In a sense, he is casting these two 
Ṣūfī masters as living proof of al-Tirmidhī’s claims about walāya.  
 Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh quotes five aḥādīth (pl. of ḥadīth) from al-Tirmidhī and provides two 
direct quotes from him about walāya and maʿrifa (gnosis).  In the introduction of Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
Allāh’s work on walāya, only al-Tirmidhī is quoted directly by name as an authority among the 
citations of the narrators of Ḥadīth and the mashāyikh (Ṣūfī masters) of the Shādhilī silsila 
(initiatic chain).568 Also, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh’s own commentary on walāya closely resembles the 
structure of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh describes the awliyāʾ as ḥummāl asrārihi wa-
maʿādin anwārihi, “the bearers of his (God’s) secrets and the mines (maʿādin) of his (God’s) 
lights.”569 We already discussed how the mine (maʿdan) is a central image in al-Tirmidhī’s 
doctrine of walāya. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh also communicates a central tenet of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine, 
which is that prophethood (nubuwwa) continues through the awliyāʾ. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh 
distinguishes clearly between awliyāʾ (saints) and anbiyāʾ (prophets), but indicates that the 
knowledge through God (al-ʿilm bi-llāh) of the awliyāʾ is what maintains the light of prophecy in 
the world.570 In fact, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh calls the awliyāʾ “āyāt Allāh” (the verses/signs of God) and 
interprets the word āya (pl. āyāt) in several Qurʾānic verses (āyāt) as referring to the awliyāʾ.571 
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This is significant because the word āya also means a verse of the Qurʾān, which is considered to 
be God’s speech and an attribute (ṣifa) of God. For al-Tirmidhī, the awliyāʾ are considered to be 
one of four of God’s traces (āthār) on earth including God’s speech in the form of the Qurʾān. 
We discussed how al-Tirmidhī sees the highest of the awliyāʾ as those who are al-dalāl ʿalā 
Allāh, that is, they indicate God through their very selves. This is the same point that Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
Allāh is making when he says the awliyāʾ are āyāt Allāh (the signs/verses of God).  
 Another important point of convergence between Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh and al-Tirmidhī is in 
the concept that walāya is not connected to time. We discussed this point of al-Tirmidhī’s 
doctrine in detail in Chapter 5. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh writes:  
waʿlam jaʿalaka Allāhu min khāṣṣati ʿibādihi wa-ʿarrafaka laṭāʾifa 
widādihi annahu sawāʾā minhum al-ẓāhir wa-l-khafī wa al-ṣiddīq 
wa-l-walī fasād al-waqt lā yakdiru anwārahum wa-lā yaḥuṭṭu 
miqdārahum li-annahum maʿa al-muʾaqqit lā maʿa al-awqāt fa-
man kāna maʿa al-muʾaqqit lā yataghayyiru bi-taghyīr al-waqt 
shayʾan wa man maʿa al-waqt taghayyara bi-taghyīrihi wa-
takaddara bi-takaddurihi.572 
 
Know, may God make you among his elite servants and acquaint 
you with the subtleties of his tender love, that for all of these: the 
manifest saint and the hidden saint and the most truthful saint and 
any saint in general, the corruption of the time he lives in will not 
sully his lights nor will it lower his degree because these (saints) 
are with the Timekeeper not with times. So, whoever is with the 
Timekeeper does not change at all with the changing of times, but 
whoever is with the time he lives in, changes with its changing and 
becomes sullied with its muddiness. 
 
This approach shares in the optimism expressed by al-Tirmidhī that there will always be 
guidance in the world in the form of human beings who carry on the prophetic legacy of the 
Prophet Muḥammad until the end of the world. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh quotes several prophetic aḥādīth 
(pl. of ḥadīth) also narrated by al-Tirmidhī to this effect, such as, ummatī ka-l-maṭari lā yudrā 
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awwaluhu khayrun am ākhiruhu, “My community is like the rain in that one does not know if its 
first part is best or its last.”573 Not only will there always be awliyāʾ in the community of the 
Prophet Muḥammad till the end of time, but when darkness and ignorance prevails, the lights of 
their guidance will shine even stronger.574 This is exactly what al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine expressed: 
that opposites must always be in balance in the world, meaning that guidance must always be 
present wherever there is ignorance and confusion. 
 In Chapter 3 we discussed al-Tirmidhī’s distinction between awliyāʾ Allāh ḥaqqan (the 
true saints of God) and awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh (the saints who observe the right(s) of God). Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
Allāh provides the same division under a variety of names indicating that he is not so much 
concerned with the naming convention as he is with the underlying distinction. He calls it al-
walāya al-ṣughrā (the lesser sainthood) and al-walāya al-kubrā (the greater sainthood).575 He 
provides a list of six different names that could be applied to this basic division. For example, he 
says we could also call it walāyat al-īmān (the sainthood of belief) and walāyat al-īqān (the 
sainthood of certainty).576 This is exactly the distinction that al-Tirmidhī makes between those 
who are awliyāʾ by virtue of their belief in God and their deeds, as opposed to those who have 
attained walāya based on God’s choosing them to be his intimate interlocutors (muḥaddathūn). 
These awliyāʾ have achieved certainty (yaqīn) through their direct experiencing of God. This is 
the basic distinction that al-Tirmidhī lays out in his book SA, a book Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh claims he 
read. 
 Finally, we talked about how al-Tirmidhī criticizes asceticism for its dependence on 
acts of worship and mortification of the flesh to produce spiritual states. This is part of al-
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Tirmidhī’s radical interiorization of the ascetic/mystical path. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, al-
Tirmidhī feels that the novice (murīd) should only perform ordinary acts of worship outwardly, 
but focus on disciplining the soul inwardly in order to progress toward a purer spiritual state by 
examining its attachments to things in the world. Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh also follows al-Tirmidhī on this 
point by criticizing the ʿubbād (worshippers) and the zuhhād (ascetics) for being overly obsessed 
with practicing and incorporating the means to reaching God without actually reaching him. In 
this passage Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh also demonstrates his debt to Ibn ʿArabī as well as al-Tirmidhī: 
Fa-l-nāẓir li-l-kāʾināt ghayr shāhid li-l-ḥaqqi fīha ghāfil wa-l-fānī 
ʿanhā ʿabdun bi-sawṭāt al-shuhūd dhāhil wa-l-shahīd li-l-ḥaqqi fīhā 
ʿabdun mukhaṣṣaṣ kāmil wa-innamā tarfaʿu al-himma ʿan al-kawni 
min ḥaythu kawniyyatihi lā min ḥaythu ẓuhūr al-ḥaqqi fīhi fa-aʿḍāʾ 
al-zuhhād wa-l-ʿubbād wa-ahl al-irāda ʿan al-kawn liannahum 
lam yasbiq ẓuhūr al-ḥaqqi fīhi wa-dhālika li-ʿadami nufūdhihim 
ilayhi fī kulli shayʾ lā li-ʿadami ẓuhūrihi fī kulli shayʾ fa-innahu 
ẓāhirun fī kull shayʾ ḥattā annahu ẓāhirun fī-mā bihi iḥtajaba fa-lā 
ḥijāb.577 
 
The one who gazes (with his heart) at existent things cannot 
witness the Real through those things and in them he is heedless. 
The one who is annihilated from them (existent things) is a slave 
absorbed by the lashings of direct witnessing. The one who 
witnesses the Real through existent things is a chosen and 
perfected slave. Aspirations only rise above the created world 
because of the true reality of the world, not because of God’s (al-
ḥaqq) manifesting in it. Hence, [we have] groups of the ascetics 
(zuhhād) and the worshippers (ʿubbād) and those who want to go 
beyond this world because for them the manifestation of the Real 
has not yet occurred and that is because they do not find him in 
every single thing, not because he (God) is not manifest in 
everything for he (God) is in fact manifest in every single thing to 
the extent that he (God) is manifest in that through which he is 
veiled, so in truth, there isn’t even a veil. 
 
Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh blends motifs from al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī seamlessly. The criticism of 
zuhhād (ascetics) and ʿubbād (worshippers) is something mirrored directly in al-Tirmidhī’s 
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works.578 However, the argument is cast in a way that reflects elements of Ibn ʿArabī’s waḥdat 
al-wujūd (unity of existence). Al-Tirmidhī talks about the veil (ḥijāb) and the lifting of the veil, 
but does not address the idea that God’s outward manifestation is so great that there isn’t actually 
a veil to begin with. Ibn ʿArabī, on the other hand, does not focus his criticism on ascetics 
(zuhhād) and worshippers (ʿubbād). 
 
The Ḥikma of the Shādhilīyya 
 We have shown how the early progenitors of the Shādhilī brotherhood incorporated 
important elements of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya, although it is significant to note that 
they were more interested in defining ḥikma as a means of articulating a method for navigating 
the spiritual path. We find this approach masterfully described in Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh’s al-Ḥikam 
(The Aphorisms).  It is a collection of two hundred and sixty-four pithy maxims that summarize 
the Ṣūfī ṭarīq (path) to God. Numerous commentaries have been written on al-Ḥikam by Ibn 
ʿAṭāʾ Allāh and it is considered a pivotal work not only by Shādhilīs, but by many other Ṣūfī 
ṭuruq (brotherhoods).579 While there are no direct references in al-Ḥikam to al-Tirmidhī or his 
works, the structure of al-Ḥikam appears to take its inspiration from al-Tirmidhī’s approach to 
ḥikma (wisdom). 
 As we discussed in Chapter 2, ḥikma deals with understanding the world of opposites 
(aḍdād) as a way of coming to know God. This is different than the gifted knowledge (maʿrifa) 
of the awliyāʾ that comes directly from God to the servant. Ḥikma is useful because it is based on 
experience and reflects the cumulative knowledge of mystics who have tread the path (ṭarīq) to 
God. This is why al-Tirmidhī states in NU, lā ḥakīm illā dhū tajriba, “A sage is only someone 
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who possesses experience, i.e., of treading the path to God.” Therefore, his experience is useful 
and it reflects the challenges and difficulties that lie upon that path. This is again why in KH al-
Tirmidhī likens the ḥakīm (sage) to one who knows the dangerous parts of the wilderness and 
avoids these dangers as a he passes through. The walī, on the other hand, gives no heed to these 
dangers because the wild beasts pay homage to him.580  
 Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh’s al-Ḥikam follows in the tradition of books of Ṣūfī aphorisms. Abū 
Madyan (d. 594/1197), the spiritual ancestor of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī, has a book of 
aphorisms. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī himself is credited with a waṣiyya (literally a last 
testament) of aphorisms. Neither of these previous works found the wide appeal and acceptance 
that was given to al-Ḥikam.581 Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh not only drew inspiration from these two 
examples of the ḥikma genre in Sufism, but also incorporated much of the received knowledge of 
Ṣūfī literature prior to him in his book of maxims. Most of the maxims revolve around a set of 
opposites (aḍdād) that are juxtaposed in such a way as to help the traveler (sālik) navigate his 
way upon the path (ṭarīq). These maxims aim to address issues that relate to both novices and 
advanced Ṣūfīs who have “arrived” at their destination (al-wuṣūl ilā Allāh). Most of the maxims 
are structured around a ẓāhir (outward) and bāṭin (inward) dichotomy. This is one of the basic 
dichotomies that al-Tirmidhī uses and it is widespread in both Sufism and Shīʿism. For example, 
the first maxim reads, min ʿalāmāt al-iʿtimād ʿalā al-ʿamali nuqṣān al-rajāʾ ʿinda wujūd al-
zalal, “Among the signs of relying upon works (outward acts of worship) is the diminishing of 
hope when missteps occur.” We can see here that the basic dichotomy that Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh is 
using is a ẓāhir/bāṭin dichotomy. Novices on the Ṣūfī path (ṭarīq) become discouraged when 
they make mistakes. That is a more or less universal feeling for a beginner in any discipline. 
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What Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh is trying to do is to refocus the ‘Ṣūfī adept’ from giving unnecessary 
attention to his mistakes. These are outward acts created by God (note that Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh is 
coming from an Ashʿarī theological point of view) and the challenge for the Ṣūfī is to reorient 
inwardly toward God in spite of these mistakes. We can see here that al-Ḥikam (The Aphorisms) 
captures succinctly al-Tirmidhī’s vision of ḥikma. Al-Ḥikam functions as a kind of manual that 
explains the pitfalls of the Ṣūfī path to God through a juxtaposition of opposites that frame an 
underlying meaning. The basic meaning of this ḥikma (wisdom) is that one should maintain 
consistent progress toward the goal and not worry about failures along the way. 
 
Conclusion 
 While previous scholarship has discussed the influence of al-Tirmidhī on later concepts 
of walāya, it has not clearly identified the extent of that influence. Chodkiewicz broke new 
ground when he devoted a considerable portion of his Seal of the Saints to the ideas of al-
Tirmidhī. However, in this work the influence of al-Tirmidhī is not fully appreciated. Part of the 
reason for this is that al-Tirmidhī has not been well enough understood and, as a result, the 
structure of his ideas that surface in the works of later Ṣūfī authors has been overlooked. We can 
also say that understanding al-Tirmidhī’s thought will better aid in understanding the mystical 
thought of those who built upon his ideas. We attempted to demonstrate this in the discussion of 
the ring mathal and its importance to Ibn Arabī’s doctrine of walāya. Al-Tirmidhī’s approach to 
ḥikma also helps us to better understand the early Shādhilī masters and their use of ḥikma as a 
pedagogical tool for training disciples in the Ṣūfī path. Even more important, however, is the 
idea that al-Tirmidhī establishes a mode of ‘thinking’ about God and the world through amthāl 
(analogies) and ḥikma (wisdom), which was adopted by the later Ṣūfī tradition as an alternative 
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to speculative theology (Kalām) and philosophy (Falsafa). Ibn ʿArabī is the most celebrated 
example of this kind of thought in the Ṣūfī traditions; however, the ways that other important 
Ṣūfīs adopted these approaches and used them to expand the boundaries of mystical inquiry still 











Islamic sainthood was not articulated as a vehicle of power and authority by Muslim 
theologians or mystics until al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī chose to use the language of walāya to 
communicate his vision for those who should inherit the charismatic legacy of the Prophet. Al-
Tirmidhī was someone who blended various discourse streams within Islamic thought to produce 
a powerful doctrine of walāya that has inspired Islamic mystics ever since. We have used 
Foucault’s episteme and concept of discourse to separate the layers of al-Tirmidhī’s thought in 
order to understand how al-Tirmidhī produced such a synthesis and how it was appropriated and 
reinvented after him. Particularly useful in this approach was the work of Franz Rosenthal whose 
delineation of the various knowledge-types in Islam became the basis by which al-Tirmidhī’s 
episteme was assessed. The results of this methodological process were quite fruitful. Many 
aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood and gnoseology came to the fore that have not yet 
been adequately discussed or well understood. For example, we found that al-Tirmidhī’s 
influence has reached beyond Islamic mysticism. We discovered that al-Tirmidhī was an 
important bridge between early Ḥanafī theology and the theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, 
and this is highly significant for understanding the development of the Māturīdī School. 
 In Chapter 1 we discussed the way in which al-Tirmidhī’s social and political context 
played an important role in structuring his doctrine of walāya. This represents an example of a 
social construction of knowledge in which patterns within the social sphere are internalized and 
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transformed to produce a new knowledge product. Al-Tirmidhī used the social institution of 
clientage (walāʾ) to configure his doctrine of walāya. This shows how al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood was not simply a mystical and religious doctrine, but was a doctrine that was 
responding to the social and political forces of his time. This lent al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
walāya a transformative force that can be seen in its later application in Nīsābūrī Sufism of the 
5th- Islamic century (11th-century C.E.). 
 In Chapter 2 we used al-Tirmidhī’s episteme to better understand his concept of ḥikma 
and its Hellenistic roots. There has been much speculation about the Hellenistic influence on al-
Tirmidhī but nothing decisive has been proposed by current scholarship. Understanding how al-
Tirmidhī used a Pythagorean cosmology helps us better understand what he means by ‘wisdom’ 
and how he reconfigures Pythagorean wisdom to function within an Islamic milieu. If we did not 
understand the tripartite structure of al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology, we would not understand how he 
used Pythagoreanism to support his claims about walāya. Al-Tirmidhī’s main concern was to 
understand the intrinsic meaning of walāya by incorporating ḥikma as a way of articulating its 
non-dual nature. While al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma is clearly inspired by Hellenistic 
precedents, he reworks and redefines the concept of ḥikma as well as the purveyors of ḥikma 
(ḥukamāʾ or sages) and then uses them to represent ideals within Islam. Instead of Pythagoras 
being the ideal ‘Sage’, it is Wahb b. Munabbih. An early exemplar of wisdom for al-Tirmidhī is 
the second Caliph ʿUmar and not Plotinus or Aristotle. This type of transformation of wisdom 
from a Hellenistic to an Islamic context is easy for al-Tirmidhī because ḥikma is already a topic 
found in Qurʾānic vocabulary and its unexploited nature lends it to being reconstituted. The 
subject matter of ḥikma, however, clearly demonstrates its Hellenistic legacy in matters that are 
both human and divine including such worldly topics as medicine or more spiritual topics such 
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as the ‘diseases’ of the soul. Ḥikma is primarily a worldly (dunyawī) knowledge that 
encompasses knowledge of the opposites (aḍdād) and how they function in the world. In this 
way, al-Tirmidhi’s use of ḥikma, within his larger gnoseology, can be construed as a comment on 
the importance of ‘science’ and its place vis-à-vis religious knowledge. 
 Chapter 3 focused on al-Tirmidhī’s discourse stream of Kalām and his particular 
involvement in the Ḥanafī/Murjīʾī theological tradition. The relationship between al-Ḥakīm al-
Tirmidhī and Ḥanafī theology has been posited but not well understood. Part of the difficulty in 
situating al-Tirmidhī within this discourse stream has been a lack of scholarly work in filling out 
the various stages in Ḥanafī theological development, particularly the period between the early 
creedal texts and the work of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. It is these texts, however, that best 
highlight al-Tirmidhī’s involvement in Ḥanafī theology. The connections range from his 
approach to heresiography to subtle arguments concerning belief and the reconciling of free will 
with predestination. We can see in this milieu that the light-basis for knowledge was not simply 
an assumption found within mystical circles but was basic to early Ḥanafī theology in the 9th-
century C.E. Early Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī were also mystics in 
their own right. The integration of theology and mysticism in this milieu should challenge the 
assumption that mysticism somehow developed in opposition to theology (Kalām) or even 
jurisprudence (Fiqh), given that Ḥanafī scholars of theology were almost always scholars of 
jurisprudence as well. This conclusion also counters the often held belief that Ḥanafīs were 
generally opposed to mysticism in contrast to Shāfīʿīs who are credited as supporting Baghdād 
Sufism. Our reading of al-Ḥakīm al-Naysābūrī indicates that there was, in fact, no exclusive 
connection between Shāfīʿīs and Ṣūfīs in Nīshāpūr from the 4th- to 6th- Islamic centuries (10th- to 
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12th- centuries C.E.). This provides an alternative reading to that of Malamud who argues that 
there was such a connection. 
 In Chapter 4 we looked at al-Tirmidhī’s involvement in the discourse stream of early 
Islamic mysticism along with other important early figures such as al-Junayd and al-Tustarī. Al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s concept of the soul in addition to his mystical vocabulary represent 
consistent themes when we compare these ideas to other mystics of his time period. One of the 
reasons that al-Tirmidhī has been cast as an outlier in Islamic mysticism can be attributed to what 
I consider to be a Baghdād-centric view of Islamic mysticism that has privileged al-Junayd’s 
Baghdād School as the progenitor of Sufism. However, when we read the writings of mystics in 
the 4th- Islamic century (10th- century C.E.) such as al-Sarrāj and al-Kalabādhī, it is clear that 
they do not use the term Sufism (taṣawwuf) to only represent a particular mystical school of 
thought, rather, they are refering to Islamic mysticism in general as a meta-madhhab. Al-
Kalabādhī, as a systematizer of Sufism who also sought to introduce Sufism to a number of the 
ʿulamāʾ of Khurāsān and Transoxania, made use of several mystical and theological constructs 
that bear al-Tirmidhī’s stamp. The fact that this connection between al-Kalabādhī and al-
Tirmidhī has been missed in previous scholarship on Islamic mysticism is a testament to the need 
for further study of the works of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. It is al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī, however 
that integrate al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of walāya most effectively into what became Sufism in its 
more mature form. This synthesis and formulation of Sufism as a meta-madhhab developed amid 
the backdrop of inter-factional conflict that eventually destroyed the city of Nīshāpūr. Nīshāpūrī 
Sufism was inclusive of the various madhhabs and transcended the divisive allegiances of 
Nīshāpūrī society. In this way, Sufism did not ‘replace’ local mystical movements like the 
Malāmatiyya and the Karrāmiyya, but was better able to adapt than these movements, which 
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continued to be active in Khurāsān until the Mongol invasions of the 13th- and 14th- centuries 
C.E. 
 The product of the great mystical synthesis of the 5th- Islamic century represents a form 
of mysticism that not only includes the vaulted mystical motifs of Baghdād Sufism, but also 
incorporates a model of religious authority that positions the Ṣūfī shaykh as a walī of Allāh for 
his disciples (murīdūn). This form of Islamic mysticism gave special privilege to the class of 
ʿulamāʾ and provided the theoretical basis for Sufism to compete with Shīʿism as a type of 
Islamic religious authority that would channel divine communication to those who not only 
spoke about the Prophet, but spoke for the Prophet and like the Prophet. The result of the 
incorporation of this new type of religious authority in its Nīshāpūr variety was striking and 
transformative for Sufism, which eventually led to its normalization in Muslim societies within 
two centuries of its origin in Nīshāpūr and its adoption all over the Muslim world.  Based on this 
understanding of Sufism, we can no longer say that Baghdād Sufism replaced earlier varieties of 
indigenous Islamic mysticism, especially when the social structure of Nīshāpūrī Sufism was 
fundamentally different than that of early Baghdād Sufism. 
 In Chapter 5, rather than treating al-Tirmidhī’s ideas as a tight system by attempting to 
resolve the diversity of his thought to uncover their underlying structure, we sought to present 
the significance of his most basic theoretical distinctions as they apply to Islamic thought and 
mysticism. If we assert, as Radtke does, that al-Tirmidhī was not a philosopher because his ideas 
are not systematic, then we would have to also eliminate Nietzsche and the later Heidegger from 
this category because neither of them follow a Cartesian and strictly system-oriented approach to 
philosophy. Al-Tirmidhī was not only a mystic, he was also a theologian and a jurisprudent and a 
philosopher. He focused his work on attempting to revamp the entire approach to Islamic 
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theology and jurisprudence in its Ḥanafī inspired form that he had received through the various 
discourse streams to which he was connected. His was a project of reform that addressed the 
very roots of Islamic legal methodology and it is apparent that this was not just an abstract 
proposal for him because it is evident that he wrote many of his works in such a way that they 
reflected this task of reform in their very structure and in the subject matter they put forward.  
 One of the signature aspects of al-Tirmidhi’s doctrine of walāya is the ‘seal of 
sainthood’ and the idea that a ‘sealer of saints’ will come at the end of time to complete walāya 
just as the Prophet Muḥammad came to complete prophethood. While this aspect of al-
Tirmidhī’s doctrine is often cited and discussed, it is not well understood exactly how he arrived 
at such a doctrine. In Chapter 5 we discussed how al-Tirmidhī’s preference for analogies 
(amthāl) led him to use motifs from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature as a way of thinking about 
issues that were of social and religious importance in his time. The ‘seal of sainthood’ appears to 
have developed out of an important analogy that al-Tirmidhī uses throughout his works, which is 
the ring analogy. The ring analogy brings together all of the basic aspects of al-Tirmidhī’s 
concept of the ‘seal of sainthood’ and the corresponding ‘sealer of saints’. The concept of a 
‘sealer of saints’ who is yet to come has important implications for Islamic mysticism and for an 
Islamic outlook on life. The generally accepted idea among Traditionalists and Ḥadīth culture is 
that the Islamic community has been in a perpetual state of decline from the time of the first 
three generations of Muslims. Al-Tirmidhī counters this idea with his own set of Ḥadīth, which 
he narrates, as well as a doctrine of sainthood that leaves open the possibility for exalted levels of 
spiritual attainment in the future that come close to the prophets themselves and surpass even the 
companions of the Prophet. The seal of sainthood was also connected to the idea promoted by al-
Tirmidhī that at any point in time there will always be forty of the awliyāʾ alive on earth, for the 
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sake of whom the world continues to exist and prosper. Both of these ideas are integrated into 
Sufism’s later cosmology such that we find Ṣūfīs today who will still go in search of the awliyāʾ 
of their time to benefit from them and to access their spiritual blessings.  
 Many of the major proponents of Islamic mysticism after the 3rd Islamic century (9th-
century C.E.) read and contemplated the ideas of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. We can see this from al-
Kalabādhī to al-Hujwīrī to al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī. This was also true of Ṣūfīs and Muslim 
mystics of later generations such as Ibn ʿArabī and the eponyms of the Shādhilī Ṭarīqa. Ibn 
ʿArabī is foremost among these and while it is clear that he read al-Tirmidhī’s works and was in 
conversation with his ideas, the extent to which Ibn ʿArabī patterned many of his fundamental 
concepts on ideas first proposed by al-Tirmidhī is less well known. The connection between al-
Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī is so important that it would not be possible to fully appreciate Ibn 
ʿArabī and his mystical ideas without an informed understanding of al-Tirmidhī’s basic premises 
and doctrines. In Chapter 6 we demonstrated this with a discussion of how Ibn ʿArabī structures 
his own doctrine of sainthood on the ring mathal of al-Tirmidhī. Reflecting upon Ibn ʿArabī in 
this light uncovers important aspects of his non-dual mysticism and shows how his approach 
differs from al-Tirmidhī. Ibn ʿArabī builds on al-Tirmidhī’s ring mathal by incorporating other 
analogies to explicate his doctrine of sainthood such as the analogy of the gold and silver bricks 
that are missing from the ‘wall of prophethood’. While Ibn ʿArabī is generally considered to be 
more influential than al-Tirmidhī on Islamic mysticism, our comparison between their two 
doctrines of walāya indicates that al-Tirmidhi’s doctrine carried more social and political 
influence, especially when we see how al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood was the foundation 
for the development of Sufism.  
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 Finally, in Chapter 6 we discussed the way that the Shādhilīs adopted and built upon al-
Tirmidhī’s notion of ḥikma as a way of developing a ‘Ṣūfī science’. Ḥikma reflects the more 
practical side of al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology and proved to be a useful framework within which the 
early Shādhilī masters communicated the precepts of their spiritual path to their followers. The 
book al-Ḥikam (The Aphorisms) became so well known that its influence spread far beyond the 
confines of the Shādhilī brotherhood. The early Shādhilīs definitely read al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 
closely as is attested by the works of the foremost spokesman of this brotherhood, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ 
Allāh. In addition to the use of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of ḥikma, we also find that the early 
Shādhilīs incorporated al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood with its indications of the optimism 
that al-Tirmidhī’s particular approach engenders.  
 Our study of sainthood and its early development in Islamic mysticism demonstrates 
that there is still much that we do not know about this early period and that there is a patent need 
for more research in this area. We were not able to encompass the wide variety of topics within 
al-Tirmidhī’s multitude of works, but the hope is that through this study we can begin to better 
appreciate the complexity of al-Tirmidhī’s contribution to sainthood and Islamic mysticism’s 
multi-faceted nature. It is also hoped that these findings will shed more light on the development 
of Sufism and its indebtedness to al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology and his doctrine of sainthood. The 
questions that this study opens are many. An area that needs further exploration is al-Tirmidhī’s 
approach to Fiqh (jurisprudence) and the potential influence he had on the development of 
Ḥanafī legal methodology. In the topic of theology there is much more that can be done to trace 
the contributions of al-Tirmidhī to Māturīdī theology and their eventual incorporation into 
Ashʿarī theology by al-Taftāzānī. In the area of Islamic mysticism, al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of 
sainthood highlights the contrasting approaches to sainthood that differentiate eastern Islamic 
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mysticism from western Islamic mysticism. Both of these trends converge in the person of Ibn 
ʿArabī and a study of his doctrine of sainthood in this light could further our knowledge of how 
the Islamic doctrine of sainthood became a more developed form in later Sufism.  
 Of particular interest to us is how sainthood has come to represent a form of religious 
authority in Islam that has been successful in adapting and adjusting Islam to new contexts and 
cultures. Ṣūfī shaykhs would not have been able to do this without inwardly recognizing their 
custodial authority to interpret the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth to serve these ends. The advent of Salafism 
and Wahhābism represents a potent challenge to this authority, one that prefers a ‘strict 
constructionist’ and textual approach to Islam rather than a human-centered approach. Our 
discussion of al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood brings up important questions about the ability 
of Sufism to perpetuate its model of religious authority in a modern context. It remains to be seen 
how Ṣūfī groups in the modern era will respond to Salafī and Wahhābī criticisms of their 
fundamental authority structures. Yet, if we take al-Tirmidhī to heart, we can only be optimistic 
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Introduction to Kitāb al-Ḥikma 
by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 
 
 This is the first time that a transcription of al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb al-Ḥikma min ʿIlm al-
Bāṭin has appeared in print. This text is a unicum, it is the only extant witness to the archetype 
and is in a manuscript at the Inebey Library in Bursa, Turkey titled Haraççi Oġlu 806. There are 
four works by al-Tirmidhī in this manuscript. The three other texts besides Kitāb al-Ḥikma are: 
Sabab al-Takbīr fī al-Ṣalā, ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ and ʿIlal al-ʿIbādāt. Bernd Radtke has noted that 
Kitāb al-Ḥikma (folios 1-19) is “undotted, of volatile script and undated”.582 Furthermore, he 
commented that he was only able to conduct a cursory study of ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ, which is the 
third of the four texts that make up the full manuscript. This suggests that he was not able to 
study Kitāb al-Ḥikma closely.583 The text of Kitāb al-Ḥikma begins on verso of folio 1 and is 
completed along with a colophon on verso of folio 18. The final page of the text includes extra-
textual notices such as the lineage of the semi-mythical Ṣūfī figure Khiḍr, who some Muslims 
believe is the wise man who conveyed special knowledge to Moses from God. Recto of folio 19 
includes an alphabetical list of the ahl al-ṣuffa (the people of the bench). These were the poor 
companions of the Prophet who lived in the mosque of Madīna and received charity given to the 
Prophet by others. This may have been of interest to those who owned this manuscript because 
                                                          
582 Ibid. Ein Islamischer Theosoph, p. 57. 
583 Ibid, p. 58. 
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the ahl al-ṣuffa have been credited by some to have been the forebears of the Ṣūfīs.584 This 
indicates that Kitāb al-Ḥikma was most likely circulated among Ṣūfī circles. Recto of folio 1 
includes a list of the four books included in the manuscript as well as several references to the 
great fire of Istanbul in 1660 C.E. that consumed the city and irrevocably altered its demographic 
layout when Muslims became the majority of the population in the aftermath and reconstruction 
of the city.585 
In addition to Radtke, Fuat Sezgin mentions Kitāb al-Ḥikma in GAS, number 42, in a list 
of al-Tirmidhī’s works. The only additional information Sezgin provides is that the title of the 
work is difficult to discern from the title page.586 The title actually appears to read al-Khidma 
min ʿIlm al-Bāṭin rather than al-Ḥikma min ʿIlm al-Bāṭin as would seem more logical. Al-
Juyūshī mentions the manuscript in his review of al-Tirmidhī’s published and unpublished works 
but does not go into detail about the contents of Kitāb al-Ḥikma other than to give it a short one-
paragraph gloss. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Baraka does not mention Kitāb al-Ḥikma in his detailed study of 
al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine of sainthood. The absence of significant references to Kitāb al-Ḥikma and 
a lack of a detailed representation of its contents where references do exist may be due to the 
lack of witnesses to the text, as well as the obscurity of the handwriting and its undotted nature. 
 
Dating and Transmission of the Text 
 The single witness that we have to Kitāb al-Ḥikma does not supply a date in the 
colophon. The three other works of al-Tirmidhī that are in the same manuscript do have dates 
and they seem to be written by the same hand. The date of the other three texts is the 25th of 
                                                          
584 This is mentioned by al-Sarrāj in Kitāb al-Lumaʿ.  
585 Marc David Baer. “The great fire of 1660 and the Islamization of Christian and Jewish space in 
Istanbul”. International journal of Middle East studies. 36 (2): 2004, pp. 159–160. 
586 Ibid. GAS, p. 658. 
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Rabīʿ al-Ākhar, 714 A.H. This translates to the 8th of August 1314 C.E. Despite the fact that 
Kitāb al-Ḥikma does not provide a date, there are several aspects of the text that help us to 
generally place this witness. The colophon at the end of Kitāb al-Ḥikma is organized in the shape 
of an inverted triangle.587 This stylistic feature became commonplace in the central Arab lands 
around the 10th/16th-century although it is known to have been used prior to this time period as is 
attested by the inverted triangle colophon in ʿIlm al-Awliyāʾ, which dates from the 14th-century 
C.E. A second feature that helps us narrow the date for Kitāb al-Ḥikma is the semi-dotted script. 
This was a feature of Arab scribal culture during the Middle Islamic period when the inclusion of 
dots or diacritic marks was sometimes seen as a defect (ʿayb) or as an insult to the reader.588 This 
indicates that this witness to Kitāb al-Ḥikma was probably penned during the Mamluk period or 
early Ottoman period in Greater Syria (or possibly though unlikely Egypt) during the 14th- or 
15th-centuries C.E. Adam Gacek presents a semi-dotted handwriting specimen from the 14th-
century C.E. that is similar to the style of Kitāb al-Ḥikma found here.589 For Kitāb al-Ḥikma, the 
hand is barely pointed, rather casually with elongated, angled with a somewhat spread or 
flattened character (though curvilinear), especially with descenders such as the final Nūn, final 
Lām, final Kāf, final Sīn, final Shīn, etc. This, together with the form used for the initial Hāʾ, the 
sweeping shaqq on even the final Kāf, the free assimilation of some letters and pointing 
(especially final Hāʾ with preceding Rāʾ), and the lack of pointing for Yāʾ and Alif Maqṣūra 
suggest Greater Syria as an origin.590 The paper seems to indicate a later date than the 14th-
century C.E. with sometime in the 15th- or 16th-century C.E. as more likely. This is with the 
                                                          
587 Gacek, Adam. The Arabic manuscript tradition a glossary of technical terms and bibliography. 2001, p. 74. 
588 Ibid, p. 145. 
589 Ibid, p. 256. 
590 This analysis was provided by Evyn Kropf, an expert codicologist at the University of Michigan whom I 
consulted about the date and origin of Kitāb al-Ḥikma. 
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caveat that this assessment was done from a color scan of the manuscript and not through an 
examination of the actual manuscript. The note on the opening flyleaf does provide a rough 
terminus ante quem of 17 Dhū al-Qaʿda 1071 A.H. [ca. 14 July 1661]. Unfortunately, we do not 
have any substantial information concerning the transmission of the text other than the name of 
the patron, Khājuman Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad al-Shaykhānī. This is not likely the Jamāl al-Dīn 
Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī (d. 1119/1707) mentioned by Carl Brockelmann, 
since this would put the manuscript date later than our terminus ad quem, dating sometime from 
the late 17th- or early 18th-centuries C.E. 
 
The Relevance of Kitāb al-Ḥikma 
 In the Introduction to the dissertation we provided an overview of al-Tirmidhī’s major 
works. Kitāb al-Ḥikma comes under the rubric of works that discuss esoteric interpretation. 
Ḥikma is connected to the knowledge of metaphysical causes and how they connect to 
phenomena in the world. In this way ḥikma functions as a type of esotericism in which the ḥakīm 
interprets the esoteric meanings behind various acts of worship. As Kitāb al-Ḥikma shows us, 
ḥikma is much more than simple esotericism. It also relates to understanding human vices and 
the nuances of the soul’s passions. In this capacity the ḥakīm can guide spiritual novices through 
the various stages of spiritual attainment. Al-Tirmidhī likens the ḥakīm to a guide who helps 
others travel safely through the wilderness because this guide understands its many dangers and 
knows how to avoid them. Kitāb al-Ḥikma is the only book by al-Tirmidhī that solely addresses 
the knowledge-type of ḥikma (wisdom). In Kitāb Bayān al-ʿIlm, al-Tirmidhī clearly distinguishes 
between three types of knowledge, with ḥikma being the intermediate stage of knowledge 
between religious textual knowledge and maʿrifa (gnosis), which is a higher stage of knowledge 
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that is bestowed directly from God. The other books in the category of ‘esoteric interpretation’ 
deal with the application of ḥikma, while Kitāb al-Ḥikma deals with the nature of ḥikma itself. 
This is significant because it further supports the notion that the ḥukamāʾ belong to a category 
that is separate from the awliyāʾ (saints). This is a hypothesis argued in the dissertation that we 
find supported by Kitāb al-Ḥikma.  
  
The Ḥikma Genre 
 Most early Islamic texts that bear the name ḥikma are associated with both Shīʿism and 
its attendant fascination with Greek Neoplatonism. The Druze Kitāb al-Ḥikma, using the same 
name, immediately comes to mind as does the Rasāʾil al-Ḥikma of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā. The first 
of these two Ismāʿīlī texts was produced during the 11th-century C.E. in Fatimid Egypt. The 
second text is closer to al-Tirmidhī both temporally and geographically and reflects the 
developments of the vibrant cultural and intellectual milieu of 10th-century C.E. Iraq. Al-
Tirmidhī’s Kitāb al-Ḥikma does not exhibit the clear emanationist structure that we find in the 
previous two books. Al-Tirmidhī’s theology in Kitāb al-Ḥikma does not present God as an 
abstract principle, but rather as a personal and intentional God who plans the affairs in the world 
and intervenes in them directly through his creative fiat. Thus, while it would seem natural to 
connect al-Tirmidhī’s work to this later genre, we must realize that it is the product of a very 
different intellectual milieu. Al-Tirmidhī’s Kitāb al-Ḥikma draws its inspiration from the Ḥanafī 
theological movement that was active in eastern Khurāsān and Transoxania where al-Tirmidhī 
lived and wrote. It is in this Ḥanafī/Māturīdī discourse stream that we find another ḥikma 
tradition based primarily in Pythagorean notions of wisdom and influenced possibly by the 
Buddhist concept of non-duality. As we demonstrated in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, al-
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Tirmidhī’s understanding of the interplay between duality and non-duality is reflected in al-
Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. 
 One of the central themes in Kitāb al-Ḥikma is walāya and the connection between the 
ḥakīm (sage) and the walī (saint). Kitāb al-Ḥikma sets out to identify the knowledge of the ḥakīm 
within the larger context of walāya. The ḥakīm is one type of walī, but not the highest type. In 
both the Rasāʾil of al-Junayd as well as in Kitāb al-Ḥikma, the ḥakīm is styled as a ‘doctor of the 
soul’. Just as the medical doctor has knowledge of the various elements and how they connect to 
the body, so does the ḥakīm have knowledge of the states of the soul and its various maladies. 
The ḥakīm is someone who guides a novice through the treacherous path towards God. This is 
because the ḥakīm knows the ‘pathways’ to and from God. This discussion of the ḥakīm is the 
precursor to the idea of the Ṣūfī shaykh who is a doctor of the soul for his novices. Al-Junayd 
juxtaposes the ḥakīm to the scholar of outward knowledge (ʿālim) but does not contrast him to 
the walī. Al-Tirmidhī brings both the scholar of outward knowledge and the walī (saint) into his 
more developed gnoseology and thereby defines the ḥakīm. So, while ḥikma and the ḥakīm serve 
to frame walāya and the walī, the whole structure of al-Tirmidhī’s gnoseology also defines the 
role of the ḥakīm vis-à-vis both scholars of outward knowledge (ʿulamāʾ) and bona fide saints 
(awliyāʾ). Scholars who study al-Tirmidhī have interpreted him as being averse to the notion of 
discipleship. This is primarily based upon a letter he wrote to a correspondent from Rayy who 
asked him about keeping the company of a “man who you hope for increase from”. Al-Tirmidhī 
was responding to someone who asked him for spiritual advice concerning the keeping of 
company of someone who would help to increase his spiritual state. Al-Tirmidhī was negative 
about the proposition, advising the questioner to travel the path of maʿrifa (gnosis), not by 
seeking the creator (khāliq) through a creation (makhlūq), but rather to seek the creator (khāliq) 
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through the creator himself.591 Kitāb al-Ḥikma helps us to contextualize this answer to the 
questioner from Rayy because it is clear from Kitāb al-Ḥikma that al-Tirmidhī considered 
recourse to the ḥakīm as essential for the would-be aspirant who is requesting guidance while on 
the path that leads to God (al-ṭarīq ilā Allāh). We can better understand the ḥakīm if we 
contextualize him in terms of the Malāmtiyya, an important mystical movement in Khurāsān 
during al-Tirmidhī’s lifetime. We know that al-Tirmidhī was in conversation with the major 
proponents of this mystical approach. Al-Tirmidhī’s concept of the ḥakīm is very similar to the 
Malāmatī ‘master’ whose knowledge of the soul enabled him to train and guide aspirants in the 
Malāmtī doctrine that centered on ‘constant blame of the soul’. When al-Tirmidhī positions the 
bona fide saints (the highest form of awliyāʾ) above these ḥukamā, he is saying that there is a 
degree higher than the Malāmatī sage and that ‘the path of blame’ is one stage on the mystical 
path within his larger doctrine of walāya. Al-Tirmidhī’s notion of the ḥakīm (as juxtaposed to the 
walī) accords closely with the subsequent notion of the Ṣūfī shaykh. As Sufism progressed, a 
distinction between the Ṣūfī shaykh and the walī developed. While the novice to the Ṣūfī path 
should ideally see his shaykh as a walī, the Ṣūfī shaykh generally does not and cannot claim this 
rank. Of course, many Ṣūfī shuyūkh (pl. shaykh) have claimed the highest degrees of walāya, but 
theoretically speaking, this should be the exception rather than the rule. As we saw with the 
Shādhiliyya, the Ṣūfīs were more comfortable talking about ḥikma, which relates to the guidance 
of novices on a practical level, but doesn’t entail the claim of walāya. However, it is significant 
to note that in al-Qushayrī’s characterization of the master-disciple relationship, the Ṣūfī shaykh 
effectively becomes the walī for his immediate students with the caveat that the shaykh cannot be 
                                                          
591 Ibid. Drei Schriften, pp. 171–172. 
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 syas īhdimriT-la nehw lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni sesu īhdimriT-la taht gnidrow htiw sdrocca amkiḥ fo noitinifed sihT 295
 eH .sriaffa fo seitilaer neddih eht srevocnu taht thgil a si modsiw ,rūmu-la nūnkam naʿ fihskay nurūn amkiḥ-la taht
 rieht htob sriaffa fo semoctuo eht sees eh ,ahinyahs-aw ahinyaz rūmu-la biqāwaʿ āray ,egas eht taht syas osla
 .892 .p ,4 .lov ,ridāwaN .dibI .)semoctuo( lufemahs dna tnellecxe
 dīḥwat fo snoitacilpmi eht etagen ton seod īhdimriT-la ot gnidrocca )bābsa( tceffe dna esuac gnivresbO 395
 .221 .p ,7 .lov ,dibI .)ytinu s’doG gnimriffa(
 .733 .p ,6 .lov ,dibI .pihsrow rof sesu eno sbmil eht naem ot tālā sesu īhdimriT-la lūṣU-la ridāwaN nI 495
 ,dibI .lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni detaeper gnihtemos si )rrahs( live dna )ryahk( doog ekil setisoppo fo noitarapes ehT 595



















ّنيتيخذلنيّربي  ّكأنهّأشفقّعلىّنفسهّمنّرب هّوأعّإنأتضرعّ
ّعلىّنفسهّلصبصلاحّنفسهّمنّرب هّوهذاّشبيهّبمنزلةّشفقةّال
ّكنيّوكذلكهللىّنفسهّفهوّيقولّإنّلمّأتضر عّيأكثرّمنّشفقةّالأميرّع
ّالمملوكّوليس ّكذلكّالربّمعّالعبدّولكنّيعلمّالحكيمّأن ّرب هّمن
 
                                                          
 deyartrop si tehporP ehT .482 ,5 .lov :lūṣU-la ridāwaN ees )lahtam( ygolana )rīma( relur eht fo esu ralimis a roF 695




























                                                          
 selpmaxe erom roF .saedi sih etartsulli ot )lāhtma( seigolana fo esu evisnetxe s’īhdimriT-la fo elpmaxe na si sihT 795
-l-aw nāʾruQ-la nim lāhtmA-la koob sih ees gnikniht lacigolana ot hcaorppa sih dna seigolana s’īhdimriT-la fo
 rāD :arihāQ-la-alājjaF-la .hannus-l-aw bātiK-la nim lāhtmA-la .īlAʿ .b dammaḥuM ,īhdimriT-la mīkaḤ-lA .annuS
  .5791 .rṣiM taḍhaN
 ni seit pihsnik gniniatniam fo ecnatropmi eht no noissucsid s’īhdimriT-la ees mret siht fo esu ralimis a roF 895
  .823 .p ,2791 ridāwaN .dibI :lūṣU-la ridāwaN
 gninrecnoc noissucsid sih ni lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni ”noitavitca“ fo noisserpxe fo edom emas siht sesu īhdimriT-lA 995
 eht sdnammoc taht eno eht si sbmil eht fo redael eht sa traeh ehT .sbmil eht dna traeh eht neewteb pihsnoitaler eht













ّإذ ّكانّمرادّالرب  ّمنّالعبدّذلكّّإيجابهنقاذهّّوإبذلكّلمّيمنعهّمنّ
ّالسباعّّ006ومثلهّأيضا ّكملكّمشفقّعلىّعبدّلهّجاهلّصارّفيّأودية
ّبجهلهّوعلمّمولاهّأن ّفيهّهلاكهّودعاهّإلىّنفسهّوحذ رهّتلكّالأوديةّ





ّاّمولاهّأخرجهّبالسوطّمنّجهلهّلأن هّعرفّأن هّلمّيفعلّذلكّوإنم ّ
ّّتباركّثمّيجزيهّالخيرّمولاهّويكرمهّبكرمهّويقولّلهّنعمّماّصنعت ّكأنه
                                                          
 a ekil swolf ti taht yaw eht dna egdelwonk fo ecruos eht ebircsed ot )lahtam( ygolana ralimis a sesu īhdimriT-lA 006
 .13–03 .p ,2 .lov ,dibI .)ayidwa( syellav revir hguorht revir
 ,UN ees luos eht gninilpicsid ssucsid ot )lahtam( ygolana na fo trap sa )ṭwas( pihw eht fo esu s’īhdimriT-la roF 106














ّبّلذلكّوالرب  ّيمدحهّعلىّذلكّوهوّيفضيّبهّإلى ّكرامةّالّر
ّالفاعلّومثلهّأيضا ّكمثلّسي دّرأىّبعبدهّفيّواديّالهلاكّ
ّفوج هّإليهّداب ًةّوأقواماّوأمرهّأنّيركبّالداب ةّوأمرّاؤلائكّ











                                                          
 era slevel eerht eht fo dnoces eht dna lūṣU-la ridāwaN sih ni slevel cisab eerht emas eht stneserper īhdimriT-lA 206
 eht si sihT .)egareva era ohw esoht setonnoc osla ti ,htap elddim a trahc ohw esoht( nūdiṣatqum sa deziretcarahc




















ّفربم  اّأصابتهمّآفةّمنّقبلّذلكّوكدرّفيّماءهمّوتغير  ّلونهّإلاّأنّ
ّيحتالواّحتىّيصفواّوإنّاحتالواّفلاّيكونّصفاؤه ّكصفائهّحيثّ
ّمّالناظرونّإلىّالأسبابّالمقتصدونالسطحّوهُّّ406لمّينظف
                                                          
 lautir( sājna morf sfoor rieht deifirup puorg dnoces sihT .noitacifirup lautir ot ereh gnirrefer si īhdimriT-lA 306
 eht hguorht aʿīrahS eht fo noitatnemelpmi fo level eht stneserper sihT .seitirupmi raluger morf ton tub )seitirupmi
 .noitacifirup lautir fo selur fo noitatnemelpmi
 lautir ecniS .noitacifirup lautir tsuj ton dna esnes lareneg a ni noitacifirup tuoba gniklat si īhdimriT-la ereH 406
 dna noitacifirup lautir dnoyeb dna evoba noitacifirup fo mrof a stneserper ti laitnesse dna cisab erom si noitacifirup










ّئحّتصيبّالمستقيّفربم  اّسقطّعنهّثمّإن هّيكونّمنّالماءّوحلّوروا











                                                          
 ,)nīqay( ytniatrec fo level eht ta si ohw laudividni eht roF .lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni ygolonimret siht sesu īhdimriT-lA 506
 stceffe dna sesuac gniees ylno naht rehtar )bābsa-la bibbasum( stceffe dna sesuac fo rotaerc eht no sesucof eh
 .71 .p ,2791 ridāwaN .dibI .sevlesmeht
 ,lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni secnatsni elpitlum ni desu era )yyiḍra( lairtserret dna )yyiwāmas( laitselec mret ehT 606
 eht taht si ereh tniop tnatropmi ehT .)ḥūr( tirips eht dna )sfan( luos eht fo serutan tnereffid eht ebircsed ot yliramirp
 ,dibI .noitisoppo fo epyt ralucitrap a ebircsed ot īhdimriT-la yb desu si ,doirep emit sih rof erar elihw ,laitselec mret






















                                                          
 ehT .)pihsnoinapmoc( abḥus no noitces eht ni lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni yaw emas eht ni mret siht sesu īhdimriT-lA 706
-la ridāwaN ni desu si ti yaw eht dna ecnatsni siht ni revewoh ,”gninrut“ fo gninaem eht sah yllareneg bullaqat drow









ّنفسكّولاّتجعلّنفسكّبينكّوبينّربكّفتنظرّمنّنفسكّإلىّربك ّفبع د  ّ
ّىّنفسكّوقر بّرب كّولاّتجعلّبينكّوبينّربكّشيئاّفّتر


































                                                          
 ,naem ot lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni )tnemhsinup( abūquʿ dna )esnepmocer( abiqāʿ smret emas eht sesu īhdimriT-lA 806
 .dibI .efil txen eht ni snoitca s’eno rof tnemhsinup dna efil tneserp eht ni snoitca s’eno rof esnepmocer ,ylevitcepser






















                                                          
 ni yrogetac elddim eht era yehT .egdelwonk fo elpoep fo yrogetac tnatropmi na tneserper )ʾāmakuḥ( segas ehT 906
 egdelwonk drawtuo fo sralohcs eht era esehT .egdelwonk fo elpoep fo noisivid etitrapirt cisab s’īhdimriT-la
 ni detcelfer si noisivid cisab sihT .)ʾāyilwa ro ʾārabuk( stnias ro seno taerg eht dna )ʾāmakuḥ( segas eht ,)ʾāmaluʿ(
 segas eht fo noitcnuf eht īhdimriT-la roF .īhdimriT-la yb skrow rehto sa llew sa mlIʿ-la bātiK dna lūṣU-la ridāwaN
 setisoppo neewteb gnihsiugnitsid yb setisoppo eht fo ytilauq laitnesse eht dlohpu dna snoitcidartnoc evloser ot si
 .053 .p ,6 .lov ,UN ees )ʾāmakuḥ( segas eht fo egasu siht fo elpmaxe na roF .)dādḍa(
 ees thgisni dna luos eht gniniart ,pihsnamesroh neewteb noitcennoc eht dna mret siht fo esu s’īhdimriT-la roF 016




















ّيجر بهّولمّيعرفهّغيرّمت همّعندّمنّجر بهّوعرفهّالحكمةّمتهمّعندّمنّلمّ
                                                          
 naht rehto gninaem rahwaj mret eht fo esu eht skrow s’īhdimriT-la fo yna ni ees ew taht emit tsrif eht si sihT 116
 eht ot ylesolc erom ereh mrofnoc ot smees ereh rahwaj fo gninaem ehT .gninaem cibarA lanigiro sti ni ”meg“
 taht deton eb dluohs tI .yhposolihp citsinelleH ro keerG ni dootsrednu si ti sa ”ecnatsbus laitnesse“ fo gninaem
 .smialc niam sih fo eno retnuoc dluow sihT .yralubacov hcus yna esu ton did īhdimriT-la taht smialc ektdaR



























                                                          
613 Al-Tirmidhī uses the same analogy (mathal) in Nawādir al-Uṣūl of streams (jadāwil) leading to rivers (anhur) 
leading to seas (buḥūr) to explain the relative capacity of different types of individuals to carry the water (māʾ) of 
knowledge. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 30–31. 
614 We have seen the use of the image of a mine (maʿdan) used throughout al-Tirmidhī’s works, especially in 
relation to the ring analogy (mathal). The image of the mine is used to refer to the heart of the individual that can 
produce various types of gems and precious metals representing the meanings that occur to the heart from the 
unseen realm. 
615 Al-Tirmidhī represents wisdom (ḥikma) as light in Nawādir al-Uṣūl. Ibid, vol. 4, p. 298. This is contrasted to the 
ʿilm (knowledge) of the saints (awliyāʾ) which is related a direct experiencing of God through intimate colloquy 






















                                                          
 .582 .p ,5 .lov ,dibI .luos eht fo stiart rewol eht rof skrow s’īhdimriT-la ni rohpatem a sa desu era )bāʾihd( sevloW 616
 ālaʿ uhāynud alha rihsāʿuy liqāʿ-la :syas eh nehw lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni gnidrow ralimis yrev a sesu īhdimriT-lA 716
 snalp hāllA yaw eht ot gnidrocca dlrow sih fo elpoep eht gnoma sevil nosrep tnegilletni ehT ,hāllA rabbad ām






























                                                          
























                                                          
 eh sa metsys etelpmoc a sa ton dna yltceridni ylno tub lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni sromuh eht ot srefer osla īhdimriT-lA 916
 .tehporP eht yb detroppus era eseht taht gnitats ,ecneics dna enicidem fo ecnatropmi eht rof seugra eH .ereh seod
 .25 .p ,2791 ridāwaN .dibI
 setisoppo fo desopmoc sa dlrow eht fo weiv s’īhdimriT-la htiw tnetsisnoc si setisoppo sa sromuh eht gnieeS 026























                                                          
















ّتقبضّراحتهّعلى ّكلّمحسوسّأم ّكيفّيحتويّبطنهّعلى ّكلّمأكولّ
ّأم ّكيفّتطيقّمنخراهّجميع ّكلّرائحةّخلقتّأم ّكيفّتصلّلهاتهّإلىّ
ّمذاق ّكلّطعمّأم ّكيفّتطأّقدماه ّكلّموطئّقلبهّالضعيفّالذيّ
ّصغيرةّمتلاشيةّمنّماءّكو نّمنّمضغةّرخوةّمتبدلةّمتغيرةّحقيرةّ
ّمهينّمقدرةّتقديرّالغفرانّأبعدّعنّاستدراكّعلمّغيرّمقدرّولاّمحدود
                                                          
 fo htoB .noitcnujnoc esolc ni )segas( ʾāmakuḥ dna )sralohcs( ʾāmaluʿ smret eht sesu yltnetsisnoc īhdimriT-lA 226
 .ereh ecneuqes eht ni desu mret driht eht ,)stceletni ssessop ohw esoht( ʾālaquʿ eb ot deredisnoc era seirogetac eseht
 ni desaercni era ohw esoht eb ot yhcrareih lautirips eht ni rehgih era ohw esoht sredisnoc īhdimriT-la esuaceb si sihT
 .75 .p ,dibI .lqaʿ
 .42:03 ,76:61 ,21:61 ,4:31 ,461:2 nāʾruQ 326
 091:3 nāʾruQ 426
 ohw esoht rof nossel a“ ,rāṣba-la īlū-il natarabiʿ-al gnidaer tnereffid a tneserp sesrev esehT .44:42 ,31:3 nāʾruQ 526
 .”thgis renni evah
 .31:54 ,24:93 ,12:03 ,96:61 ,11:61 ,3:31 ,42:01 nāʾruQ 626






















                                                          
 .7:23 nāʾruQ ot ecnerefer a si sihT 826
 .511:32 nāʾruQ ot ecnerefer a si sihT 926
 .011:02 nāʾruQ ot ecnerefer a si sihT 036























                                                          
 woh sessucsid eh nehw lūṣU-la ridāwaN ni egaugnal emas eht gnisu aedi ralimis a sesserpxe īhdimriT-lA 236






















                                                          
 .63:34 :nāʾruQ 336
 .73:34 :nāʾruQ 436
 desserpxe aedi na si gnieb namuh eht fo )ʾādʿa( seimene eht esoppo taht )sārruḥ( sdraug era ereht taht aedi ehT 536
 )afirʿam( egdelwonk s’doG fo serusaert eht tcetorp yeht taht ni tnereffid era UN ni denoitnem sdraug ehT .UN ni
  .623–523 .pp ,2791 ridāwaN .dibI .seimene era ohw slived eht morf
 ,dibI .gnieb namuh eht fo seimene eht yb traeh eht fo lasuora eht ssucsid ot UN ni desu si ygolonimret emas sihT 636
 .623 .p
 .dibI .tehporP eht fo ayālaw eht ebircsed ot kcolf sih dna drehpehs eht fo lahtam emas eht sesu īhdimriT-lA 736
























                                                          
 modeerf neewteb noitcennoc eht tuoba noitatressid eht fo 1 retpahC ni dessucsid noitcennoc eht evah ew ereH 836















ّوألقّماّفيّيمينكّتلقفّّ146الأعلىن كّأنتّإلاّتخفّ بالغيبّإن ّاللهّقوي ّعزيز
ّتهاّالآيةّوإنّيمسسكّاللهّبضر  ّقولهّسّيرّإلىّ346قولهّأسمعّوأرىّفأتياهّإلىّ246اماّصنعّو
ّفي ّكلّطرفةّعينّّ546[   ]ّأنتّمضطرّإلىّ446الرحيمفلا ّكاشفّلهّإلاّهوّإلىّقولهّ










                                                          
 .7:74 :nāʾruQ 936
 .rehto hcae elbmeser htob yeht ecnis tnedicca yb ylbaborp tsom nāʾruQ eht fo sesrev owt sdnelb īhdimriT-lA 046
 .52:75 dna 04:22 era esehT
 .86:02 :nāʾruQ 146
 .96:02 :nāʾruQ 246
 .74–64:02 :nāʾruQ 346
 .701:01 :nāʾruQ 446






















                                                          
 a ot )naigoloeht( millakatum eht snekil dna )ygoloeht( mālaK sezicitirc ihdimriT-la erehw fo elpmaxe na si sihT 646


























ّمحشو ةّبالآفةّأماّعلمتّأن هّينبغيّللمتكل مّّ846لعظمتهّوكلاهماّمضرةّبالحكمة
ّنظرهّإليهّواستخراجّالكلامّمنّعندهّّإذاّابتلىّفاضطر  ّإليهّأنّيكون
 
                                                          
 .mālaK fo msicitirc rehtruf stneserper sihT 746

















ّماّيستحقهّبعظمتهّوتعرفهّبحكمتهّوكلّماّأوصيتكّّ[   ]ّهذاّالمقدارّمن






                                                          
 si evitcepsrep sihT .ecitsuj sih fo tuo eb dluow ti neht eno ekasrof ot doG erew taht setats īhdimriT-la ereH 946























                                                          
 sih fo sretpahc eht fo enO .krowemarf lacitsym s’īhdimriT-la ni tnatropmi si )abḥus( pihsnoinapmoc fo cipot ehT 056



































































                                                          
 era )alluhg( sevals larutlucirga ro mraf ehT .sevals fo sepyt fo noitarugifnoc emas eht sesu īhdimriT-la UN nI 156






















                                                          
 .623 .p ,dibI :UN ees )qibā( evals yawanur eht fo ygolana ralimis eht roF 256















































                                                          
 .411:02 :nāʾruQ 456
 .441:2 :nāʾruQ 556
 .79:51 :nāʾruQ 656
 .11:42 :nāʾruQ 756






















                                                          
 .p ,2791 ridāwaN .dibI .UN s’īhdimriT-la ni amkiḥ fo tcepsa tnatropmi na deredisnoc si )abirjat( noitnemirepxE 956
  .422































































































                                                          
 fo rettimsnart rojam a gnieb mih fo tnuocca no ”egaS ehT“ ro mīkaḥ-la sa hibbanuM .b bhaW seltit īhdimriT-lA 166























                                                          


















ّكانتّإليهاّوكلّواحدّهم هّفيهاّمقدارّأمورهّوحوائجه ّكما ّكانتّحوائج
ّهاّإن ّكانتّمنّأهلّالخدمةموسىّإلىّعصاهّواللهّأعلمّفهوّمدعو  ّإلىّإلقائ
ّويكلفّالتحولّمنّمقدارهّإلىّمقدارّمولاهّفإذاّألقاهاّرأىّفيّإلقائه
  ّ
                                                          
 ”.dna drawrof emoc“ ,aw libqa si esrev siht morf gnissiM 366
 .13:82 :nāʾruQ 466
























                                                          






















                                                          




















































































































































































ّلإسرافكّعليهّفإنيّلاّأخافّأنّيباددنيّشيءّفألبس  ّلباسّالذل  ّوالتواضع
ّوتكّأناّالذيبقلاّولاّبطشّيفوتنيّلحيلتكّأوّيستغنيّولاّتقدر  ّلهّإ
ّأدب رّالأمرّوأفص لّالآياتّمالكّالملوكّأوتيّالملكّمنّأشاءّوأنزعّالملك
ّمِنّأشاءّوأعز  ّمنّأشاءّوأذل  ّمنّأشاءّبيديّالخيرّإنيّعلى ّكلّشيءّقدير
ّماّأفتحّللناسّمنّرحمةّفلاّمِسكّلهاّوماّأمسكّفلاّمرسلّمنّبعدي
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ّبر دّاللهّعينكّفيماّفس رواّالقر  ّبالبردّفي ّكلامّالعربّوإنماّدعواّبهذا



































                                                          












ّوفتحّلهّطريقّمعرفةّالقد وسّالظاهرّالعليّالعظيمّفلاّيقدرّأنّيتمى   ّالمنازل
ّالطاهرةّأوّيسألّذلكّأوّيزاولهّاستحياءّمنّاللهّتعالىّوإجلالا
ّعنّأنّيكونّهوّيصلحّمعّأقذارهّأنّينالّمنهّهذهّالمنزلةّأوّيكونّأهلاّلها



















ّالعبادّبهاّوكيفّابتلاهمّوكيفّحو لهمّوكيفّقل بهمّوشت تهمّوصن فهم
ّقلبهّمنّهيبةّعظمتهّوجلالةّفيورثهّذلكّخوفاًّمنهّوجلالاًّحتىّيمتلئّ
ّوإشفاقاًّعلىّنفسهّوضرعةّإليهّوتواضعاًّثمّيرجعّبذلكّالنظرّإلىّالمبتلي
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ّةّاليقينّبالم   ّوالربّوصفاتهوبسببهّالوجوبّفإنّحاجتكّإلىّمباشّر
ّعلىّحقائقهّوصدقهّفاللهّالمعينّولاّترضّلنفسكّعملّالعبادّمعّنور
ّاليقينّوالتصديقّوذلكّإنماّينصرّبفضلّاللهّمن ّكانّمنهّفارغاّمنّالشغل
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Chabbi, Jacqueline. “Remarques sur le développement historique des mouvements ascétiques et  
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